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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the linkage between ontology and politics in Spinoza, 
and considers the extent to which his philosophy discloses novel materialist 
conceptions of nature, history and society. It explores the distinctive paradigm of 
the individual proposed by Spinoza emerging from his materialist ontology, and 
the ways in which this impacts effectively upon the constitution of the multitude 
as a political category. Arguing that Spinoza’s ontology unveils a complex 
process of vital and psychic individuation, I develop a contemporary 
interpretation of Spinoza’s writings through Simondon’s notions of collective 
being, disparation, emotions and transindividuality. The study of Spinoza’s 
ontology in the light of Simondon is crucial for re-considering the central role of 
affectivity within the development of human beings. This refers to the redefinition 
of affectivity as a powerful source of psychic and political individuation, which is 
the cornerstone of relation, power and transformations. The understanding of 
Spinoza’s process of affective and collective individuation constitutes the basis 
for analysing his political theory.  
The inquiry focuses to the emergence of the political status of the 
multitude from this complex process of collective and affective individuation, and 
considers the extent to which the multitude impacts concretely upon the realm of 
the political. Specifically, the discussion draws attention to the affective state of 
the multitude, and the ways in which this produces fundamental relational events, 
meanings, power and problematic political individuals. The argument then turns 
to examine the model of democracy proposed by Spinoza and the role of the 
multitude within the constitution of the democratic body. It sheds light on the 
pivotal part played by the multitude within the production of democracy, and 
investigates the interface between affectivity and democracy more broadly. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abbreviations and Translations 
 
The translation adopted is Spinoza B, (2002), Complete Works, 
(Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company) [trans. S. 
Shirley]. 
 
References to Spinoza’s texts follow the abbreviations shown below:  
 
E =  Ethics 
TTP = Theologico-Politicus Tractatus (Theological-Political Treatise) 
TP = Politicus Tractatus (Political Treatise) 
EP = Epistles 
 
References to the Ethics follow the conventions indicated below:   
prop. = Proposition 
dem. = Demonstration 
schol. = Scholium 
Def. = Definition 
ax. =axiom 
postul. = postulate 
Def. Aff = the definition of the affects at the end of Part III.  
Roman numerals before these abbreviations describe the parts of the 
Ethics.  
 
References to the TTP include chapter and page number. References 
to the TP contain chapter followed by the paragraph. Page number of the 
TTP and TP refer to Shirley’s translation (2002). In chapters III and IV I 
have adopted the following rule of capitalisation of the terms. Conceptual 
personae are named and cited in capital letters- e.g., the Apostles, the 
Devotees of the prophet, the Subjects of Moses and the Citizens of 
democracy. For the capitalisation of conceptual personae, I refers to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s style (1994).  
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Introduction 
 
Understanding the social through Spinoza’s philosophy: New directions in 
contemporary political theory 
 
There is an unexplored political reality alongside the recognised body 
politic: a political reality that articulates various commonalities, new gestures of 
insurgence and cohesion. It is situated in the zones of intersection between 
authorised and non-authorised places for political praxis and thought such as the 
state, public and civil spheres, the market and the body of law, and its political 
strategy is constructed around an alternative paradigm of relation. This paradigm, 
and the constitutive power to which it corresponds, does not originate from 
tensions between extant social forms, such as the inequality and rivalry between 
social groups, but rather from their action and thought, which exceeds the fixity of 
social, political and economic class. 
Although not identified within consolidated models of society, the 
emerging subjectivities that arise from this political reality are extremely 
productive of meaning, knowledge and power, and impact concretely upon our 
socio-political context. These subjectivities have actualised a fracture between the 
political and politics, between the philosophy of praxis and real action, and 
between society and community. It is to the political cogency of this unrecognised 
reality that this thesis draws particular attention. The focus is to re-construct a 
novel materialist paradigm of the political field from the plenitude of actions, 
thoughts, and relational forces embodied by this other political actuality. My aim 
is to re-locate the centrality of a materialist ontology of individuation within 
contemporary political theory and philosophy. A materialist thought of 
individuation, I argue, might provide our search with crucial theoretical 
instruments for re-constructing the anatomy of the social from the zones of 
intersection indicated above.  
The study of the theme of individuation is conducted by examining the 
ontology and politics of seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and 
determines through his categories of thought the political stakes of contemporary 
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forms of association. Attention is given to Spinoza’s affective and political 
process of individuation, and the extent to which his thesis might offer a more 
innovative account of the material process that lies at the very basis of every 
community. The focus on Spinoza’s theory of individuation introduces a new 
awareness of the relation between affectivity and politics, the genesis of mass 
movement and the meaning of democracy. I refer to an extensive understanding of 
the political role of affectivity within the construction of democracy and the 
constitution of the multitude as a powerful individual. It is to this linkage between 
affectivity and politics, I claim, that contemporary theories of democracy and 
community should pay greater attention.  
The return to Spinoza’s philosophy advanced here is situated within the 
general tendency inaugurated by continental thought, which has proposed re-
founding the paradigm of the political through its conclusion within the 
ontological field. The resurgence of interest in ontology within continental 
discourse derives from the recognition of the increasing level of complexity of 
society, which has revealed the inadequacy of our political tools. In order to 
establish the guidelines of the present research project, and in order to thereby 
explain the role of Spinoza’s philosophy within contemporary thought, I shall 
delineate the intellectual milieu from which this thesis originates. It is thus to a 
discussion of the main themes developed by contemporary continental thought 
that I now turn.      
 
A detour of politics via ontology   
 
In order to politically conceptualise contemporary forms of association, 
continental political thought, variously named post-modern and post-structuralist, 
has claimed an alliance between politics and ontology. Continental political 
philosophy has sought the support of certain ontological categories of thought, 
firstly, for understanding the meanings and potentialities introduced within the 
existing political context by these heterogeneous subjectivities; and secondly, for 
determining the extent to which these subjectivities act and think politically. 
Ontology, as we will discuss below, sheds light on the constitutive elements, 
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which permeate the equilibrium of the political reality of the present regardless of 
whether this is presumed as political or not.  
The discovery of the importance of the linkage between ontology and 
politics within continental political philosophy derives from a more general 
discussion within certain currents of post-Marxist thought, which has denounced 
the crises of the materialist paradigm and the philosophy of praxis. That paradigm, 
and indeed that philosophy should be based on a more extensive account of the 
structure of the material world; an account that should re-explain the impact of the 
latter upon human actions and thoughts. A re-consideration of these themes is 
central for re-defining the materialist notion of production and the types of 
relation that can be developed from it. Althusser’s preoccupation with the poverty 
of the twentieth-century paradigm of materialism occupies a central position 
within the development of contemporary materialist conceptions of philosophy, 
politics and history. He poses the urgency of re-signifying the Marxist paradigm 
of materialism, which has been corrupted by certain orthodox readings.  
The central problems of these orthodox readings, Althusser observes, is 
the vision of the world as a place of mechanical rules and opposing forces, within 
which social relations are conditioned by the economic mechanism. This 
generates constantly dominant and dominated individuals, ideas and behaviours, 
which are moulded by the dialectical logic of conflict and lack. By contrast, 
reality progresses throughout a variety of unexpected events developed in the 
absence of ‘contradiction’. Phenomena of struggle and solidarity, Althusser 
recognises, proceed through a more complex interaction between the structure and 
the superstructure, within which a variety of unsuspected events such as 
imagination and desires play a role in the construction of political identities. Thus, 
it becomes crucial to articulate alternative questions that are shaped by two 
factors: firstly, the reality of human beings as unique combinations of materiality 
and imagination; secondly, the necessity of looking through the structure of the 
universe as a confluence of heterogeneous phenomena, and not exclusively as a 
mass of struggles between forces (Althusser, 1976: 126-132; 2005: 89-128).
1
 
                                                 
1
 Althusser in the later writings (1978-87) would refer to Epicurus’s notions of clinamen and 
atoms, which derive from Heraclites’s naturalist ontology, see Althusser (2006: 163-205).   
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In this light, even ideology, which expresses the power of a social class 
under a specific economic juncture, unveils, in Althusser’s re-interpretation, a 
more problematic mechanism, which does not only produce the alienation and 
exploitation of individuals’ needs and the preservation of the ruling class. 
Ideology essentially controls individuals through the reinforcement and 
encouragement of imaginary practises. In order to preserve and further develop 
the ideological apparatus of the state, the dynamics of the imaginary structure of 
individuals acquires a strategic role. Imagination has the power of creating social 
relations, common beliefs and collective desires, which forms political meaning, 
identity and cohesion (Althusser, 1971: 142-177). For Althusser, our awareness of 
the political relevance of these heterogeneous and contingent factors, through 
which the apparatus of the state is defended, will certainly open new possibilities 
for a philosophy of praxis, or will at the very least make the sovereign authority of 
the state less inescapable.    
Following Althusser’s preoccupations, continental political thought has re-
constructed the anatomy of the material world, and considered the many ways in 
which this transforms individuals. Strictly speaking, if the paradigm of 
materialism has to be re-formulated, it is only through the re-shaping of our 
knowledge of the material world itself that novel materialistic conceptions of 
history, society and politics might be articulated. As the world is not a motionless 
system of physical phenomena, and as it affects human action and thought in 
multiple ways, its study requires more complex categories of thought. These 
should determine the mode in which the material forces of production generate 
political gestures and relations. This renewal of interest in the structure of the 
sensible world has brought about, as mentioned before, the discovery of ontology 
as powerful theoretical ground, through which a more complex materialist 
conception of nature and its system of production might come to light.  
The continental political gesture of resituating politics within ontology for 
re-framing the materialist field and philosophy of praxis has involved not only the 
re-foundation of political discourse; in addition, it also has posed the problem of 
the re-configuration of the domain of ontology itself. If politics alone can no 
longer offer defensible materialist premises, because individuals have been split 
11 
 
into political and non political areas and opposing classes, then ontology, as it has 
been traditionally considered, is not directly related to materialism either. For the 
conspicuous part of Western philosophy from Plato onwards, with minor 
exceptions, ontology has generally been included within the domain of 
metaphysics.  
In classical metaphysics, ontological arguments concerned the 
investigation of the nature of God or Being. Ontology was treated as a subset of 
metaphysics concerned with the proofs of the existence of God, Being and nature, 
which investigates the first cause of the universe, the generation of matter and the 
relation between human being, nature and Being. Ontological analysis was mostly 
understood as a search for the ultimate principles beyond (meta) the universe 
(physiká), which attributes to the material world the status of the lower genera 
(particularly in neo-Platonic and Scholastic traditions of thought). Given the 
abstract objects examined by ontology, its categories such as substance, matter, 
thought, becoming and individuation came to connote mostly transcendent 
meanings. As a result, these have been adopted as theoretical tools by Idealistic 
philosophies, which postulate a qualitative distinction between matter and 
thought, nature and Being. This led to the discharge of ontology from any possible 
association with materialist theories, philosophies of praxis, and, above all, 
politics. In this respect, the Marxist formulation of historical materialism is 
exemplary.    
By contrast, the novelty of the continental political move lies precisely in 
two fundamental retreats, which inaugurate a different approach to political 
theory, philosophy and society. Firstly, the retreat of the political from politics, 
which I have indicated above, and which I will discuss further; secondly, the 
withdrawal of ontology from metaphysics, and thus from Idealist appropriations. 
The recovery of ontology from metaphysical themes involves the affirmation of 
the autonomy of ontology, and, importantly, its return to the original Ancient 
Greek meaning rooted within pre-Socratic thought. For pre-Socratic philosophy in 
particular, ontology is a search through and only within the order of nature, which 
investigates the unseen potentialities and forces of matter. A ‘naturalistic’ 
approach explores the relation and interaction between different forces and 
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elements in nature, through which complex and heterogeneous individuals are 
developed. The importance of this way of thinking ontology, for contemporary 
political reflections, resides upon its treatment of nature as a powerful organism, 
which generates beings through relational movements and confluences, and not 
through a mechanism of opposing forces. The materialist ontology of the pre-
Socratic form of naturalism opens the way to thinking nature as a productive body 
characterised by exchanges of elements and various potentialities. 
Taking into account these themes, the return to ontology within political 
theory – or, better, the political ‘detour’ taken via ontology – constructs a novel 
path toward the reconfiguration of the political realm, and also a re-consideration 
of the many ways in which heterogeneous parts of reality activate political 
relations, individuals and actions in the absence of conflicts. It provides 
alternative categories of thought and brings forth the possibility of understanding 
the political relevance of the contemporary subjectivities lying between political 
and non political zones, ruling and ruled classes, and of re-thinking politics 
beyond boundaries.  
For continental political thought, the idea of society as a mere assemblage 
of parts – an assemblage derived from the stipulation of a contract between self-
independent and rational individuals – is untenable (see for example, Hardt and 
Negri, 2006; Deleuze and Guattari 2004a). Building upon Marx’s lesson of the 
critique of classical liberalism (Marx 1990: 279-280), for whom the latter covers 
under the illusion of equality a deeper set of productive relations and inequalities, 
beside the different theoretical positions taken, thinkers such as Balibar (1994), 
Deleuze, Guattari (2004a, b), Foucault (1998), Nancy (1991), Badiou (2002), 
Agamben (1998, 2000), Hardt and Negri (2000, 2006) argue that society has to be 
thought as a complex process; where elements such as language, body and 
emotions ground political relations and, at the same time, are consistently affected 
by political institutions such as the state, laws and right. In other words, relations 
once posited are already political and political bodies, once affirmed, immediately 
invade the alleged private sphere. Therefore, the enquiry into the realm of the 
political cannot avoid the deep analysis of its ontological foundation, which sheds 
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light on the relational movements and forces involved within the production of 
common meanings, collective desires and actions.  
More rigorously, the investigation of the political cogency of the powerful 
subjectivities of the present has to be conducted contemporaneously with the 
ontological quest, through which alternative avenues for politics and society, in a 
materialist way, might be disclosed. This linkage between ontology and politics 
has brought about, on the one hand, the re-discovery of the political implications 
of ontological categories such as immanence and transcendence, each of which 
connotes a different political scenario; on the other, this detour of politics via 
ontology has generated the ontologization of certain political notions such as the 
state, sovereignty, right and community, thereby introducing a more extensive 
account of the mode through which politics forms and pervades every aspect of 
human life.  
This thesis operates within the context of this multifaceted and almost 
labyrinthine debate, which has been nurtured within continental political thought. 
The thesis is precisely situated within the common quest to attain a novel 
vocabulary for politics through recourse to a materialist ontology, and brings into 
the present debate further and alternative issues. It focuses on the relevance – both 
political and ontological – of the notion of individuation, and considers the extent 
to which the latter’s usage within political theory and philosophy provides a 
multisided account of the material conditions through which biological, political 
and psychic individuals are generated.     
 
Reading Spinoza in the light of Simondon’s ontology of individuation  
 
This thesis is constructed around a fundamental problem of great concern, 
which arises from the continental political portrait of the material world as 
abundant and productive, and as a locus within which phases of both conflict and 
correspondence form important political behaviours. Given the multifaceted 
description of reality, the central question that accompanies this project concerns 
what paradigm of the individual emerges from this conception of the world? 
Strictly speaking, how do we think the realm of the individual in a materialist 
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way? Without addressing these questions, I believe, political and ontological 
analysis cannot proceed any further. A consideration of individuation will 
however engage with these issues.  
An enquiry into the notion of individuation, I argue in the pages below, 
becomes extremely crucial in this specific cultural and historical juncture. What is 
at stake here is literally the re-learning of the individual after the collapse of the 
influential ethical and political paradigms of Liberalism and Marxism, and 
thereby re-building, from and through these ruins, a fresh notion of the individual. 
In other words, if the re-formulation of the realm of the political requires the 
support of ontological categories, the re-definition of the individual requires more 
extensive and problematic ontological argumentation. A theory of individuation 
aims at the discovery of the fundamental conditions of possibility and uniqueness 
of an individual, and also establishes the relation of an individual with its milieu, 
whether natural, political or psychic. The importance of returning to a thought of 
individuation resides in its political implications. More rigorously, the main 
objects of a philosophy of individuation are situated in the middle of ontological 
and political domains. 
In twentieth-century continental philosophy, the theme of individuation 
has nurtured a fecund debate, which has brought about the need for re-shaping our 
knowledge of the relation between the individual and the material world. Figures 
and groups as diverse as Merleau-Ponty, Lacan and the Frankfurt school have, in 
different ways, all cast doubt on the validity of accepted definitions of 
individuality such as the self, will and egoism. Accordingly, these formulas do not 
exhaustively explain the role of the others and the milieu within the genesis of the 
individual. Rather, they situate the peculiarity of an individual within obscure 
forces and egoist drives, and consider its genesis somewhat detached from the 
external world and from other beings (human beings or not). This tendency has 
crucial political implications. As the genesis of the individual is understood 
independent from its context, the relation with others is conceived not as a 
constitutive moment of individuation itself but rather as a function which 
regulates the common life of individuals already formed. This has caused the 
undervaluation of the cogency of an ontology of individuation for the 
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development of new materialist notions of community, relation, and more 
generally, for the philosophy of praxis.  
Building upon the twentieth-century continental orientation, our 
hypotheses are based on the necessity of the conception of individuation today, 
and the impossibility of its abandonment from contemporary materialist analyses 
and theories of community. The argument that I will develop throughout this 
thesis is principally the priority of reinstating the notion of individuation within 
politics and philosophy. This entails viewing the theme of individuation as an 
investigation into a process that is at once both one and multiple, and which 
generates not only specific historical human beings and society but also more 
complex phenomena, such as temporality and life. Understanding individuation as 
a process means recognising how apparently distinct events and individuals, such 
as political community and psychic gestures, are instead expressions of a 
heterogeneous confluence of forces, intensities and movements. In this way, the 
ontology of individuation might contribute to a knowledge of the mechanisms 
through which factors such as language, knowledge, body, emotions and 
imagination are equally constitutive sources of individuation.  
In looking to recover the theme of individuation within contemporary 
materialist discourse I have discovered powerful arguments in the seventeenth-
century philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza proposes an innovative materialist 
conception of the individual, and develops this through an intricate linkage of 
ontological themes and political analysis. In Spinoza’s theory of the individual, 
the ontological enquiry proceeds contemporaneously with the political reflections. 
This means that ontological claims found political notions, and that political 
theses are instrumental in thinking ontological categories of thought. The 
understanding of how political conceptions are supported by ontological 
categories and vice versa in Spinoza’s philosophy constitutes the basis for 
delineating his paradigm of materialism and the meaning of the individual. 
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Re-thinking the individual in a Spinozist way 
  
Taking these themes into account, the thesis explores the ontological and 
political process of individuation offered by Spinoza, and considers the extent to 
which his treatment of the theme of individuation introduces novel materialist 
conceptions of history, politics, nature and society. This is articulated principally 
in the Ethics, and is developed further in the political Treatises. In the Ethics, 
nature, conatus, the physics of the body and the theory of affects ground 
Spinoza’s process of vital and psychic individuation; whereas in the political 
writings the vision of society as the expression of a collective and natural act of 
desire, the definition of the body politic as a mens una, the equality between 
natural and civil rights, the category of the multitude and the advocacy for 
democracy, all actualise and further expand the process of individuation 
commenced in the Ethics.  
In order to examine the richness of Spinoza’s theory of individuation, and 
in order to thus analyse its relation with politics, I have adopted an alternative 
strategy of reading Spinoza’s philosophy from the Ethics to the political Treatises. 
Following and developing Balibar’s ideas (2002: 103-147), I have decided to 
investigate Spinoza’s thought through the ontology of individuation of Gilbert 
Simondon (2007). Two main reasons have motivated this recourse to Simondon’s 
ontology. The principal reason is that I have become concerned with Spinoza’s 
complex paradigm of the individual, which includes the notions of the body and 
affectivity. Spinoza offers a vision of the human being centred on a conative 
desire of striving and persevering into life, which organises both the activities of 
the mind and body. This force is constantly enriched by an endless production of 
affects, ideas and bodily movements.  
These affects and bodily movements are shaped by a great variety of 
exchanges of power with other individuals and the world. Even affects, 
considered in themselves, seem to lie between the individual subject and the 
object, and to bring the two into a more complex relation. Furthermore, the body, 
which is defined in the Ethics as the primary locus of knowledge, is presented as a 
multifaceted domain, and its power is said to consist in the different confluences 
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of movements and interactions with other individuals by which it is progressively 
moulded. As a result, the account of the human individual that emerges from this 
is characterised by a form of collective nature. An enquiry into these notions is 
imperative for conceptualising the status and role of the multitude within 
Spinoza’s political thought. 
As noted above, the complexity of the themes involved within Spinoza’s 
philosophy has led my enquiry to seek the support of Simondon’s ontology of 
individuation. The recourse to Simondon has been crucial for determining how in 
Spinoza’s thought this collective tendency of the individual does not imply the 
denial of its uniqueness, but rather the affirmation of its powerful status within the 
world; furthermore, and most importantly, in terms of political theory this brings 
Spinoza to the centrality of the multitude as a collective individual within the 
development historical and political processes.   
The presence of these aspects within Spinoza’s philosophy alone 
constitutes a sufficient reason for attempting the novel approach of using 
Simondon’s ontology of individuation here. Yet, there are further important 
elements, which make my intervention more pertinent. These stem from the 
different portrayals of Spinoza’s thought – each of which is possessed of differing 
alliances and affinities – that can be found within the two principal traditions of 
philosophical thought: namely, the analytic and the continental schools. Besides 
reciprocal influences and points of convergences that have recently been 
developed, these two traditions have formulated two really distinct exegeses of 
Spinoza’s ontology and politics. The analytic interpretation presents Spinoza as 
radical exponent of seventeenth-century rationalist tradition, and considers the 
centrality of his theories of the mind and knowledge to his ontology. The 
continental approach inscribes Spinoza’s thought within a distinct materialist 
tradition next to pre-Socratic naturalist philosophy, Nietzsche and Marx, and 
assumes materiality, nature and affectivity to be the cornerstones of Spinoza’s 
philosophical project.  
From these re-elaborations of Spinoza’s ontology, two diverse 
understandings of Spinoza’s political thought follow. For the analytic school, 
Spinoza’s political model is centred on ideals of self-mastery, profit and egoist 
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individualism. For the continental wave of thought, Spinoza’s political theses 
provides a theory of and for the emancipation of the masses from an ideological 
state; a theory that ultimately aims at the supremacy of the community and the 
collective enjoyment of freedom. These different portrayals have led my enquiry 
to propose a third way of reading Spinoza, that is, through Simondon’s category 
of thought; a third way that might advance contemporary Spinozist interpretations 
and open towards novel trajectories.  
  The importance of Simondon’s philosophy of individuation for our 
investigation resides, first of all, on his central preoccupation with understanding 
the process of individuation as a means towards thinking the individual; a 
preoccupation that guides his entire project. For Simondon, the conditions of 
uniqueness and possibility of an individual are not to be found through a 
deductive method that moves from the already individualised being to its 
constitutive process. Rather, the peculiarity of an individual derives from a more 
general process of individuation, which inheres within the vital and psychic 
production process of nature-Being. It is in this general process that the distinctive 
features and relevance of an individual emerge. 
Simondon’s focus on the priority of determining the process before the 
individual leads him to affirm the bond between the forming individual and its 
milieu, the collective field. The collective field, which is shaped by energies, 
heterogeneity and potentials, is the only condition of individuation, without which 
both the individual and the process itself cannot take place. The centrality of the 
collective being involves bringing attention back to the significance of relation for 
the development of the individual. Simondon attributes to relationality an 
ontological status, and presents it as the source of the process of individuation. 
This brings about the discovery of relationality as a fundamental element of vital 
and psychic transformations, which pervades the entire system of production, and 
thus not only the human being. There is a process of individuation here, insofar as 
there are relational events and movements. This suggests that beings and the 
collective field are all relational by nature. 
 As emotions are the most powerful mediators of relations, Simondon 
attributes to them the role of differentiating beings into more problematic psychic 
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individuals. Emotions, Simondon claims, do not pass from one individual to the 
other: rather, they are located precisely in the collective field. From this complex 
process of collective and psychic individuation, the peculiarity of the individual is 
its being always in the middle between generality and singularity, potentiality and 
actuality. The individual, Simondon tell us, is profoundly disparate: it is in 
constant excess of an undifferentiated and individualised mass of power. The role 
played by the ontological structure of the individual within the development of 
this process is crucial and manifold. The individual becomes, in Simondon’s 
analysis, the theatre and protagonist of the process of individuation; a figure that 
poses and at the same time solves a problem of an excess of heterogeneity within 
the system. 
These are the main notions that have accompanied my enquiry into 
Spinoza’s ontology and politics. Studying Spinoza’s philosophy in the light of 
Simondon has been decisive particularly for re-considering the theory of 
affectivity examined in the Ethics, which has brought about the discovery of the 
role of affects and passions as the ground of relational phases of psychic and 
political individuation. An awareness of this process is crucial for understanding 
Spinoza’s political thought, and specifically for the constitution of the multitude 
as a proper political category and its role within the realisation of democracy. It is 
precisely in this context that the role of affectivity becomes the cornerstone of 
crucial political gestures. Affectivity sets in motion a series of relational 
movements, which bring into the existing domain a new order of flows of time, 
life and problems. Put differently, affectivity is the generative source of the 
production of the ‘common’, which lies at the very heart of any forming and 
existing community. As the expression of affectivity and passions, the multitude 
becomes the protagonist, sometime manifest and sometimes latent, of Spinoza’s 
political quest. Thus, the understanding of the process through which affectivity 
produces meanings, relations and actions, is the only condition for thinking the 
multitude in a Spinozist way.  
The multitude does not only mean a composite political individuality that 
differs from the categories of people, mass and citizen. It is rather a place and, at 
the same time, a constitutive element of the production of the political. The 
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central role given by Spinoza to the affective status of the multitude is essential 
for considering the political stakes of his democratic theory. It is the affective and 
powerful life in common of the multitude that guides Spinoza’s enquiry into 
democracy; and it was through this that he recognised the impossibility of 
thinking democracy as a fixed model of state alongside monarchy, aristocracy and 
tyranny. If democracy according to Spinoza is the greater expression of human 
living in common, then it has to be thought as a pure open plane, which 
essentially means a complex and collective body nuanced by a variety of affects 
such as love, joy, fear and hatred. In this light, our awareness of the linkage 
between the multitude, affects and democracy, I believe, might open unexplored 
avenues for re-conceptualising democracy today, which should be able to embrace 
at once all the actual and forming political individuals lying in the interstices of 
the social domain.  
In order to develop my reading of Spinoza’s philosophy through 
Simondon’s ontology of the individual I have structured my arguments in the 
following way. In chapter I,  I have critically investigated the reception of the 
Ethics within contemporary Spinozist studies, and considered the model of 
materialism presented within his ontology. Attention has been given to the 
interpretations of Spinoza’s ontology within the analytic and continental 
perspectives. The discussion draws upon the ways in which these two schools 
have treated the status of materiality and its relation with thought within Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. From the analysis of these interpretations, I have introduced the 
position followed in the thesis as a whole and defined the meaning of materialism 
attributed to Spinoza. It entails an anomalous process of production. It is a 
process because the role of the attributes comes closer to those of phases and 
moments, which bring changes into the system that in turn actualise and 
differentiate its exiting equilibrium. It is anomalous because elements of 
contingency coexist within the general order of necessity. Ultimately, it is a 
process of production, because Spinoza defines the essence of Substance as pure 
power, which suggests the idea of an endless activity, folding and unfolding  the 
actual world. These arguments set the conceptual ground of Spinoza’s process of 
individuation analysed in chapter II.  
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Chapter II analyses Spinoza’s process of the collective and affective 
individuation via Simondon’s philosophy. The attention is given to Spinoza’s 
materialist conception of the individual based on the view of the power of the 
affects and the collective dimension of both the individual and the generative 
system. Chapters III and IV discuss the political implications of Spinoza’s 
ontology of individuation for the constitution of the political meaning of the 
multitude. Specifically, chapter III addresses the relation between affectivity and 
politics in Spinoza’s political writings, and asks how affects give rise to complex 
political communities, meanings and transformations. Chapter IV explores the 
interface between affectivity and democracy in Spinoza’s political reflections. It 
investigates the centrality of affectivity within the formation of the democratic 
community, and considers the ways in which the multitude becomes the 
protagonist of the political scene. In chapters III and IV, I adopt a strategy of 
reading Spinoza’s political texts through the use of conceptual-affective personae, 
which is constructed around Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of conceptual personae 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-83). This strategy allows the emphasis to be 
placed upon the notion of affectivity as a process of actualisation and 
transformation of the political. A short conclusion summarizes my arguments and 
suggests further avenues of research.  
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Chapter I 
 
Contemporary studies on Spinoza:  
New perspectives and problems 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I examine several contemporary studies of Spinoza, and 
consider the ways in which they have introduced a new awareness of his 
philosophy into the multifaceted intellectual context of the present. An analysis of 
current approaches within Spinozan scholarship is imperative for understanding 
the great complexity of his ideas, and presenting such an analysis here will serve 
to indicate the philosophical ground upon which this thesis is constructed. As set 
out in the introductory discussion above, the central aim of this thesis is to re-
assess the relevance of Spinoza’s ontology and politics, and to thereby develop a 
fresh materialist notion of the individual. Such a return to Spinoza may afford a 
response to the demand for new materialist notions of politics, history, society and 
humankind that continental thought has inaugurated. I will argue here and in the 
following chapters that Spinoza's work can provide a new, innovative paradigm 
for materialism, and one that is based on a collective process of individuation. 
This paradigm can be inferred from the dynamic relation between Being, nature 
and the human subject within Spinoza's work, and is given more explicit form in 
his political discourses. 
In order to introduce my arguments, and in order to also present an initial 
account of the form of materialism elaborated within Spinoza's philosophy, I will 
begin by discussing recent approaches that have arisen within Spinozan studies. 
This will entail drawing attention to the importance of the opposition between 
continental and analytical interpretations of his work, for in analysing that 
opposition we will be obliged to consider the ways in which the continental and 
analytic traditions have treated the question of materialism. According to the 
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analytic interpretation, Spinoza stands alongside Descartes and Hobbes as one of 
the most radical thinkers of the seventeenth-century rationalist tradition. The 
continental approach, on the other hand, identifies Spinoza’s theses with a 
distinctive paradigm of materialism and a philosophy of praxis, situating these 
next to the Pre-Socratic model of naturalism and to the philosophies of Marx and 
Nietzsche.  
Divergences between analytic and continental approaches to Spinoza 
emerge from the differing ways in which those traditions have addressed his 
Ethics: a text in which he presents his metaphysics and theory of humankind, but 
which has also proved to be the most problematic and controversial of his works. 
Furthermore, in the Ethics Spinoza addresses the themes of matter and thought, 
upon which the difference between analytic and continental schools of thought is 
based. Consequently, analysing the conceptual nucleus of the Ethics is a 
precondition for an understanding of the origins of the differences between the 
continental and analytic approaches to Spinoza's work. In addition, it is also 
crucial for determining whether or not Spinoza’s metaphysics has any materialist 
implications. The first section of this chapter thus offers a critical exegesis of the 
Ethics. Particular attention is given to parts I and II of the text, which contain its 
most problematic aspects. In these two parts of the book Spinoza establishes his 
theories of the infinity of matter; of universal causation; of the correspondence 
between nature and God, and of the structures of ideas and bodies.     
Having set out the inherent problems of the Ethics the second part of this 
chapter will focus on the book's reception within the analytic and continental 
traditions. Whilst the analytic reading considers ideas and rationality as the central 
elements that drive the entire system of the Ethics, the continental approach 
claims that nature, matter and power are the constitutive principles of Spinoza’s 
ontology. The former concludes that for Spinoza nature is organised through the 
laws of universal causation, and that human actions are to be understood through 
the parallelism of mind and body; the latter derives a model of materialism from 
these same theories of nature and mind-body unity. This model addresses 
contingency as regards events and beings, and more significantly, it re-situates 
thought in a dynamic relation with matter.   
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The problem with the analytic exposition of the Ethics, in my view, lies 
not in its recognition of the powerful status of thought, but rather in the status that 
it attributes to matter. The risk of reading Spinoza’s ontology within an analytic 
perspective is a form of mentalisation of matter. By this I mean that the structure 
of matter comes to mirror the structure of thought, becoming an empty category. 
By contrast, Spinoza claims that matter is one of the infinite modalities of Being: 
it is thus parallel to thought, and not dependent upon it. The arguments that I will 
advance by way of a study of the analytic account of the Ethics will thus concern 
the necessity of re-considering Spinoza’s notions of thought, matter and universal 
causation from an alternative perspective: a perspective from which his notions of 
the absolute, immanence and power can all be seen to afford means of uncovering 
the more complex philosophical mechanism that underlies his determinist system. 
This, I will argue, greatly exceeds any rationalist logic.  
Spinoza's categories of the absolute, matter, power and immanence form 
the core of the continental reading of the Ethics, and are thus also crucial to its 
definition of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a radical model of materialism. The 
exegesis of the Ethics developed within the continental perspective insists that 
these categories re-assess the cogency of the sensible world. This approach also 
presents Spinoza’s conception of nature as pure activity, within which thought and 
matter are equally productive. Yet the main difficulties of this reading, in my 
view, arise as to how this account of nature as a system of pure activity effectively 
operate, and also as to how this system coexists with Spinoza’s determinist vision 
of the universe. By developing further continental analyses I will argue below that 
Spinoza’s ontology of Substance describes a complex process, and that reading it 
in this way explains at once the existence of contingent aspects within a causal 
flow, together with the self-generation of matter and thought.    
However, from the study of these opposing views of Spinoza’s ontology, a 
question immediately arises: Is there any ‘third way’ to study the Ethics? Is there 
an approach that would, in certain respects, embrace and also advance existing 
literature? The concluding section of this chapter engages with precisely this 
issue. I will set out the position that will be assumed in the thesis as a whole: a 
perspective from which the Ethics is seen as a complex ontology of the actual. 
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Specifically, the claim that I will make throughout this chapter is that Spinoza’s 
ontology is based on an anomalous process of production. My use of the term 
anomalous stems from the fact that within Spinoza's metaphysics of Substance, as 
we will see, determinism and contingency coexist without contradicting one 
another. I refer to his ontology as a process of production, because within 
Spinoza's metaphysical system the emergence of ideas, bodies and the relation 
between cause and effect correspond to series of changes. It is this anomalous 
process of production that grounds Spinoza’s paradigm of materialism. In this 
regard the significance of conceiving Spinoza’s ontology of Substance as an 
anomalous process of production concerns the possibility of re-considering the 
status of matter and the individual within nature. These are constitutive elements 
of a unique and multiple order, and an awareness of this is crucial for developing 
new materialist conceptions of history, humankind and society.    
 
1. The Ethics: Inheriting problems and objectives 
 
The Ethics is Spinoza’s masterpiece, and represents a definitive 
consolidation of his philosophical project. Published posthumously (1677) with 
the complete title of: Ethics, Demonstrated in geometrical order and divided into 
five parts (Ethica, more geometrico demonstrata, et in quinque partes distincta), 
the work is composed in Latin and organised thematically into five sections. 
These are Part I On God, Part II Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Part III On 
the Origin and Nature of Emotions, Part IV Of the human bondage, or the Nature 
of the Emotions and Part V Of the Power of the Intellect, or Human Freedom. In 
these sections, Spinoza explores a variety of fundamental issues in philosophy, 
from general metaphysical questions such as the essence of God and the status of 
nature to more specific themes concerning the role of human being within the 
universe. These include a theory of knowledge, a study of affectivity and 
rationality, and the mechanism through which these generate distinct 
psychological behaviours and social habits. 
A study of the Ethics is imperative not only for the intrinsic value of its 
contents, but also because it is a prerequisite for an exhaustive retrospective of 
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Spinoza’s early works, and especially for that of his politics. As anticipated in the 
introduction of this thesis, the political themes presented in the Theological-
Political Treatise and the Political Treatise are grounded on ontological and 
ethical concepts that are explained in the Ethics, and vice versa. This means that 
ontological claims have political implications, and that the latter can be seen to 
further expand and clarify arguments made in the Ethics. An awareness of this 
intricate linkage between Spinoza’s ontology and politics, I will argue, is crucial 
for determining his distinct materialistic account of the individual, around which 
his theories of democracy and the multitude are constructed.  
It is only through the reflections that have emerged within contemporary 
Spinozist studies that this connection between the Ethics and the political 
Treatises has come to be recognised more adequately. The ways in which Spinoza 
scholars have interpreted the claims of the Ethics have informed their 
understandings of his political thought, as we will see in the following chapters. 
For thinkers such as Curley and Smith, whose work falls within the analytic 
tradition, liberal ideals of self-mastery, rationality and liberty are constitutive 
elements of Spinoza’s politics, and reflect the Ethics' arguments concerning God, 
the mind and the human being (Smith, 2003:123-149; Curley, 1996: 315-342; 
1988: 115-135). In contrast, for the continental school the direct consequence of 
Spinoza’s ontology is a politics centred on the values of community, mutual 
support and emancipation from any ideological apparatus (see for example, 
Balibar, 1998: 76-98; Negri, 1998: 167-234). Thus, and as stated above, the 
centrality of the Ethics for delineating Spinoza’s political thought renders an 
enquiry into its conceptual nucleus indispensable. Doing so highlights the 
problematic aspects of the Ethics and explains the origins of the divergences 
amongst scholars. However, before analysing its contents we need to discuss the 
method and the language adopted in the Ethics, as this contains the key elements 
that indicate the overall structure of the work.  
 
 
 
 
27 
 
“Ethica, more geometrico demonstrata” 
 
We can begin by noting that the philosophical method employed by 
Spinoza in his major work constitutes one of the initial difficulties that a 
reader might encounter. The “more geometrico demonstrata” alluded to in the 
book's subtitle refers to its attempt to present philosophical argumentation in a 
manner that accords with the axiomatic-deductive logic of Euclidean 
geometry, as set out in Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. This latter book also 
adopts an axiomatic-deductive method, as within it Euclid establishes certain 
universal and self-evident principles (axioms) from which he then deduces 
theorems. The demonstration of each theorem follows the deductive logic of 
mathematics, i.e. the attempt to extrapolate from particular and contingent 
phenomena universal laws and properties. The resulting laws are considered 
universal because they are applicable to every singular event in any given time 
and space. 
As in Euclidean geometry, each part of the Ethics begins with general 
and certain definitions and axioms from which theories of God, nature and 
humankind are deduced and rigorously articulated through a sequence of 
propositions, scholia, corollaries and lemmas. These aspire towards the same 
universality as that of geometrical theorems, and do so through an accurate re-
elaboration of physical facts and processes. In conferring philosophical 
authority to the geometrical method Spinoza not only acquires its line of 
reasoning, but more importantly also adopts its particular style. This entails 
the reduction of every discursive element to concise propositions, each of 
which returns the reader to previous propositions and definitions. Scholia and 
corollaries are the most explanatory parts of the Ethics, which clarify 
preceding claims and draw further conclusions. The scholia are however 
especially important, in that they often seem to support a conceptual level 
alternative to that of the propositions to which they refer. Deleuze, for 
example, has envisaged in the order of the scholia 'subterranean' theses, which 
do not follow from propositions and definitions. For Deleuze, as we will see, 
the scholia delineate Spinoza’s authentic doctrine of Substance, that is, the 
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constitution of the plane of immanence (Deleuze, 1997: 21-32).      
Ultimately, we need to discuss the language employed in the Ethics, 
that is, its Scholastic Latin. Its usage brings to light a two-sided problem, 
which bears upon both the reader and the writer himself. For Spinoza, the 
difficulty is the metaphysical meaning with which this language has been 
traditionally associated. Terms, fundamental in the Ethics, such as 'Substance', 
'attribute', 'mode' and 'universal causality' are the heritage of a host of 
intellectual paradigms: Descartes, for example, employed the Scholastic style, 
working such expressions into his own rationalist theses. The Cartesian 
lexicon is in fact strongly present in the Ethics; a symptom of the degree to 
which Descartes' philosophy was both an important reference point for 
Spinoza and a difficult obstacle to overcome. Indeed, the reader of the Ethics 
needs to extract and distinguish Spinoza’s own usage of the classical terms 
from their traditional significations. It is for this reason too that so many 
commentators come to place Spinoza’s philosophy in close proximity to 
Descartes and, more generally, to rationalist approaches (see for example, 
Curley, 1988; Israel, 2002).
 2
  Having delineated the principal problems of the 
structure of the Ethics we are now in a position to discuss the contents and 
difficulties of each part of the book. In the first part, “Of God”, Spinoza sets 
forth his paradigm of monism. Let us flesh out the central aspects of his thesis. 
 
1.1 The thesis of monism  
 
The Ethics begins from the traditional metaphysical starting point of 
presenting a doctrine on Substance. Yet unlike traditional metaphysical studies, 
Spinoza’s theory of Substance does not begin by questioning the existence of 
God, and by seeking support for that existence in proofs and demonstrations. 
Rather, Spinoza presents God's existence as an indisputable truth, and as the 
precondition to all events and beings in the universe. This differs from the central 
preoccupation of both Scholastic (Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Anselm, 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed study of Spinoza’s lexicon, see particularly Giancotti (1970) and Runes (1951).      
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among others) and Cartesian ontologies, which are directed towards human 
awareness of the existence of God; the focus of Spinoza’s own theological 
metaphysics, however, is an attempt to map the anatomy of God as a primary, 
originary Substance. This is the object of part I of the Ethics, where the existence 
of neither God nor human knowledge is in question. What is at stake there is 
instead a more adequate understanding of Substance, through which theories of 
humankind and the universe might be predicated. 
In this fashion, definitions from I to VIII of part I establish the nature of 
Substance-God and indicate its constitutive elements. According to Spinoza, 
Substance is self-caused (E. I, def. I, III), absolutely positive and infinite (E. I, 
def. VI). What Spinoza means here is that Substance is being itself, conceived as 
self-generated and all-inclusive. Specifically, the positive dimension of absolute 
infinity states that there can be no external and opposing substances to that of 
God. Spinoza also claims here that Substance is characterised by an infinite 
number of attributes, and a variety of modes. Each attribute is directly connected 
with Substance, expressing a modality of its essence (E. I, def. IV). Attributes are 
not distinct essences and separate entities. Rather, they have to be considered as 
qualities of the prime Substance, which expresses and reveals its nature through 
them (E. I, prop. X, proof and scholium). The definition of the attribute is 
extremely problematic and has been interpreted in many different ways. For some 
analytic scholars such as Bennett, the attribute is a basic property of Substance, 
which indicates one of its functions (Bennett, 1984: 60-66). For other continental 
thinkers, such as Macherey, the attribute actualises the essence of Substance and 
is thus entirely equal to it (Macherey, 1997: 71-79). These divergences between 
Spinoza’s commentators mostly derive from differing interpretations of the verbs 
“to perceive” and “to express” (E. I, def. IV, VI), which describe the role of the 
attribute. These verbs may have been intended to perform a descriptive function, 
or to denote the powerful, expressive nature of the attribute. In the first case, the 
attribute describes a state of Being; it thus does not add any further specification 
to Substance. In other words, as a basic property, the attribute simply tell us in a 
certain and determinate way what Substance is. In the second case, the attribute is 
attributive of further properties which found and enrich the essence of Substance. 
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 The mode is an affection of Substance, albeit one that relies upon an 
external cause for its existence. The mode does not possess an individual essence, 
but rather constitutes an actual state of Substance (E. I, def. V). As Spinoza will 
clarify later in the Ethics, the mode is immediately related to the attribute and 
implicit within Substance (E. I, prop. XXIII; E. II, prop. I-I). Via the attribute to 
which it refers, the mode shares the essence of Substance, and represents a 
determinate actualisation of one of the latter's properties. In his definition of the 
mode, Spinoza includes human beings, ideas, bodies and, more generally, all 
singular events in nature. As with the attributes, the nature and status of the mode 
is also a subject of great debate. Spinoza describes a mode as an affection of 
Substance, which exists in “something else”, and is conceived through “some 
thing else” (E. I, Def. V). The problem here concerns the effective role of 
singularities within Spinoza’s metaphysic. As the mode is described as an 
affection of Substance, the question arises as to whether the mode affects 
Substance, or whether it is in fact affected by Substance. As regards the first 
option: if the mode is considered as an affection, then it would see to modify the 
essence of Substance; the condition of the individual would then acquire greater 
importance. If however the mode is affected by Substance, affection would then 
seem to denote a condition of being determined by an all-inclusive God. The role 
of the differentiated being would then be passive and subordinated to Substance. 
Discussions around these questions have been many sided, as we will see in the 
sections below.       
The remaining definitions and axioms establish the general principles 
around which Spinoza will base his model of monism, his determinist system and 
his theories of the attribute and mode. These include the meanings of finitude and 
eternity (E. I, def. II, VIII), and the distinction between freedom and necessity (E. 
I, def. VIII). This distinction introduces his anti-anthropomorphic account of God. 
He relates freedom to the absence of external constriction  and importantly not 
with free will. In this way, Substance is the union of freedom and necessity, 
because it is not determined by other substances and also its activity towards the 
world could not have been different from the actual one. More precisely, God’s 
free will coincides entirely with the necessity of the order of reality.  
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Necessity and contingency 
   
Spinoza's monism is formulated in proposition XIV, where he claims that 
God alone can be conceived as substance. This recognition of God as a unique 
substance implies a denial of any plurality of substances, and thus also of any 
hierarchy among them. Spinoza’s paradigm of monism embraces a variety of 
fundamental themes in ontology. These refer to the notions of universal causation, 
immanence, power, the status of matter and the anatomy of nature. In the 
scholium to proposition XV, Spinoza addresses the question of matter, and 
entirely re-configures the category of extension. The latter is viewed as an infinite 
and indivisible unity, whilst matter becomes an attribute through which Substance 
expresses its essence as infinity and eternity. This is a fundamental move within 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, and it opens directly onto the theme of materialism.  
The inclusion of matter within the domain of Substance might be 
interpreted into two opposing way. In the first case, given matter's status as an 
attribute, Spinoza might seem to be identifying Substance with the universe of the 
concrete. Spinoza’s ontology of Substance therefore has a materialist implication.  
In the second case, because matter expresses infinity, indivisibility and eternity, it 
might be considered as a form of idealisation of extension. The latter would 
thereby lose its peculiar traits of contingency and finitude; strictly speaking, 
matter would lack materiality. From this second perspective, Spinoza’s notion of 
matter is opposed to any alliance with materialism. Instead, and because 
Substance is moved by a determinist structure, matter discloses in a certain and 
determinate way the rationality of the whole. It is from these differing views on 
the status of matter that the divide between analytic and continental readings 
arises: the former tends towards a rationalisation of Spinoza’s concept of matter; 
the latter, as we will see, defines that concept as the core of a materialist project.   
The theme of determinism is the object of propositions from XVI to 
proposition XXIX. Spinoza explains that in nature every event is ordered and 
emerges form a precise concatenation of causes and effects; thus, for any given 
phenomenon there is a relating cause. The notion of universal causation does not 
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solely imply the dismissal of the notion of free will from divine nature, thereby 
corroborating the inconsistency of casting the latter in terms of 
anthropomorphism, but more significantly entails the refusal of contingency. For 
the analytic school, Spinoza’s claims as to the necessity of God, as developed 
through the laws of causality, constitute the key elements that structure his 
rationalist metaphysics. 
The theme of contingency is discussed in the scholium to proposition 
XXIX, which affirms the distinction between “Natura naturans” (naturing nature) 
and “Natura naturata” (natured nature). By the former, Spinoza means the totality 
of all attributes, or God as free cause. By the latter, Spinoza intends nature as an 
affection and mode of Substance, and thus as something that is dependent on an 
external cause. This distinction is quite critical. It suggests that contingency is not 
negated as such, but that it is rather part of the universal system of causation. 
Given God's unity with nature, and given that nature as 'natured nature' includes a 
certain form of contingency, contingent events would seem to exist within the 
essence of Substance, which would in turn be directly related to the world of the 
concrete, and thereby to materiality. If this is the case, Spinoza’s recognition of 
contingency within God-nature would reinforce those materialist interpretations of 
his ontology. It is thus around these arguments that continental thought constructs 
its approach to Spinoza and from which the position, undertaken in this thesis, 
mostly follows.    
In proposition XVIII, Spinoza identifies the ontological nucleus of the 
laws of causation with the principle of immanence. By this, Spinoza means that 
the action of God upon the world should not be taken as being qualitatively, 
ontologically and temporally different from the effects of his activity, but rather 
that this action is in fact inherent within the universe. Indeed, the assumption of 
the immanent logic characterising Substance’s activity directly implies the 
exclusion of any higher dimension beyond or behind the world. In the remaining 
propositions, Spinoza states that the very essence of Substance is power, which 
coincides with its existence (prop. XXXIV). The essence of Substance is thus its 
most general category, and explains the universal laws of immanent causation: for 
God produces the world immanently because he is power, and this corresponds 
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directly to his actual being. The theme of power closes the metaphysics of 
Substance.  
The themes of power and immanence, we will discuss in section two, are 
the core of the continental view that Spinoza’s metaphysics offers an innovative 
model of materialism (see particularly, Deleuze, 1992 and Negri, 1998). When 
developing this interpretation further in the concluding section of this chapter I 
will stress the indeterminacy and generality of the notion of power with which 
Spinoza characterises the essence of Substance. I will argue that these elements 
indicate that Spinoza’s system of production involves a more complex system of 
production; one that embraces and at the same time exceeds the rigid 
concatenation of cause and effect.  
 
The theory of parallelism 
 
In the first half of part II, attention is given to the attributes of thought and 
matter and to the ways in which they operate. Thought and matter are said to be 
the attributes peculiar to the human body and mind, which are the object of the 
remaining sections of part II and, of the successive sections of the Ethics as a 
whole. Part II begins with seven definitions and five axioms. The definitions 
delineate Spinoza’s conceptions of the body, ideas (and specifically of adequate 
ideas), duration, reality and singular beings. The following axioms signal the 
entrance of the human element to Spinoza's ontological argument, as they indicate 
basic laws which characterise human activity, such as thinking and perceiving the 
modifications of the body. Ultimately, axiom V specifies the nature of these 
affections, which derive from the modes of thought and extension. Of the first ten 
propositions, the key notions are contained in propositions I, II, and VII, as they 
articulate the passage from the metaphysics of Substance to the theory of mind 
and body. In proposition I, Spinoza addresses the question of thought by 
presenting a completely different view of its origin. In his re-formulation, thought 
is an attribute of Substance, which expresses its essence in a certain and 
determinate way. In proposition II, Spinoza reiterates the affirmation of matter as 
one of the attributes of Substance set out in part I, affirming its autonomy from 
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thought and the ontological equality between the two. 
The arguments of the two propositions culminate in the thesis of 
parallelism presented in proposition VII. The term “parallelism” derives from the 
Euclidean postulate of the parallels, according to which two straight lines are 
called parallels when, if prolonged infinitely, they never intersect one another. In 
Spinoza’s usage, parallelism involves the notions identity and distinction. 
Accordingly, the structures of thought and matter are identical, but the attributes 
are distinct in themselves. By this, Spinoza means that thought is not matter and 
vice versa. There is therefore no causal flow between ideas and bodies, and each 
order follows its own concatenation of causes and effects. This also results from 
Spinoza’s arguments concerning the attribute, for which an attribute cannot be 
produced by another (E. I, ax. II, V; E. I, prop. X, proof and scholium).   
The theory of parallelism constitutes one of the most controversial notions 
of the Ethics, and heightens the great divide between the continental and analytic 
readings. According to the continental view, Spinoza’s formula of parallelism 
indicates his complex materialist vision of reality; according to the analytic 
reading, it constitutes an affirmation of his rationalist ontology. Yet the central 
question that informs both interpretations is as to whether Spinoza's inclusion of 
the thesis of parallelism within his metaphysics of Substance attests to a 
philosophical turn from a monist to a dualist position (as developed through the 
composition of the Ethics), or whether it rather  consolidates his unitary vision of 
reality.  
The separation between the orders of thought and extension suggest that 
the physical and mental aspects of reality are to be treated as two independent 
domains, each obeying their own principles and laws. In this respect the concept 
of parallelism would seem to tend towards a certain form of dualism that would 
weaken the monistic paradigm. Furthermore, the notion of parallelism opens up 
the theme of the consistency of matter and thought, and the ways in which these 
are connected with one another. Lastly, it is from the thesis of parallelism that 
Spinoza derives his definitions of the mind, body and nature of the human being. 
Therefore, the analysis of the theory of parallelism is crucial for understanding 
Spinoza’s account of humankind. Taking these elements into account, let us now 
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flesh out how the theory of parallelism operates concretely within the human 
context. 
 
1.2 The ontology of humankind: Mind and body, affectivity and rationality
3
  
 
Spinoza’s ontology of humankind commences with the theme of the 
constitution of the mind, and he addresses this question by positing the mind’s 
intrinsic correspondence with the body.  He states that the object of the human 
mind is the body (E. II, prop. XIII and scholium), and in the following 
propositions he explains that ideas are shaped by body’s affections, which in turn 
are generated through bodily movements and composition with other bodies. 
Thus, ideas are not considered as abstract archetypes contrary or prior to corporeal 
substances; neither are the mind and the body assumed to be two independent and 
self-generated components of the human being, which interact with one another as 
two separate entities. By contrast, they form a dynamic unity, where the 
enhancement of the body immediately corresponds to the improvement of the 
mind; vice versa, an awareness of the body enriches our knowledge of the 
potentiality of the mind. This implies the re-assessment of the role of the body in 
relation to the mind (E.II, prop. XIV,XV).  
This view of the body means that an account of the mind requires an 
accurate enquiry into the dynamics of extended beings. In the middle of part II, 
Spinoza presents a concise but extremely detailed physics of bodies, explaining 
their constitutive elements and laws. Common to all bodies, he claims there, are 
the states of rest and movement, and varying degrees of solidity and fluidity. Each 
single body is possessed of a predisposition to compose itself with other bodies. 
This predisposition gives rise to exchanges of substances and movements, which 
leave the originary individual unchanged (E. II, ax. I, postul. VI). As with 
particular bodies, the entirety of nature, according to Spinoza, has to be thought as 
a single individual (E. II, Lemma VII, scholium).  
                                                 
3
In this section, I will offer a broader overview of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, the genealogy 
of affects, rationality and intuitive science. A critical account of these themes will be given in 
chapter II.  
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Similarly, Spinoza explains that the human body is itself a highly complex 
system comprised of a great number of other individuals (E. II, postul. I). 
Furthermore, it affects and can be affected in infinite ways (E. II, postul. III, IV). 
As a result of the correspondence between mind and body, such affections do not 
correspond solely to bodily modifications, but also, and more importantly, to 
connections and series of ideas (E.II prop. XVI, XVII, XVIII). The theme of 
mind-body unity occupies a decisive position within the Ethics, and it 
reintroduces the question of whether Spinoza’s ontology has predominantly 
materialist or rationalist implications. On the one hand, Spinoza's theory of the 
mind – which argues for the complete union of mind and body – holds that in 
some cases ideas are the result of bodily affections. This would mean that 
thoughts have a material foundation. On the other hand, in his final propositions 
Spinoza ascribes to the mind alone the ability to generate true ideas and 
understand phenomena ‘in the light of eternity’ (E. II, prop. XLIV). If this is taken 
together with proposition XII, which claims that to every extended being 
corresponds an idea in the mind, and which also holds that bodies cannot be 
conceived without these corresponding ideas, it would seem to imply that the 
mind possesses a certain dominance over extended reality.  
Illustrations of these differing ways of reading Spinoza’s theory of mind-
body unity can be found in two opposing positions, which have emerged within 
contemporary Spinozist studies: namely, the ‘mentalist’ approach, and the 
materialist interpretation represented by Bennett and Curley. As we will discuss in 
section two, where the former maintains that the structure of the mental dominates 
the material (Bennett, 1984: 127-151), the latter holds that the genesis and 
development of ideas is strictly dependent upon the development of bodies 
(Curley, 1988: 51-78). Materialist conclusions are also reached by the continental 
reading, yet for this school the materialist component of Spinoza’s theory of 
mind-body unity involves a more complex re-theorisation of both idea and body. 
The mind and the body are recognised as extremely productive of further ideas, 
bodies, relations and meanings (see particularly Deleuze, 1992: 99-144, 217-253; 
Balibar, 2002: 86-102).  
In order to deal with the question of whether or not the mental is superior 
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to the material, and in order to further develop the continental analysis, I will 
argue in chapter II for the adoption of the theory of the collective process of 
individuation formulated by the twentieth-century philosopher Simondon (2007). 
Making use of Simondonian categories, I will argue that in Spinoza’s ontology the 
mind and the body are more similar to functions that operate as forces, and 
activate exchanges of substances and movements.   
Passing now from the theme of the mind and body to the theory of 
knowledge: concatenations of ideas and bodily affections, according to Spinoza, 
delineate three specific kinds of knowledge. These are: imagination (the first 
kind); rationality (the second kind); intuitive science or intellectual love of God 
(the third kind). Each expresses a particular dimension of life. By imagination, 
Spinoza indicates a condition in which human knowledge lacks certainty, and in 
which the individual observes phenomena only in terms of their contingent 
aspects. This first form of knowledge is thus dominated by affects and passions. 
However, through Spinoza's second form of knowledge, rationality, the mind is 
able to regard natural phenomena in their necessity, thus discerning the 
determinate series of cause and effects. The third kind of knowledge, intuitive 
science, consists in understanding nature immediately in terms of cause, without 
passing through the observation of contingent facts (E. II prop. XL, scholium II). 
Here the human subject develops a distinct form of love, which is a reflection on 
nature in its entirety as a multiform individual shaped by a variety of other 
individuals. This form of love culminates in the intellectual love of God, which in 
turn coincides with the love of God towards humankind.  
The dynamics of these three different forms of life and knowledge are 
examined extensively in parts III, IV, and V. Particular attention ought to be paid 
towards the arguments developed in parts III and IV of the Ethics, where 
Spinoza’s discourse acquires more evident political nuances: for as we will see, 
affectivity and rationality do not only correspond to psychological behaviours, but 
also to political practises. Here however we can simply note that the three kinds of 
knowledge discussed above originate from a shared ontological ground, which 
Spinoza calls the 'common notions': universal categories of thought owned by all 
men (E. II, Prop. XXXVIII and corollary). It is also important to remember that 
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for Spinoza, these are not static and ultra-mundane essences, but rather inhere 
within nature.  
Central to Spinoza’s theory of knowledge is the connection between these 
three kinds of knowledge, and particularly that between imagination and 
rationality. This is because the ways in which human beings can pass from an 
imaginative status to a rational one implies a specific political strategy. In the 
TTP, liberation from the imaginative condition coincides with the emancipation of 
the masses from despotic regimes. Moreover, and as we will see in chapters III 
and IV, given that in the TTP the imaginative state is peculiar to the political 
category of the multitude, its analysis is instrumental for determining the meaning 
ascribed by Spinoza to the multitude. The domain of imagination is also shaped 
by affectivity, which is the object of part III of the Ethics described below.         
 
Genealogy of the affects  
 
The third part of the Ethics explores the domain of imagination, which is 
the ground of the affects, and presents a rigorous genealogy of the latter. Its 
central thesis is that affectivity is a natural element of human nature in much the 
same way as rationality (E. III, preface). The understanding of the nature of the 
affects is crucial for determining Spinoza’s distinct account of the individual, 
which has an impact upon his political thought.  
As anticipated above, in the Theological-Political Treatise Spinoza 
explains the role played by affectivity within a political community. For Spinoza, 
this indicates the degree of freedom possessed by individuals within a society. 
The dominance of passions such as fear and hope defines a condition of slavery; 
conversely, an increase in affects such as joy and love denotes a more democratic 
and free state. More importantly, affects and passions are the cornerstone of the 
category of the multitude. Consequently, a study of affects and passions affords a 
consideration of the multitude's ontological and psychological origins.  
Spinoza begins by defining the meanings of adequate and inadequate 
causes, activity and passivity and the role of affectivity. A cause is said to be 
adequate when its effect can be clearly and immediately understood. Conversely, 
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a cause is inadequate when its effect is perceived confusedly and indirectly (E. III, 
def. I). Individuals are active, then, when they distinguish causes from effects, and 
when they are also the causes of such effects. On the contrary, individuals are 
passive when they are the partial effects of an external cause (E. III, Def. I-II). An 
affect is described as the affections of the body, which can increase or decrease its 
power (E.III, Def. III). If the human being is an adequate cause of these affections, 
the affect is an action; if not, the affect is a passion. In postulates I and II, Spinoza 
adds that the human body can be affected in many ways, from which its activity 
can be reinforced or reduced. Affections modify the structure of the body, which 
retains the impressions and images of the external object that affected the 
individual. Similarly to the body's propensity for actions and passions, the mind is 
capable of both inadequate and adequate ideas. Inadequate ideas keep the mind in 
a state of passivity; active ideas afford an active position (E. III, prop. I, III). 
Before investigating the nature of the affects Spinoza formulates his theory 
of conatus: a term that refers to a continual striving towards the perpetuation of 
existence, and which in his view characterises all creatures in nature (E. III, prop. 
VI, VII, VIII). The conatus of humankind governs both physical and psychic 
activities, including the rational faculty (E. III, prop. XI-XIII), and affects play a 
pivotal role in orienting, increasing and decreasing this primordial force. 
Importantly, the human being’s conatus is driven by desire. In the general 
definitions of the affects, Spinoza will qualify desire as the very essence of the 
human being; an essence that shapes the functions of both the mind and the body 
(E. III, Def. Aff. I). To put this in a more contemporary fashion, conatus might be 
regarded as Spinoza’s definition of biological life, which corresponds to an 
irreducible drive. 
 This definition of biological life as a pure power to live and desire has 
crucial political implications. As I will argue in chapter IV, adopting Agamben’s 
line of reasoning, Spinoza's notion of biological life is, considered in itself, 
extremely powerful and inherently political (Agamben, 1998: 71-110).
4
 In the 
                                                 
4
 An extended analysis of the political implications of Spinoza’s notion of conatus will be given in 
chapter IV. In this chapter, I will utilize Agamben’s theory of bare life (Agamben, 1998), in order 
to examine the themes of sovereignty and the power of the multitude in Spinoza’s political 
thought.   
40 
 
TTP, where Spinoza explains the cause of the dissolution of any despotic regimes, 
a tyrant can deprive his subjects of every civil rights and freedoms as much as he 
pleases. Although the individuals concerned are thus reduced to mere biological 
life, their conatus will nonetheless drive an innate attempt to continue to live and 
persevere towards fuller forms of lived existence, thus equipping them with the 
power to react and to subvert the existing political condition. 
Proceeding with his analysis of the affects, Spinoza presents the sphere of 
affectivity predominantly as a domain of uncertainty grounded in the first genre of 
knowledge, imagination. His study is constructed around two principal categories 
of affects. These are the couples of love and joy and sadness, from which derive a 
varied typology of further affects such as fear, hope, self-esteem, anger, 
generosity, envy, indignation and so on (E. III, prop. XV-XVII). The affective 
process is activated through an individual's experience of an external object or of 
another individual, the outcome of which can be advantageous or destructive. The 
resulting impressions influence successive experiences, distinct social and psychic 
behaviours. Specifically, joy, love and their derivatives maintain the individual in 
an active state, favouring mechanisms of self-awareness and socialization. 
Conversely, hatred, sadness and similar passions generate a passive condition, 
which weakens and progressively detaches the human being from his or her 
milieu. In this case, practises of subjection and, more generally, cruelty take place.  
The difference between positive and active affects consists in their 
capacity to generate relational conditions. This capacity is stronger in affects of 
joy and love than in passions such as fear and hope, where relations are mostly 
dominated by external causes and tend gradually to disappear. Although affects 
are productive of relations, the limit of the affects envisaged by Spinoza resides in 
their mutable nature (E. III, prop. XVII, scholium), which prompt individuals to 
hate objects that might once have been desired, thus giving rise to unstable 
relationships.  
For the purposes of the present discussion we need not enter into the 
problematics of each singular affect; instead, we can simply reflect on a common 
element that emerges from Spinoza’s attempt to theorise them. There is a 
relational character to both actions and passions, as affects of both joy and sadness 
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are explained in terms of an individual's movement towards an object or towards 
another individual. Such connections and interactions constitute the preconditions 
for varied actions and ideas. This sheds light on Spinoza’s distinctive approach to 
affectivity, insofar as it shows him to consider the latter as a primary locus of 
social relations, whether they be passive or active.  
Many questions arise from these premises, and the first is as to whether or 
not actions and passions are assumed to be two contrary forces. On the one hand, 
Spinoza inscribes both tendencies within the domain of affectivity, holding them 
to emerge from the universal laws of nature, and thus casting them as equally 
constitutive of the human being. Moreover, actions and passions are generative of 
relations between individuals: the former develops active relations, and the latter 
more passive ones. On the other hand, passions considerably reduce the human 
subject's power of thinking and acting, producing ignorance, subjection and 
cruelty. More importantly, Spinoza claims that hatred can be destroyed by love 
(E. III, prop. XLIII, XLIV).  
This leads to the view that the two types of affects are in fact opposing 
forces, one productive and the other somewhat destructive, and to the contention 
that active affects eventually overcome passions. If this is case, the question that 
then arises is as follows: how can love and its derivatives suppress those of hatred, 
given that both are grounded in the sphere of imagination, that is, the domain of 
falsity par excellence? If actions and passions do not oppose each other, the 
coexistence of the two considerably alters the human equilibrium. Thus, the 
difficulty is as to how actions and passions effectively operate within the general 
affective process. Answers to these questions have been multi-sided, and Balibar's 
response (Balibar, 1998, 2002) is decisive for the main argument of this thesis. In 
building upon Balibar's contention that relationality in Spinoza's conception of 
affectivity is a source of individuation, the following chapter will argue that 
affects, for Spinoza, found a collective process of individuation. Whilst applying 
Simondon’s ontology of psychic individuation, as Balibar proposes (Balibar, 
2002), the arguments that I will advance point to the collective dimension of 
affectivity. This does not inhere within already individuated individuals; rather, it 
forms psychic beings and states. The second problem concerns the connection 
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between conatus, desire and passions. Whilst conatus and desire refer to an 
irreducible power of self-affirmation, passions reduce this power. Therefore, how 
do conatus, desire and passion function without annulling each other? In part IV, 
Spinoza addresses these questions by positing rationality as the remedy to 
passions and, more generally, affectivity. 
 
Rationality 
 
In part IV, Spinoza’s thesis is that the improvement of rationality 
corresponds to the achievement of freedom. In order to gain freedom, therefore, 
human beings have to undermine the power of the affects and re-situate them 
under the guidance of reason (E. IV, preface). These themes involve a more 
general enquiry into the origins of human weakness and strength. Accordingly, 
human weakness is in part caused by the universal laws of causation, which are 
common to all creatures, and to which the human being has to adapt (E. IV, prop. 
II, IV, V). In part, this impotence derives from the dominance of the affects over 
conatus, as they restrain both the body and the mind (E. IV, prop. VI, VII). In this 
sense, the belief in fixed notions of good and evil, virtue, fortune and misfortune 
are expressions of this impotence: they evidence the mind's weakness and its 
mutilated knowledge, which results from the dominance of the affects (E. IV, Def. 
I, II, prop. VIII). By contrast, Spinoza explains that concepts of evil and good, of 
fortune and misfortune, indicate objects and beings the existence of which is 
either advantageous or adverse to the preservation of conatus. Similarly, virtue is 
held to have no universal meaning, but rather to coincide with an individual’s very 
essence, that is, with his or her power. When related to humankind, virtue thus 
consists in the power of understanding the world exclusively through the laws of 
nature (E. IV, Def. VIII).  
In the second half of part IV, Spinoza introduces the theme of rationality. 
He describes rationality not as a meditative path, achieved through the complete 
effacement of the body and its relating affects. To do so would be absurd, as the 
definition of the affects given in part III of the Ethics presents them as natural 
elements of humankind. The superiority of rationality does not reside in its 
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capacity to eliminate affectivity as such; rather, it consists in the power of 
narrowing affectivity's aspects of uncertainty and passivity. The result is an 
individual’s self-awareness of his or her limitations as regards the capacity to 
dominate natural events, together with a knowledge of his or her passions. These 
are the bases, for Spinoza, upon which true freedom and happiness are founded 
and developed.  
The enhancement of the rational faculty brings about the need for the 
creation of a community, which is constructed around practises of mutual support. 
It is for this reason that Spinoza rejects as contrary to reason models of asceticism, 
of the solitary wise men, or suicide (E. IV, prop. XIX, XX, XXI, XXII). Under the 
guidance of reason human beings are no longer afraid of others but rather 
recognise in their reciprocal assistance the greatest advantage for the improvement 
and preservation of their own being. This is precisely the meaning of Spinoza’s 
dictum “Man is God to man” (E. IV, prop. XXXV, schol.). The theme of 
relationality encountered in part III thus acquires a decisive position. In this 
context, the value of relation is directly connected with rationality.
 5
 Social 
relations are the outcome of the mind’s power over the passions; a power that 
secures individuals from reciprocal acts of cruelty, and which establishes more 
conscious practises of sharing and support. This leads towards the creation of civil 
society, within which every human being can fully develop and preserve his 
conatus. 
From Spinoza’s account of rationality and, more generally, from that of 
human bondage, many questions arise. First and foremost, they concern the very 
value ascribed by Spinoza to rationality, and whether this might be properly 
defined as the remedy to affectivity. In Spinoza’s studies of human weakness and 
rationality affectivity is, in one way or another, omnipresent. Joy and love remain 
essential elements of human liberation, which opens towards rationality and stable 
social relations. Therefore, taken in itself, what is the very nature and role of 
rationality, given its strict connection to the affects of joy and love? Ultimately, 
Spinoza’s claims presents a further order of problems, which refer to the very 
nature of humankind and to the type of community suggested in the Ethics. If 
                                                 
5The communicative character of Spinoza’s notion of rationality has been highlighted by Balibar 
in his Spinoza and Politics (Balibar, 1998: 95-124). This will be examined in chapters II and III.    
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driven by passions, individuals tend to disagree with one another; if driven by 
rationality and positive affects they tend to come into concordance. Yet if 
passions are a natural aspect of the human being, one is led to ask whether the 
latter is in fact truly social by nature. Furthermore, if human beings require the 
establishment of a society for the complete development of their own being, then 
what model of society can best guarantee this? Given the coexistence of passions, 
actions and rationality – the former being destructive, and the latter positive – 
does Spinoza’s thesis imply a strong authority able to suppress those destructive 
urges? Or does it rather imply a harmonious society, in which civil and political 
communities are unified? Spinoza will address these questions in section V of the 
Ethics, and in the political Treatises. In order to consider them here, let us now 
flesh out the main arguments and problems of the final part of the Ethics.   
 
Intellectual love of God and true knowledge 
 
In the concluding part of the Ethics Spinoza defines the third kind of 
knowledge discussed above, i.e. the intellectual love of God or intuitive science. 
This entails the analysis of virtue, true happiness and freedom. Specifically, in the 
first half of part V, Spinoza re-elaborates his theory of rationality, focusing on the 
possibilities of freedom and happiness afforded by the acquisition of rational 
habit. In the second half, he establishes the fundamentals of intuitive science, and 
considers the extent to which this is the highest form of love hold by both God 
and humankind. To begin with, the path to freedom is through reason. This equips 
individuals with the power to moderate the passions through which they are 
conditioned by past, present and future events, and more generally by external 
objects (E. V, prop. X, scholium). By contrast, rationality entails the re-evaluation 
of random experiences through adequate ideas, which activate self-oriented 
responses towards the world and towards others. The result is the development of 
true knowledge of nature and humankind, and the ethical model that corresponds 
to this genre of knowledge is represented by equanimous behaviour: an inclination 
towards the maximisation of those affects that positively influence human beings, 
and which counteract passions. It is in this context that freedom lies.  
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Given that freedom is denied by the argument of universal causation that 
starts from the analysis of God in part I, human freedom cannot refer to any 
notion of free-will. The human subject is a part of nature, and thus cannot detach 
itself from the infinite chains of events and processes; nor can the subject ever 
gain complete control over adverse phenomena and beings. Thus, in Spinoza’s 
paradigm of determinism, the degree of freedom endowed to the human being 
concerns his or her ability to elaborate active actions and thoughts, which are 
derived from adequate knowledge and self-awareness. Strictly speaking, the more 
active the individual is the more free he is. Virtue is precisely constructed around 
adequate knowledge and self-awareness, which in turn opens the way to true 
happiness. This consists in the enjoyment of actual life and disregard for death. 
The enjoyment of life frees individuals from the fear of death and from hope for 
salvation, both of which place them at the mercy of their passions, and render 
them slaves to fortune. This enjoyment also maintains the mind and body in an 
increasing state of activity.  
Adequate knowledge, virtue and true happiness are the prerequisites for 
acquiring awareness of God-nature through the third genre of knowledge, intuitive 
science. (E. V, prop. XXIV-XXVII) For Spinoza, the latter consists in 
understanding God directly through his attributes (thought and extension). 
Intuitive science is based on the recognition that any existing body, physical state, 
idea and mind inhere within the domain of extension and thought. As these are 
expressions of God’s essence, and as that essence is power, understanding them 
involves knowledge of God's power of acting and thinking. It also includes a 
different account of nature, which considers the latter in terms of its productive 
aspect, i.e. as 'naturing nature'. This kind of knowledge replaces both the appetites 
of the body and the desires of the mind with the category of 'intellectual love of 
God'. The latter is twofold: it is, on the one side, human striving towards a 
comprehension of the essence of Substance-nature in its complexity, that is to say, 
through the multiplicity of the attributes; on the other, intellectual love defines the 
very nature of God’s existence. God’s power of thinking, acting and existing 
connotes his love towards the world (E. V, prop. XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII).  
Ultimately, and as mentioned in part I, attributes express the eternity of 
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Substance in a certain and determinate way. Thus, the human mind’s knowledge 
of Substance through thought and extension allows it to perceive and experience 
eternity, however partially. Therefore, knowledge of the third kind indicates that 
eternity is, in some respects, implicated in the structure and potentialities of 
humankind (E. V, prop. XXII). As part of the infinite and eternal essence of God, 
the human mind, according to Spinoza, is endowed with the capacity to 
comprehend God in the light of eternity (E. V, prop. XXIII, XXIX, XXX). With 
this argument, together with that as to the intellectual love of God, Spinoza 
unfolds decisively his doctrine of the one Substance. These arguments circle back 
to the themes elaborated in parts I and II, and add further conceptual dimensions 
to the thesis of monism. Spinoza thereby specifies the nature of the force that 
comprises this love – a force that encompasses and drives reality itself – and 
indicates the status of the human being within this cosmic system of necessity, 
and also the ways in which he or she might achieve a complete awareness of its 
mechanism. This is the highest commitment that Spinoza ascribes to humankind, 
and it is the ultimate objective of his own philosophical project. Intellectual 
knowledge of Substance and the human perception of eternity are one of the most 
difficult lessons that Spinoza leaves to his readers; a lesson that concludes the 
Ethics, and indeed one that opens it to critique.
 6
   
In this latter respect these concluding arguments as to the intellectual love 
of God and the mind’s grasp of eternity can be seen to generate more questions 
than solutions. This is particularly evident in the second half of part V, which 
seems to abandon the political tones of parts III and IV, and which returns to the 
metaphysical themes examined in parts I and II. Thus, what is the role of part V, 
and how is it connected to the other parts of the book? If we assume a continuity 
between parts III, IV and V, we are led to enquire as to the political meaning of 
part V, particularly as regards its concluding section. Contemporary Spinoza 
scholars have attempted to answer these problems. In the section below I examine 
the ways in which continental and analytic thinkers have re-elaborated the 
arguments of the Ethics. The discussion draws upon the interpretations of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics of Substance, thought and matter that have developed 
                                                 
6
 For an extended analysis of the conceptual nucleus of the Ethics and its inheriting problems, see 
particularly Lord (2010).  
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within those two traditions of thought. An extended analysis of the analytic and 
continental studies of Spinoza’s theories of affectivity and rationality will be 
given, respectively, in the second chapter of this thesis.  
 
2. Spinoza and his readers: The Ethics in the rationalist and continental 
traditions    
 
As discussed above, the Ethics presents a range of complex concepts, such 
as the notions of attribute, mode and the thesis of parallelism. Contemporary 
Spinozist scholars have all been engaged in analysing these notions, and with 
developing specific strategies for interpreting the more problematic elements of 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Decisive contributions have developed within the analytic 
and continental schools, which have formulated two opposing exegeses of the 
Ethics, both of which attribute a different meaning to Spinoza’s metaphysics, 
thereby locating the latter within distinct philosophical milieus. Thinkers from the 
analytic school of thought such as Bennett, Curley, Hampshire, Yovel and Smith 
agree on the assumption that a rigid system of determinism drives the entire 
thread of the Ethics, around which Spinoza’s model of rationalism is founded and 
developed. They consider Spinoza as one of the founding fathers of the modern 
rationalist thought alongside Hobbes and Descartes, and also as a precursor of 
eighteenth-century principles.
7
 
By contrast, for theorists within the continental school such as Deleuze, 
Balibar, Macherey and Negri, Spinoza’s ontology is an expression of a complex 
form of materialism, which greatly exceeds empiricist and rationalist models. 
Nature and, more generally, matter is re-evaluated by Spinoza as a powerful and 
living being, which is formed by bodies, ideas and movements. Given this 
distinctive materialist ontology, they conclude that the Ethics has to be situated 
                                                 
7
The division between the analytic and continental schools assumed in the thesis is mainly a 
methodological strategy. I am aware that differences between the two approaches to Spinoza are 
more complex and also cannot be always identified within one of the two traditions. It is for 
methodological needs too that I have included Yovel and Hampshire within the analytic school. 
Although the two authors read the Ethics with less analytic tones, however, they tend to situate this 
within a rationalist perspective. For an exhaustive analysis concerning differences and 
convergences between the two schools of thought, see particularly Critchley (1996 a, b), Dummett 
(1993), Mullarkey (2006), and Patton (2006).      
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within anti-Cartesian philosophies in the same vein as Heraclites, Nietzsche and 
Marx. Although these approaches seem distanced by an insurmountable divide, 
they have nonetheless both introduced new concerns into Spinozan scholarship 
concerning the political meaning of Spinoza's ontological claims in the Ethics, 
thus illuminating the strong continuity between that work and the political 
Treatises. Furthermore, these readings have completely undermined Hegel’s well-
established critique of the Ethics. Hegel described Spinoza’s ontology as a static 
system, within which singularities are mere reflections of the one Substance.  
The reaction to Hegel’s interpretation constitutes a central stage within the 
development of contemporary studies. Hegel has been opposed with a really new 
theorisation of the Ethics, and more generally, of Spinozism as a whole. Whilst 
for Yovel, for example, the error of Hegel’s reading is his misunderstanding of the 
cogency of Spinoza’s rationalist strategy, which paradoxically reveals 
innumerable similarities with Hegel’s own system (Yovel 1992b: 25-50), 
Macherey points out the great challenge that Spinoza presents to Hegel’s ontology 
of transcendence. Spinoza confronts Hegel with a vision of reality as a dynamic 
and powerful system, developed in the absence of negative phases and dialectal 
play (Macherey, 1979: 259-260). Given the importance of Hegel’s reading and its 
centrality to these new approaches to Spinoza, we should turn now to the main 
aspects of his refusal of Spinozism.  
 
Hegel’s critique of the Ethics 
 
Hegel has offered a very rigorous exegesis of past philosophical models 
from the Ancient Greek period to the Modern age, whose reading has been pivotal 
for various successive scholars. When dealing with Spinoza, Hegel launches one 
of the fiercest attacks against the purported illusions of the Ethics, and one that 
has had an enormous resonance through the history of ideas (Macherey, 1979: 17-
40).
 
Nonetheless, Hegel’s critique has been crucial for the affirmation of 
Spinoza’s thesis in many different ways. On the one hand, the marginal position 
of the Ethics within the history of ideas is perhaps due to the influence of Hegel’s 
analysis; yet on the other, its vehemence has fostered an interest in Spinoza’s 
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ontology amongst philosophies that aim to oppose the Idealist paradigm. 
Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s paradigm of monism is possessed of three 
main aspects. Firstly, it is addressed to the notion of Substance as an absolute and 
positive infinity. This is viewed an empty notion, because the Spinozan absolute is 
taken to be the initial phase of the disclosure of Being to the world, and not the 
conclusive state of the realisation of the power of Substance; for Hegel, the latter 
is ultimately subject, as it comes to full self-consciousness through its own 
negative movement (Hegel, 1977: 10). For Hegel, the absence of contrary, 
negative elements within the realm of the absolute implies a motionless system, 
which maintains Substance in a self-reflective position (Hegel, 1955: 261; 1977: 
84-79). Secondly, Hegel’s aim is to refute Spinoza’s theory of parallelism as the 
identity of reality under different dimensions as thought and extension. This 
notion of parallelism involves the inclusion of all its predicates within the essence 
of Substance, and in Hegel’s reading this indicates the effacement of the cogency 
of the world and all singularities within an all-embracing Being (Hegel, 1955: 
281). Hegel’s critique of parallelism, then, leads to his third attack, which 
addresses the issue of individuality. As result of his views on the theory of 
parallelism, and due to his contention that Spinoza's absolute is motionless and 
thus meaningless, Hegel contends that the constitution of the individual is a false 
category. For him, the status of individuality in the Ethics is entirely restrained by 
the all-inclusive Substance.  
It is around these three main arguments of Hegel’s critique outlined above 
that the reaction commonly formulated by contemporary Spinoza’s commentators 
is constructed, and the differing strategies adopted to overcome the limits of the 
Hegelian interpretation mark the divergence of the analytic and continental 
readings. They articulate irreconcilable positions concerning Spinoza’s ontology 
and theory of humankind, from which derive two opposing approaches to his 
political theory. Let us then flesh out, firstly, the arguments raised by the analytic-
rationalist school of thought.  
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2.1 Spinoza according to the analytic school of thought: The Ethics between 
panpsychism and materialism 
 
Analytic scholars classify Spinoza’s metaphysics within the modern 
paradigm of rationalism and also his anthropology and ethics as precursors of 
individualist and, more generally, liberal ideals. For this tradition, the importance 
of the Ethics does not solely reside in its many affinities with the Cartesian and 
Hobbesian models; in addition, its originality is held to reside in the ways in 
which the Ethics overcomes weaknesses present in Descartes’ and Hobbes’ 
systems. In this light, Spinoza’s philosophy is acclaimed as an enhancement and, 
in some cases, even as a radicalisation of Descartes’s thought and, more generally, 
of the seventeenth-century rationalist tradition (see particularly Israel, 2002: 157-
174, 230-327, 591-598; Curley, 1988).   
Primary evidence of Spinoza’s inheritance within the rationalist tradition 
is the geometrical method. During Spinoza’s age, a great number of rationalist and 
empiricist thinkers such as Galileo, Bacon and Descartes were influenced by the 
axiomatic-deductive method, and created their own system of axioms, definitions 
and propositions following this same deductive method. The use of the deductive-
axiomatic method in philosophy and science responds to a precise purpose: 
namely, the attempt to connect human rationality with the observation of nature, 
through which the ultimate cause of reality might be discovered. Spinoza’s 
interest in the geometrical method goes beyond this general cultural tendency.  
Unlike Descartes, for example, who rarely formulates his metaphysical 
reflections in geometrical manner (see, for example, Descartes, 1996), Spinoza’s 
metaphysical enquiry is pervaded by Euclidean geometry. As we have seen, 
Spinoza adopts in his arguments both the logic and the style of a treatise of 
geometry. The analytic school thus concludes that this method does not merely 
reflect a style of espousing philosophical claims, but rather that it is philosophical 
in itself (Curley, 1988: 3-10; Bennett, 1984: 16-28).  This is the base of Spinoza’s 
rationalism. The geometrical method offers Spinoza the possibility of discovering 
the generative principles of the universe without requiring the support of 
transcendental principles and obscure 'truths'. It also provides the philosophical 
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investigation with new theoretical instruments that are held to be able to disclose 
the rational structure of Substance-nature.  
One of the central and common arguments that characterises the analytic 
interpretation is the importance accorded to the notion of universal causation. This 
is the key concept for understanding Spinoza’s paradigm of monism. It drives the 
notions of immanence, nature, absolute infinity, attribute and mode, which imply 
a complex system that extends the rationality of Substance to the entire order of 
reality. It is in this context that the great modernity of Spinoza’s rationalist gesture 
lies: for he replaces the theological figure of the Creator, the Aristotelian prime 
motor and the pantheist model with an innovative paradigm of rationality.   
In this interpretation of Spinoza, the attribute acquires a central role. The 
attribute is not a separate essence and is not caused by other attributes, but rather 
exclusively by Substance. Attributes share and co-participate in the unity of 
Substance, and together they compose the totality of Substance’s essence, in a 
manner in which the existence of one requires the presence of the others (Curley, 
1988: 23-36). It is precisely the absolute and positive infinity of God (as 
postulated in part I, definition VI), the analytic approach concludes, that expresses 
this specific nexus between attributes (Bennett, 1984: 60-77; Smith, 2003: 31-36). 
As a result, the domain of Substance reveals a well-connected and unitary system, 
within which each element logically follows and inheres one with the other.  
In this fashion, the inclusion of nature and matter within the realm of 
Substance further enriches Spinoza’s paradigm of determinism. Nature is not 
conceived as a chaotic place, within which phenomena arise unpredictably, thus 
precluding their comprehension; rather, Spinoza affirms that the emergence of 
every event and being within the world derives from a precise concatenation of 
causes and effects, which is entirely intelligible by the human being (E. I, ax. III, 
IV). Given this determinist structure, the domain of nature becomes recognised as 
a composite body characterised by a linear process, which expresses the 
rationality of reality as whole. As nature is characterised by causal order, the 
analysis of its mechanism proceeds through the distinction between cause and 
effect, which entails solely the lumen naturalis (rational faculty) possessed by 
every man (E. I, Appendix). 
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Spinoza’s radical model of rationalism 
  
If commentators are mostly in agreement about the rationalist character of 
Spinoza’s model of monism, it is, however, the definition of this form of 
rationalism that moves them towards diverse positions. These might be grouped 
into two principal theses. One identifies Spinoza’s model of rationalism with a 
form of conceptual determinism; the other highlights the materialist foundation of 
his metaphysics. The stimulating debate inaugurated by Bennett and Curley 
exemplifies these two tendencies within the analytic school. Bennett stresses the 
logical aspect of the Ethics, whereas Curley insists on the materialist and 
empiricist elements within Spinoza’s conception of Substance-nature. The 
controversy derives from the different conclusions that the two thinkers draw 
from Spinoza’s thesis of parallelism, and, specifically, from the way in which they 
connect this to his general system of universal causation. This pertains to the 
meaning and function of the mental and the material respectively, and to the 
degree to which one aspect of reality may dominate the other.  
In his book A study of the Ethics, Bennett offers a very original thesis. The 
formula of parallelism, he claims, tends towards a dualist vision of reality 
(Bennett, 1984: 41-49). Accordingly, there is no causal flow between thought and 
extension. This is supported particularly by Axiom V and Proposition X and its 
scholium in part I, where Spinoza affirms that attributes have to be considered in 
themselves and not in something else. Therefore, thought does not imply 
extension and vice versa; rather, they inhere within two really distinct orders. Yet 
where the axioms and propositions of part I postulate the distinction between 
attributes, proposition VII in part II suggests a certain form of equality between 
thought and extension. Bennett resolves the question by ascribing the principle of 
identity to the properties of the two attributes, rather than to the attributes 
themselves: for him, it is not ideas and bodies that are identical, but their 
structures. The principle of identity does not then imply a causal nexus between 
thought and matter and their relating modes, but an equality between their 
systems, and thus also the modality by which they constitute the essence of 
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Substance.  
The conclusions that Bennett draws from his interpretation of the thesis of 
parallelism are innovative and radical in form, opening up an alternative 
understanding of Spinoza’s ontology. A paradigm of panpsychism, he claims, lies 
at the very heart of Spinoza’s notion of parallelism. By this, Bennett means that 
the order of the mental dominates that of extended reality. This derives not from 
proposition VII, where the official thesis of parallelism is formulated, but rather 
from part II, proposition XII. This proposition contains Spinoza’s extensive 
explanation for parallelism, which in turn coincides with his panpsychist position 
(Bennett, 1984: 127-149); as Spinoza writes, “Whatever happens in the object of 
the idea constituting the human mind is bound to be perceived by the human 
mind; […]. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is 
a body, nothing can happen in that body without its being perceived by the mind” 
(E. II, prop. XII). For Bennett, this proposition explains that it is not the body 
itself that is the first object of the mind, but rather the idea of that body. This 
would reinstate the predominance of the mental over extended reality, thereby 
reinforcing the panpsychist thesis (Bennett, 1984: 135-139). 
In the same vein, but with less radical tones, Smith and Della Rocca have 
viewed the theory of parallelism as entailing the superiority of the attribute of 
thought over that of extension. Without expressly corroborating Bennett’s thesis 
of panpsychism, however, they suggest that the correspondence between thought 
and extension implies the dominance of the mental order upon the material aspect 
of reality (Smith, 2003: 63-69); a dominance that they hold to be explicated at the 
micro-level through the mind-body thesis. Smith reads Spinoza’s theory of the 
unity between mind and body as an account of a complex correspondence, within 
which the mind progressively acquires knowledge and control over the body 
(Smith, 2003: 69-93). This would explain Spinoza’s thesis of the eternity of the 
mind (E. II, prop. XLVII and scholium), and also his affirmation in part III of the 
autonomy of the mind from the body (E.III, prop. II) (Smith, 2003: 63-72).  
Moreover, the superiority of the mind over the body is further supported 
by Spinoza’s definition of falsity as a privation of knowledge. Falsity is a state of 
the mind, in which the latter is restrained by the body’s activity, and regards 
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external events in their contingency rather than through the laws of universal 
causation. Therefore, the mind, when free from the body, is not so limited and 
perceives the universe in its necessity. As Spinoza states, the mind has the 
capacity to consider the world 'in the light of eternity' (E. II, prop. XLIV, 
corollary II). The primary consequence of this is that the three kinds of knowledge 
describe the path of the mind towards the achievement of freedom and control 
over the states of the body. Therefore, Spinoza holds an extremely powerful 
account of rationality, which has an intimate relation with the essence of 
Substance through the attribute of thought (Smith, 2003: 86-93).  
Della Rocca (2008) has raised original arguments recently, concerning the 
very meaning of the theories of universal causation, the mind and the three kinds 
of knowledge. He has conceived these notions as precursors of the principle of 
sufficient reason, considering Spinoza’s metaphysics to be closer to Leibniz’s 
account than to Cartesian philosophy. For Della Rocca, Spinoza’s conception of 
the structure of the universe as a strict chain of cause and effect and his definition 
of God as thinking being mean that there necessarily exist an adequate cause 
(reason) for every event; the understanding of an event thus depends on 
knowledge of its cause. Given his attention to the causal aspects of Spinoza’s 
ontology of Substance, Della Rocca’s interpretation suggests that the system of 
determinism explained in the Ethics expresses logical structure more than any 
empiricist characteristics (Della Rocca, 2008:33-78). It is for this reason that 
Della Rocca’s position, in my view, might be situated in close proximity to 
Bennett’s panpsychist thesis. Besides their specific conclusions, both thinkers 
stress the conceptual form of determinism of Spinoza’s monist ontology, thus 
privileging the mental in respect to the material. In this way, the two authors reject 
any alliance with materialist readings of Spinoza. A position more open towards a 
materialist interpretation of the Ethics within the analytic school is advanced, as 
we will discuss below, by Curley. Maintaining a rationalist view, he envisages in 
Spinoza’s arguments a strong materialist component that would invalidate 
panpsychist and mentalist interpretations.  
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Materialist elements within Spinoza’s rationalist metaphysics  
 
In contrast to both these mentalist and panpsychist positions, Curley 
affirms that the model of parallelism consolidates Spinoza’s form of rationalist 
materialism. For Curley the formula of parallelism indicates a one-to-one 
correspondence between the modes of thought and extension, constructed around 
the conceptual difference between the two attributes (Curley,1988: 62-73). This 
difference reconciles the argument of non-causality between attributes with the 
principle of identity that emerges in proposition VII and, more generally, from 
Spinoza's monism. If the two attributes of thought and extension and their related 
modes are only distinct from one another conceptually, then they do not stand as 
two really different substances; rather, they both fall within the infinite perfection 
of God, thereby expressing his essence. Thus, extension is not cast as an inferior 
or dominant dimension of reality, but is instead ontologically equal to thought. As 
an expression of Substance’s essence, matter acquires a powerful status. The 
perfection of Substance is developed through the rational nexus of cause and 
effect, and this latter is embodied by matter, one of the attributes of Substance; 
this attribute thus reflects in a certain and determinate manner the rationality of 
whole. It is precisely in this context that Spinoza’s paradigm of materialism lies. 
Curley’s approach to the concept of parallelism is central for understanding 
Spinoza’s theory of mind-body unity.  
According to part II proposition XIII, the mind’s first object is its body. 
This means that in the human being the production of ideas is fundamentally 
bound to the capacity of an existing body. In this way, the more the mind becomes 
aware of the states of its body the more adequate the knowledge of itself and the 
external world becomes. The various levels of awareness of the mind, Curley 
suggests, correspond to the three kinds of knowledge. In the state of imagination, 
the mind has a confused understanding of the body's capacities. Therefore, 
Spinoza’s theory of the mind and, more generally, the formula of parallelism, 
Curley concludes, are closer to the materialist tradition than to mentalist or 
dualistic arguments (Curley, 1998: 67-78).  
A materialist vision of Spinoza’s theories of parallelism and of the unity of 
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mind and body is also supported by Hampshire (2005), who offers a materialist 
explanation of Spinoza’s metaphysics that might be best situated at the crossroads 
between the analytic and continental readings. Hampshire suggests that Spinoza’s 
form of materialism does not merely affirm the superiority of the material over the 
mental. More significantly, the physical universe in Spinoza's model of 
materialism, Hampshire explains, is not conceived as a linear concatenation of 
cause and effect. Rather, Spinoza upholds an extremely dynamic and active 
conception of matter, which greatly exceeds a mechanical model of matter 
(Hampshire, 2005:55-70).   
    
Critical reflections on the analytic exegesis of the Ethics  
 
The portrait of Spinoza offered by the analytic approach has brought about 
the re-discovery of the power of thought and rationality within his ontology. This 
is the leading motor of Spinoza’s system of reality, which informs Substance, 
nature and all existing being. Related to the human context, rationality is 
explicated through the potentiality of the mind, which owns the contents truth, 
freedom, virtue and eternity. As we have seen, these notions, taken together with 
the axiomatic-deductive method, are assumed to be fundamental to Spinoza’s 
rationalist metaphysics. However, there are other aspects of parts I and II of the 
Ethics, which do not express immediate rationalist meanings. These are the theory 
of parallelism, the definition of matter as one of the attributes of Substance, and 
the twofold status of nature (naturing nature and natured nature). As discussed 
above, the study of these concepts has divided analytic scholars into mentalist and 
materialist currents. This division is centred on the dispute concerning the very 
values of thought and extension within Spinoza’s ontology. The controversy 
between Bennett and Curley greatly exemplifies these tendencies. In my view, 
and as I will argue below, these different interpretations indicate the impossibility 
of completely assimilating Spinoza’s philosophy into the analytic school.  
If we re-consider Spinoza’s metaphysics through an alternative strategy 
we might discover a conceptual nucleus different from the one sustained by 
analytic scholars; and I would suggest that just such a strategy can be constructed 
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around the categories of the absolute, power and immanence, which drive the 
notions of necessity, attribute and nature. The re-consideration of these concepts, I 
will argue, reveals a distinctive system of causality that includes elements of 
contingency, and multiplicity, and which escapes the rationalist logic tout court. 
In order to demonstrate the relevance of this new strategy, we need first to 
examine the problematic aspects posed by the analytic reading of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of Substance and specifically his treatment of matter.   
To begin with, Spinoza’s move of including matter within the realm of 
Substance might be interpreted as the elevation of the category of extension to the 
status of attribute, thereby ascribing to it the qualities of infinity, eternity, 
indivisibility and autonomy (the latter stemming from the non-causal links 
between attributes) (E. I, prop. XV, scholium). Assuming the analytic approach, 
Substance expresses absolute necessity, and this means a rational development. 
Therefore, as one of Substance's attributes matter holds in a certain and 
determinate way rationality too. Similarly, Spinoza’s definition of nature might be 
easily explained as the consolidation of his model of determinism. Nature, in its 
aspect of naturing nature, might be identified with rationalist meanings. As 
naturing nature, this corresponds to God intended as free cause (E. I, prop. XXIX, 
scholium). According to the general analytic reading, a free cause involves a 
system of determinism and absolute rationality. Considered as a free cause, nature 
thus expresses this universal rationality. Up to this point, therefore, the analytic 
argument is strongly defensible. 
However, nature is also described by Spinoza as natured nature. As 
natured nature, nature embraces all the existing modes derived from the attributes 
(E. I, prop. XXIX, scholium), and this introduces elements of contingency into the 
determinist system. Contingency emerges from the constitution of the mode. 
Although the mode is the outcome of a causal chain, taken in itself, it is finite; 
more significantly, its nature does not involve “necessary existence” (E. I, prop. 
XXIV; E. II, ax. I; see also Deleuze, 1992: 201-215). As a set of all existing 
modes, natured nature consequently involves a certain degree of contingency, 
which weakens the rigid causal flow. Certainly, this does not entirely invalidate 
the rationalist thesis; yet nonetheless, the presence of natured nature within 
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Substance makes any attempt to frame it in strictly analytic terms somewhat 
problematic.   
With the theme of parallelism, the ontological nucleus of the Ethics 
becomes considerably more difficult to read through analytic lenses. The theory of 
parallelism establishes the similarity, and not the identity, between the structures 
of thought and matter. Some analytic scholars (Bennett amongst others), as we 
have seen, tend to attribute dualist implications to the formula of parallelism. On 
this view, the thesis of parallelism is understood via a literal, geometric meaning, 
i.e. as indicating two lines that never intersect each other. The claims of part II, 
proposition VII are explained in terms of the similarity between the anatomies of 
thought and extension; the attributes themselves thus remain two really distinct 
properties of Substance-nature.  
However, as soon as we read the corollary of proposition VII, the 
hypothesis of the division between the two attributes of thought and extension 
becomes less convincing. For Spinoza, the formula of parallelism is not exclusive 
to thought and matter, but is instead characteristic of every attribute (E. II, prop. 
VII, scholium). Thus, it is not only matter and thought that possess a parallel 
equilibrium, but also the whole infinite range of Substance's attributes. 
Consequently, if Spinoza’s model of parallelism involves a dualist split, then there 
must also be countless other dualist splits between all other attributes. Given the 
monist argument affirmed in part I of the Ethics, this would be absurd. Therefore, 
the theory of parallelism does not indicate a move towards dualism on Spinoza's 
part, but rather expresses his complex unitary vision of reality. 
From this perspective, the unity of reality is erected upon the inclusion of 
nature within the essence of Substance, where the orderly attributes of thought 
and extension equally express the development of this perpetual rational 
mechanism. In this way, thought and extension mirror indistinctly the totality of 
Substance, and are absorbed within its domain. The two attributes do not actively 
constitute distinct modalities of Being and are no longer independent and 
qualitatively different one from another. To be more precise, matter and thought 
become somewhat interchangeable, and the result is that matter, somewhat 
paradoxically, thus lacks materiality. In order to faithfully maintain an analytic 
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exegesis of the Ethics matter therefore has to be rationalised and entirely 
incorporated within the mental structure. In other words, what lies at the outset of 
the general analytical interpretation, on my reading, is a tendency towards a 
mentalisation of Spinoza’s notion of matter. 
   This tendency to read a mentalisation of matter and nature into Spinoza's 
metaphysics is common to the two principal analytic interpretations of the Ethics, 
the materialist and mentalist approaches. As already discussed, Curley holds that 
Spinoza’s rationalist metaphysics comes close to a materialist position, where 
matter abandons its contingent and indeterminate traits and acquires a more 
rational dimension. Matter thus becomes entirely intelligible through the 
understanding of its causal mechanism (Curley, 1988: 42-78). By contrast, for 
Bennett and Smith, Spinoza’s form of rationalism is foreign to any materialist 
discourse: in their view, it presents a more mentalist account of reality, within 
which the material aspect reflects and is driven by its mental counterpart (Bennett, 
1984: 125-151; Smith, 2003: 63-86).  
Besides the different conclusions, these two currents are symptomatic of a 
more general difficulty encountered by the analytic engagement with Spinoza. 
This refers to the impossibility of entirely translating Spinozist matter into an 
analytic language. Matter is the fundamental problem with which an analytic 
reader of the Ethics is confronted. In both the materialist and mentalistic 
tendencies, matter is identified with the structure of thought and, in some cases, 
even subjected to the mental. Matter is treated, I would argue, as the disturbing 
category, which perturbs the linear and necessary flow of Substance. As a result, 
in the two readings, whether materialist or mentalist, extended reality acquires a 
marginal status.  
As mentioned above, a radicalisation of this tendency is expressed by 
Bennett, whose hypothesis I shall return to below.  Bennett envisages in Spinoza’s 
ontology a panpsychist component, which emerges from the theories of 
parallelism and the mind. For Bennett, these conceptions together with the notions 
of universal causation and the autonomy of the attribute do not imply the identity 
of matter with thought, but rather the strict dependence of the material upon the 
mental aspect of reality. This is further corroborated by Spinoza’s proposition of 
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the necessary existence of an idea for any given body, and conversely by the 
impossibility of extended beings without ideal aspects. Strictly speaking, there 
cannot exist bodies without ideas, and there can be no ideas without bodies 
(Bennett, 1984: 127-149).  
If the material cannot be conceived without its mental parallel, in my view, 
matter would occupy a mere reflective status. Matter would mirror the structure 
and development of thought. If this is the case, then if taken in itself the attribute 
of extension would constitute an empty category, for which the attainment of 
meaning requires a form of sublimation into thought. In this light, Spinoza’s 
ontology of matter would echo to some extent the Hegelian phase of the objective 
mind. Certainly, this possibility goes beyond Bennett’s argument, but I do think 
this notion of Hegelian sublimation is the risk run by the panpsychist thesis. 
Furthermore, the dependency of the material upon the mental would contradict 
Spinoza’s definition of the autonomy between attributes and, more importantly, 
their modal difference, by which attributes are distinguished through grades of 
reality and the ways in which these latter express Substance.  
Bennett’s thesis has further implications at the macro-level. If the mental 
is the precondition to all beings and events in the world, one would be led to 
identify Substance with thought. The question that then arises from this 
hypothesis would then be as to how we could think the relation between 
Substance and nature. How might we consider the two aspects of nature, 
especially that of natured nature? Given the priority of the mental, the result may 
be the effacement of nature within an all-inclusive and thinking Substance, which 
in turn would culminate in the negation of the consistency of the material world as 
such. In this way, Bennett’s thesis of panpsychism, I would argue, comes closer to 
the Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s ontology as a paradigm of acosmism, for which 
Spinozist Substance involves the dissolution of the world and all singular beings 
within the “abyss” of the absolute identity (Hegel, 1955: 281).  
Finally, Bennett’s thesis of the dominance of the mental upon extended 
reality insinuates a certain form of higher rationality, or an agency that exists 
beyond the universe, orienting and reconciling a meaningless nature with the 
perfection of thought. This would conflict with Spinoza’s denials of free will and 
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of the creation ex nihilo, as well as his affirmation of the genesis of reality moved 
by an immanent, necessary and powerful cause. In order to free matter from this 
marginal status, we might attempt to read the Ethics from the alternative 
perspective that I spoke of above, which draws attention to the notions of absolute 
infinity, power and immanence. It is not a lack of disregarding the concepts of 
necessity, universal causation and thought but of re-configuring them within a 
new standpoint.  
 
Re-thinking Spinoza’s notion of the absolute: Towards a dynamic materialist 
ontology 
 
As we have seen, the analytic reading deduces Spinoza’s paradigm of 
rationalism mostly from the analysis of Substance in its aspects of necessity; from 
the refusals of free will and plurality of essence; from the non causality between 
attributes, and from universal causality. According to the latter, there is a cause 
for any given event: a sufficient reason that always explains that event's existence. 
This approach tends to view the notions of immanence, absolute infinity and 
power as direct consequences of Spinoza’s theory of universal causation: for the 
centrality given to causality would lead one to read Spinoza’s theory of Substance 
as a circular and static system, within which the emergence of beings and various 
phenomena is entirely embedded within the causal logic of an all-inclusive and 
rational Being.  
However, if we begin our study with the analysis of absolute infinity, 
immanence and power and combine these with the necessity of God, we might 
discover the great dynamism of Spinoza’s system of reality. Before claiming the 
necessity of Substance, Spinoza poses its positive and absolute infinity (E. I, Def. 
VI). The centrality of this notion emerges more strongly from its explanation, as 
Spinoza goes on to address the theme of multiplicity, and relates this to the 
absolute character of Substance. Substance is absolute because it is formed by an 
infinity of attributes. By definition, the attribute is a modality of Being such as 
matter and thought, which describes the many ways in which Substance is (E. I, 
Def. IV, prop. XI). These render Substance unlimited and positive. Multiplicity 
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derives precisely from the explanation to definition VI. This establishes the 
decisive role played by the infinity of the attributes for configuring the 
absoluteness of Being. To put this in more contemporary fashion, Spinoza’s 
conception of the infinity of the attributes might be perfectly explained through 
the category of multiplicity (see particularly, Deleuze, 1992: 41-82; Macherey, 
1997: 65-87).  
It is the multiplicity of the attributes that founds the absolute anatomy of 
Substance. Therefore, the absolute is not a mere sum of its parts; instead, those 
parts (attributes) compose the absolute. The role of the attribute is therefore 
extremely crucial. The attributes allow Substance to pass from a self-reflective 
dimension, where this is defined as causa sui (E. I, Def. I), towards a more 
articulated state. Put differently, Substance is not only self-generative being but 
also it is through the attributes dynamic and multisided. Given that Substance 
constitutes the highest degree of reality, we might affirm that the infinity of 
attributes comes to shape the entire order of reality (E. I, prop. IX). In this way, 
reality is not a linear and static unity, but rather a diversified system. 
Taken in itself, the absolute is a powerful concept, which allows Spinoza 
to combine, within a unique order, necessity and rationality on the one hand, and 
the multiple forms that reality might assume on the other. Absolute infinity 
implies in itself the notion of necessity, without degenerating into a linear system. 
It is the positive dimension of absolute infinity, I would argue, that articulates the 
aspect of necessity and not vice versa, and it gives to the entire system a 
determinate and somewhat inescapable structure. As we have seen, the analytic 
reading tends to consider the absolute as an implication of the notion of necessity, 
and as the totality of the attributes. The result is that Substance is defined as 
absolute necessity (Bennett, 1984: 111-124). By contrast, rehabilitating the 
absolute from the concept of necessity enables us to recognise that Substance 
involves an all-inclusive and determinate system together with a multisided and 
dynamic being. It is for this reason that the notion of the absolute is the key 
concept for understanding the constitution of Spinoza’s ontology. 
If as I maintain absolute infinity is the starting point for examining 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, the notions of immanence and power acquire a decisive 
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position. These two elements indicate the ways in which Spinoza’s system is not 
solely rational and multisided but also productive. Specifically, Spinoza states, 
that “God is the immanent cause of all the things” (E. I, prop. XVIII). This 
proposition does not only involve the replacements of the anthropomorphic idea 
of God and free-will with the establishment of a well-ordered system. For 
Spinoza, God is not only a free and necessary cause but also immanent. The 
meaning of cause suggests a certain idea of activity and production. Besides its 
resulting effect, a cause is implicitly connected with the aspect of force, and is 
seen as a productive gesture. In the Ethics, the theme of cause is considerably 
more complicated, as there it is combined with notions of immanence and 
causality. As a result, reality does not involve a solely causal chain: more 
importantly, it means productivity. This could however be taken to imply a linear 
and fixed mechanism.  
In order to dissipate any tendency towards immobility from his 
metaphysics of Substance, Spinoza identifies the essence of Substance with a 
more universal and indeterminate category, that is, power (E. I, prop. XXXIV; E. 
II, prop. VII, corollary). Power involves an action of production. Substance is 
qualified by power in its universal meaning. This means that Substance does not 
only embody causal production, but also opens it up to different and unexpected 
ways of production. As we already know, the attributes that shape Substance’s 
essence are infinite, and thus so too are the expressions of this force. If we re-
configure Spinoza’s propositions of power and immanence within the absolute 
examined above, the constitution and genesis of reality becomes recognised as an 
extremely powerful and multisided order.   
Therefore, the strategy, I have advanced here and will further expand in 
the concluding section of this chapter, has allowed us to discover the great 
dynamism of Spinoza’s system of reality. This is constructed around the 
categories of the absolute, immanence, power and the multiplicity of the 
attributes. It is precisely in this context that my reading differs from the analytic 
interpretation discussed above and pertains to the continental reading examined 
below. Whilst analytic scholars such as Curley, Bennett and Smith consider 
rationality as central element within Spinoza’s metaphysics, I assume the category 
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of the absolute as the starting point of the theory of Substance. This move has 
allowed my enquiry to emphasise elements of contingency, multiplicity and 
heterogeneity present in Spinoza’s account of reality, which importantly do not 
contradict the general system of universal causation. More significantly, the re-
positioning of the centrality of the absolute has enabled us to escape the risk of 
prioritising one element upon the others such as thought upon matter. In this 
sense, we have overcome the problem of a mentalisatisation of matter and, more 
generally, the whole reality. By contrast, I have claimed, Spinoza’s account of 
reality is extremely diversified and powerful body, in which thought and matter 
equally play a fundamental role within the actualisation of Substance. 
It is around the view of Spinoza’s Substance as a manifold and productive 
system that continental philosophy constructs its interpretation of the Ethics. Here 
the reading is centred upon the re-assessment of the notions of immanence, 
attribute, matter, nature, parallelism, and power. As we will discuss below, 
philosophers such as Deleuze, Macherey, Negri and Balibar read the same 
propositions of the Ethics that Curley, Smith and Bennett claim to be great 
examples of rationalism. They however discover powerful anti-rationalist 
categories of thought, which delineate Spinoza’s distinct model of materialism. It 
is to an analysis of these interpretations that I now turn. 
 
3. Reading the Ethics in the twentieth-century continental thought 
 
The engagement of continental thought with Spinoza is undeniably a 
distinctive one. This interest emerges from a more general discontent that initially 
emerged within the French academic milieu, which questioned the authority of the 
philosophies of Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. Twentieth-century 
French philosophy contested the reduction of the spontaneity of human 
subjectivity to a rational structure or transcendent principle that would explain the 
formation of knowledge in terms of a one-sided relation between subject and 
object. The treatment of matter as an object ignores the multiform order of nature, 
which exceeds the subject-object schema. This implies, on the one hand, the loss 
of the multiple factors, which generate thoughts such as desire, imagination and 
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also relations. On the other, the decrease of the status of the material world under 
the supremacy of a rational subject involves the dismissal of the multiple ways in 
which the world and subject are interconnected. In order to escape the divide 
between subject and object, and in order to also re-configure the meaning of 
matter, Spinoza became an important reference point for many continental 
philosophers, alongside those of Nietzsche and Marx. 
8
 
My discussion here will not venture into the disputes surrounding French 
thought during the twentieth century. My focus lies on the role played by the 
rediscovery of Spinoza’s ontology within continental philosophy, and the extent 
to which this was utilised to develop a new approach to materialism. The novelty 
of the twentieth-century’s engagement with Spinoza concerns not only the 
definition of Spinoza’s philosophy as a form of materialism, which as signalled 
above has been already asserted by some analytic readers. Rather, it is the 
inclusion of Spinoza’s thought within a different materialist tradition, in the same 
line with pre-Socratic philosophies and, especially, anti-rationalist models. 
In this context, Althusser’s claim that in order to read Marx it was 
necessary to embark upon a “detour of Marx via Spinoza” is an important one 
(Althusser, 1976: 142). It has enriched Marxist studies of society and placed 
Spinoza’s philosophy in the foreground (Althusser, 1976: 142; Montag, 1999: 
XIII-XXI, 119-123). Following Althusser’s suggestion, for thinkers such as 
Matheron (1988), Macherey (1979), Deleuze (1992, 1998), Balibar (1998) and 
Negri (1998), the turn to Spinoza’s philosophy signified the possibility of rescuing 
Marxist materialism from the negative logic of dialectics, and from certain 
positivist interpretations (Montag, 1999: XI-XXI). Twentieth-century thought 
finds thoughtful conceptions of the world, humankind, affectivity and rationality 
in Spinoza's theses, which, when combined with the political Treatises' themes 
regarding the critique of religious ideology and the role of the masses in politics, 
might further enrich Marxist materialism and its philosophy of praxis. Spinoza 
opens the way to a different mode of theorising the relations between individuals 
and the material forces of production, affording a means of presenting them in a 
manner that operates in the absence of conflicts and negative phases (Macherey, 
                                                 
8
For an engaging account of the question of the subject within contemporary French philosophy, 
particularly in Althusser, Derrida, Foucault and Lacan, see Williams (2001). 
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1979: 259-260).  
The re-situating of Spinoza’s philosophy within a diverse intellectual 
milieu contributed to the affirmation of the autonomy of his theses from 
Descartes, Hobbes and, more generally, the seventeenth-century metaphysical 
tradition. Whilst Spinoza’s ontology was associated with Cartesian philosophy, 
his political thought was associated with that of Thomas Hobbes. The inclusion of 
Spinoza’s ontological thesis within the Cartesian paradigm derived in part from 
his study of Descartes and the use of Cartesian vocabularies in the Ethics. The 
strong Cartesian tradition in France, indicated above, to which Spinoza was 
inevitably associated, was also responsible for this assimilation. On the other 
hand, the assimilation of Spinoza’s political theory to that of Hobbes was 
motivated by the focus of both philosophers upon the notion of the contract as the 
origin of the civil society.
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It is within this novel approach to Spinoza’s writings that this present 
study is situated, and it seeks to bring into the existing debate new, further 
directions. Building upon the continental interpretation of Spinoza as an 
innovative form of materialism, the concluding section of this chapter will return 
to the notions of the absolute, attribute, power and immanence discussed above, 
arguing that Spinoza’s ontology of Substance reveals an anomalous process of 
production. This argument is constructed around the notions of multiplicity, 
contingency and necessity, through which his materialist ontology comes to light.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
Spinoza assumes the origin of the body politic from a collective pact between individuals. For 
Hobbes, instead, the contract derives from an act of subjection of singular men to the authority of 
the Leviathan. However, for Negri and Balibar, the model of the social contact represents only a 
stage within the evolution of Spinoza’s political thought, which will be replaced by the theory of 
consensus espoused in the later Political Treatise, see Balibar (1998) and Negri (1998). These 
themes of contract and consensus will be investigated in chapters III and IV.    
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3.1 Re-thinking materialism in the light of Spinoza 
 
Continental Spinozist studies' recognition of the Ethics' potential status as 
a materialist ontology is indebted to the reflections of Deleuze and Macherey, 
which have greatly influenced the works of thinkers such as Negri and Balibar. 
Deleuze (1988; 1992) and Macherey (1997; 1979) have brought to light the 
complexity of the notions of absolute infinity, the attribute and mode, immanence, 
parallelism and power. These are the cornerstone around which Spinoza’s 
materialist ontology is constructed. The portrait of Spinoza inaugurated by 
Deleuze and Macherey, and which has been developed further by other 
continental philosophers, is strongly opposed to that presented by the analytic 
readings. One of the primary elements that marks this opposition is the meaning 
given to the geometrical method employed in the Ethics.  
Deleuze observes that the order of the scholia differs greatly from those of 
the propositions and definitions, and thus finds two conceptual levels within the 
Ethics. For Deleuze, the structure of the Ethics does not proceed in a linear way 
from definitions to propositions, which would be further clarified in the scholia. 
The scholia, instead, follow their own logic and are disconnected from 
propositions and definitions. He envisages a subterranean content within the 
Ethics, which expresses the authentic thesis of Spinoza’s ontology. Deleuze 
concludes that the radical notions of Spinoza’s ontology lie secretly in the scholia, 
which formulate the real constitution of Being as a plane of immanence (Deleuze, 
1997: 21-32). Like Deleuze, Negri also recognizes a theoretical difference 
between the sections of the Ethics. For Negri, this corresponds to a systemic 
caesura, which he refers to Spinoza’s turn from a Platonic position towards a 
materialist one. In this sense, Spinoza’s theory of Substance expresses the 
persistence of Platonic elements within Spinoza’s thought, wherein his ontology is 
still a reflection upon reality. In contrast, Spinoza’s conceptions of the attributes 
and modes in parts II, III and IV, delineate his passage to a materialistic project, 
which is concerned with the constitution of reality (Negri, 1998: 54-107).  
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Deleuze encounters Spinoza: The plane of immanence
10
 
 
Passing from the geometrical method to the paradigm of monism, 
Deleuze’s exegesis of Spinoza’s theory of Substance occupies a crucial role 
within the continental re-consideration of the Ethics as a materialist ontology, and 
to which the present study is largely indebted. Deleuze’s enquiry reveals the 
distinctive materialist foundation of the Ethics, indicating how Spinoza’s ideas 
meet the demands of post-modernity. In order to determine the peculiarity of 
Spinoza’s materialist ontology, Deleuze employs the theory of ontological 
expressionism. In Deleuze’s reformulation, the meaning of expression denotes an 
attributive role and involves the functions of differentiating and actualising. The 
strategy of expressionism enables Deleuze to analyse the meaning and role of 
each component of Spinoza’s ontology, i.e. the meaning underlying its parts rather 
than the whole. Following this logic, for Deleuze, Spinoza’s model of monism is 
centred on a triad, where “substance expresses itself, attributes are expressions, 
and essence is expressed” Deleuze (1992: 27). 
In this light, Deleuze draws attention to every element of the Ethics, which 
is expressive of something. As Spinoza begins by ascribing to the attribute the role 
of expressing the infinity of God (E.I, Def. VI), Deleuze focuses upon the relation 
between Substance and attributes, which is explained in the definition of the 
absolute (E.I, Def. VI). Deleuze observes that the positive character of the 
absolute is constructed around a new ontology of difference. This conception of 
difference develops two modes of thinking distinction, the numerical and the one 
in kind. In the Ethics, difference is understood, Deleuze claims, as modal, and 
through this absolute infinity is actualised in its parts (E. I, prop. XV, Scholium). 
Put differently, the absolute cannot be distinguished either numerically or 
qualitatively; it must follow an alternative mechanism of differentiation (Deleuze, 
1992: 27-95).  
                                                 
10
 Discussions surrounding Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza have been multi-sided. The main 
problem, which still divides Spinozist and Deleuzian scholars to some extent, arises as to whether 
Deleuze forces the arguments of the Ethics in order to affirm his thesis; or whether it is rather 
Spinoza’s ontology that grounds such fundamentally Deleuzian notions as difference, immanence, 
body and desire. Concerning these questions, see particularly Hardt (1993: IX-XV, 56-111), 
Macherey (1998: 117-124), Howie (2002) and Zizek (2004). 
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In definition VI of the absolute, Spinoza tells the reader that the absolute 
status of Substance derives from the infinite number of attributes that express its 
essence. In turn, by definition, attributes are real existences, which delineate 
modes of Being (E. I, prop. XV, scholium). Given the centrality of the attributes, 
Deleuze concludes that the relation between Being and its parts is structured 
through the rules of modal difference, which is crucially real: it is real because 
attributes are existences, and these actualise the essence of God, and it is modal 
because they express a specific level of reality. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s account of 
difference has a further implication. The notion of difference is not only 
descriptive of a particular state of reality, but more significantly it is productive 
(Deleuze, 1992: 191-215). Attributes, as we have seen, express the essence of 
Being, that is, power. The role of actualising and differentiating Substance is 
directly connected with the function of producing. In this light, the role of the 
attribute becomes that of expressing the power of Substance (Deleuze, 1992: 41-
67).
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Given that the absolute expresses the multiplicity and actuality of the 
attributes, and given also that these actualise the power of Substance within 
nature, nature is not a dimension of Being, but rather a powerful body. If 
Spinoza’s account of the absolute implies a vision of the world as a living being, 
this would seem to introduce a subjective account of nature, wherein nature is 
idealised and consequently lacks materiality. In order to dispel any doubt, Deleuze 
develops the idea of the plane of immanence, which is the core of his reading of 
the Ethics as well as that of his own philosophy. Deleuze deduces the notion of 
the plane of immanence by connecting Spinoza’s definition of the absolute, the 
theory of parallelism, and the notion of difference (Deleuze, 1992: 99-143, 169-
186).   
As a plane of immanence, Spinoza’s theory of Substance becomes 
recognised as a unique plane of reality, which enfolds a variety of bodies, 
thoughts and forces. In this plane of immanence, nature, matter and thought 
acquire novel meanings and powerful roles. Nature is not only a dynamic and 
differentiated body, it is also the domain of thought. This results from Spinoza’s 
                                                 
11Spinoza’s ontology of the modal difference would impact strongly upon Deleuze’s own 
philosophy; see Hardt (1993: 59-66). 
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thesis of parallelism, which, in Deleuze’s re-formulation, involves the withdrawal 
of thought from the dimension of the ideal to the concrete realm of nature. For 
Deleuze, the great achievement of Spinoza’s theory of parallelism is its account of 
ideas and, more generally, its presentation of thought in terms of actual and 
productive forms, as opposed to static and predetermined archetypes. In turn, 
matter acquires a crucial role: it does not denote a mechanical sequence of 
physical phenomena, but a complex process shaped by contingent modes and 
movements (Deleuze, 1992: 99-113, 169-180). It is the plane of immanence, 
Deleuze fiercely concludes, that lies at the very heart of Spinoza’s ontology, and 
which reveals his paradigm of materialism (Deleuze, 2001: 26; 1988: 122-130).  
Deleuze’s claims as to the existence of the plane of immanence within the 
metaphysics of Substance has a significant impact upon Spinozist studies. It 
marks the great difference in approach between the continental and analytic 
interpretations of the Ethics. In order to better understand this difference, a 
comparison between Bennett’s and Deleuze’s readings is imperative. These two 
writers not only delineate two contrasting definitions of Spinoza’s ontology: more 
significantly, their accounts exemplify the distinctive strategies adopted by the 
analytic and continental schools of thought as regards the examination and 
interpretation of the Ethics. Furthermore, a discussion of Bennett’s and Deleuze’s 
interpretations provides the present study with fundamental theoretical tools for 
determining the meaning of Spinoza’s materialist ontology and, specifically, for 
addressing the ways in which this does not imply the reduction of the value of 
thought in relation to matter.  
It is from the analysis of the theory of parallelism that the divergence 
between Bennett and Deleuze derives, and it is upon this that they construct two 
really distinct portraits of Spinoza’s ontology. Bennett, as we have seen, envisages 
a form of panpsychism within the metaphysics of Substance; Deleuze deduces the 
plane of immanence. Where the former tends to read the formula of parallelism in 
terms of a dualism between thought and matter, Deleuze’s interpretation figures 
thought and matter as two equally constitutive elements of Substance, both of 
which actualise its essence. Yet at the basis of both of these two approaches are 
the principles with which Deleuze and Bennett explain the theme of parallelism 
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and combine it with the concept of monism.  
Bennett, in my view, tends to consider thought and matter as two opposing 
properties of Substance. The monist account of Substance – developed through 
Spinoza's denial of the plurality of essence, his emphasis on the union of God with 
nature, and the importance of immanence to Spinozan philosophy – is read by 
Bennett through the principle of identity. In this manner, the thesis of parallelism 
means the divide between the mental and material aspects of one fundamental 
reality. From Spinoza’s model of monism, we know that thought and matter 
cannot coexist as two independent substance. Given the identification of the 
monist theory with the principle of identity and the assumption of matter and 
thought as contrary terms, the affirmation of the unity of reality, in Bennett’s 
reading, implies the effacement of the two attributes within an all-inclusive Being, 
or the dominance of one element over the other. For the system of absolute 
necessity, which Bennett conceives as a conceptual determinism, it is the mental 
that drives and unifies the domain Substance-nature. Yet in ascribing priority to 
thought, we encounter the problem of explaining Spinoza’s assumptions of the 
non-causality between attributes, the modal difference and the status of matter and 
nature in relation to Substance.  Moreover, the positive dimension of the absolute 
tells us that opposing modalities of being cannot exist; there can only be different 
grades of reality. Consequently, the relation between attributes has to be thought 
exclusively in terms of modal difference. Therefore, Bennett’s interpretation of 
the connection between attributes, in my view, does not entirely address the 
themes of the non-causality of the attributes, the absolute and the modal 
difference.       
By contrast, Deleuze interprets matter and thought through the principle of 
modal difference, by which these express various, and not contradictory aspects of 
reality. In this way, the formula of parallelism does not open to a dualist split 
between the mental and the material orders of reality, weakening the argument of 
monism formulated in part I of the Ethics. If matter and thought are not 
considered as contrary elements, this eludes the problem of prioritising one of the 
two attributes in order to maintain Spinoza’s monist account of Substance. 
Spinoza’s affirmation of the unity of reality, in Deleuze’s analysis, comes to 
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signify a highly differentiated plane, in which differences coexist not as 
independent substances but as fundamental parts of a complex unity. Deleuze’s 
attention to modal difference, and his use of the latter as a key to reading the 
Ethics, thus allows him to reconcile Spinoza’s monist account of Substance and 
the notions of non-causality between attributes on the one hand, with the parallel 
equilibrium between those attributes on the other. Yet Deleuze’s focus on the 
modal difference has a more crucial implication: it enables him to recognise 
Spinoza’s innovative model of materialism, which corresponds to the productive 
and the concrete status of both thought and matter. Thought and matter are 
concrete because they are actual modalities of Being. They are also productive 
because they activate concatenations of ideas, bodies and movements.  
In this fashion, whilst Bennett’s reading concludes by envisaging a form of 
panpsychism at the heart of Spinoza’s ontology, Deleuze, as we have seen, 
discovers a plane of immanence lying underneath the determinist structure of the 
Ethics. Following Bennett’s panpsychist position, Spinoza’s account of reality 
appears as a one-sided system, where the material is merely a projection of the 
dominant structure of the mental. But if this is the case, how do we justify 
Spinoza’s definition of the essence of Substance as power? From Spinoza’s 
explanation, power is intended as the identity between the power of thinking and 
that of acting. Given this conception of power, it would seem highly problematic 
to explain it solely through the activity of a thinking Being. Deleuze’s hypothesis 
as to the presence of a plane of immanence within Spinoza’s account is, in my 
view, able to avoid this problem.    
The plane of immanence, organised through modal difference, brings 
about the discovery of Spinoza’s vision of reality as pure activity. To be more 
precise, given that difference in Deleuze’s account is directly related to the 
modality of production, and given also that the plane of immanence unfolds 
varying and actual forms of Being, Spinoza’s affirmation of the essence of 
Substance as power means that Substance is a pure activity. In the case of the 
attributes of matter and thought, then, this activity is actualised simultaneously 
through the power of thinking and acting. In this way, Deleuze is able to identify 
Spinoza’s general assumption of Substance as power with the notion of activity. 
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The importance of this, for the arguments developed here, is that it affords the 
possibility of re-conception of Spinoza’s materialist project.  
These themes of the plane of immanence and power move our discussion 
to another central aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of 
Substance: namely, the theory of the dual aspects of Substance. This is explicated 
by Deleuze through the order of power anticipated above. As mentioned, Spinoza 
defines the power of Substance as the identity between the activities of thinking 
and acting. Given Deleuze’s assumption of the unity of Substance with nature, the 
notion of power expresses the dynamics of nature. Although Substance and nature 
inhere within a unique plane, they follow diverse orders. In order to avoid any 
dualist conclusion, Deleuze maintains that Spinoza’s theory of Substance has the 
dual aspect of necessity and possibility (Deleuze, 1992: 122-128). Deleuze affirms 
that from the viewpoint of the absolute necessity of Substance the power of 
thinking and acting are one and the same, whereas from the viewpoint of nature 
(natura naturata) the power of thinking and acting is expressed through a variety 
of combinations of degrees of reality (Deleuze, 1992: 123-128). For Deleuze, the 
power of Substance thus involves a continuous process of differentiation, which is 
expressed through the multiform essence of Substance. As result, as an aspect of 
Substance, nature means a specific modality of power, which is actualised through 
its contingent character.    
Deleuze’s argument of the orders of power sheds light on many difficult 
themes within the Ethics. Deleuze introduces the way to read the metaphysics of 
Substance beyond its determinist edifice, without however ignoring causality as 
such. His study liberates Spinoza’s theory of Substance from the rigid laws of 
universal causality, with which it has been associated. His reading brings about 
the discovery that the essence of Substance means a mechanism of production, 
which operates through the orders of necessity and possibility. In this way, 
Deleuze rehabilitates the contingent elements present within nature, giving to 
these a powerful status. Deleuze’s re-theorisation of Spinoza’s ontology has 
certainly opened up towards a consideration of Substance as activity and 
multifaceted system of production. However, his analyses are not entirely free 
from problems. Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics, in my view, remains 
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strongly anchored to the notion of Substance. This emerges from his theses of the 
plane of immanence and power.  
Although Deleuze’s interpretation of the orders of power unveils a system 
by which reality is produced, this latter is examined mainly from the viewpoint of 
Substance and not sufficiently from that of possibility, i.e. from the contingent 
aspect of Substance-nature. In other words, from Deleuze’s account we know that 
Substance involves activity; yet, we do not know concretely the extent to which 
contingent elements are productive too. Therefore, the theme of power, I would 
argue, is investigated mostly from the standpoint of Being. This raises the 
question of whether singularities are productive too, or rather different results of 
this system of production. Moreover, the interpretation of the dual aspects of 
Substance (possibility and necessity) encounters the risk of falling into a form of 
circularity, which in turn would be deprived of the characteristics of dynamism 
and production. If we consider Spinoza’s concept of Substance as two-sided, its 
activity is explicated through a circular movement that goes only from the 
viewpoint of necessity to possibility and from this to necessity. This would 
narrow, in some respects, the universality of the category of power assumed by 
Spinoza as the very essence of Substance. 
 Similarly, Deleuze’s claims as to the presence of a plane of immanence 
tends to prioritise Being at the expenses of its parts. The plane of immanence, as 
we have seen, re-assesses the roles of the attributes such as thought and matter; 
nevertheless this does not fully explore the very meaning and potentiality of 
singularities. This might lead one to read in the Ethics a form of all-inclusive and 
powerful plane, which, however actual and multiform, embodies and is not 
embodied by singularities. Without fully considering these arguments, an enquiry 
into the meaning of materialism in Spinoza’s ontology cannot proceed any further. 
In the concluding section of this chapter I will explore these themes, and will 
determine those materialist components of Spinoza’s metaphysics that might 
enrich the contemporary search for materialism. 
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Macherey’s discovery of multiplicity  
 
As anticipated earlier, Macherey is together with Deleuze a central 
exponent of the return to Spinoza that initially developed within twentieth-century 
French thought. Unlike Deleuze, who employs the logic of expressionism for 
explaining Spinoza’s ontology, Macherey suggests that an exegesis of the Ethics 
has to be conducted solely through the Ethics itself, without seeking the support of 
external strategies. For Macherey, the conceptual nucleus of the Ethics is 
rigorously constructed on its own line of reasoning. In order to discover the 
meaning of Spinoza’s ontology, Macherey affirms, one cannot adapt the contents 
of the Ethics to already existing intellectual models such as Cartesian, Hobbesian, 
Marxist and expressionist as Deleuze does, because Spinoza’s text is erected on 
its own specific paradigm of thought (Macherey, 1997:79-80). The reader is thus 
required to follow the book's structure and development exclusively.  
The reason of Macherey’s concern with the method for reading the Ethics 
derives from the recognition of an error common to many commentators of the 
Ethics, from Hegel, through Geroult, to Deleuze. This is the genetic approach to 
the theory of Substance, which emphasises Being at the expenses of the parts. The 
genetic approach searches for the primary causes and the generative process from 
which beings and states of reality originate. If one applies this method to the 
Ethics, the result is the primacy of Substance over its constitutive elements, 
because Being, within Spinoza's metaphysics, is assumed to be the ultimate and 
immanent cause of all beings and a unique essence. Therefore, besides their 
differing perspectives, thinkers such as Deleuze and Geroult commonly end up 
ascribing a subjective status to Spinoza’s notion of Substance (Macherey, 1997: 
74-79). 
Macherey’s move consists in searching for the constitutive elements that 
form the anatomy of Substance, and not the origins of its parts, as pursued by the 
genetic approach. In this way, he discovers the powerful status of the attribute, 
which is more than a source of differentiation as Deleuze maintained. Macherey 
considers the attributes entirely equal to Substance. For him, Substance is its 
attributes (Macherey, 1997: 84-87). In order to understand the ways in which 
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Substance becomes real and manifest to and within nature, Macherey suggests 
that Substance begins with the plurality of its attributes (Macherey, 1997:79-83). 
It means that the attribute is not derived from Substance or is a proof of the 
existence of God; rather, for Macherey, Substance is no more nor less than its 
attributes (Macherey, 1997: 88-90). Thus, Macherey argues that the attributes 
constitute Substance rather than expressing it. Importantly, this leads him to 
conceive Substance as a “concrete Being”, the power of which depends on the 
plurality of the attributes (E. I, Def. IV, prop. VII, prop. XI, prop. XX). 
The relevance of Macherey’s reflection for our analysis resides in the 
discovery of a crucial concept within the Ethics: namely, the notion of 
multiplicity. Following Macherey’s reading, multiplicity is the fundamental aspect 
of Substance, which differentiates and actualises its essence. The result is the re-
assessment of the value of actuality within Spinoza’s ontology. This does not only 
derive from Spinoza’s affirmation of immanence but also from the multiplicity of 
the parts (attributes and modes). In this way, Macherey uncovers the multiple and 
actual dimension of Substance. A consideration of these themes present within the 
Ethics is imperative for determining the materialist meaning of Spinoza’s 
ontology. In order to establish the materialist nucleus of Spinoza’s metaphysics, 
we need to explore the ways in which the self-generation of Substance 
immediately corresponds to the production of the world. Macherey addresses this 
question in a distinct manner. He disperses Spinoza’s Substance in every existing 
and thinking thing (Macherey, 1997: 83). As a result, Spinoza’s question of the 
ontological production of reality is related to the actuality of nature, and of all 
existing determinations. In this sense, for Macherey there is no Being in the 
Ethics, but rather an infinite plurality of existences, which form the realm of 
Substance (Macherey, 1979: 107-128).  
Certainly, Macherey’s attention to multiplicity liberates Spinoza’s 
ontology from the subjective status of Substance and from a merely determinist 
mechanism, within which the power of beings has been restrained. Furthermore, 
Macherey’s recognition of the centrality of the attributes and modes avoids the 
possibility of narrowing the development of reality within the Ethics into a 
circular and self-reflective system; a problem that we have seen exhibited by 
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Deleuze's reading. By contrast, Macherey stresses that Spinoza’s ontology implies 
notions of actuality and multiplicity, which are crucial elements of his materialist 
project. Yet in my view, Macherey’s analysis leaves a question unresolved, and 
this is as to the understanding of the mechanism through which the concept of 
multiplicity in the Ethics is able to produce reality in a materialist way.  In order 
to address this question, we need to further expand the theme of multiplicity in 
Spinoza’s ontology, and to re-situate this within a more complex process of 
production. It is to a re-consideration of this argument that the concluding section 
of this chapter is dedicated. 
 
Behind determinism: Relations and forces of production 
 
Building upon Deleuze’s and Macherey’s theses, Negri and Balibar have 
developed fecund analyses concerning Spinoza’s theory of Substance. From 
different perspectives, they have pointed to the function of production, which 
emerges from Spinoza’s account of actual reality. In The Savage Anomaly, Negri 
has claimed that the Ethics, after abandoning the Platonic overtones of part I, 
presents a complex ontology of power. This is structured through the ontology of 
matter and thought in part II, and culminates in the genealogy of affects and 
rationality. Parts II and III especially aim at re-signifying the anatomy of the 
material world and developing a new awareness of the potentiality of humankind. 
In this way, the metaphysical sections of the Ethics disclose an extremely 
powerful and multisided vision of the universe. Similar to Deleuze and Macherey, 
Negri envisages in the categories of attribute and mode fundamental elements 
which move Substance from a mere self-reflective dimension to an actual and 
plural one (Negri, 1998: 96-107; 193-230). Given the concept of immanence and 
the unity of God and nature, Negri concludes that Substance means directly the 
actuality of the world, which in turn means pure power (Negri, 1998: 89-101).  
For Negri, the originality of Spinoza resides in the re-conceptualisation of 
the notion of production and the identification of this with the material world. In 
his reading, Negri claims that production means neither a linear process of causes 
and effects, nor opposing forces, but rather an irregular and somewhat 
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spontaneous process. In this context, thought and matter become equally two 
constitutive elements of this process of production, and do not exist in opposition 
to one another. Rather, they compose a complex unity that is not based on the 
priority of one element over another. In this light, Negri argues, Spinoza’s 
paradigm of materialism, can be seen to imply the recognition of the material 
world not as a mere object, which requires the presence of a subject to gain 
meaning, but rather as a system shaped by interactive forces and beings (Negri, 
1998: 176-216).  
Albeit with less Marxist tones, Balibar also identifies Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of Substance as a productive process. Unlike Negri, Balibar does not 
only consider this process as moulded by forces, but also as generative of different 
and complex forms of individuals. Balibar views Spinoza’s Substance as a 
universal and expansive unity, which is composed of relations between different 
forms of individuals (Balibar, 2002: 115-119). The importance of Balibar’s 
approach is his re-consideration of Substance as the place of commonalities, from 
which every being comes to light. Spinoza’s metaphysics of Substance does not 
only describe a plural, active and immanent plane, but more importantly an 
infinite chain of causal relations between existing beings. Thus, the universal laws 
of causation imply relational conditions. In this causal flow of relations, Balibar 
claims, causal relations are extremely productive of further individuals, meanings 
and movements. The materialist component of Spinoza’s ontology, Balibar 
suggests, consists in the union between Substance and nature. In this way, nature 
is a source and primary condition for the development of these various relations. 
Significantly, in Balibar’s reading, the categories of matter and thought become 
relational elements too, and are structured through the connections between ideas 
and bodies (Balibar, 2002: 86-102).
12
 
The reflections formulated by Balibar and Negri represent an important 
phase within the re-theorisation of the Ethics within continental thought, which 
discloses novel trajectories towards a re-situating of Spinoza’s ontology within an 
alternative paradigm of materialism. It is from the arguments raised by these 
                                                 
12
 A detailed account of Balibar’s reading of the Ethics will be given in chapter II, where I develop 
his suggestion of the similarity between Spinoza’s ontology and Simondon’s thought of 
individuation.   
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authors in particular that the following chapters are developed. Balibar’s reading 
has many significant implications. Without ignoring the presence of the 
determinist system in the Ethics, he reaches alternative conclusions to those 
formulated by the analytic scholars discussed above. Balibar discovers that the 
cause-effect nexus is centred on the category of relationality. This is a crucial 
move within Balibar’s analysis.  
The theme of relationality passes from being considered the exclusive 
object of parts III, IV and V, and is found to also reside within the first section of 
the Ethics. This means that Balibar gives relationality an ontological significance, 
which precedes and founds its ethical and social denotation. It is this relational 
nucleus that lies at the very heart of Spinoza’s metaphysics of Substance, and 
which drives the order of necessity. Balibar’s assumption of relationality as an 
ontological concept located at the outset of the theory of Substance reveals that 
the causal flow is fundamentally relational, and that this relational component is 
productive. Put differently, relation is generative of physical effects, ontological 
states of Being and varied changes. It thus does not only describe the ethical and 
social behaviour of individuals, but also the dynamics of reality as a whole. In this 
way, Balibar is able to directly connect Spinoza’s ontology with his politics 
within a materialist perspective. Given that the very essence of Substance-nature 
is power explicated simultaneously through thinking and acting, relationality, as 
prime of motor of reality, means a power of acting, thinking and existing. Thus, 
this contention is already nuanced by political tones. The relational aspect of 
Spinoza’s ontology, as envisaged by Balibar, constitutes the basis of my enquiry 
into the distinctive features of Spinoza’s ontology. The arguments that I advance 
in chapter II are that this relationality is the cornerstone of Spinoza’s collective 
process of individuation, which informs Being, the world and singularities. 
Similarly to Balibar, and as we have noted above, Negri too tends to 
establish a more direct connection between Spinoza’s ontology and politics. He 
explains the many ways in which Spinoza’s ontology might contribute to the re-
founding of Western Marxism. Negri highlights the productive aspect of 
Spinoza’s theory of matter, and indicates how this unfolds a variety of forces. For 
Negri, materiality in the Ethics proceeds through a productive process that goes 
80 
 
far beyond the rigid rational system. Yet following his logic, I have encountered 
the problem of explaining the mechanism by which Being passes from a self-
reflective position (the platonic influences of part I) to the production of 
differentiated beings. Moreover, Negri does not entirely address the question of 
how Spinoza’s system of production involves a causal order and, at the same time, 
a more spontaneous process. The re-positioning of the centrality of the category of 
the absolute, in my view, might shed light on these unresolved themes: for a re-
consideration of the absolute, via a fresh approach, might disclose the ways in 
which Spinoza’s determinist system is formed by a certain ‘spontaneous’ activity. 
These arguments are the object of the following section. 
 
4. Spinoza’s anomalous ontology of the actual 
 
Having delineated the main characteristics of the analytic and continental 
readings of the Ethics we are now in the position to formulate the elements of the 
approach adopted here. Although the two schools have examined every aspects of 
the Ethics, I think that there remain unexplored themes within Spinoza’s ontology. 
I refer to the concepts of nature, power, the attribute, the absolute and immanence. 
A return to these notions might indicate the form of materialism supported by 
Spinoza, and the extent to which this might enrich contemporary materialist 
thought.  
As discussed above, analytic scholars have offered persuasive 
explanations concerning the metaphysics of Substance, pointing to the powerful 
status of thought within Spinoza’s metaphysics. This is assumed to be the 
dominant element of his philosophy, and to drive the entire thread of the Ethics. In 
both of the two analytic tendencies discussed above – the materialist and the 
mentalistic – rationality is taken to be the founding principle of Spinoza’s system. 
This operates at the macro-level through the theory of universal causation, and at 
the micro-level through the theory of the eternity of the mind and the three kinds 
of knowledge. 
Certainly, the rational and determinist elements highlighted by analytic 
scholars are present in the Ethics. However, the centrality ascribed to these 
81 
 
aspects by the analytic reading leads one to prioritise the rational component, and 
to under-value other fundamental themes of Spinoza’s ontology. The analytic 
approach to the theory of Substance opens up towards a form of mentalisation of 
reality, and especially of matter. This possibility is common to both the mentalist 
and materialist currents. By this, I mean that the order of thought comes to 
constitute and harmonize the entire system of reality, including nature. If the 
mental is assumed to be dominant, and if Substance is a unique being parallel to 
nature, then this would seem to be conducive towards identifying the whole 
reality with thought. As nature is one of the aspects of Substance, it becomes 
entirely attuned to the rational structure.  
The risk is, on the one hand, the effacement of the status of matter. This is 
the case of Bennett’s thesis of panpsychism discussed above. On the other hand, 
the statuses of matter and nature assumes the anatomy and development of the 
mental, as we have noted in Curley’s materialist account. Although rationality 
plays a pivotal role within the Ethics, and although thought is an attribute of God, 
we cannot ignore that the domain of Substance unfolds in varying elements, in 
such a way that thought is one of its founding principles. Spinoza includes in his 
vision of Substance the two sides of nature, naturing nature and natured nature. 
Certainly, as natura naturans, nature might obey a certain rationality. However, 
as natura naturata, it is also the ground of contingent events and beings, which 
escapes the rational logic.  
Furthermore, from part II, propositions I, II and VII, we know that thought 
is only one of the infinite attributes of God-nature alongside extension. As an 
attribute, thought expresses in certain and determinate way the essence of 
Substance, in the same way as matter. Thought is not the essence of Substance but 
rather one of its infinite modalities. However, one might argue that Spinoza firmly 
insists on the necessity of Substance, which inevitably sends us back to the idea of 
a rational system. This is also further reinforced through the concatenation of 
cause and effect, from which events follow. Nonetheless, given that thought is an 
attribute of Substance, this suggests that Spinoza distinguishes between the 
necessity of Substance and thought as rationality. Therefore, I think that the 
necessity of Substance-nature involves a more complex process, which exceeds 
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the order of rationality. In order to address these arguments, we need to take a 
fresh approach.  
Developing further the continental reading, particularly Deleuze’s and 
Macherey’s theses, the argument that I will make in this section is that Spinoza’s 
ontology supports a different paradigm of materialism, which is an alternative to 
that proposed by analytic interpretations. This argument refers to the ontology of 
the actual, which is constructed around the notions of power, attribute, immanence 
and nature. Together these concepts bring about the rehabilitation of nature from 
mere thinghood and mirror image of thought to a very complex and dynamic 
system. In order to determine the richness of Spinoza’s ontology of the actual, we 
need to draw attention primarily to the notion of power, which is defined as the 
very essence of Substance.  
Given Spinoza’s definitions of God as a unique, real and perfect being, we 
might presume that power is predicated of the fundaments of reality itself. This is 
also corroborated by Spinoza’s description of God as the immanent cause of all 
things, which implies the rejection of any form of transcendence. Considered in 
itself, the notion of cause does not solely involve the genesis of an effect. Beside 
this aspect, cause means the activity of producing, where, in the effect generated, 
we might include an individual, an ontological phase and so on. In turn, the 
emergence of an effect brings change into the existing equilibrium. As this cause 
related to Substance is immanent, and as it incorporates reality, we might 
conclude that the action of producing inheres within reality. Indeed, we might 
deduce that for Spinoza, taken in itself, reality is self-productive. Therefore, the 
concept of immanence together with power occupies a very decisive position 
within the thread of the Ethics, which indicates a new ontological paradigm; a 
paradigm in which the replacement of the concept of reality as a product of an 
higher will or transcendent principle corresponds to the affirmation of reality as a 
self-generating body. 
Spinoza enriches his monist thesis with the statement of the 
correspondence between God’s power of existing and acting, by which the two 
phases are coextensive one with the other (E. I, prop. XXXIV, XXXV; E. II, prop. 
VII). The claim embraces a crucial argument in the study of ontology, that is, the 
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theme of the commencement of reality. This concerns the question of whether 
reality is generated from an external and prior disclosure of Substance, or whether 
it is self-generated. In the first case, the problem is as to whether Substance should 
be considered as a higher rationality, which founds and directs all existing beings 
and conditions in the universe, or as an obscure archetype from which beings 
descend. Through the study of these arguments we enter into the domain of 
transcendental ontologies, running from Plato, Plotinus, Saint Thomas, Schelling, 
Hegel onwards. In the second case, we face the theme of materialism. Its primary 
concerns are the understanding of the potentialities of matter and also the extent to 
which this involves in itself the production and development of individuals and 
various phenomena. The ways in which a philosopher addresses these problems 
impact directly upon the understanding of the origin and ends of historical events, 
individuals and societies. Given the nature of this thesis and our present concerns, 
we need only to trace the most representative types of materialism within the 
history of philosophy. 
Important arguments concerning the meaning of matter have been 
formulated by the hylomorphic model of materialism. According to this view, all 
existing beings result from the combination of matter and form: matter achieves 
its form from itself, and is thus self-productive in some respects.
13
 Matter acquires 
a more central role within eighteenth-century empiricist tradition, where it 
becomes acknowledged as the only observable object, and thus as the exclusive 
source of truth. Materiality assumes the meaning of a well-ordered set of 
phenomena, which might be examined through the scientific investigation. 
Materialist tendencies, in my view, are also present in the nineteenth-century 
paradigm of pantheism. In this, God becomes identified with the power and 
becoming of nature, with which all existing beings are infused. Lastly, and as 
anticipated in the introduction to this thesis, there is an emerging model of 
materialism inaugurated within contemporary continental thought, to which I 
principally refer. This considers matter as a complex system, which is productive 
of bodies, affects, movements and heterogeneous forces. Spinoza, I argue, might 
be adequately situated within this emerging form of materialism. He resolves the 
                                                 
13
 I discuss the theme of hylomorphism in more detail in chapter II.  
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question of the materialist commencement of reality in an innovative manner.  
From the previous explanations on the immanence and power of 
Substance-reality, we already know that reality is self-productive. The unity of the 
powers of existing and acting and the immanence of Substance do not solely mean 
that the reality is self-generative, corroborating more strongly the denial of the 
creation ex nihilo. More significantly, this reveals a move of self-disclosure. This 
move of self-disclosure corresponds immediately to a gesture of producing. As a 
result, there is not in the Ethics the moment of disclosure of Being towards an 
external universe. Instead, I would argue, in Spinoza’s ontology reality, once 
posed, unfolds in and to an order of production.             
Spinoza refines his arguments with the notion of absolute infinity, which 
also involves a consideration of the role of the attribute. The absolute occupies a 
strategic position. It opens up to the understanding of reality not only as an all-
inclusive but also as plural and heterogeneous being. Spinoza states that the 
absolute dimension of Substance derives from the uncountable attributes, by 
which infinity is formed (“for if a thing is only infinite in its kind, one may deny it 
has infinite attributes”, E. I, Def. IV). By definition, attributes are not independent 
essences or qualities of God such as eternity, truth or goodness; instead, these are 
expressions of Being, which are existences (E. I, Def. IV). This absolute infinity is 
directly related to the dimension of the actual, as Macherey has noted, where this 
actuality is formed by the multiplicity of the attributes (Macherey, 1979: 107-
128). It is actual because the attributes are existing modalities of Substance’s 
essence; it is also plural because the attributes by which the absolute is formed are 
infinite.  
Ultimately, following Macherey’s reading, given that the attributes are 
distinct one from the other, the absence of a causal nexus, in my view, entails a 
certain idea of heterogeneity within the domain of Substance. In other words, we 
might say that it is the absolute God, once posed, that is scattered in all its 
attributes and not the attributes dispersed in the boundless territory of Substance. 
As a result, the absolute is already disclosed through its determinations (the 
attributes), which leads one to conceive Substance more as a plane rather than as a 
well-ordered system. Building upon Deleuze’s lesson, as a plane, this is crucially 
85 
 
plural, heterogeneous and dynamic (the essence of Substance is power). 
Moreover, the infinity and heterogeneity of the attributes avoid the possibility of 
priority of one of them upon the other. This prevents Spinoza’s theory of 
Substance from falling into a self-reflective and one-sided dimension.  
From the considerations made so far, we are now in the position to answer 
the initial question concerning the meaning of Spinoza’s claim as to the necessity 
of God, whether or not this regards the rationality of the whole reality. If we re-
situate the notion of causality within the plane of absolute immanence, this 
expresses the impossibility of arresting and narrowing this system within a well-
connected mechanism and assemblage of elements. Spinoza’s theory of 
Substance, I claim, unveils an anomalous process of production.
14
 It is anomalous 
because he places alongside the eternal necessity of Substance the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of the attributes, the notions of power and immanence and, as we 
will discuss further below, the contingency of nature and the modes. It is a 
process because the anatomy of Substance derived from the analyses above does 
not solely reflect a circular system of cause and effect or a Deleuzian plane of 
immanence. Rather, it involves series of changes which derive from the categories 
of power, immanent cause and the attribute. Spinoza’s awareness of this, I think, 
is greatly illustrated in a concise but extremely meaningful proposition, which 
states: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in 
infinite ways” (E. I, prop. XVI; my italics). These elements suggest that Spinoza’s 
ontology proceeds through excess and various levels of complexity, which 
combine determinist instances with spontaneous phases.
15
   
In order to fully understand the dynamics of this process, we need to return 
to the controversial issue of the status of the attribute. For Bennett and similarly 
Curley, this should be considered as a universal and basic property of Substance 
(Bennett, 1984: 60-70). Seen in this light, Spinoza offers an advance over 
Descartes’s notion of the attribute. Whilst Descartes narrows the properties of 
                                                 
14
 I borrow the expression “anomalous” from Toscano’s study on the non-linear process of 
individuation in Simondon and Deleuze (Toscano, 2006: 1-16).  
15The meanings of excess and process, with which I have explained Spinoza’s theory of Substance, 
are Simondonian notions (Simondon; 2007). I will develop further these arguments in the next 
chapter, where I explore Spinoza’s process of individuation through Simondon’s ontology of 
individuation.  
      
86 
 
God to omnipresence, truth and omniscience, Spinoza extends these to universal 
categories such as thought, matter, infinity and eternity, which include the 
Cartesian ones (Curley, 1988: 9-27). The consideration of the attribute as a 
property generates a problem when we pass to analyse the theory of parallelism. 
As we have seen, for some analytic scholars this implies a form of materialism 
(Curley, 1988: 62-78), and for others it invites a mentalist account of reality 
(Bennett, 1984: 127-149). If we consider attributes as fixed properties, the 
affirmation of the correspondence between thought and extension within a unique 
order might lead, in one case, to read in Spinoza’s system a form of dualism; in 
another, the dominance of one over the other. If attributes are properties, this 
might conduce to assimilate the structure of one to that of the other. More 
radically, assuming the necessity of Substance as a form of universal rationality, 
the connection between causality, parallelism, and the univocity of God might be 
interpreted as the dominance of the attribute of thought upon the entire system.    
In contrast, following Deleuze’s (1992) and Macherey’s theses (1979, 
1997), if we assume the attribute, literally, as the expression of Substance’s 
essence, and as power, attributes come to delineate phases of Being rather than 
property. To express power is to actualise (attribute is an existing modality of 
Being), in a certain and determinate way, the eternal production inherent within 
reality. To actualise power does not merely denote the function of mirroring the 
essence of Substance, but rather the role of bringing into the realm of reality new 
elements. This is precisely true of the attributes of thought and extension, which 
together enrich reality. As phases, they can coexist within a unique system 
without annulling or opposing each other. In this way, we escape the dilemma 
posed by the formula of parallelism, which led us to question whether Spinoza’s 
proposition VII signals a philosophical move from a monist thesis to a dualist 
position. This also prevents our analysis from interpreting proposition VII as the 
consolidation of Spinoza’s unitary vision of a reality shaped by the primacy of 
thought upon the other attributes.    
Up to this point, we have described Spinoza’s monist ontology as centred 
on an account of reality as an actual, self-productive and heterogeneous process. 
Yet this still does not imply materialism. In order to determine the form of 
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materialism proposed by Spinoza, we need to examine his notions of nature and 
matter. In the first section of this chapter, we saw that in the Ethics nature is two-
fold and united with Substance (Deus sive Naturae). The unity of God and nature 
emerges also from the conditions of immanence and positive absolute indicated 
above. From these elements, the status of nature becomes complex and 
multifaceted.  
As aforementioned, from the standpoint of natura naturans, nature 
involves the activity of producing (power of existing and acting) effects, which 
might be events, movements and individuals (Spinoza’s physics of bodies). These 
are, in one word, changes. From the standpoint of natura naturata, this is also the 
outcome of its self-production, within which contingent modes such as ideas and 
bodies exist. By definition, the mode is an actual and contingent expression of 
Substance-nature’s attributes. In other words, nature means contemporaneously 
necessity and contingency. Given the unity of nature and God, the two functions 
of nature cannot be thought of as being ontologically separated, the active one 
referring to Substance and the contingent one to nature; rather, they should be 
thought of as two aspects of a unitary system. Furthermore, Spinoza reminds us 
that nature behaves as a one and as a multiple entity, formed by several 
individuals (E. II, Lemma VII, schol.). Nature is simultaneously the place of 
universal causality and contingent phenomena. How does Spinoza conceive both 
as aspects of nature? 
From these premises, I argue that nature expresses the anomaly of the 
process of production discovered above. Given the unity of reality and the 
inescapability of immanence, nature is the condition of possibility of reality itself. 
It is precisely in this vision of nature that the originality of Spinoza’s 
philosophical gesture lies. The rehabilitation of nature from the domains of mere 
contingency and strict determinism crucially explains how Spinoza’s ontology of 
the actual is a paradigm of materialism. This derives from the productive status of 
nature and more significantly from its inherence within the order of power 
examined above. In this light, the novelty of Spinoza’s materialist ontology of the 
actual, on the one hand, consists in the discovery of nature as an extremely 
complex process in which contingent beings acquire cogency not in relation to the 
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achievement of an ultimate objective of Being, but rather possess it in themselves 
by virtue of their very contingency. On the other hand, this refers to the 
reassessment of nature as power, which embodies and exceeds the universal laws 
of causation. Moreover, this model of materialism is free from any possible 
tendency towards an idealisation of nature or its dispersion within an all-inclusive 
Being.  
Ultimately, we need to add a further element to our discussion, that is, the 
theme of matter. As mentioned, this is an attribute of Substance, which expresses 
power. Matter is one of the primary concerns of Spinoza, which occurs at the very 
beginning of his metaphysics of Substance. In part I of the Ethics, as we have 
seen, Spinoza re-configures the category of extension by ascribing to it the 
qualities of the attribute. These are eternity, indivisibility, infinity in its kind and 
also autonomy (the non-causality between attributes). Besides these specific 
characteristics, matter acquires the role of actualising the infinite power of 
Substance-nature; a power that allows nature to expand itself through different 
modes. This is a crucial move of Spinoza. The category of extension becomes 
powerful not solely for its elevation as an attribute of Substance, which might be 
interpreted as its idealisation, but for its materiality. It expresses the world of the 
concrete par excellence. To put this more clearly, taken in itself, matter means 
infinite concatenations of extended modes, bodies, movements of speed and 
slowness. Thus, this is productive, however anomalously or rationally, and it is for 
this reason that Spinoza assigns to the category of extension the status of attribute. 
It is the anatomy and development of matter that brings Spinoza to recognise its 
intrinsic attributive meaning. What further marks the modernity of Spinoza’s 
materialist ontology is the correspondence of matter with thought, affirmed in the 
thesis of parallelism. Given the non-causality between attributes and also the 
geometrical meaning of parallelism, in Spinoza’s formula of parallelism matter is 
entirely equal, different and no longer opposed to thought. As a result, this cannot 
be attuned to the structure of thought. Equally, thought cannot reflect the series of 
extended beings.  
In this way, there is not a form of idealisation of matter or materialisation 
of thought in the Ethics, but rather a complex unity, which unfolds the realm of 
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Substance-nature, and which does not involve identity. This has also important 
consequences for the category of thought. As an attribute, this expresses or 
actualises, the power of Substance-nature. As with matter, thought is productive 
and brings further changes into the existing order (concatenation of ideas). This 
implies the withdrawal of thought from the static and self-reflective position to a 
powerful condition. Put differently, in Spinoza’s ontology thought maintains its 
authoritative meaning. However, this consists in its being generative of various 
modes, each of which actualises the power of Substance-nature. Spinoza’s 
materialist ontology of the actual, I would claim, consists in this really new 
theorisation of materialism, which runs from the actuality of Substance, the two-
fold power of nature and culminates in the productive status of matter and 
thought.  
Spinoza’s philosophical gesture becomes crucial especially in the present 
debate, concerned with the revisiting the meaning of production, matter and the 
concrete. This might enable contemporary research to recognise the richness of 
the expressions of the actual world. Ultimately, Spinoza’s materialist ontology of 
the actual, which is the position undertaken in this thesis, has further implications. 
One of the more significant is the possibility of re-theorising the concepts of life 
and individual which, when considered from this standpoint, acquire distinct 
meanings that involve a more complex notion of relationality centred on 
affectivity, power and movements. In other words, thinking Spinoza’s 
metaphysics as a materialist ontology of the actual leads our study to investigate 
the argument of individuation in the Ethics. It is to a consideration of the themes 
of individual, life and relationality, conducted in a Spinozist manner, that 
contemporary materialist thought should play closer attention. These are the 
themes that I will discuss in the following chapter.        
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Chapter II 
 
Spinoza’s philosophy of individuation: 
The collective life of the individual  
 
 
Introduction  
 
In chapter I, I examined the reception of the Ethics within contemporary 
Spinozist studies, and considered the ways in which the analytic and continental 
schools have classified Spinoza’s ontology. Through studying these two 
interpretations I have sought to construct the key-elements of the approach to 
Spinoza’s philosophy that I am advancing in this thesis, and thereby of my 
contention that his ontology and politics affords an innovative model of 
materialism. For analytic scholars such as Bennett, Curley and Smith, Spinoza’s 
metaphysics is one of the greatest expressions of the modern rationalist tradition 
of thought. Spinoza’s ideas are viewed as overcoming the weaknesses and, in 
some cases, as even radicalising the theses of Descartes and Leibniz. This analytic 
interpretation often holds that Spinoza’s paradigm of rationalism is centred on a 
powerful account of rationality, which operates through the necessity and absolute 
immanence of Substance, the laws of universal causation, the mind and the three 
kinds of knowledge. 
In contrast to the analytic exegesis, continental thinkers such as Deleuze, 
Macherey, Negri and Balibar have claimed that Spinoza’s ontology is founded on 
an innovative form of materialism, which is situated next to Pre-Socratic 
philosophy, Nietzsche and Marx. This is constructed around his re-assessment of 
materiality, which does not imply the effacement of the cogency of thought and its 
subjection to matter: rather, in the Ethics, thought acquires a powerful status as 
matter. Thought is not assumed as a static category above the world, rather it is 
dynamic and productive of ideas. From the comparison between the analytic and 
continental elaborations of the Ethics, and through developing the continental 
reading further, I have claimed that Spinoza’s theories of Substance, nature, 
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matter and thought reveal an anomalous ontology of the actual. This involves a 
non-linear system of production, which is based on the categories of the absolute, 
attribute, nature and power. I have defined this system as an anomalous process of 
production.  
It is anomalous because elements of contingency and determinism coexist 
harmoniously within a unique order. It means that in Spinoza’s ontology, 
necessity does not imply the refusal of contingency as such. This results from his 
definition of the twofold status of nature as naturing nature (nature intended as a 
free cause) and natured nature (nature as the set of all the existing modes) and the 
constitution of the mode (E. I, prop. XXIX). Although the existence of the mode 
depends from an external cause, taken in itself, the mode is contingent (E.I, Def. 
V, prop. XVI, XXIV). Spinoza says the mode does not involve necessary 
existence; it is a pure actuality. As the set of all existing modes, nature, therefore, 
embraces a certain form of contingency.  
I have also called Spinoza’s ontology of Substance a process because the 
role of the attributes comes closer to phases, which actualise and further develop 
the existing order. As expressions of Substance’s essence, attributes are not 
properties of Substance, and thus mere descriptions of power; instead, they make 
Substance actual. More importantly, through relating modes attributes 
continuously bring changes into the existing equilibrium. This anomalous process 
is that of production, because Spinoza identifies the essence of Substance with the 
most general category of power (E. I, prop. XXXIV). This suggests that causality 
is not the unique expression of the action of Substance-nature within the world.     
Whilst taking these arguments into account, this chapter explores the 
paradigm of the individual that emerges from Spinoza’s ontology, and considers 
the extent to which this might enrich contemporary materialist discourses. 
Specifically, I ask: what theory of the individual might we draw from Spinoza’s 
anomalous process of production exposed in chapter I? Assuming that the domain 
of Substance is modelled by infinite and heterogeneous attributes, how can this be 
generative of singular individual beings? Furthermore, given the centrality of 
materiality, how is this productive of psychic states? I think that the philosophy of 
Gilbert Simondon might shed light on the complexity of Spinoza’s conception of 
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the individual, and that it may thus afford answers to these questions. As Balibar 
has contended, and as I will demonstrate and develop, Simondon’s philosophy of 
individuation offers pertinent ontological categories for our re-reading of 
Spinoza’s theme of the individual (Balibar, 2002: 103-147).  
Without postulating tempting similarities, parallelism or influences 
between the two philosophers, however, Spinoza and Simondon base their 
ontological system on common categories. These focus on a strict monism, a form 
of materialism, and the significance of affectivity to the relational nature of human 
being.
16
 This shared ontological ground creates, in my view, the conditions 
through which an investigation of Spinoza’s theory in the light of Simondon 
acquires great cogency. Although the chapter is primarily an enquiry into 
Spinoza’s process of individuation, the use of Simondonian categories requires 
the analysis of Simondon’s theory of individuation itself. In the first section, 
therefore, I will give an account of Simondon’s thesis of individuation, and will 
point out the main differences between his ontology of individuation, antecedent 
and contemporary philosophies of individuality. 
Proceeding from the analysis of Simondon to Spinoza, in the second 
section, the discussion will draw particular attention to the role given by Spinoza 
to relationality, body, conatus and affectivity. The arguments that I will develop 
throughout this chapter are that reading the Ethics through Simondon’s theory of 
individuation brings about the discovery of an alternative materialist account of 
the individual and, more generally, the theory of individuation. I refer precisely to 
the questions of the twofold role of the physics of bodies and common notions, 
which operate as pre-individual mass and collective process of individuation. 
Furthermore, when Spinoza is read through the lenses of Simondon’s thought, the 
themes of conatus, the geometry of affects and disclose a unique tendency 
towards a form of transindividualism. This transindividual force is the basis upon 
which every model of community (psychic, political and social) is developed. It is 
in this context that Spinoza’s materialist conception of the individual resides, and 
it is through the latter that the human being emerges as a mixture between 
universality and particularity, collective being and individuated individual.  
                                                 
16
 As Simondon opposes monist philosophies, by a form of monism in Simondon’s philosophy I 
mean literally his refusal of different substances such as matter and form. 
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1. Re-positioning the question of individuation in contemporary thought 
 
The theme of individuation has been a central concern in the history of 
philosophy, politics and science. The focus of an enquiry into the notion of the 
individual tends to be addressed towards the discovery of the conditions or 
archetypes from which individuals are generated. When related specifically to the 
human context, the concept of the individual involves the analysis of a variety of 
interlocked arguments. These refer to definitions of life, or more precisely to the 
different forms of life, such as the ethical, the biological and the political; to the 
degree to which these forms are proper to the human being, and also to the 
distinctive elements of knowledge, whether they derive from the nature of the 
individual being or rather social and historical junctures.  
Moreover, the study of the individual investigates the meaning of the 
body, and enquires as to how the latter operates; it asks whether or not this 
operation is guided by the mind; it investigates the origins and aims of moral 
principles, and questions whether such principles should regulate, follow or 
restrain the affective disposition of individuals. Ultimately, the study of the 
individual considers the extent to which political categories such as the state, civil 
society and the social class are expressions of individuality; and if the answer to 
that question is affirmative, it asks further as to whether those political formations 
are artificially or naturally constructed upon the characteristics of the human 
subject. Given the indeterminacy of these questions, the discussion of the genesis 
and principles of the individual has taken a myriad of forms and theoretical 
positions. Thus, the problem of defining the domain of the individual runs from 
Plato, Aristotle, passing through among many others Duns Scotus, Spinoza, 
Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud to Simondon, and more recently to 
Deleuze.  
Before discussing further the significance of individuation in 
contemporary thought, we need to distinguish between a philosophy of 
individuality and an ontology of individuation. The importance of underlining this 
distinction resides in the different strategies adopted for determining the 
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fundamental aspects of human beings; strategies that each delineate completely 
different political, ethical and social scenarios (Toscano, 2006: 4-16; Agamben, 
1993: 9-22; Combes, 1999: 10-25). Put differently, the ways in which we qualify 
human nature impact directly upon our awareness of politics, ethics and the 
material world.    
Broadly understood, a philosophy of individuality posits individuality 
prior to its constitutive process. This assumes the genesis and development of the 
individual isolated from its milieu, focusing exclusively upon the study of the 
structure of the formed human being. This tendency is present in different ways 
within various philosophical paradigms: for example, in Medieval philosophy 
such as Saint Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Abelard; in modern rationalist 
thought, such as that of Descartes and Leibniz; more recently, in Gestalt 
psychology (Simondon, 2007: 9-54).
 17
 Given the exclusion of the material world 
from the genesis of individual beings, the better to discover the peculiar features 
of the human being per se, attention comes to be directed towards the analysis of 
the latter’s structure as an independent unit that already contains within itself the 
causes of its own generation and evolution. Yet taken in itself, the human being is 
a composite of mind, body and affectivity, and as a result arguments have been 
characterised by disputes surrounding the question of the priority of one of these 
elements among the others. This approach has generated a categorisation of the 
heterogeneous potentialities of an individual being into determinate forms of life 
such as biological, intellectual and passionate life, only one of which is defined as 
peculiar to humankind. Political and ethical discourses have been constructed 
around the privileged function assumed to connote the human being, such as 
rationality, selfishness and sociality. Consequently, within the history of thought 
many political and ethical conceptions have been erected around the identification 
of individuality with notions of egoism and self-mastery, through which concepts 
of state and community have been explained.  
These aspects are direct consequences of the fundamental limit that 
                                                 
17
 I am aware of the philosophical and historical diversity between the mentioned authors. In this 
context, the inclusion of different philosophers within the model of philosophy of individuality is 
motivated by the common strategy of investigation employed for defining singular beings. For an 
analysis of this theme, see particularly Toscano (2006: 4-11) and Agamben, (1993: 11-12, 19-22) 
from whose reflections I mainly refer.     
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characterises a philosophy of individuality; a limit that entails the impossibility of 
knowing the generative system of the individual, and thereby the unintelligibility 
of the principle of individuation. Given that the constitution beings is detached 
from its process, the conception of individuality is based on anthropomorphic, or 
at least upon zoomorphic models. In this light, we simply bind the richness of 
expressions of individuality within a priori formulae such as matter and form, 
rather than understanding the reality of an individual (Simondon, 2007: 9-30) .  
Unlike the philosophy of individuality, the ontology of individuation 
focuses on the general process through which individuals come to light. For an 
ontology of individuation, it is crucial to determine the conditions of 
individuation, as opposed to focusing on the individual itself. This implies a more 
extensive account of the relation between the individual and its generative system. 
The study of the process of individuation brings about the discovery of the 
multiple confluences between individuals and the material world. This introduces 
a different awareness of the ways in which phenomena such as affectivity, 
movements of speed and slowness impact concretely upon the genesis and 
becoming of the individual, and equally of the role of the individual for the 
actualisation of these events (Toscano, 2006:7-16, 199-201; Simondon, 2007: 31-
65, 98-103). As an ontology of individuation stresses the notion of process, it re-
defines the relation between the individual and the environment as part of a more 
complex system of production. The individual thus follows and inheres with the 
becoming of one unique order, which unfolds countless modalities of 
individuality. To consider the question of individuation as a process means to 
theorise the realm of the individual as a complex reality that is constantly 
traversed by transformations and exchanges with the material world (Simondon, 
2007: 9-30).  
In order to re-found the paradigm of contemporary materialism formed by 
this dynamic vision of the world and human being, the re-positioning of the theme 
of individuation is imperative. This need for an ontology of individuation within 
contemporary philosophical and political debate is instrumental in re-shaping our 
understanding of the material world. The order of the real expresses itself in very 
complex and creative ways, re-configuring the boundaries of inert matter. Fecund 
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arguments have been elaborated within contemporary physics and biology that 
aim at undermining the traditional division between the organic and non-organic 
domains. Attention has been directed in this regard to re-defining the anatomy and 
potentiality of matter and body: in physics, for example, theories of “solitary 
waves” and chaos have forwarded the idea of the universe as a self-organising 
system.  
The claim is that matter is continuously exposed to transformations, which 
originate from unseen movements. These transformations and movements reveal a 
unique source of generation between living and non-living beings, which implies 
the discovery of a single spontaneous order for all forms of reality (De Landa, 
1992: 128-161; Newell, 1985: V-XVII). Non traditional biology, such as Gaia and 
prokaryotic theories, refute the conception of the body as a unitary and single 
entity, and propose instead that it should be seen as a relation between movements 
and exchanges of energies (Sagan, 1992: 362-385). An awareness of these aspects 
of modern science must be integrated into future materialist discourses, because 
the genesis and development of the individual inheres within this structure of 
nature. Such arguments suggest that is by investigating the unseen operations 
behind matter that we might discover the unique features of the individual.   
This recognition of the complexities of nature, the body and individuality 
has recently nurtured a rich debate within the social sciences, political theory and 
philosophy. The central concern that occupies contemporary thought is the search 
for a more extensive paradigm of the individual: one that considers its 
unavoidable linkage with the material world, the potentiality of the body, its 
affective anatomy, and also its relational state. The attention given to these 
elements has brought into question the inadequacy of consolidated theories of 
individuality, which have constructed the relation between the individual and its 
context on the schema of a subject-object relation. Furthermore, contemporary 
discourse has questioned the validity of certain models, which have assumed 
human existence to be regulated through distinctive functions such as rationality, 
affectivity, and through biological and social determinants; models that to some 
extent split the life of the psyche from those of the body, and from ethics and 
politics as indicated above. Thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Guattari, 
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Deleuze and Simondon have contributed to the recent formulation of important 
ideas that bring to light the impossibility of thinking the individual as an atomised 
and rational subject. In this fashion, the focus has been upon the analysis of 
language, relations, emotions, imagination and the embodiment of the mind as 
fundamental conditions of the genesis and becoming of an individual subject. The 
emergence of these conceptions indicates the need for an alternative grammar of 
the individual, which might elaborate new categories of thought able to express its 
multiform state.  
In order to re-think the constitution of the individual, in my view, a return-
or perhaps simply a turn-to the philosophy of Simondon is crucial. Simondon 
replaces the notion of individuality as a rational and independent unit with that of 
the individual as a problem. His focus is primarily on the analysis of the general 
process of individuation, through which beings are generated. Attention to this 
process, he argues, brings about the discovery of the collective as a fundamental 
source of individuation, without which the individual would not exist. 
Furthermore, Simondon’s ontology of individuation holds particular importance 
for the central argument of this chapter and for its investigation of the notion of 
the individual within Spinoza’s thought. Through Simondon’s ontology, I will 
argue in section two, Spinoza’s paradigm of the individual will disclose a 
distinctive model of the individual, which re-situates singular beings and the 
external world in a more dynamic relation. In order to re-configure the domain of 
the individual within the present, I will claim, Spinoza might constitute an 
important reference from the past, and one to which contemporary thought should 
pay greater attention. Taking these arguments into account, let us first flesh out 
the main aspects of Simondon’s theory of individuation. 
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1.1 Simondon’s ontology of individuation        
 
Simondon has occupied a somewhat marginal position within twentieth-
century continental thought, and his originality has been recognised only recently. 
The scope of his philosophy is very extensive and heterogeneous, and 
encompasses aspects of biology, psychology, Marxist political theory, science, 
ontology and phenomenology. It emerges from a combined study of Pre-Socratic 
ontology, quantum mechanics, cybernetics and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of perception, with whom he completed his doctorate. The convergence of these 
different areas culminates in a complex and extremely rich theory of 
individuation, albeit one that did not immediately find a vast intellectual audience. 
It is Deleuze’s discovery of the great originality of Simondon’s ontology of 
individuation that contributed to a renewal of interest in his work, which has been 
pursued by a group of contemporary theorists that includes Stiegler, Combes and 
Latour.      
Simondon’s ideas reflect the intellectual turn initiated in twentieth-century 
French academia referred to in chapter I, and also the new tendencies that have 
developed in the philosophy of science and the social sciences. Like many of his 
contemporaries, Simondon actively participated in the intellectual campaign 
against Idealist philosophies, existentialist ontology, and against Cartesian and 
empiricist theories of the subject. Furthermore, given his particular interests in 
science and psychology, he fiercely opposes consolidated scientific and 
psychological studies such as the theory of information, cognitivitist models, 
Gestalt psychology and the psychoanalytic tradition of thought. Central to his 
critique is the mode in which the genesis and development of the individual has 
been explained in philosophy, science and psychology, each of which has 
assumed that the individual can be conceived in abstraction from and prior to its 
generative process. Despite the different perspectives involved here, Simondon 
holds that a common problem lies at the outset of many such paradigms: namely, 
a tendency to consider the individual as the principle of the process of 
individuation. Focus is thus directed within these accounts towards the analysis of 
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the individual as a given reality, upon which the process of individuation depends.  
In Simondon’s account, this has inverted the terms of the problem, as one 
should not simply question what a human being is, but rather how he or she is 
formed, and what mechanism and forces are involved in this process of becoming 
singular. To take the individual as given implies its detachment from its context, 
that is, nature. Addressing its origins, however, affords the discovery of its 
location within a more general process of production; a process in which it is not 
the founding principle, but rather a constitutive element. Whilst the conception of 
the individual as an incontrovertible truth has generated zoomorphic and 
anthropomorphic doctrines of individuation, this attention to the generative 
mechanism of individuation delineates the multiple ways in which the material 
world impacts upon the evolution of every being. A unique process of 
individuation is assumed for all singularities; one that discloses the common 
elements and potentials between living beings and also, as we will see below, the 
many convergences between them and non-organic forms of life.  
Attending to this process serves to highlight, on the one hand, the powerful 
role played by nature within the becoming of the individual; a factor that exceeds 
the biological phases of its constitution. On the other hand, the centrality of the 
process to the constitution of the individual being entirely re-shapes our 
understanding of the latter, which comes to be recognised as a result of various 
interactive phases and factors. This account of the genesis and anatomy of the 
individual has further implications. As the individual is a mixture of 
heterogeneous elements inherent within nature, the definition of its peculiar 
character cannot be based on a hylomorphic schema. This latter reduces the 
complexity of the individual to the dualism between matter and form, which also 
considers the world as an inanimate object. For Simondon, many contemporary 
and past models of individuation heavily rely on the paradigm of hylomorphism, 
which runs from the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy through to Gestalt theory 
and the Freudian school of thought.
18
 This, in Simondon’s view, support the 
                                                 
18
The hylomorphic definition of beings derives from Aristotle’s philosophy. For Aristotle, 
Substance is the union of matter and form, and beings are a composite of soul and body, Aristotle 
(1985; 1986). For an accurate account of the question of the principium individuationis in 
Scholastic philosophy, see Spade (1994).  
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division of the individual into substances such as the mind and the body, vital and 
psychic forms of life, etc., and ascribes a privileged status to one element of each 
such pairings. Simondon does not only refute this division, but also – and more 
significantly – the validity of these categories as such. 
The move made by Simondon in his attempt to re-formulate the paradigm 
of the individual is radical. He does not propose the re-theorisation of a specific 
theory or concept, which would remain anchored within a particular philosophical 
tradition. Instead, he constructs an alternative ontology that introduces novel 
conceptions of materiality, subjectivity, life, ethics and politics. The novelty of 
Simondon’s philosophical project lies, first of all, in the different questions that 
guide his enquiry, and also in the new categories of thought, around which he 
constructs his philosophy. In his ontology of individuation, Simondon uniquely 
adapts cybernetic theories, which were particularly influential in his time, Pre-
Socratic physics, and Merleau-Ponty’s notions of the body and perception.  
As indicated above, the fundamental concern of Simondon's work is the 
unveiling of the process of individuation, which he presents as the sole possible 
means of knowing the individual. Simondon relocates the genesis and 
development of the singular human being within the more complex process of 
production of nature. This has two essential implications. Firstly, the assumption 
of the inheritance of all singularities within the structure of nature delineates a 
primordial common mass of undifferentiated energies and movements at the basis 
of the process of individuation, from which individual thought, body, temporal 
flows, space, affectivity, humankind and community emerge. Simondon calls this 
primordial mass “the pre-individual” (Simondon, 2007: 177-181, 194-197). This 
replaces the category of the universals of classical metaphysics. 
Whereas the universals are pre-defined and fixed principles, from which 
the individuals depend and strive toward, the pre-individual is undifferentiated 
and heterogeneous; it is more than a unity, and dynamic. It is an open domain of 
potentials, from which various beings and events follow (Virno, 2009: 61-65; Del 
Lucchese, 2009a: 183-185). This is a process that continuously invents itself, 
where individuals add something to the existing equilibrium (Virno, 2004: 75-80; 
Stiengler, 2009: 46-48; Toscano, 2006:140-143). Secondly, this brings about the 
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discovery of the collective realm as the constitutive element of the process of 
individuation. The collective is the exclusive condition of actualisation and further 
differentiation of beings, which signifies and re-signifies the potentials and 
degrees of energy embodied by the pre-individual mass. The collective is 
concrete, plural and extremely powerful, and it is through and within the 
collective that the individual emerges and lives. The significance of the collective 
is its relational tendency, and the ways in which this tendency generates 
individuation. Relation is the cornerstone of an individual, and also the force that 
drives the entire process of individuation from the biological, psychic and social 
phases. The centrality given to the notion of relation by Simondon delineates how 
his ontology contains within itself political and ethical nuances: for although he 
does not explicitly address political theses, his enquiry indicates the strategy upon 
which political theory might be constructed.  
As indicated earlier, Simondon employs distinct and novel categories of 
thought in order to investigate the ontological process of individuation. Simondon 
recovers the concepts of transduction and the disparate from the domains of 
cybernetics, biophysics and mechanics (Simondon, 2007: 23-31, 73-83). These 
notions enable Simondon to highlight the operation through which exchanges of 
energy between states of beings generate new structures (Simondon, 2007: 77-83; 
Toscano, 2006: 151-156). In Simondon’s usage, transduction means the exchange 
and creation of new quantities of energies between beings and states of beings 
(Mackenzie, 2002; Toscano, 2006: 140-144). In each of these transductive 
movements, the quantity of energy exchanged and formed is defined as a 
disparate degree.
 
The disparate is precisely an excess of heterogeneity and 
potentials, and it emerges from the composition between phases of being and 
individuals. The disparate delineates a certain quantity of power, which exceeds a 
preceding phase of individuation.  
In turn, this excess of heterogeneity sets in motion a new moment of 
individuation.
19
 The notion of the disparate is the fundamental category within 
                                                 
19“There is disparation when two twin sets that cannot be entirely superimposed, such as the left 
retinal image and the right retinal image, which are grasped together as system, allowing for the 
formation of a single set of a higher degree which integrates their elements thanks to a new 
dimension” (Simondon 2007, quoted in Toscano, 2006: 139). 
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Simondon’s ontology, through which he characterises the vital, psychic and social 
aspects of an individual. The disparate explains the status and role of the 
individual within the process of individuation (Toscano, 2006: 136-147). In his 
review to Simondon’s text, Deleuze finds in the notion of the disparate the great 
originality of Simondon. For Deleuze, the disparate means asymmetry, which 
involves a continuous problematic state within the process of individuation 
(Deleuze, 2004b: 86-89 ). The Simondonian concept of the disparate will play an 
important role in Deleuze’s theory of individuation (see for example Deleuze, 
2004a: 307-329). Furthermore, the disparate acquires a fundamental role for 
understanding the intricate theme of the individual in Spinoza. In section two, I 
will employ this concept for determining the status of the singular beings and 
humankind within Spinoza’s theory of Substance.  
The theme of transductive movements, together with that of the disparate 
structure of beings, are both linked to Simondon’s more general re-theorisation of 
the concept of information. In Simondon’s theory of individuation, information 
replaces notions of form, language and communication as a source of meaning 
and relations. In his application, information becomes recognised not as 
transmission of coded messages but as a passage from one state to another. The 
exchanges of potentials between disparate beings imply a transmission of 
information, which is productive of a further state of individuation. In this sense, 
information allows a transmission of grades of intensity (Toscano, 2006: 142-147; 
Garelli, 1994: 50-62). These exchanges and excesses of power and heterogeneity 
maintain the equilibrium of the system, which is constantly kept in tension. 
Simondon defines the collective field shaped by a metastable equilibrium. 
Metastability connotes a regime of pure potentiality (a false equilibrium), which 
calls for the creation of more articulated structures able to actualise the potential 
energies created in the already constituted order (Simondon, 2007: 31-33).  These 
are the main categories of thought that guide Simondon’s ontology of 
individuation. Furthermore, an understanding of these notions is essential for our 
enquiry into Spinoza’s theory of the individual. Having considered these elements 
introduced by Simondon, let us investigate how these effectively operate within 
the development of an individual. 
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1.2 Ontology of relation 
 
Simondon’s ontology of individuation is set out in his book 
L’individuation psychique et collective à la lumiére des notion de Forme, 
Potentiel et Métastabilité (1989) (The psychic and collective individuation in the 
light of the notions of Form, Potentiality and Metastability), which constitutes the 
culmination of his doctoral studies. The starting-point of Simondon’s ontology is 
not a doctrine on Being, in which the latter is assumed as a unitary and prime 
principle from which the universe and all creatures are generated. Instead, his 
enquiry commences with a thesis about becoming, which he holds to be the only 
condition of possibility for thinking Being, reality and beings. For Simondon, 
Being is not what is, but rather what becomes; and Being becomes solely through 
individuation (Simondon, 2007: 13-24; Del Lucchese, 2009a: 180-181). This 
delineates the path through which Being passes from an undifferentiated position 
towards an actualised and heterogeneous dimension.  
The attention given to the theme of becoming explains the central claim 
that guides Simondon’s inquiry, that is, knowing the individual through 
individuation rather than individuation through the individual (Simondon, 2007: 
12). It is for this reason that Simondon’s enquiry begins with the theory of 
ontogenesis. Ontogenesis is a branch of biology, which studies the development 
of an organism from its earliest stages (its genesis) to maturity.
20
 Ontogenesis 
allows Simondon’s analysis to emphasise the interstitial zones between human 
beings and other individuals (Ansell Pearson, 1999: 90-96; Combes, 2001: 6-18). 
This brings to light the shared ground from which singularities emerge. The result 
is the recognition of the relational structure of beings at every stage of 
individuation. Therefore, Simondon’s recovery of ontogenesis from biology 
reveals his intention to study the anatomy of relationality, and the multiple ways 
in which this is productive of transformations. To be more precise, Simondon’s 
central postulate is that relation has the status of Being (Simondon, 2007: 18-
                                                 
20
For an  account of ontogenesis and phylogeny, see Gould (1977).  
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19;Del Lucchese, 2009a: 180-182). 
21
 
In this fashion, Simondon distinguishes two fundamental phases of 
individuation: vital and psychic. These stages do not proceed through a causal 
progression, such as a dialectical play and evolution towards the better. Rather, it 
is a modal individuation, in which each moment does not depend from any 
particular factor or principle (Virno, 2009: 60-63). It is characterised by levels of 
heterogeneity and potentials, through which transductive movements generate a 
complex state that in turn exceeds the existing formation in a new more 
problematic structure. The novel equilibrium formed is not more perfect than the 
previous one but more complicated, which means more heterogeneous. In this 
sense, differences between vital and psychic forms of life, organic and non 
organic beings reside in the degree of potentials remained to be released, which 
sets forth further problems, movements and transformations (Simondon, 2007: 22-
30). In both phases, the process of individuation unfolds through a collective field, 
within which potentials are actualised into novel beings. This collective is both 
the individual and the environment and at the same time it is more than the 
individual and the environment. As mentioned above, the collective is a relational 
condition, and a powerful source of biological, psychic and social meanings. 
Furthermore, the collective delineates the role of an individual within the general 
process of individuation.  
The presence of the individual within the collective means the 
actualisation of unexpressed degrees of power, and also the emergence of further 
levels of heterogeneity derived from the disparate status of beings. This moves 
both the individual and the collective toward further phases of individuation. In 
this respect the individual, Simondon claims, is an open domain, and is nuanced 
intensively by a variety of heterogeneous potentiality. In Simondon’s words, the 
individual is a “theatre” of individuation, and not the latter’s result. This means 
that the individual is intended as a continuous activity and that this activity has an 
effective impact upon the development of the process (Simondon, 2007: 14-20). 
In other words, the individual adds something to the process and vice versa 
(Simondon, 2007: 19-22; Virno, 2009: 63-64). This category of the collective is 
                                                 
21
 “According to this hypothesis, we might consider that every authentic relation has the status of 
being, and develops within a new individuation” [translation mine], (Simondon, 2007: 18).   
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one of the fundamental Simondonian categories around which I will base my re-
reading of Spinoza’s ontology of humankind, addressed in section two of this 
chapter. In Spinoza, I will argue, the nature of beings, whether biological, 
political, psychic and ethical, originates and develops on a collective plane. The 
notions of the body, for example, and affectivity reveal this collective structure, 
which drives all beings in their evolution.  
     
Vital process of individuation   
 
We have already seen that relation is the cornerstone of Simondon’s 
ontology of individuation, and that it organises the equilibrium of both the 
individual and collective field. Simondon traces the origins of this spontaneous 
relational disposition of beings back to a non individuated matter, which is said to 
be common to all individuals, and the ground of individuation. Simondon defines 
this undifferentiated mass as the “pre-individual”. This is an unlimited source of 
heterogeneous potentiality, which accompanies the individual in all its phases of 
individuation (Barthélémy, 2005: 37-48).
22
 In order to explain the pre-individual, 
Simondon sends us back to the Ancient Greek notion of Apeiron (Simondon, 
2007: 196-197), which was originally formulated by Anaximander in the 6
th
 
century BC. He uses the term in his physics, in order to describe the genesis of the 
world (cosmos). By Apeiron, Anaximander means an endless and undetermined 
natural mass, from which every element (water, air, fire) comes to light. In this 
sense, the Apeiron is a generating source of production that inheres within nature. 
Simondon’s reference to Anaximander acquires great importance in our 
search for a contemporary model of materialism, within which the re-positioning 
of the meaning of the individual might be predicated. Firstly, Simondon’s citation 
of the Apeiron denotes his fidelity to the conception of nature as productivity 
itself. He also differs from Aristotle’s view, and more generally from that of the 
hylomorphic tradition of thought, insofar as the power of matter is said to be 
entirely intelligible when considered in itself. It is, he claims, a source of 
                                                 
22Concerning Simondon’s notion of pre-individuality, Massumi defines this as the emergent 
dimension, which is out of phase (Massumi, 2002a: 208-256). Similarly, Ansell Pearson refers to 
the pre-individual realm as the ground of potential forms of life, see Ansell Pearson (1999: 90-96). 
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production. Secondly – and to put this in contemporary language –as the Apeiron 
is an indeterminate and never-ending quantity of mass, nature-matter is becoming, 
production, and, in consequence, power. Lastly, Simondon’s usage of Apeiron 
tells us the ways in which movements can generates beings and events such as 
space, time, history and humankind. The meaning of the Apeiron is thus crucial 
for our understanding of Simondon’s notion of the pre-individual. 
If the pre-individual reality resembles Anaximander’s Apeiron, then one is 
led to think of the pre-individual as a pure power; a power that is, importantly, 
matter itself. In this light, matter discloses an unconditional force, which traverses 
individuated beings. Further, this pre-individual force shapes both the collective 
and the singular, thereby entailing the impossibility of theorising the development 
of an individual in abstraction from the becoming of the collective (Simondon, 
2007: 196-197). The primary consequence of this is that the notion of the pre-
individual involves the re-signification of the world of the organic and the 
importance of the vital process of individuation. This implies a renewal of interest 
in the organic world, which comes to be seen not as a place of mechanical and 
biological functions, but rather as a system of transductive exchanges of disparate 
degrees of energy and metastability. Furthermore, Simondon’s rehabilitation of 
the organic and materiality brings to light his dismissal of the definition of inert 
matter in favour of a more extensive account of the relation between living and 
non living forms. The study of organic structure is cogent not because it expresses 
human characters potentially, but rather for the potentiality and relational 
transformations that connote its domain. It is for this reason that Simondon’s 
ontology of individuation begins with an enquiry into the vital process of 
individuation. The importance of his arguments, for the purpose of this work, 
concerns the application of the notions of intensity, exchanges of energy and 
collective to the vital individual. These will form the theoretical ground around 
which my analysis of Spinoza’s physics of the bodies and common notions will be 
constructed.   
In order to define the individual, Simondon adopts the notion of the 
quantum from the physical sciences. In this sense, there is an individual insofar as 
there is a variation and successive propagation of energy between and within 
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quanta. For Simondon, for example, the crystal might be rightly identified as an 
individual, because it satisfies the instances of intensity, pre-individual mass and 
collective field in tension (metastable) (Simondon, 2007: 83-84). The crystal does 
not connote a mere geometrical form, but is instead a dynamic organization, and 
is open to further individuation. Further, as the crystal’s structure is seen as a knot 
of intensity, disparation, pre-individuality and collective organisation, its 
relational status is also brought to light (Hottois, 1996: 7-24). This is a very 
crucial move within the general theory of individuation: it indicates the distinctive 
characteristics of Simondon’s materialist paradigm, and pertains to the latter’s 
reinstatement of the value of biological life. Given its dynamic and powerful 
structure, a biological reality within the natural world is for Simondon no less 
important than ethical, theoretical and social life; equally, this does not acquires 
meaningful position as expression of political and psychic gestures potentially. 
Simondon re-focuses attention on biological life as it is. The latter is presented as 
powerful, relational and fundamentally plural, and, given its relational level, as 
already involved in the political. 
In this way, Simondon rejects not only the divide between the organic and 
the non-organic, but also, and more significantly, the uncontested Aristotelian 
classification of the genres of life into the political and the biological, according to 
which only the former deserves to be lived and defended.
23
 Simondon certainly 
does not explicitly claim that biological life is political, but he does nonetheless 
tell us that it is relational, problematic and thus productive of forces and new 
possibilities. The significance of biological existence lies in these confluences of 
different movements. Our awareness of the great relevance of every expression of 
life must, I think, be included within those contemporary materialist discourses 
that are concerned with the search for a different grammar of the individual.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 I follow Agamben’s critique of the Aristotelian categorisation of human life. He sees in the 
Aristotelian model the origin of the division of the unity of life into the political and non political, 
and also that of the attendant view that it is only the latter that occupies a privileged status 
(Agamben, 1998: 15-30). I will return to the political implication derived from this distinction 
between forms of life in chapter IV.   
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Psychic process of individuation 
 
Similar to the vital process of individuation, the process of psychic 
individuation is, first of all, articulated through the collective field, the disparate 
and pre-individual matter. It is in this context that Simondon gives a very complex 
account of the status of emotions and affectivity, and also of the ways in which 
these activate novel relational meanings and individuals. In the analysis of the 
psychic process of individuation, Simondon inaugurates (a not always explicit) 
dialogue with Freud and Marx. Particularly in relation to Freud and his heirs, 
Simondon rejects the notions of unconscious, within which a knot of unknown 
conflicting forces and desires orient the individual into the world. He accuses the 
psychoanalytic approach of splitting psychic life into an interiority and exteriority, 
and of locating the power of an individual within an obscure and self-organised 
unit (Simondon, 2007: 97-100).  
By contrast, Simondon re-situates psychic life in the publicity of the 
collective. As we have analysed above, in the collective field transductive 
movements of differentiation and complication give rise to novel individual 
realities. For Simondon, the psychic process of individuation is equally traversed 
by these transformations (Simondon, 2007: 98-104). A psychic being emerges and 
lives within relational conditions, which expose its pre-individual reserve of being 
to the multiplicity of the collective.
24
 For Simondon, then, there is a process of 
psychic individuation insofar as an individual perceives, acts or makes other 
beings.
25
  
Simondon claims that the core of psychic life is positioned in the dynamics 
of emotions and affectivity. As psychic individuation is always in relation, both 
emotions and affectivity establish practises of participation within the collective 
domain. To participate involves sharing and exchanging information. These 
                                                 
24By “reserve of being”, Simondon means a quantity of undifferentiated power, which persists 
within the individuated individual (Simondon, 2007: 106-135).   
25
In his Du monde d’existence des objets techniques (1958), Simondon defines as phases of 
psychic individuation the interaction between the technical objects and the individual. The re-
evaluation of the technical objects undeniably indicates, in different ways, the influences of 
Marx’s notion of the General Intellect, and also Heidegger’s account of Dasein and technique. For 
an analysis of the differences and similarities between Simondon, Marx and Heidegger, see 
particularly Virno (2004: 34-47, 78-81).   
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exchange and alterations of information transform the psychic individual 
(Massumi, 2002a: 1-21, 229-230; Manning, 2007: 90-100). Affectivity and 
emotion, Simondon argues, are precisely transformations, which model the 
psychic life of the individual within the collective.
26
 It is through affectivity and 
emotion that being comes to experience the world and others. In this sense, 
affectivity and emotion do not inhere within an already constituted individual, as 
they are not internal parts of an individual being; rather they are located in the 
interstices between an individual, the collective context and the pre-individual. In 
the following section, I will propose a re-reading of Spinoza’s theory of the 
affects through the definition of affectivity advanced by Simondon. His theory 
will help us to understand the problematic role of affects and passions within 
Spinoza’s ontology and politics.  
Simondon distinguishes between the role of affectivity, emotion and 
perception within psychic individuation. Whilst affectivity defines the relation 
between the pre-individual mass and the forming individual, emotion moves the 
individual towards acting, thinking and orienting himself within the world. 
Perception establishes cognitive practices through the direct relation between the 
individual and world.
27
 To perceive, Simondon claims, means “placing oneself 
across” (Simondon, 2007: 91). It is precisely in this gesture that knowledge lies. 
Knowledge does not result from an interaction between the subject and the object, 
but rather from a relation between relational beings (the individual, the milieu and 
the others) (Simondon, 2007: 91-92; Del Lucchese, 2009a: 187-188).
28
  
The theme of affectivity, in Simondon, is manifold. He replaces the 
meaning of affectivity as expressions of desire (Eros) and fear of death (Thanatos) 
– concepts inherited from certain psychoanalytic discourses – with those of 
relation and tension. Affects delineate the tension between two forms of 
                                                 
26“Affectivity-emotion [affectivo-émotivité] is not solely the repercussion of the result of the action 
in the internal structure of the individual being; it is a transformation, it plays an active role: it 
expresses the relation between the two domains of the same subject. Affectivity-emotion modifies 
the action according to this relation, harmonizing it, making the effort also to harmonize the 
collective” [translation mine] (Simondon, 2007: 106).  
27
Simondon’s distinction between affectivity, emotion and perception reflects the influence of the 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945) of Merleau-Ponty.       
28
Concerning the theme of perception and knowledge, Del Lucchese has drawn an interesting 
parallel between Simondon’s theory and Deleuze’s definition of “simulacrum”, (Del Lucchese, 
2009a: 186-189). 
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heterogeneity, the one of the pre-individual and the other of the individual. For 
Simondon, this tension founds spirituality. The treatment of affectivity as a source 
of spirituality casts doubt on an entire tradition of thought, which explains desires 
and affects as a defence of the individual from the innate fear of death. In 
Simondon’s reformulation, spirituality emerges from the domain of affectivity and 
connotes the problematic relation between the individual and the pre-individual. 
The singular being perceives himself to be perceptibly smaller and 
contemporaneously inherent within the pre-individual matter. It is in this 
problematic relation that the desire for eternity, and not of death, comes to light 
(Simondon 2007: 104-111).     
If the individual is frightened by the pre-individuated mass, at the same 
time, this pre-individual mass exists within the individual as a part of his reserve 
of being. This fluctuating phase brings about a form of recognition between the 
individual and its pre-individual realm, which gives rise to the emergence of 
eternity. In the history of philosophy, Simondon observes, many notions of 
eternity have been proposed. The Scholastic and, in different ways, the Cartesian 
arguments of the immortality of the soul and intellect greatly exemplify the 
attempt to explain the encounter between the pre-individual and the individual 
(Simondon, 2007: 104-105). It is solely Spinoza, Simondon affirms, who fully 
understood before his contemporaries the dynamics of the psychic state of eternity 
(Simondon, 2007: 104). In the proposition “sentimus experimurque nos aeternos 
esse” (“Nevertheless, we feel and experience that we are eternal”, E.V, prop. 
XXIII, Scholium.), Simondon recognises, Spinoza has given voice to the reality of 
a crucial phase within the psychic life of beings.  
Beside the arguments as to the nature of eternity and what is eternal, 
Simondon’s focus is upon the unveiling of the mechanisms that lie at the very 
heart of spirituality. Spirituality expresses the problematic status of the individual, 
which is constantly in the middle between generality and the particularity, 
between the pre-individual and the collective. It is in this context that the process 
of collective psychic individuation takes place. This process occurs only within 
and through the collective, which functions as mediator between the pre-
individual and the individuated reality. It is in this moment that Simondon 
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introduces his notion of transindividuality as the founding condition of psychic 
individuation.   
 
The transindividual anatomy of the individual 
 
The theme of the transindividual occupies a pivotal role within 
Simondon’s enquiry into the conditions of psychic and collective individuation. 
The fundaments of the transindividual are emotion and affectivity (Simondon, 
2007: 106-111). Simondon makes a fundamental distinction between 
interindividuality and transindividuality: the former goes from one individual to 
another and establishes relations between already formed beings; transindividual 
action permeates individuals and makes them constitutive elements of a more 
complex system.
29
      
The role of the transindividual operates within the pre-individual, the 
individual and the collective and vice versa, without however coinciding with 
these categories. It re-organises the relation between the individual and the pre-
individual, re-situating and harmonizing this relation within the domain of the 
collective. In this way, the singular individual is no longer disoriented and does 
not recognise the pre-individual as an external reality, but rather as an element of 
more complex order. This allows the individual to structure and participate in a 
novel phase of individuation. As discussed, the structure of individuals is 
disparate: they are essentially asymmetric (Deleuze, 2004b: 86-88). In the 
collective, the action of the transindividual is focused on the integration of these 
disparate degrees of intensity into a more problematic structures, which 
incorporates potentials and metastabilities that in turn articulate a more 
problematic phases of collective individuation. 
In other words, during the process between the vital and the psychic 
moments of individuation, pre-individual potentials exceed the individual being. 
                                                 
29“The interindividual relation goes from individual to individual; it does not permeate individuals; 
the transindividual action is that which makes it, so that individuals exist together as the elements 
of a system that carries potentials and metastability, […], then the discovery of a structure and a 
functional organization that integrates and resolves the problematic of incorporated immanence. 
[…]. The transindividual does not localise individuals; it makes them coincide; it makes 
individuals communicate through significations” [translation mine] (2007: 191-192).   
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These pre-individual masses of intensity maintain a constant order of asymmetry, 
which articulates – which literally problematises – further moments of 
individuation. It is in this asymmetry, with its excess of potentialities, that the 
notion of relations lies. The transindividual action structured through the emotive 
context actualises the relational status (the disparation between emotive states) of 
emotion throughout the psychic individuation. For the relational nature of 
emotion, the process of psychic individuation cannot be conceived as anything 
other than collective, and this places the quasi-individual being permanently in the 
middle of pre-individuality and collective individual. As this account presents the 
individual as being constantly exposed, the process of individuation brings about 
the discovery of the amphibian character of the individual (Virno, 2004: 78-80). 
The individual is permanently in the middle between pre-individual force and the 
collective plane. The peculiarity of an individual lies precisely in its permanent 
location in middle of these factors. This leads one to think the quidditas of an 
individual being as a series of complex relations between disparate grades of 
intensity, which operate in the interstices between the vital and psychic levels.  
Lastly, we must emphasise that the transindividual does not only structure 
psychic states but also ethical and social practises. The transindividual is the 
force, Simondon affirms, that moves political and social realities. Given the 
psychic and social meaning of the transindividual, that we cannot conceive social 
and psychic communities separately. Instead, there exists only a psychic-social 
community (Simondon, 2007: 192-193). By this, he means that there is a unique 
process of individuation, which unfolds the social and vice versa. It is for this 
reason that Simondon firmly states that a society becomes, and it is not created by 
a social contract. 
 
New possibilities for the individual of the present  
 
We might now present some conclusions based on Simondon’s theory of 
individuation. The importance of Simondon’s theory concerns his gesture of re-
founding the paradigm of relation itself. Simondon does not address the question 
of why individuals enter into relation, or of whether or not human nature is 
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relational. Simondon’s philosophical gesture is the analysis of the ontological 
status of relation itself. Simondon raises important questions concerning 
relationality itself, and consequently asks how it is possible to signify the reality 
of relation.  
These guiding questions lead Simondon to reject the anthropomorphic and 
zoomorphic definitions of relation. The essence of relation brings about the 
discovery that behind the transformations within the material world there are 
relational states and movements. In this fashion, individuation as a process of 
transformations is seen in terms of a becoming of disparate forms of relation. 
There is individuation insofar as there are relational events. As it is the place of 
transformations, nature is therefore a system of dynamic relations, which 
individualise and problematise individuals. Our awareness of the material world 
as a relational framework might improve the contemporary vocabulary of 
materialist philosophy. In this sense, the arguments, I will develop in this chapter 
and those that follow are intended to offer a contribution to this grammar.  
The theme of relation becomes crucial when Simondon passes to analyse 
psychic individuation. Since relation is the generative source of psychic life, 
emotion and affectivity found the psychical life of beings. Simondon’s arguments 
about emotion and affectivity are based on the assumption that they are prior to 
individuated being. Emotional and affective activities pass through the individual 
without inhering within them. This means that different emotional states are in 
truth moments of individuation, without which the process of individuation would 
not take place. Simondon’s theory of emotion and affectivity imply a quite 
different understanding of the relational and emotive constitution of the 
individual, upon which novel ethical and political theories should be predicated. 
Simondon’s theory sheds light on the collective dimension of emotion, which 
pervades every social and political organisation. The consequence of Simondon’s 
arguments calls us to question theories that present the social contract as the basis 
of civil society, and also those ethical and anthropological conjectures, which rely 
on the definition of human nature as social and egotistical.  
Taking into account the main arguments and implications of Simondon’s 
philosophy of individuation, the questions that I will now move on to discuss 
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concern how and to what extent his ontological categories might clarify Spinoza’s 
theories of conatus, body and affectivity. In the following section, I will examine 
how an interpretation of Spinoza via Simondon’s philosophy will raise important 
theses regarding the richness of the expressions of Spinoza’s geometry of affects, 
to which contemporary thought should pay greater attention. In order to look for 
an adequate language of affectivity able to express its materiality and cogency, the 
claim that I will develop in the section below is that Spinoza’s thought, when seen 
through a Simondonian lens, offers crucial theoretical resources.          
 
2. Spinoza’s paradigm of the individual  
 
As anticipated in chapter I, Spinoza’s study of the individual is 
developed from part II to part V of the Ethics. In the second half of part II, the 
main arguments concern the analysis of the anatomies of mind and body and 
how these are related one another. In this section, Spinoza presents his theory 
of knowledge and explains the mechanism through which the mind acquires 
self-awareness and awareness of the world.  He gives an account here of the 
constitution and the role of the body for the attainment of knowledge. The 
body is regarded as the first object of the mind, through which the latter 
develops various forms of knowledge, adequate and inadequate ideas (E. II, 
prop. XIII).   
Central for the purpose of the present discussion is Spinoza’s 
definition of the human body, which is introduced in the physics of bodies.  
The human body is a dynamic composite of a great number of individuals, 
each of which is extremely complex and varies continuously (E. II, postulate 
I). The importance of this resides in the concept of the body as a mixture of 
different parts, which are constantly in movement. This statement suggests 
the idea of the body not as an already-made substance, but rather as a domain 
of various functions.  
In part III, Spinoza addresses the theme of human bondage, which is 
caused by a life lived under the dominance of affectivity. In this context, we 
enter into the domain of imagination (the first kind of knowledge), within sets 
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forth primary forms of self-awareness and perception of otherness. The 
analysis of the dynamics of the affects involves a variety of fundamental 
themes such as the theory of conatus, the essence of human being, and 
relationality. Furthermore, as I have already mentioned in chapter I, Spinoza’s 
arguments on affectivity are central for determining the political status of the 
mass within society and also the constitution of the authority of the state. In 
the political Treatises, Spinoza will employ affects such as fear, hope and 
indignation to describe both the characters of the mass and that of the ruler.  
 In part IV, Spinoza describes the importance of rationality and 
positive affects such as joy and love for the complete development of human 
nature. These are the sole conditions through which the human being 
experiences freedom. Spinoza explains what a life under the guidance of 
reason truly consists of, and how from this individuals might obtain the 
highest satisfaction. This results in the development of values of friendship 
and mutual support. The respect of rational prescriptions coincides with the 
recognition of other human beings as advantageous for the improvement of 
one’s own nature (E. IV, prop. XXXV, schol.). In this section, political and 
ethical meanings become more explicit. Furthermore, it is in part IV that 
Spinoza introduces the theme of life and connects this with active affects such 
as joy and love (E. IV, prop. XIX, XX, XXI, XXII). 
The focus of part V of the Ethics is the conditions, through which men 
might attain the Amor Dei Intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). This 
represents the highest form of human knowledge, freedom and joy. By this, 
Spinoza means that human understanding operates directly through the 
attributes of thought and extension. This genre of knowledge is expressed 
through a particular type of love, which is twofold: namely, the love of the 
human being towards God, and the love of God toward humankind. From the 
divine standpoint, the action of God upon the world is his love toward 
humankind. This opens up an innovative meaning of love, which replaces the 
conception of divine love as piety and goodness with the power of acting and 
producing. In turn, this implies the recognition of love, in its highest 
expression, as a generative source of beings and of various levels of reality. 
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From the human standpoint, knowledge of the third kind means to 
understand God in its entirety and complexity. This involves perceiving God 
under the light of a certain eternity (E. V, prop. XXII, XXIII). For Spinoza, 
this means to love God immediately. He gives only one historical example of 
human experience of the third kind of knowledge. In the Theological Political 
Treatise Spinoza indicates in the figure of Christ a model of understanding 
God directly through the latter’s attributes, as he explains “Christ 
communicated with God mind to mind” (TTP, Chapter I, p. 399). In the 
following chapter, I will investigate the political relevance of the life of Christ 
as the embodiment of this form of love and the ways his existence structures 
decisive political gestures.  
Having taken the general plan of the three sections of the Ethics into 
account, we are now in a position to examine the resulting paradigm of the 
individual and the extent to which this might enrich our awareness of the 
individual of the present. The starting point of Spinoza’s thought of the 
individual is his genealogy of the affects. His theory of affectivity, as we will 
see below, is the subject of one of the great debates amongst scholars; one 
that signals the great difference in approach between Spinozist analytic and 
continental studies.  Let us flesh out the problematics involved within 
Spinoza’s genealogy of the affects.   
 
2.1 Geometry of the affects and its problems 
 
In part III of the Ethics, Spinoza’s dictum is that humankind is a part of 
nature and not a “kingdom within a kingdom” (E. III, Preface). The human being 
obeys to the universal laws of causation in exactly the same manner as all other 
creatures in nature. As an expression of human weakness, affectivity has to be 
investigated as a natural phenomenon, which originates from a precise 
concatenation of cause and effect. The discovery of these causes indicates the 
conditions through which the human being might reduce the power of the affects 
upon his or her life. 
As described in chapter I, Spinoza distinguishes between actions and 
117 
 
passions (E. III, Def. III). If we are an adequate cause of these affections, then the 
affect is an action; if however we are an inadequate cause of the effects, then 
affect is defined as passion. By 'adequate cause' Spinoza means a cause that gives 
rise to effects that can be understood clearly and distinctively. Individuals are 
active, when they distinguish causes from effects, and importantly when they are 
the causes of the effects. On the contrary, individuals are passive when they are 
partial effects of an external cause (E. III, Def. I-II). In the postulates I and II, 
Spinoza explains that the human body can be affected in many ways, from which 
its power of acting can be increased or decreased. These varied affections alter the 
structure of the body without changing the whole individual. In postulate II, 
Spinoza literally refers to a vestige of preceding experiences, which has been 
impressed on human being. 
 Proceeding from the definitions of affects, passions and actions to the 
theory of conatus, Spinoza defines this latter as the striving to exist and persevere 
into life. This is held by every being in nature. Related particularly to humankind, 
conatus structures human behaviours and cognitive phases. It plays the pivotal 
role of orienting one self to the world (E. III, prop. VI,VII, VIII).  The theory of 
conatus presents Spinoza’s conception of life, upon which his paradigm of the 
individual is constructed. As I will discuss here and in the following chapters, the 
meaning given to Spinoza to the concept of life (conatus) is crucial for 
determining the distinguishing features of psychic, biological and political 
individuals. Lastly, in the human context conatus corresponds to desire, which is 
the very essence of a human being (E. III, Def. Aff. I). By this, he intends a 
transition from a lesser to a greater level of perfection. Desire is referred to both 
the mind and the body (E. III, Def. I Aff., explanation).   
In the theory of the affects, conatus activates the affective process and 
operates through the active and passive affects. Affects function through an 
individual’s experience with an object and of another individual, the outcome of 
which can be advantageous or destructive. The resulting impressions influence 
successive experiences, distinct social and psychic behaviours. Specifically, joy, 
love and their derivates maintain the individual in an active state, favouring 
mechanisms of self-awareness and socialization. Conversely, hatred, sadness and 
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similar passions generate a passive condition, which progressively weakens the 
human being’s conatus (E. III, prop. XV-XVII).  
Spinoza’s analysis of the affects presents many problematic theses. The 
primary source of difficulties is represented by the concept of conatus. 
Ambivalences are contained in the verbs “preserving” and “striving”, which 
define the origins of individual actions and thoughts. The former might be 
identified with the instinct of self-preservation, the latter as an innate struggle for 
the improvement of individual condition. Whilst the term “preserving” might be 
easily assumed as expressing a form of individualist egoism, the verb “striving” 
presents two different meanings. Firstly, to strive might indicate an egoistic desire 
of an individual for extending his power over others. In this case, striving would 
further expand the egoistic instinct of self-preservation. The result would be a 
paradigm of the individual centred on a strong egoist individualism. This would 
involve a politics based on ideals of self-mastery, profit, and conflict for power. 
An individualist portrait of human nature would also imply a conception of the 
state and society as a mere assemblage of individuals, which functions as a 
guarantor of singular interest and prevents reciprocal offences.  
However, the verb “striving” might also delineate a tendency towards the 
achievement of the highest form of perfection. Thus, the term might express a 
teleological meaning, that is, a goal-directed individual existence. This would, on 
the one hand, coincide with Spinoza’s system of determinism and also his refusal 
of free-will; on the other hand, the teleological hypothesis would weaken the first 
aspect of conatus as a self-preserving drive. In this second case, Spinoza’s ethical 
and political project would support a form of agency behind-beyond human 
gestures, the vision of a political society above individuals, and the highest form 
of perfection. Lastly, the verbs “preserving” and “striving” might be read together 
as expressing the meaning of pure power.  In this case, conatus would suggest 
Spinoza’s idea of the life of an individual as activity. This would converge with 
his definition of Substance’s essence as a power (E. I, prop. XXXIV). The ethical 
and political implications would be a theory of society erected not on the value of 
self-interest and result of an higher will, but instead an expression of many 
different individual desires.  
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As with the theory of conatus, Spinoza’s thesis of affectivity is not free 
from difficulties. At the outset of these is the question of what theoretical tools we 
should employ for understanding the theme of affectivity in the Ethics. In other 
words, how do we read Spinoza’s notions of affects, passions and rationality? Do 
they describe states of mind’s awareness, or rather ethical and political 
behaviours? In the first case, we analyse Spinoza’s affective process from a 
cognitive standpoint. Affects would connote more or less perfect phases within 
the general process of mind’s awareness. Spinoza’s conception of affectivity, as a 
whole, would aim at the description of human process of knowing and the psychic 
models emerging from this. In the second case, the dynamics of the affects 
delineate the mechanism through which human beings develop an idea of well-
being, of norms and practises of socialisation. Furthermore, affects and passions 
raise the question of whether these should be regarded as opposing categories or 
rather as different expressions of social and ethical attitudes, which do not oppose 
each other. Ultimately, Spinoza’s definition of human essence as desire opens up 
a more complex theme: that is, whether desire presupposes a theory of lack, or 
rather a theory of power.  
To be more precise, Spinoza defines desire as a transition from a lesser to 
a greater degree of perfection. This might give rise to the idea that for Spinoza 
human desires derive from a state of lack and need. If this is the case, then taken 
in itself, human essence is lacking, and requires for its complete development the 
attainment of higher forms of perfection and goals. However, as mentioned above, 
Spinoza also qualifies individual nature as conatus, which is directly connected 
with the meaning of power and self-affirmation. Referred to human essence, 
conatus indicates that human life is intended as union of different powers, which 
run from physical, ethical and cognitive desires. It is around these questions that 
scholars within the field of contemporary Spinoza studies have constructed their 
readings of Spinoza’s paradigm of the individual, from which they have deduced 
his politics and ethics. In chapter I, I have delineated the main characteristics of 
the two principal interpretations of Spinoza’s philosophy, i.e. those of the analytic 
and continental traditions. These two interpretations will still accompany our 
enquiry into Spinoza’s theory of the affects and will constitute the theoretical 
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ground from which the approach developed in this thesis takes shape.  
Although distinctions between the exegeses of Spinoza formulated within 
the two mentioned traditions of thought cannot be traced definitely, and although 
there are many points of convergence and similarities, for the purpose of the 
present discussion, I want to emphasise the differences in approach to the theme 
of affectivity followed by analytic and continental readers of the Ethics. The 
analytic school is generally characterised by a tendency towards a reading of the 
affects from a cognitive perspective, whereas the continental tradition is more 
inclined to attribute a stronger political and ethical meaning to Spinoza’s thesis of 
affectivity. Let us flesh out in more detail, firstly, the implications of reading 
Spinoza’s theory of affectivity from a cognitive perspective.  
 
The analytic study of the affects 
           
In chapter I, we have seen that central aspect of many analytic 
commentators is the importance given to rationality within Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. They consider ideas and reason central within Spinoza’s model of 
Substance, which drive human beings and nature. In the analysis of the theory of 
the affects, this general line of reasoning results in a cognitive strategy, which 
identifies Spinoza’s conception of affectivity as different stages of the path of the 
mind towards self-awareness. A further commonality between scholars can be 
found in the view that Spinoza’s notion of conatus and desire denotes a self-
preserving instinct, a desire for self-affirmation and the improvement of 
individual power. Whilst the arguments of part III of the Ethics are described as a 
cognitive process, the remaining sections are viewed as establishing Spinoza’s 
moral philosophy. This prepares the terrain for the exposition of the political 
theses of the political Treatises. 
A decisive contribution towards the development of a cognitive reading of 
Spinoza’s conception of affectivity has been offered by Hampshire, whose 
reflections have been influential, albeit not exclusively, for many analytic 
Spinozist scholars such as Bennett and Curley. As anticipated in chapter I, for 
Hampshire, Spinoza’s metaphysics is centred on a paradigm of materialism, 
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which attributes to materiality a dynamic and productive status. In the human 
context, in Hampshire’s view, this model of materialism is explicated through the 
centrality of the body for the improvement of mind’s awareness. This is the 
fundamental ground of physical and mental states, through which the human 
subject orients himself within the world, constructs relations with the others and 
creates ethical and social norms. It is for this reason that Hampshire considers 
both ideas and affects primarily as physical phenomena, which derive from bodily 
movements and interaction with other bodies (Hampshire, 2005:110-112). In this 
light, Spinoza’s notion of conatus and desire are together intended as an innate 
drive for preserving and increasing individual power. These are the key elements 
around which Spinoza’s egoist paradigm of humankind is constructed. Conatus 
and desire structure the body’s activity, which in turn activates affective and 
mental processes. Moreover, conatus and desire are the prime reason and ultimate 
end of moral norms and socio-political practises (Hampshire, 2005: 105-110). 
Given the centrality of the body for the improvement of human desire, 
Hampshire deduces a cognitive psychology from Spinoza’s theory of affects. 
Affects delineate the weakness of mind, which shape different psychological 
illness and personality. As a result of the material foundation of the affects, the 
remedy to the mind’s weakness is an accurate investigation of its causes in much 
the same way as we generally do for any physical phenomenon. Following 
Hampshire’s analysis, therefore, the arguments of part III seem to present a 
psychotherapy, which aims at liberating human life from psychic bondage and 
disorders (Hampshire, 2005: 106-110; Bennett, 1984: 347-350). From this account 
of Spinoza’s conceptions of affectivity and conatus, Hampshire draws a parallel 
between Freud’s theory of desire and Spinoza’s study of the affects. Affinities, 
Hampshire claims, reside on the notions of conatus and drive, on an innate force 
of self-preservation and extension of energy. These are for both thinkers the 
fundamental instruments for understanding interior life. Hampshire however 
clarifies that Spinoza and Freud do not claim that human beings are aware of their 
desires to dominate others. By contrast, their intention is to indicate a method 
through which human weaknesses might be investigated scientifically. It is only 
through this study of human nature that we might discover what truly lies at the 
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very heart of human imperfection and unhappiness (Hampshire, 2005: 110-112). 
Building upon Hampshire’s cognitive reading of part III of the Ethics, 
Bennett too views the theme of affectivity as the weakness of the mind. Bennett 
envisages in the dynamics of the affects Spinoza’s account of individual ordinary 
psychic disorders, strengths and self-interested desire. Affects are inadequate 
responses that an individual provides to his natural instinct of self-preservation, 
that is, conatus (Bennett, 1984: 240-251).For him, conatus means a self-
preserving force, which in the human being becomes recognised as self-interest 
and as an individualist attitude. Conatus derives, Bennett explains, from Spinoza’s 
more general thesis, for which in nature “no thing can be destroyed except by an 
external cause” (E. III, prop. 4). Related to the human context, Spinoza’s denial of 
self-destruction culminates in his rejection of suicide (Bennett, 1984: 237-240). 
These are the fundaments of Spinoza’s egoist and individualist paradigm of the 
individual.  
For Bennett, Spinoza’s egoist model of the individual is developed from a 
rigorous study of human cognitive processes, which are rooted in the domain of 
the affects. In contrast to Hampshire’s materialist account of affectivity, Bennett’s 
reading echoes somewhat the panpsychist meaning given to Spinoza’s theory of 
parallelism (Bennett, 1984: 131-139). As discussed in chapter I, the formula of 
parallelism here means the dominance of the mental upon the material. In the 
geometry of the affects, this results in the inclusion of the dynamics of affectivity 
within the mental structure of the individual. In this light, affective states and 
desires indicate a process, in which the mind strives towards the acquisition of an 
higher state of vitality. Affects, Bennett affirms, should be regarded as moments 
within mind’s manifold process of self-awareness (Bennett, 1984: 254-267).   
The liberation of the mind from the affects coincides in Bennett’s analysis 
with the mind’s highest level of vitality (Bennett, 1984: 259-262). The path of the 
mind toward its highest form of vitality corresponds to the distinct form of moral 
philosophy. At the outset of his moral philosophy Spinoza gives his definition of 
human nature as naturally egoist and individualist. Reason thus teaches us the best 
way to achieve and increase our self-interest (Bennett, 1984: 307-310). Its 
‘dictates’ have both a cognitive and teleological meaning. This results from 
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Spinoza’s claim that self-interest is the cornerstone of human conduct. Given this 
form of egoism, human behaviour is influenced by this egoistic nature, which 
comes to shape the precept of reason. From this, Bennett concludes Spinoza’s aim 
in the Ethics is not only to demonstrate that egoism is natural, but also that it is 
moral under the guidance of reason. Spinoza considers the dictates of reason as 
moral principles, which have prescriptive value (Bennett, 1984: 299-310).   
Like Bennett, Curley also draws Spinoza’s individualist and realist moral 
philosophy from the latter’s notions of conatus, affects and rationality. However, 
unlike Bennett, Curley’s interpretation stresses its political and ethical 
implications rather than the cognitive mechanism of Spinoza’s genealogy of the 
affects. For Curley, central within the theory of the affects is the category of 
conatus. He suggests reading conatus not only as an instinct of self-preservation 
but also as an innate desire for the increase of individual power (Curley, 1988: 
107-119). In this light, Spinoza’s study of affectivity aims to provide human 
beings with moral precepts and remedies. In contrast with Bennett, who views 
affects as mind’s weakness, for Curley in Spinoza affects are negative insofar as 
they decrease individual conatus; they are in consequence positive insofar as they 
further expand human being’s power (Curley, 1988: 119-126).  
Furthermore, positive affects move human beings towards the 
development of rationality. Under the guidance of reason, Curley explains, human 
beings discover in mutual cooperation the best way to improve their own being 
and fulfil their needs and desires (Curley, 1988: 128-135). The ‘dictates’ of reason 
in Spinoza, Curley explains, are considered hypothetical and at the same time 
categorical. They are hypothetical because we need to follow the 
recommendations of rationality as if we want to increase our own being. They are 
also categorical because the improvement of one’s own conatus it is already the 
innate fundament of moral action (Curley, 1979: 371-376). The conclusions 
Curley draws from his analysis of parts III and IV of the Ethics is the definition of 
Spinoza’s moral philosophy centred on a paradigm of egoist individualism. It is 
self-interest (conatus) that founds moral and political norms. Self-interest is the 
foundation and at the same time the ultimate end of society.  
In contrast with the general analytic tendency toward the identification of 
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the theory of conatus as egoist self-preservation, Smith attributes a teleological 
meaning to it. He suggests reading the verb “striving” not as an individualistic 
desire for self-affirmation and power, but as a tension that motivates a higher form 
of perfection (Smith, 2003: 100-104). This form of perfection is represented by a 
life lived under the guidance of reason; a life that coincides with the acquisition of 
true happiness and freedom. This innate inclination directs every phases of human 
existence, including affective life. This is not the domain of cruel egoist desires, 
which oppose mind’s activity. Rather, these describe the weakness of the mind 
and its striving toward the attainment of self-awareness (Smith, 2003:104-113). 
The greatness of Spinoza’s thought of humankind, Smith concludes, does not 
reside in the encouragement of ascetic values, in order to gain perfection. By 
contrast, it consists in the enjoyment of actual life developed through political 
society (Smith, 2003: 137-153). 
 
Critical reflections on the analytic reading of affectivity  
 
The analytic reading has underlined the role of the affects within the 
development of human self-awareness and knowledge of the world, and has 
considered affectivity largely as an imperfect phase of the mind. Besides the 
different conclusions achieved by analytic scholars, the common risk, to which a 
cognitive approach might lead, is the possibility of failing to fully unfold the 
potentialities of affectivity. If we take up a cognitive strategy, we circumscribe 
affectivity within the domain of the mental, and this prevents us from recognising 
all the characteristics of the affects. If affects are viewed as the weaknesses of the 
mind, then this leads towards a view that casts them as states of lack. This also has 
direct impact upon the understanding of Spinoza’s account of the mind. The 
vision of the development of the mind through various states of weakness 
introduces a certain logic of lack at the outset of the entire cognitive process. If 
affects are assumed as negative, and if the mind is required to free itself in order 
to develop all of its capacities, then this means that the power of the mind derives 
from a condition of lack. In this way, the awareness of the mind does not express 
the power of controlling affectivity and understanding the world adequately, but 
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rather a gesture of poverty, from which the mind begins its journeys towards 
adequate and intuitive genres of knowledge. 
Although affects are considered in the Ethics as the causes of human 
bondage, we cannot ignore that especially in part IV positive affects such as joy 
and love are constitutive elements of rational life and essential for destroying 
passions such as hatred (E. III, prop. XLIII, XLIV). In this fashion, the attainment 
of rationality would not derive from a struggle of the mind from its states of 
poverty (affects) but rather from a more complex process, which involves the 
encouragement of positive affects. As a result, mind’s awareness would emerge 
from joyful experiences, and not from lack. Lastly, we must emphasise that 
affects and passions such as joy, hope and fear do not only indicate moral or 
psychic moments that in turn form political concepts: these moments are in fact 
already political.  
This aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, together with the link between 
positive affects and rationality, has been highlighted by the continental 
interpretation. This has insisted upon the political implications that emerge from 
Spinoza’s theory of the affects, and from their irreducibility within rational life. 
The arguments that I will put forward in the conclusive section of this chapter aim 
to take the continental reading further, by way of an ontological analysis of the 
theory of the affects. This is an alternative perspective to the cognitive view, and 
might open up a potential re-conception of the richness of the affects’ expressions, 
which are productive of powerful psychic realities, relationality, and of political 
and social meanings. Let us firstly turn to the interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of 
affectivity within the continental tradition of thought.  
 
Affectivity within the continental tradition 
 
As already anticipated, interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of the affects 
vary greatly within the analytic and continental schools of thought. Spinozist 
scholars from these traditions investigate the theme of affectivity through different 
strategies. Analytic scholars, as we have seen, follow a cognitive approach and 
identify affects as phases of the mind which need to be advanced for the 
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acquisition of higher rationality and true happiness. By contrast, in the continental 
reading affects are studied in their autonomy from the mind, and are directly 
related to the arguments of the political Treatises. This strategy leads continental 
Spinozist commentators to discover in the theory of affectivity important ethical 
and political meanings, which will be fully developed in the political Treatises.  
As discussed in chapter I, for those that follow the continental approach, 
Spinoza’s ontology is founded on a distinct model of materialism, in which matter 
occupies a productive dimension. The implications of this form of materialism 
become more evident within the theory of the affects. For this interpretation, 
affectivity is the cornerstone of Spinoza’s materialist paradigm of the individual. 
The key-element of the theory of the affects is the notion of conatus. Unlike the 
analytic reading, continental scholars translate the verb “striving”, contained 
within the definition of conatus, as pure power and activity. This, however, does 
not necessarily mean a desire to dominate others and an individualist instinct for 
self-preservation. Rather, conatus, activating the affective process, develops 
political and social relations. These aspects, indicated above, have been 
particularly developed by post-Marxist Spinozist scholars within the general 
continental interpretation. In the post-Marxist appropriation, the originality of 
Spinoza’s theory of the affects is found principally within the concept of conatus 
and also in his analysis of the domain of imagination. The notion of conatus, 
through the affective process, is the prime motor of social relations. The 
importance of this resides on the crucial implication that this has for 
understanding Spinoza’s political thought.  
Following this view, in the Ethics as well as in the political Treatises, 
interactions between individuals always emerge from and within latent or explicit 
dynamics of power. Thinkers such as Negri and Montag more recently have 
strongly insisted on the meaning of conatus as an expression of a power relation 
(Montag, 1999: 31-53).
30
 Especially, Negri has read in the notion of conatus and, 
more generally, in that of affectivity, Spinoza’s genealogy of power, which is 
fully explicated in the political Treatises (Negri, 1998: 193-223; Hardt, 2000: xi-
                                                 
30
Montag includes the analysis of the theory of the conatus within a more general discussion of 
Spinoza’s politics of the multitude (Montag, 1999: 62-89). I will return to Montag’s position  in 
chapters III and IV.     
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xvi). Furthermore, Negri has envisaged in Spinoza’s notion of the affects the 
character of the multitude. Affects such as indignation generate forms of 
resistance within the body of the multitude against the existing authority of the 
state (Negri, 1998: 204-216). 
Passing from the argument of conatus to the general theory of imagination, 
this discloses a theory of for the emancipation of the masses from despotic 
regimes. Ideology, by which a despotic state is supported, is based on the 
encouragement of imaginative-affective practises which are instrumental for 
maintaining the dominance of the ruler over the people. Therefore, for thinkers 
such as Matheron (1988), Negri (1998) and Tosel (1984) Spinoza’s analysis of the 
origin of imagination aims at indicating the ways in which might liberate 
themselves through the power of thinking and acting.  
 
Relationality and ethical vision of the world      
 
With a quite different emphasis in respect to the post-Marxist reading, but 
whilst maintaining a materialist perspective, Balibar draws primary attention to 
the relational nature of conatus and affects. Unlike Negri, for example, who tends 
to read the sphere of the affects and conatus within a logic of power, Balibar, 
instead, focuses to the relational dynamics activated by the affects. In chapter I, I 
discussed Balibar’s position concerning the metaphysics of Substance, whose 
main theses point to the relational forces behind the logic of cause and effect. This 
reading continues and is further developed in his analysis of the theory of the 
affects. Besides their political meaning, Balibar maintains that affects describe 
primarily relational states. He observes that in Spinoza affects are regularly 
explained as movements towards the others. These movements generate relations 
between individuals. The affect of hope, for example, necessarily requires the 
presence of the hoping individual and the hoped individual or object.
31
 This 
                                                 
31Balibar develops an important reading of the centrality of Spinoza’s theory of the affects for 
understanding the status of the masses within the state. Balibar examines, specifically, the double 
meaning of the passion of fear in the Theological Political Treatise. This means, on the one side, 
the fear of the mass towards the ruler and equally the fear of the ruler himself towards the mass 
(Balibar, 1994: 3-37). Balibar’s thesis will be treated at greater length in chapter IV, which 
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directly activates a relational condition. Affects, more generally, structure the 
actions and thoughts of two or more individuals. In this sense, Balibar continues, 
affects reveal a collective dimension (Balibar, 1998: 76-98).  
Balibar deduces a theory of communication from the relational force of the 
affects. An affect does not solely bring individuals into relation; it also makes 
them communicate. Put differently, affectivity creates common meanings, through 
which individuals communicate (Balibar, 1998: 95-98). In recent writings, and 
whilst suggesting an affinity between Spinoza and Simondon, Balibar has argued 
that this relational force of the affects uncovers a form of transindividuality 
(Balibar, 2002: 103-147). To be more precise, conatus and human desire, by 
which affects are moved, activate forces that exceed singular individuals. These 
are the bases upon which social bonds and various commonalities are developed 
(Balibar, 2002; 1998:101-119). Thus, relations are more complex and go far 
beyond the dynamics of power. It is from Balibar’s suggestion on the connection 
between conatus, desire and affects and transindividuality that my reading of the 
theme of affectivity proceeds. 
Deleuze similarly points to the relational meaning of the affects. For him, 
relationality is the leading concept of Spinoza’s general study of the individual, 
which organises every existing being. Relationality guides the physics of the 
bodies, the common notions, affectivity and rationality. Whilst the physics of the 
bodies and common notions indicate different levels of commonalities between 
individuals, affects and rationality form various ethical behaviours (Deleuze, 
1990: 217-288). These open up to Spinoza’s ethical vision of the world, which is 
centred on the notion of conatus (Deleuze, 1990: 217-233). Its unique 
commandment is the necessity of improving one’s own being through the 
establishment and development of a continuous ‘encounter’ with others (Deleuze, 
1990: 201-234). In Deleuze’s reformulation, the increase of power of the conatus 
derives from movements of composition and decomposition with other 
individuals, through which beings exchange parts with others and acquire further 
degrees of perfection.   
The importance of affectivity is the capacity of an individual being to 
                                                                                                                                     
examines the anatomy of the multitude within the Theological Political Treatise and the Political 
Treatise.   
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generate and live constantly in a relational condition, in which he becomes more 
powerful. In this light, the difference between affects and passions consists in the 
ability to develop more complex encounters with others. Positive affects move 
individuals towards others, whilst passions progressively detach beings from the 
world. Therefore, affects are not positive or negative per se; rather, the outcomes 
of these encounters have a positive or negative meaning (Deleuze, 1990: 235-
288). The resulting ethical model is precisely based on this theory of encounters. 
For this, there are no moral differences and qualitative distinctions, for example, 
between the wise man and the ignorant. They are ethically equal, and are 
distinguished by their actions and responses to random encounters with others. 
The ignorant man affected by passions tends progressively to detach himself from 
the others, decreasing his body and mind. The wise man is more active and 
inclined to encounter other beings more regularly. His mind and body will 
therefore be more complex. However, taken in themselves, the wise and the 
ignorant are exactly equal and possess the same power and potentials. This is what 
in Deleuze’s view describes Spinoza’s ethical vision of the world, which is mainly 
constructed around practical suggestions (Deleuze, 1988: 17-43; 1990: 255-272). 
Balibar and Deleuze’s reflections have been particularly influential for 
Massumi, Gatens and Lloyd, amongst others. Although Massumi’s interests are 
not exclusively directed to Spinoza’s philosophy, however, he has brought to light 
dormant aspects within Spinoza’s model of the individual, which have been 
crucial for the arguments of the present chapter. For Massumi, Spinoza’s 
paradigm of the individual is based on distinct notions of body, movements and 
affectivity. Developing Deleuze’s ‘theory of encounters’ further, Massumi has 
underlined that these encounters between bodies, as described in the Ethics, stem 
from a novel paradigm of movement. In the physics of the bodies, movements, 
Massumi observes, do not merely involve physic changes; by contrast, there is an 
endless ground of relational forces, which in turn structure cogent beings and 
events. At the outset of these movements there is an innovative conception of the 
body (Massumi, 2002a: 1-21). In Spinoza, Massumi explains, the body is not 
conceived as a definite unity, but rather as a complex mixture of movements, 
intensities and functions. Spinoza’s notion of the body, Massumi firmly 
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concludes, has to be intended as pure ‘openness’, that is, a continuous process of 
transformation and relational forces (Massumi, 2002a: 46-51).
32
 When related to 
the human context, the geometry of the affects, in Massumi’s view, discloses 
Spinoza’s advocacy of their autonomy. Affectivity is analysed in itself and not 
within cognitive, ethical and political standpoints. In Spinoza’s study, affects are 
irreducible conditions for the development of an individual, which characterise 
human life as a whole (Massumi, 2002a: 28-39).  
Within this multifaceted portrait of Spinoza’s paradigm of the individual, 
elaborated within the continental tradition, we might distinguish a tendency that 
has emerged more recently, which draws from Spinoza’s theory of the affects a 
social-psychology. This is greatly exemplified by the studies of Gatens and Llyod. 
The relevance of their analysis to this chapter’s arguments is that the social-
psychological approach that they follow does not lead them to narrowly define 
affectivity within the domain of the mind, and to consider affects merely as an 
indication of weakness. For Gatens and Llyod, Spinoza’s social psychology is 
also centred on the theory of conatus, affects and passions. Affectivity establishes 
social relations through imaginative practises of recognition and identification. 
Affects communicate ‘images’ of the other individual, who might be similar or 
different to our selves (Gatens, Llyod, 1999:66-69). Spinoza’s first genre of 
knowledge, imagination, has to be intended as a mimetic process, in which an 
individual associates joy or sorrow with the image of the other individual (Gatens 
and Lloyd, 1999:65-69). From this, the relevance of the affects consists in the 
power of generating relational practises (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 23-33).  
For Gatens and Llyod, the understanding of the relational character of 
affectivity and imagination is imperative for understanding the form of political 
life proposed by Spinoza in the political Treatises. Imagination and affects are not 
negative or positive, but rather are productive of both social union and conflict. 
Gatens and Lloyd’s reassessment of the psycho-social character of affectivity is a 
fundamental contribution to the re-understanding of the status of affects and 
passions. However, in my view, a problem still remains open. If affects describe 
psychic-social phases, what is the resulting materialist paradigm of the individual 
                                                 
32Massumi’s proximity to Simondon’s philosophy becomes particularly evident in the formulation 
of Spinoza’s conception of the individual.   
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indicated by Spinoza? In other words, through the affective-imaginative process, 
what can we really know of an individual in a Spinozist way? The following 
section of this chapter engages these issues.    
 
Inherent problems within the continental reading of affectivity 
 
The reading offered by continental Spinozist scholars has underlined the 
linkage between the theory of the affects of the Ethics and the political Treatises. 
From this standpoint, the geometry of the affects functions as a theoretical basis 
for acquiring an extensive knowledge of Spinoza’s political thought, and 
particularly for his notion of the mass. This reading has brought about the 
discovery of thoughtful theses, which have been decisive for shaping the approach 
proposed in this chapter. The importance of the continental reading of affectivity 
resides in its consideration of the dynamics of the affects independently from 
rationality. In this fashion, affectivity develops actions, which, although not 
guided by reason, are central within the life of an individual, and are not imperfect 
phases of a cognitive process, as suggested by analytic scholars. Affects, conatus 
and desire organise social relations, which impact consistently upon the political 
body. These express the many ways in which power (conatus and desire) 
structures, through the affective mechanism, gestures of resistance and struggle 
which go far beyond the egoist desire for self-preservation. These are instead 
essentially collective, and shape the dynamics of a group rather than those of a 
singular human being. Thus, the understanding of affectivity is the sole imperative 
for determining the mechanism through which the mind might free itself from its 
servitude. By contrast, it is imperative for understanding the genesis of a 
community.  
However, in my view there is a risk involved in the arguments advanced 
particularly by post-Marxist commentators of the Ethics. This is the under-
evaluation of the meaning embodied by Spinoza’s theory of the affects. From this 
perspective, we certainly become more aware of the political meaning of the 
affects and of their impact upon a community. Yet, I would argue, we still do not 
truly know what an affect is within Spinoza’s ontology. In other words, although 
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we have a knowledge of the ‘effects’ of the affects, we do not fully understand 
their nature and the resulting model of an individual. Furthermore, the result of 
portraying affects, desire and conatus within a logic of power might be to view 
Spinoza’s conception of the individual as being restricted within struggling forces 
and conflict. However, in the Ethics the dynamics of the affects exceed the logic 
of conflict. They instead develop values of friendship and solidarity. This 
relational nature of Spinoza’s theory of the affects that has been identified from 
the continental perspective has most significantly developed, as discussed above, 
from the work of Balibar and Deleuze. It is to their reflections that my reading of 
Spinoza’s theory of affects is largely indebted. Although from a different 
perspective, Balibar and Deleuze have shed light on an ignored aspect of the 
geometry of the affects, that is, its relational character. Unlike post-Marxist 
readers, for Balibar and Deleuze, affectivity is a generative source of individuals, 
which goes far beyond political life. It is for this reason that the present research 
draws particular attention to Balibar and Deleuze’s arguments.  
Building upon their theses, I intend to develop Balibar’s suggestion 
concerning the transindividual tendency embodied by affectivity, which discloses 
its collective dimension. In Deleuze’s arguments, I have found fecund insights for 
re-thinking the role of the affects and the body within human life. However, I 
think, the theme of the affects in Spinoza is possessed of further and more 
complex aspects, which need to be re-investigated by way of a different strategy. I 
refer to the re-positioning of affectivity within the domain of ontology. A 
consideration of this might enable us to determine the ways in which affects are 
irreplaceable conditions of psychic individuation. By this, I mean that in the 
Ethics affectivity does not solely involve the constitution of relations between 
individuals. Rather, affects disclose a multisided process of collective and psychic 
individuation, in which relations are not the ultimate results of this process but the 
primary source. It is in this context that the originality of Spinoza lies.  
In order to delineate Spinoza’s theme of individuation, I propose to read 
the Ethics in the light of Simondon, and will apply the Simondonian concepts of 
the collective, transindividuality, pre-individual force, metastability and 
disparation to Spinoza’s work. Thinking Spinoza’s system in this way, I will 
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argue below, will shed light on the question of relation and the collective ground 
upon which the paradigm of the individual lies. Taking into account these 
elements, let us flesh out Spinoza’s process of individuation in depth.  
 
3. A detour of Spinoza via Simondon 
 
As anticipated earlier, the aim of this chapter is to develop a reading of 
Spinoza’s theory of humankind through the ontology of individuation of 
Simondon that I discussed above. By this, I do not intend to forcefully establish 
parallels between the two philosophers or to claim Spinoza as a precursor of 
Simondon whilst also inscribing Simondon within a model of Spinozism. 
Furthermore, Simondon’s knowledge of Spinoza’s ontology, with few exceptions, 
heavily relies on the Hegelian interpretation, according to which the Ethics is a 
static system (Simondon, 2007:160-161, 223-224; Del Lucchese, 2009a: 185-
186); for Hegel, the individual in Spinoza is an empty category, and is entirely 
absorbed within the motionless domain of Being.  
Therefore, my attempt is to employ the Simondonian line of thought in 
order to re-investigate the central themes of the Ethics, and to suggest the 
existence of a dialogue between the two philosophies. Balibar envisaged many 
affinities between Simondon and Spinoza, which I have indicated above (Balibar, 
2002: 103-147). These affinities have also been reiterated recently by close 
readers of Simondon such as Combes, who emphasises the convergence between 
Simondon’s concepts of affectivity and relationality and Spinozian desire and 
conatus (Combes, 2001: 12-13). Building upon their suggestions, I will focus on 
analysing the paradigm of the individual in the Ethics through Simondon’s 
ontological concepts. In order to develop my reading of Spinoza's thought of the 
individual in the light of Simondon, we need first to return to the arguments 
advanced in chapter I. 
In chapter I, I gave a broad description of the type of process involved 
within the metaphysics of Substance in part I of the Ethics. I have defined this as 
an anomalous process of production. By anomalous, I mean the existence of 
contingent elements within a deterministic system. Contingency emerges from the 
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statuses of the mode and nature. Although the mode is the result of a causal nexus, 
when taken in itself, it is contingent. Spinoza tells us that the existence of the 
mode does not imply necessary existence (E. I, Def. V, prop. XVI, XXIV). 
Spinoza presents nature both as a free cause (naturing nature) and also as a set of 
all the existing and contingent modes (E. I, prop. XXIV). This insinuates the 
presence of contingent elements within the causal production. Therefore, 
anomaly, in my reading, resides on this coexistence between necessity and 
contingency. 
As we considered Simondon’s ontology of individuation earlier, we are 
now in a position to refine the principal characteristics of Spinoza’s process of 
production. For Simondon, a process is formed and activated by phases, which 
differentiate Being. Each phase corresponds to a moment of individuation, 
without which Being does not exist. Hence, Simondon affirms that Being is 
becoming (Simondon 2007:13). In Spinoza, then, the role of phases, as I have 
argued in chapter I, is represented by the attributes, from which Substance is 
composed. Attributes express Substance (E. I, Def. IV, VI). In the Ethics, to 
“express” means to actualise. In turn, to actualise means to differentiate (Deleuze, 
1992: 41-67; Macherey, 1979: 107-128). Attributes, thus, actualise and 
differentiate Substance, without which the latter cannot exist. Therefore, as I have 
claimed, these behave in the domain of Substance as Simondonian phases.   
Furthermore, Spinoza states that Substance’s essence is power, which 
coincides with its actual being. In turn, this corresponds to a power of producing 
(E. I, prop. XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI). This suggests that Spinoza’s system 
should be intended as a pure activity. The activity of Substance is developed 
through a never ending generation of beings. In nature, Spinoza explains, “no 
thing can be destroyed except from an external cause” (E. III, prop. IV and dem.). 
Even the emergence of an external cause would not entirely destroy the singular 
being; rather, as we will see below, it would transform its existing structure. For 
the system of determinism, we know that a potential external cause would 
generate a new effect and so on ad infinitum. These notions, in my reading, 
indicate that the power of Substance implies a form of eternal becoming, which is 
not a meaningless flow. Instead, the becoming of Substance is dynamic; it is 
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continually differentiated by attributes and modes, and is essentially productive of 
beings.  
More importantly, for the arguments of immanence and the linkage 
between God and nature (E. I, proposition XXIX, schol., prop. XVIII; E. II, prop. 
VII, schol.), this anomalous process of production unfolds within nature. It is 
precisely in this moment that Substance passes from an eternal activity to 
constitute beings through a distinctive process of individuation. In order to 
discover the constitutive phases of this process of individuation and the resulting 
individual, as mentioned above, I employ Simondon's ontogenetic strategy. By 
this, I do not intend a genetic approach to Spinoza’s concepts as many Spinozist 
commentators from Geroult to Deleuze did in different ways. This approach looks 
at beings and states of beings in order to know the causes.  An ontogenetic 
strategy aims at knowing the individual through individuation (Simondon 2007: 
12). Therefore, my focus is not addressed to the search for a definition of the 
individual within the Ethics, but instead to its generative process. It is an enquiry 
into processes, from which singularities acquire an ontological relevance. 
Therefore, primary attention is given to every element within the Ethics that is 
generative of 'some forms of individual'. As Spinoza begins first with ascribing 
this role to both the physics of the bodies and the common notions, our focus will 
rest on these concepts.  
 
Physics of bodies and common notions   
 
In the Ethics, common notions and the physics of bodies establish general 
principles, around which all beings converge and are developed. The physics of 
bodies, as we have already discussed, define physical laws to which all 
individuals obey and by which all are ordered. These laws are referred to the 
extended beings and regulate the activity of bodies in the world. These also shape 
the entire order of nature (E. II, Lemma VII, schol.). In the human being, these 
laws acquire an important position. Given the strict relation between the mind and 
body, bodily movements and changes inevitably have an effect upon the mind, 
and thereby upon the human subject as a whole (E. II, prop. XIII, XIV).  
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The common notions are not predefined archetypes and principles, upon 
which singular ideas are modelled. By contrast, in Spinoza, common notions 
simply indicate certain commonalities between bodies and ideas, in which all 
beings converge adequately (E. II, prop. XXXVIII and corollary). The originality 
of Spinoza’s thesis concerns the transposition of the problem of universal 
categories of thought from the Aristotelian-Scholastic view of the transcendent 
Intellect to the order of nature.
33 
According to Deleuze, the physics of bodies and 
the common notions delineate levels of commonality between individuals, which 
are the bases of encounters (Deleuze 1992: 217-288). Developing Deleuze’s 
explanation further: I argue that common notions and the physics of bodies 
function as a common ground, from which all beings come to life.  
In the physics of bodies, Spinoza explains that every individual being 
converges upon speed and rest (E. II, ax. I, II, III, lem. I) and is ordered through a 
mixture of fluid and hard masses (E. II, postulates I, II). The amount of fluid or 
solid elements involved determines different types of movement from speed to 
slowness, and vice versa. The different levels of speed and magnitude distinguish 
bodies progressively (E. II, ax. II, Lemma I). In order to re-investigate the physics 
of bodies and the resulting individual, a reading of this theory through 
Simondon’s notion of the pre-individual is decisive. Before proceeding with our 
interpretation, a preliminary clarification of the usage of Simondon’s notion in 
this context is needed.  
By the pre-individual, Simondon means an emerging dimension, which is 
the union of power and potentials (Simondon 2007: 196-197). In Simondon, the 
‘emergent’ indicates a common ground of all beings, possessed of a continuing 
power of individuation. Its activity permeates beings and remains always between 
them. Certainly, in the physics of bodies, we do not find the concept of 
undifferentiated mass described by Simondon. Movements and masses in the 
physics of bodies are not the Greek Apeiron evoked by Simondon. We find 
instead the aspects of activity, potentiality and dynamic force that precede and 
                                                 
33
For a study of the universalis in the history of philosophy from Aristotle, passing through 
Averroes, Spinoza, to nowadays, see Illuminati (2002: 78-80; 1998: 85-98). Illuminati argues that 
differently from the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of thought and Cartesian philosophy, Spinoza 
considers the common notions as inhering within actual reality. This gives rise to the independence 
of human mind for the creation of concepts.    
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remain attached to beings throughout their entire development. These 
characteristics, in my view, present a different language for reading the Ethics.  
In order to develop this reading, we first need to consider the laws of 
motion and magnitude from the standpoint of the physics of bodies. From this 
standpoint, motion, rest and magnitude are activities, which precede beings and 
surround these permanently (E. II, ax. I, II, lemma I). Moving within a 
Simondonian perspective, for example, axiom I of the physics of bodies, 
according to which “all the bodies are either in motion or at rest”, acquires a 
meaningful position. These movements are in truth pure activity, which are 
common to all beings. More importantly, this activity permeates beings; it is 
always there. It is, we might say, the emerging reality, which lies underneath and 
through beings. In this light, and when considered through Simondonian concepts, 
Spinoza’s physics of bodies does not describe physic phenomena; instead, 
movements and magnitude tell us the common genesis of individuals, and are, to 
phrase this in keeping with Simondon, a form of interstitial reality. Furthermore, 
given that the laws of motion and magnitude have a material character, and are a 
unique pre-individual, this view indicates that beings have a common material 
genesis. These dynamics shape nature itself (E. II, Lem. VII, schol.). 
This form of pre-individual reality embodied by the physics of bodies is 
present, in different ways, within the common notions too. As mentioned above, 
common notions are not predefined archetypes above and before individuals. 
Spinoza does not present the common notions as universal principles, such as 
Justice, Truth, Humankind, and nor does he model singular ideas upon them. 
Strictly speaking, we do not know what each of the common notions is. We do 
however know that they are indispensable for the developing human beings, and 
that they orient them into the world. Given the generality and indeterminacy of the 
common notions and their role within the human context, in my view, they 
function as a pre-individual field, in a Simondonian sense. They express a pure 
activity and an irreducible force by which individuals are surrounded.  
Their generality and indeterminacy is an endlessly potentiality, through 
which actualised concepts come to light. This aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy 
results more clearly from the passage within part II, proposition XXXVII, where 
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Spinoza affirms “those things that are common to all things and are equally in the 
part as in the whole”(my italics). Maintaining a Simondonian perspective, it is 
precisely the aspect of ‘being in the part as in the whole’ that reveals the pre-
individual character of the common notions. These behave as a form of emerging 
reality, which is potentiality and, at the same time, actuality. Spinoza states that 
common notions are the basis from which politics, arts and science derive (E. II, 
prop. XL, schol.). In this sense, common notions embody a variety of meanings 
and individuals, both potentially and actually.  
Furthermore, regarding the literal meaning of the term “common”: 
common notions do not only indicate a generic field nuanced by potentials, but 
also a unique generative source for all beings. As with the physics of bodies, 
common notions tell us that the genesis of beings derives from only one, common 
pre-individual field. This is what in Spinoza’s language, in my view, means the 
agreement and commonality, to which all beings converge (E. II, XXXVIII, 
corollary). The importance of understanding Spinoza's physics of the bodies and 
the common notions as a pre-individual dimension stems from its political 
implications. These are the bases upon which the political concept of the 
'common' lies. By this I mean a condition which unfolds shared flowings of time, 
meanings and actions. In the following chapters I will argue that this shapes the 
Spinozan multitude.  
 
Spinoza’s collective process of individuation 
 
Up to this point, we have analysed the meaning of the physics of the 
bodies and common notions through Simondon's work. I have claimed that both 
reveal a pre-individual and powerful reality, which is the unique generative 
ground of all beings. These aspects tell us that all individuals share and derive 
from a common pre-individual state. Therefore, we might conclude, in Spinoza’s 
ontology there is not a pre-individual field for each genre of life (animal, human 
and vegetative life). This inevitably implies a distinctive linkage between beings 
and their milieu, which is prior to their genesis, and an irreducible condition 
thereof. However, we do not know the extent to which beings come to life from a 
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common terrain. The common notions and the physics of bodies open onto 
Spinoza’s collective process of individuation.  
Proceeding with our Simondonian strategy, we have seen that a process is 
constituted by phases, each of which actualises and individualises a generic mass 
into more or less stable beings. In the metaphysics of Substance examined in 
chapter I, this role is occupied by the attributes, which reveal the anomalous 
process of production. In this context, the function of phase is played by both the 
physics of the bodies and common notions. Movements of speed and slowness, 
hard and fluid substances and common notions function as phases within a 
process. Motion, magnitude and common notions bring changes into existing 
equilibrium. Movements bring bodies to compose and collide with other bodies, 
through which individuals become distinguished one from another, and through 
which they are composed (E. II, from ax. II to Lemma VII). This activity indicates 
that motion, rest and magnitude do not merely move beings but instead 
individuate them. The modality of this individuation is relational. The laws of 
motion and magnitude through the dynamics of composition and collision cause 
relations between individuals, from which the latter acquire a new structure 
(Massumi 2002a: 1-21, 46-52; Deleuze 1992: 217-238). Spinoza sustains in part 
II, axiom III that from movements of collision and composition the individual 
might alter its shape.  
Therefore, I would conclude that laws of motion and magnitude express a 
collective process of individuation, activated by the dynamics of collision and 
composition between individuals. Movements and masses constitute a process of 
individuation because these bodies and substances literally compose new 
individuals. This process of individuation is also collective, because we know 
from the physics of bodies that this involves all bodies and individuals 
collectively, without which movements cannot be activated (E. II, lemma III and 
corollary).Ultimately, Spinoza's physics of bodies introduces a novel conception 
of relationality. Relationality is productive of beings and exceeds human 
behaviours. Common notions operate as Simondon’s ‘reserve of beings’. By this, 
Simondon refers to unexpressed meanings and power, which remain unrealised in 
the pre-individual and which continually reinforce the equilibrium of individuals 
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(Simondon 2007: 106-135). In Spinoza, the aspect of the common notions of 
“being in part as in whole”, in my reading, operates as a reserve of beings, 
through which beings transform their structures. This is because due to the 
meaning of “common” described above, this process cannot be anything other 
than collective. It means that the generation of new ideas proceeds through and on 
a collective terrain. For the language of the Ethics, these concepts have adequacy 
because there are agreements between bodies (E. II, prop. XXXVIII, corollary). 
Lastly, we must emphasise that Spinoza’s process of collective 
individuation, structured through the physics of bodies and common notions, has a 
materialist meaning. We have seen above that the physics of bodies inheres within 
nature, and that common notions are not transcendent archetypes. By contrast, 
they are in a direct relation with bodies. In this sense, they have a material 
component. Given the power of individuation and the pre-individual reality 
constituted by both theories, this model of materialism is innovative: it does not 
involve the reduction of ideas and bodies to mere physical phenomena and 
mechanical rules, but instead shows them to be extremely rich and dynamic. The 
importance of conceiving Spinoza’s theories of the common notions and physics 
of the bodies as a pre-individual reality and materialist collective process of 
individuation lies in the crucial implications they have upon our ability to 
understand the human individual in a Spinozist way.  
 
The anomaly of an individual 
 
From the arguments made so far we can see that the individual is 
fundamentally anomalous. There are many reasons for this anomaly: firstly, the 
position of the individual within the process of individuation. The individual is 
not the principle of this process, but its role is fundamental. It is not the principle 
because the process inheres within the general activity of God-nature. It 
explicates, necessarily, the power of God. Nevertheless, the individual is a 
constitutive element of the collective process of individuation because its 
existence brings further movements and various masses into the existing 
equilibrium. Without the individual there could be no encounters, and thereby no 
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possibility of improving one's own conatus. Secondly, the anomaly of the 
individual is represented by its status. From the physics of the bodies, we know 
that a human body is composed by a great number of other individuals, each of 
which is extremely complex (E. II, postulate I). Complexity here refers to the 
heterogeneity of substances such as hard, fluid and soft elements by which an 
individual body is formed (E. II, postulate II). It also derives from the disposition 
of an individual body to exchange its parts with other bodies and individuals, 
which continually transform its structure (E. II, postulates III, IV).  
The result is that the equilibrium of an individual is never stable, but rather 
echoes Simondonian metastability (a false equilibrium). Given this tendency 
towards transformation, and given also the movements and masses by which 
bodies are surrounded, the state of an individual is always in tension. It is for this 
reason that I have placed the equilibrium of Spinoza’s human body in close 
proximity to Simondon's category of metastability. A further consequence of this 
tendency of a human body is that its anatomy is already somewhat relational and 
collective. It is relational because a human body is moved toward other bodies in 
a never-ending play of affecting and being affected (E. II, postulates III, IV, VI). 
This relational character is also the ground of further movements of individuation, 
which involve the individual itself and the others (E. II, postulate VI). I have also 
defined this tendency as a collective one, because it is the very nature of human 
body, as we have seen above, to be composed by a great number of individuals; it 
is also its primary need to live in a collective condition, in which the human body 
might exchange parts with other bodies (E. II, postulates from I to VI). Therefore, 
I would argue, the human body in Spinoza's ontology is not an already-made unity 
but rather a complex knot of different functions and relational movements; it is 
fundamentally an expression of collective life. 
The relevance of thinking Spinoza's conception of the body in this way 
resides on the connection that it has with the mind. As mentioned above, Spinoza 
affirms that the first object of the mind is its body (E. II, prop. XI). Given that the 
body is a knot of different functions and relations, and as this is connected with 
the mind, the constitution of the mind is extremely complex too. This complexity 
is measured by the collective and relational character of its body, which 
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continually maintains its equilibrium in tension too. This metastable equilibrium 
of the mind, in my reading, is greatly exemplified in part II, proposition XIV, 
where Spinoza claims that “The human mind  is capable of perceiving a great 
many things and this capacity will vary in proportion to the variety of the states its 
body can assume” (my italics).  The connection of the mind with the body, in 
Spinoza, has a further important implication. The structure of the mind is not only 
constantly in tension but more significantly it is collective in exactly the same way 
as the body. Spinoza tells us that the formal being of the mind is shaped by a great 
number of ideas, which in turn are activated by bodily movements and relations 
with others (E. II, XV).  
As with the body, therefore, the character of the Spinozan mind is both 
collective and relational too. We have seen above the collective dimension of the 
mind. It is also relational because the mind's capacities derive from the relational 
movements of the body and the ideas that emerge from these movements. The 
relationality of the mind, crucially, allows the development of notions of duration, 
recognition and otherness. It is because the mind enters into relation with other 
bodies and ideas that it acquires knowledge of time and otherness (E. II, prop. 
XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXX, XXXI). 
As a mixture of body and mind, the human individual is collective and 
relational too. Its equilibrium is constantly in tension towards further movements 
of composition and collision with others. In one word, in the Ethics a human 
individual, I claim, resembles the Simondonian disparate. By this term Simondon 
refers to a constant excess of heterogeneity, which uncovers an asymmetric state 
(Deleuze, 2004b: 86-88). In Spinoza, this form of asymmetry is given by the 
states of the mind and the body. These states of the mind are continually nuanced 
by an excess of states and substances of the body, and by the many and forming 
ideas that compose the mind. The level of reality acquired by an individual 
depends precisely upon this form of asymmetry, which moves the human being 
towards others. By perfection and reality, we have seen, Spinoza means “the same 
thing” (E. II, Def. VI).  
This suggests that the perfection and actuality of an individual are directly 
related to its capacity to compose and decompose itself with others (E. II, prop. 
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XIV). From the arguments advanced above, this involves relational and collective 
states. I would therefore conclude that perfection and actuality are seized upon the 
relational and collective equilibrium of individuals. This form of asymmetry 
constitutes the third aspect of the anomaly of Spinoza's concept of the individual 
indicated above. The understanding of Spinoza's conception of the individual and 
its generative process is essential for exploring his theory of affects and the ways 
in which these structure more complex forms of collective life. Affectivity is the 
core of the relational activity of individuals; this traverses and exceeds 
singularities, revealing a tendency towards transindividuality (Balibar, 2002: 119-
147). Taking into account these arguments, let us flesh out the dynamics of 
Spinoza’s theory of affects as a collective process of psychic individuation. 
 
4. Thinking the individual in a Spinozist way  
 
Spinoza's study of the affects embraces many important themes such as the 
definition of human essence, cognitive mechanism, ethical, psychic and political 
behaviours. In contemporary Spinozist studies, as we have discussed above, 
affectivity has been analysed through two principal strategies. Analytic scholars 
such as Bennett and Curley follow a mainly cognitive approach and locate 
affectivity within a more general process of knowledge. Bennett, for example, 
includes the affective dynamics within the structure of the mental and identifies 
affectivity with the ‘illness’ of the mind. The resulting moral philosophy is based 
on the paradigm of individualist egoism, where the ‘dictates’ of reason indicate 
the best way to improve one’s own being and pursue individual interests.  
In the continental school, Spinoza’s theory of the affects is connected with 
his politics. Especially within certain post-Marxist current, affectivity and conatus 
are acknowledged as a genealogy of power and also as a critique of ideology. 
Furthermore, Spinoza’s study of affectivity is assumed to be instrumental for 
understanding the very status and role of the mass in politics. Accordingly, 
affectivity shapes the character of the masses, through which gestures of 
resistance (indignation) and subjection (fear and hope) are developed. The 
corresponding ethical model is based on the creation of an emancipated 
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community, where freedom is a common enjoyment of life desires. The cognitive 
and the socio-political aspects highlighted by analytic and continental scholars are 
equally present within Spinoza's study of affectivity. We cannot ignore that 
Spinoza treats affects as parts of human weakness and, at the same time, that in 
the political Treatises they play a pivotal role within the development of social 
bond and common gestures of resistance. The presence of these different elements 
within Spinoza's account of the affects raises the question of what is the very 
nature of the affects: specifically, that of whether they involve a politics of 
emancipation or rather a theory of knowledge.  
In order to determine the meaning and role of affectivity within the Ethics, 
I think, we need to search for a third way, which prevents us from stressing the 
cognitive aspect of the affects at the expenses of the social-political implication, 
and vice versa. As anticipated above, I suggest re-situating affectivity within 
Spinoza's ontology. The re-positioning of affectivity within ontology does not 
imply its inclusion within another field of knowledge such as politics and theory 
of the mind; rather, it aims to re-assess the autonomy of the affects. The autonomy 
of the affects means a consideration of the value of affectivity in itself, and not the 
possible impact that this has upon the mind and social-political behaviours.  
In the preface to part III of the Ethics, Spinoza firmly recommends to his 
reader to treat the affects not as a “kingdom within a kingdom” but rather as 
inherent within nature. This derives from his general vision of humankind as part 
of nature, which obeys natural laws in exactly the same way as do all other 
creatures. Spinoza’s thesis of the affects as natural elements, in my reading, 
discloses his intention to analyse the ontological foundation of affectivity.  An 
awareness of this is crucial for understanding Spinoza's paradigm of the individual 
and the extent to which his model might express the peculiarity of the individual 
of the present. Taking into account these premises, let us pass to analyse the 
implications of situating affectivity within an ontological dimension and the 
anatomy of the individual that emerges from the affective mechanism. 
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4.1 The anatomy of the affects
34
  
 
In the preceding section I argued, by way of Simondonian concepts, that 
the physics of bodies and the common notions reveal a common ground from 
which an individual emerges and lives. They found Spinoza’s collective of process 
of individuation, which is activated by movements of speed and slowness, 
exchanges of different substances, and general categories of thought. This process 
is collective because common notions, movements and masses are a unique 
generating source for all being. They also function as a collective process of 
individuation because from common notions, movements and masses complex 
individuals derive. The collective dimension of common notions and the physics 
of bodies have a crucial implication. This is the maintenance of the resulting 
individual in a permanent relational equilibrium, through which it acquires more 
grades of complexity, which in turn lead to further phases of individuation. In the 
language of the Ethics, complexity indicates a higher level of reality, and this 
means perfection. Therefore, I have concluded, relationality is the founding 
principle of Spinoza’s process of collective individuation. More importantly, the 
grade of reality of an individual is measured by its relational equilibrium, through 
which it becomes more complex and thus perfect. This collective process of 
individuation grounds psychic life, which is rooted primarily in the realm of the 
affects.  
The claim that I will make in this section is that Spinoza’s theory of the 
affects unveils a collective process of psychic individuation that is productive of 
powerful psychic individuals. This process, we will see below, is rooted within 
the general physics of the bodies and common notions, and further operates in the 
social-political context, and especially in the body of the multitude analysed in the 
political Treatises. In order to develop my arguments, the support afforded by 
Simondon's strategy, adopted above, becomes even more decisive. This is because 
it might allow us to understand how, in Spinoza’s account of affectivity, the 
emergence of psychic beings coincides immediately with cogent political and 
                                                 
34
A detailed analysis of affects such as joy, fear and hope will be given in chapter III, which 
focuses on the affective tones of the multitude. For the purpose of this chapter, I will stress the 
power of individuation expressed by affects and passions. 
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social gestures. Let us then firstly return to Simondon’s general account of 
affectivity.  
For Simondon, affectivity is the cornerstone of the collective process of 
psychic individuation, through which individuals acquire knowledge, awareness 
of the world and of others. He distinguishes between affect, emotion and 
perception. An affect defines the relation between an individual and the pre-
individual, emotion orients an individual within the world and the others. 
Perception establishes cognitive practices, which are crucially developed from a 
relation between individuals and their milieu. Central for our reading of Spinoza's 
theory of the affects is Simondon's consideration of affects and emotions as 
transformations, which generate really new and actual beings. These 
transformations are relational and operate in a collective dimension. Therefore, 
affects and emotions do not describe the interior life of an individual; rather, they 
individuate beings towards more complex forms of collective lives. Affects and 
emotions, in Simondon's view, reside precisely in the interstices between 
individuals and are individuating forces, which continually re-create a collective 
condition. The collective is the irreplaceable ground of knowledge, because it 
constantly maintains individuals in relations. To put this in a more Simondonian 
fashion, the collective gives to individuals the possibility to 'place themselves 
across', through and solely through which they perceive others and the world. It is 
precisely through this gesture that knowledge may develop.  
The result of this collective process of psychic individuation is the 
emergence of psychic-social groups, which change continually. By this, 
Simondon means that psychic groups separate from social-political union cannot 
exist. Rather, there are only psychic-social communities. Equally, there are not 
distinct processes of individuation, one psychic and the other social. By contrast, 
there is a unique collective process of individuation, in which the creation of 
psychic individuals coincides with the existence of social and political 
subjectivities, and vice versa (Simondon, 2007: 63-65, 130-138, 175-186 ). The 
relevance of Simondon's theses for our arguments here is his assumption of the 
autonomy of the triad affect, emotion and perception from psychological, 
cognitive and social spheres and the recognition of their power of individuating 
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collective meanings, knowledge and individuals. These, once posited, are already 
relational, psychic and social.  
 
The power of the affects: Intensity, individuation and relation 
 
In part III of the Ethics, we certainly do not read a clear distinction 
between an affects, emotion and perception as in Simondon’s collective process of 
psychic individuation; similarly, we do not see Spinoza connecting explicitly the 
affective dynamics with those of psychic individuation. What we observe is that 
affectivity is directly related to a primary form of knowledge: imagination. 
Although imagination delineates an inadequate genre of knowledge, it is 
nevertheless assumed by Spinoza to be an initial condition for developing self-
awareness, awareness of the world and otherness. Given that affectivity is rooted 
in the domain of imagination, affects play a role within the formation of human 
imaginative knowledge. More significantly, the creation of inadequate ideas 
within individuals corresponds to the emergence of interactions between them; 
interactions which have a repercussion on political and ethical conduct. It is for 
this strict connection between affects, elementary knowledge and relationality that 
recourse to Simondon's ontological categories becomes imperative.  
Following Simondon's dictum of knowing the individual through 
individuation, we need to proceed with the same strategy employed for the 
physics of the bodies and common notions and thereby analyse the affective 
mechanism in itself. From the standpoint of affectivity, this is centred on 
movements of affecting and being affected. Affective moments alter the 
equilibrium of mind and body, which pass from active to passive state 
alternatively (E. III, Def. III). Activity corresponds to an improvement of human 
conatus; conversely, passivity implies a decrease of conatus (E. III, postul. I, 
prop. I-XI). Activity and passivity originate from two principal couples of affects, 
which are joy and love, sadness and hatred. Joy and love are defined as transitions 
from a lesser to a higher degree of perfection, by contrast pain and hatred are 
transitions from a higher to a lesser level of perfection (E. III, prop. XI and schol., 
Def. Aff. II-III). 
148 
 
Taken in themselves, therefore, affects are varying transitions. The literal 
meaning of the term “transition” refers to a movement or passage from one state 
to another. Therefore, an affect is precisely a movement which contains in itself a 
power of transformation. This power of transformation derives from the capacity 
of the affects to increase and decrease the state of perfection. The varying levels 
of perfection coincide with concrete changes within individuals. These changes 
are traces (literally “vestige”) impressed by the affective transitions upon the 
human being, each of which delineates specific ideas and actions (E. III, postul. 
II).   
As mentioned above, affects are transitions from and to various degrees of 
perfection. In the Ethics, we have seen, perfection means the acquisition of a 
greater degree of reality, and this implies a higher state of composition of ideas 
and bodies (E. II, prop. XXXVII and corallary).  Hence, the actuality of beings, as 
I have argued in the preceding section, is linked to its degree of complexity, which 
in turn means to be relational and to live in a collective context. Given that affects 
are powerful movements of transformation and perfection implies actuality, 
affectivity is thus directly related to the actuality of human beings. In order to 
determine the effective stakes of Spinozian affective movements of 
transformations, analysing them through Simondonian logic is extremely relevant. 
As anticipated above, affects set forth movements from and to various 
states of perfection, which transform the equilibrium of both mind and body. In 
the Ethics, we have seen perfection means actuality (E. II, Def. VI). Thus, through 
the affective mechanism mind and body acquire different levels of actuality. The 
degree of actuality of mind and body, we have seen, means that these are 
composed by a certain amount of other elements such as simplest bodies and 
ideas, which in the Ethics are broadly defined as individuals (E. II, postul. I, II, 
III, prop. XIV-XV) Given that a certain capacity of actualisation is implied in the 
dynamics of the affects, and given that this involves a new composition of mind 
and body, affectivity uncovers a process of psychic individuation. To be more 
precise, Spinoza’s genealogy of the affects is a process of psychic individuation in 
a Simondonian sense, which is fundamentally collective and relational. 
It is a process because each affect operates as a phase, which brings 
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transformations into the existing order. Spinoza tells us that affects involve 
change.  Changes are the traces impressed by the affects on individuals, which 
determine specific actions and thoughts that are now more, now less perfect (E. 
III, Def. III, postul. I, II). Each affect is a conductor of changes, and thus behaves 
as a phase within this process. More significantly, the transformations generated 
by the affective movements organise a process, which does not proceed towards 
qualitative phases, so to speak, towards the ‘better’. Affects, Spinoza explains, 
constantly vary; joy might change into sorrow and vice versa and these further 
transform into other affects, which might be active and passive alternatively (E. 
III, prop. XVI, XVIII, schol. II). Given this variability, affects cannot be described 
as ‘upward’ movements as Bennett maintains, and neither can they be described 
as downward movements (Bennett, 1984: 253-262). Positive affects such as joy 
and love do not exclusively cause a progression towards a superior condition, 
because even these may suddenly turn into passive affects such as pain.  
Therefore, the varying levels of perfection activated by the affective 
transitions should be considered as a non-linear process. This develops through 
complexity, which means more or less levels of compositions of bodies and ideas, 
that is, perfection. It is for this reason that Spinoza’s affective transitions might be 
better explained within a Simondonian perspective, where a process implies 
continual transformations. In Simondon’s collective process of psychic 
individuation, these transformations are produced by the couple affect-emotion, 
which individuate beings into more problematic structures. The individuating 
power of the couple affect-emotion, in Simondon’s ontology, derives from its 
force of relating individuals to one another, and of relating them in turn to the 
collective field (Simondon, 2007: 114-123).  
Ultimately, the affective process of individuation is psychic, without 
inhering within the interiority of an individual or the structure of the mind. In 
contrast with Hampshire and Bennett, and more generally with the analytic 
tradition, as we will see below, the affective process actualises meanings, notions 
of time and actions, which are collective and maintain individuals in a relational 
condition. Given that affectivity activates movements of affecting and being 
affected, which transform the entire anatomy of an individual through various 
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compositions with other individuals, these movements cannot merely describe the 
interior life of a human being. Furthermore, given that the affective movements 
determine the activity and passivity of individuals, which coincide 
contemporaneously with the acquisition of ideas and actions, they cannot express 
the path of the mind towards higher states of vitality as Bennett affirms (Bennett, 
1984: 254-262). Actions imply an activity situated and constantly oriented within 
the external world. This inevitably brings individuals into relation with the others. 
Spinoza always regards affects as dynamics between individuals. Joy, for 
example, is explained as a relation between individuals and a shared object. Joy, 
however, does not arise from an external object and the individual. Spinoza 
affirms that everything can accidentally cause joy and sadness and also, as we 
know, that these affects vary suddenly (E. III, prop. XLVIII, L and schol.). 
Spinoza identifies active affects with the different grades of intensity, which these 
cause. As Spinoza affirms “He who imagines that what he loves is affected with 
pleasure or pain will likewise be affected with pleasure or pain, the intensity of 
which will vary with the intensity of the emotion in the object loved ” (E. III, 
prop. XXI; [my italics]). As an intensive movement, an affect, I would argue, is 
transversal to individuals.  
As mentioned above, affects are transitions, and thus traverse human 
beings. As with the law of motion, magnitude and common notion examined 
above, affective transitions are movements, which operate in the interstices 
between individuals, and which make them converge into a novel collective 
structure. This I claim, is what Spinoza means when he presents affects as 
transitions. These transitions discover a multifaceted power of individuation. The 
result is not a joyful individual or object, but rather a new psychic-affective phase, 
which is crucially collective and productive of meanings, flows of time and more 
relational individuals. This collective dimension of the affects emerges more 
clearly from the imitation of affects, which gives rise to the affects of emulation 
and pity (E. III, prop. XXVII and schol.).
35
 This presents a collective ground, 
within which individuals experience sharing meanings, actions and time. 
                                                 
35
 From a different perspective, Curley has pointed out the social meaning of the doctrine of the 
imitation of the affects, considering this as part of Spinoza’s form of realism about human 
psychology, (Curley, 1988; 116-119).   
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Individuals are only the ultimate result of this collective psychic state, but more 
importantly they are constitutive elements. Individuals exchange with others the 
affections impressed by the affects, which vary from one human being to another 
(E. III, prop. XXVII, corollaries I-II and schol.). Affections, we have seen, relate 
to the activities of both mind and body. Spinoza explains that individuals are 
affected in different ways by the same affect (E. III, prop. XXVII, dem. and schol. 
L.). This is precisely the case described by the imitation of affects, where similar 
affects impact upon human beings in different ways.  
In this sense, individuals bring their affections into the existing 
equilibrium, developing more complex collective meanings and individuals. The 
collective results from the similarity of affects by which human beings are 
surrounded. This generates shared meanings, through which individuals re-situate 
collectively within the world. Meanings here entail the formation of self-
awareness, conceptions of the others and the world. They have a collective 
character because the affective state is common for all individuals (E. III, prop. 
XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI). Furthermore, given that affects impress 
alternations within the human being, from which he acts and thinks in certain 
way, in the imitation of the affects, affective movements create a collective 
ground, through and within which individuals are further individuated. They 
commence to act and think in a certain way collectively and not as singular 
subjectivities.  
Lastly, as anticipated above, the power of affects involves flows of time, 
which vary from one affect to another (Gatens and Lloyds, 1999: 28-33). Spinoza 
states that human beings moved by positive affects such as love and joy tend to 
recognise the others and their milieu at the present. If human beings are affected 
by hatred and sadness, they are instead inclined to consider the causes of hatred 
and pain through the coordinate of the past. They are inclined to destroy passive 
affects and prevent themselves from possible similar negative affects (E. III, prop. 
XII, XIII, XVIII and schol. I). Therefore, whilst positive affects proceed through 
the coordinates of present and future, passions remained anchored within the 
coordinate of the past (E. III, prop. XVII and schol.). In both cases, affects are 
generative of forms of time, which are not psychic states folded within the 
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interiority of an individual being. By contrast, they re-create a collective context, 
within which human beings act and think. In one word, they live. 
Although affects are productive of meanings, individuals and relations, 
however, we cannot ignore that Spinoza regards the sphere of affectivity and 
specifically passions as somewhat negative. Hence, the question is whether we 
should consider affects and passions as lacking. From the Ethics, we know that 
these are a natural part of humankind and cannot be removed from human life. It 
is in this moment that Simondonian logic becomes extremely important. Taken in 
themselves, affects are not lacking in either positive or negative characteristics, 
rather these are, I argue, problematic. Spinoza describes affective states as 
mutable conditions, in which individuals are driven continually towards diverse 
directions. This mutability of the affects generates problems within the existing 
equilibrium, which transform the entire process of individuation and individuals 
into novel and more problematic psychic states. This results more clearly from 
Spinoza’s explanations of the fluctuation of the affects (E. III, prop. XVII, schol.).  
Taken in itself, a passion is not assumed as a privation. Spinoza is quite 
clear that a passion is a “transition from and to” (E. III, prop. XI, schol., Def. Aff. 
III, explication). Proceeding with our Simondonian strategy, passion is therefore a 
movement, an intensity, just as love is. The passive intensity generates a different 
grade of complexity, which tends to maintain the equilibrium of the process 
within a more stable state. Given that passions are transitory, we might deduce 
that this does not reside in a singular individual or object. Passion, I would argue, 
is no more or less than this “from and to”, that is, a movement. This emerges more 
strongly from Spinoza’s description of the dynamics of hatred, where this is 
described as an activity between individuals. This activity organises common 
meanings, experiences of time, actions and inadequate ideas (E. III, XXXV, 
XXXVII, XXXIX). In turn, human beings moved by hatred generate further 
meanings, thoughts and gestures through the development of other passions such 
as sorrow, fear, consternation and bashfulness (E. III, XXXIX, schol., XL, XLI, 
XLV). In this way, a passion, as Simondon suggests, is transversal to both the 
individual and the world. It is collective and involves distinct forms of 
relationality. 
153 
 
Given that passive affects maintain both relational and collective 
movements, we must not under estimate the negative meaning Spinoza attributes 
to them. Thus, the question is: what is passive in passions? Assuming that 
passions have a collective dimension and their effects involve collectively beings, 
passions affect the equilibrium of an entire system, bringing new transitions 
within the process of individuation. The resulting equilibrium and individuals are 
not defective of “something”, and these individuals are not less perfect. In the 
language of the Ethics, a level of perfection means less complexity, that is, a 
lesser degree of composition.  
A passive state, I claim, is a stable system, which means minor exchanges 
of movements and beings between individuals. Put differently, there is less of an 
increase of power, which would make the system more dynamic (E. III, prop. 
XLVI, XLII). As a consequence, a passion does not arrest the process and the 
individuals within it. From the Ethics, we know that self-destruction is denied. A 
passive state is thus simply more stable and less complex. The reading of passions 
in this way has a crucial implication. In chapter III, I will examine the political 
meaning of the passions, which characterise religious communities within the 
Theological-Political Treatise. This consideration of passions might enable us to 
understand the ways in which passions ground fundamental political gestures. 
Having examined the status of passions and actions, and the process inhering 
within them, we might pass to delineate the main elements of Spinoza’s paradigm 
of a human individual. For Spinoza, as we have seen, an individual is shaped by 
conatus, which in the human being orients its desire. It is to these notions that I 
will finally turn. 
 
Conatus and desire 
 
Up to this point, we have described the affective process of psychic 
individuation and the ways in which beings emerge from this. We are now in the 
position to answer our initial question, that is, what is an individual and 
specifically a human being in Spinoza’s thought? In order to address this theme, 
we need to return to the notion of conatus. As seen, by conatus, Spinoza refers to 
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striving to exist and persevere into life (E. III, prop. V, VI, VII, VIII). To put this 
in a more contemporary fashion, conatus might be intended as Spinoza’s 
definition of biological life, which in humankind is the basis of psychic, political 
and ethical lives. Unlike Aristotle and his heirs, Spinoza does not qualify life into 
genres such as biological, political and theoretical, in which only the political and 
the theoretical are proper of humankind and thereby deserve to be defended. By 
contrast, biological life (conatus) is a precondition to other expressions. From 
these premises, therefore, the question is what does it mean that a vegetative life is 
striving and persevering into life? 
As we have already discussed, contemporary Spinozist scholars have 
emphasised different aspects of conatus such as the preservation of one’s own 
life, the instinct to improve an individual’s existence and dominate others. In this 
sense, many Spinozist commentators have concluded that Spinoza’s notion of 
conatus exemplifies his moral paradigm of egoist individualism (Bennett, Smith 
and, to some extent, Hampshire). For other post-Marxist Spinozist readers, 
conatus has been described as a form of conflicting power, which regulates 
human relations (Negri and Montag amongst others). By contrast, I suggest 
stressing the aspect of conatus as a “striving toward”, and recommend analysing 
this through a Simondonian logic. Specifically, striving is a power or a force, 
which is innate and common to all creatures in nature. For the literal meaning of 
the preposition “towards”, this suggests the idea of movement oriented to an 
‘outside’. “Striving towards” is force, which is both internal and external to 
individuals.  
It is internal because conatus is the innate tendency, which characterises 
the very essence of every individual being (E. III, prop. VII). It is also external 
because this power is shaped by movements, which drive individuals towards an 
external world. In this, they release their own potentialities and improve their 
actual existence. The importance of this milieu for the development of conatus 
lies in relating oneself to others. Therefore, to strive towards connotes a relational 
attitude, which is somewhat transversal to individuals. It resides within them and 
the same time is directly connected with the world. Furthermore, conatus is 
extremely powerful. It brings individuals towards the world, through which they 
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orient themselves and increase their own life (E. III, prop. VIII and schol. LIV). In 
this way, I argue, Spinoza’s concept of conatus uncovers a relational power, 
which cannot be narrowed to an egoist desire for domination or an unconscious 
drive in a Freudian sense.  
By contrast, maintaining a Simondonian perspective, conatus reveals 
Spinoza’s distinct account of life. Given that conatus defines all existing beings in 
nature and is, as we have seen above, relational and powerful, every form of life is 
also relational and powerful. In this respect, in so far as beings (human beings or 
not) strive towards and struggle to preserve their existence, they own a relational 
power, which produces and reinforces their activities within the world. Thus, 
Spinoza’s notion of conatus brings about the discovery of the necessity of the 
linkage between individuals and their milieu for the actualisation of life. 
Moreover, given that relation is implied within the aspect of “striving towards” 
and given that this also involves power, relationality can be seen as the 
cornerstone of any expression of life and is, more significantly, generative of 
actions and power. This also results from the general collective process of 
individuation structured through the physics of the bodies and common notions. 
As examined before, this brings to light the anomalous status of an individual, 
which is relational and requires a collective field for its actualisation.  
In the human context, conatus has a crucial implication. Given the nature 
of conatus analysed above, it means that the biological life of a human being is 
powerful and fundamentally relational. Considered in itself, human life is centred 
on a relational force, which is a precondition of all other functions. A human 
individual, I argue, is relational by nature. This is what regulates a human being’s 
activities, such as the political, ethical and the theoretical. Spinoza calls this 
relational force desire. In humankind, conatus is expressed by desire (E. III, Def. 
Aff. I). Desire structures both the mind and the body. In this light, human desire is 
a striving towards others, through which human beings increase their mind and 
body (E. III, prop. IX, schol., Def. Aff. I, explication). Similarly with the conatus 
of all other beings, desire is transversal and situates human beings within the 
world. Yet differently from conatus as such, within the human sphere the activity 
of orienting individuals within their milieu coincides immediately with political, 
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ethical and theoretical behaviours (E. IV, prop. XXI, XXIII).  
Given this transversal nature of human desire, I think the Simondonian 
notion of transindividuality fully unfolds the power of desire. By 
transindividuality, Simondon means an affective movement of individuation, 
which traverses beings. This is a force that re-structures beings into a new 
collective dimension (Simondon, 2007: 104-111). This is the basis upon which 
psycho-social unions are generated. In Spinoza’s arguments, desire is a relational 
power, driven by affective movements. As discussed above, the affective 
transitions structure a process of psychic individuation, which creates collective 
psychic conditions, as we have seen with the imitation of the affects. In this, 
individuals are constantly in relations with the others, through which shared 
meanings and actions are actualised. Building upon Balibar’s arguments (2002: 
119-147), I argue, Spinoza’s concept of desire embodies Simondonian 
transidindividuality, which lies between human beings and exposes them towards 
novel psycho-social unions (E. III, prop. IX, schol.; E. IV, prop. XXXV, corollary 
and schol., prop. XXXVII). Reading desire as a form of transindividuality, in my 
view, enables us to understand Spinoza’s conception of political society. In the 
later Political Treatise, we will see in chapter IV, he will identify the origin of 
society with a gesture of common desire and affective states such as fear and hope 
(TP, Chapter VI. 1). His claim further corroborates the vision of desire as a 
transindividual power, which individuates human beings into psycho-social 
communities.     
From these premises, the status of the human individual is anomalous, that 
is, increasingly complex. It is complex because as a tension desire moves the 
individual towards a new state of transformation, through which it acquires more 
reality. As seen, this transformation involves relational states. Desire, therefore, 
brings to light a fundamental characteristic of an individual, that is, its collective 
life. Conatus and desire continuously move the individual towards compositions 
with the others, through which he becomes ‘more real’. Hence, an actual life is 
composed: it is relational and collective. Similarly, the entire process cannot 
maintain a dynamic equilibrium and proceed towards more complex phases. It 
follows that the human individual is a crucial element within the general process 
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of individuation, without however being its unique principle.  
 
Towards a politics of the affects 
  
Taking into account these arguments, we are in a position to advance some 
more general reflections. The importance of Spinoza’s philosophical gesture, I 
argue, concerns the re-characterisation of affects and passions for the development 
of psychic life. Spinoza, as we have discussed, raises significant questions 
concerning the definition of the individual, the collective and relational status of 
the affects, and importantly how these emerge. Through Simondon’s philosophy 
of individuation, the genesis and development of vital and psychic individual in 
the Ethics come to light as a very complex process, in which each phase is an 
expression of power that in turn sets forth novel transitions. It is in this context 
that the richness of Spinoza’s notion of the individual emerges. The asymmetric 
condition of beings calls for movements, through which relations are developed. 
From the physics of bodies to the geometry of affects, there is a form of pre-
individual mass (the common notions), which constantly re-signify the structure 
of Being and beings. This pre-individual mass, as we have seen, inheres within 
reality.  
Therefore, Spinoza’s arguments concerning affectivity and the individual 
realm open the way towards understanding the reality of humankind as 
problematic, relational, and fundamentally collective. It follows that every social 
and psychic community is moulded through these transindividual conditions. In 
order to look for a novel materialist conceptions of politics and ethics, I think we 
should incorporate Spinoza’s thesis into our political and ethical discourse; or at 
least we may question what might be the implications of thinking society and 
individuals in the light of Spinoza’s philosophy. The remaining chapters of my 
thesis explore the following questions. Firstly, what are the implications of 
thinking a collective and affective process of individuation for political and social 
practises? Secondly, what are the historical, social and ethical expressions of this 
transindividual reality? Let us now turn to a political analysis of these questions.   
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Chapter III 
 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: 
The affective tones of the political 
 
 
Introduction 
  
In chapter II, I explored the paradigm of the individual offered by Spinoza. 
I proposed that his theories of the physics of bodies, common notions, affectivity, 
conatus and desire – theories that Spinoza presents most clearly in parts II and III 
of the Ethics – should be read through Simondon’s ontology of individuation. 
This attempt to approach Spinoza through Simondon was motivated by the 
discovery of a distinctive model of individuation within Spinoza’s philosophy; a 
model that can be discerned in the Ethics, and which can also be found in the 
political Treatises. Spinoza’s notion of individuation, I have argued, is constructed 
around a collective process of individuation. This is a process in a Simondonian 
sense because laws of motion, magnitude and common notions operate within it 
as powerful phases that introduce constitutive changes into an existing 
equilibrium. These movements, masses and ideas transform individuals into more 
complex forms of life. This process is also collective, because common notions, 
movements and masses constitute a unique generative source for all beings, and 
function as a common ground from and within which individuals emerge and live 
collectively.   
In the human context, this collective process of individuation grounds 
psychic life. This process is rooted in the domain of the affects. Employing 
Simondon’s logic, I have concluded that Spinoza’s study of affectivity uncovers a 
complex collective process of psychic individuation. Affectivity is the cornerstone 
of this process, which is centred on relationality and the collective field. 
Relationality emerges from the constitution of the affects. These are intensive 
movements (literally “transitions”), which involve both affecting and being 
affected. These movements or transitions, which relate individuals to one another, 
impress traces upon them; each trace shapes distinct actions and thoughts, giving 
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rise to a really new individual. The affective process, I have also claimed, does 
not describe the interior life of an individual being, and nor are affects subordinate 
elements of a more general cognitive system internal to the structure of the mind. 
Rather, affective movements are intensities, which lie on the interstices between 
individuals. These intensities function within a collective field. The collective is 
the common ground generated by the affects (Spinoza’s theory of the imitation of 
the affects), in which individuals participate and further produce shared 
conceptions of time, otherness and actions.  
It is for this reason that I have claimed that in Spinoza’s process of psychic 
individuation the individual is not the principle of individuation, but rather a 
constitutive element of a more general process of individuation. As a 
consequence, the peculiarity of a human being is characterised by a relational 
power (conatus), and his or her life is driven by a form of transindividual 
tendency (desire). This tendency determines human desire for constructing 
psychic, social and political communities. The importance of thinking Spinoza’s 
theories of the affects and humankind in this way resides in the impact that they 
have upon his politics. Affectivity is the protagonist of Spinoza’s enquiry into 
different models of political organisation and the role of the mass in politics. 
Therefore, the awareness of affective process and human desire towards the others 
is the prerequisite for understanding the genesis, anatomy and development of a 
community in a Spinozist way. 
Taking into account the arguments developed in chapter II, this chapter 
explores the relation between affectivity and politics in Spinoza’s thought. The 
focus is addressed to the manifold and somewhat ambivalent status of passions 
and affects in the theological section of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
(hereafter TTP), and the various ways in which these form complex political 
communities. Particularly in the theological part of the Treatise, passions and 
imagination occupy a central position within the political life of the individuals, 
shaping entirely the action and thought of the masses. Spinoza’s treatment of the 
affective condition of the mass, which he developed through his reading of the 
Old and New Testaments, brings about the discovery of the problematic status of 
passions and imagination within the political context. These are, on the one hand, 
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the origin of human misconceptions about God, the state and the Church, and 
thereby of the exploitation of people’s desires and needs; on the other hand, 
passions, grounded in the domain of imagination, are powerful source of relations, 
common values, mutual support, which undeniably reinforce the entire political 
body.  
The analysis of the multi-sided power of passions over a community 
constitutes the basis upon which the multitude, as a political individual, 
progressively emerges within Spinoza’s political arguments, becoming the 
principal protagonist of the political section of the Treatise and the Tractatus 
Politicus (hereafter TP). Therefore, the understanding of the ways in which 
affectivity produces political individuals, meanings and forces is crucial for 
determining the genealogy of the multitude within Spinoza’s thought. In 
consequence, this chapter will not draw attention to the multitude itself; rather, it 
will examine the role of affectivity within the production of the political. As 
passions and imagination represent the most ambivalent notions within Spinoza’s 
theory of affects, the discussion here will focus on the passive and imaginative 
aspects of the body politic of certain communities examined in the theological 
section of the Treatise. An enquiry into Spinoza’s conception of the political 
dimension of the affects brings about the discovery of affectivity as a powerful 
and collective source of actions, thoughts and relations, through which the 
constitution and development of the multitude as a political individual and, more 
generally, as a community, takes place. This vision of affectivity might contribute 
to the re-founding of a political vocabulary for passions and affects, affirming 
their autonomy from the spheres of ethics and psychology. These latter have 
fragmented the power of affectivity into social and cultural codes, and have 
viewed it in terms of an obscure and unconscious natural drive.  
In relation to these arguments many questions guide this chapter. Firstly, 
how and to what extent does Spinoza’s ontology of individuation effectively re-
shape the way in which the origins of political society are theorised? If the 
ontology of individuation that Spinoza develops through affects, passions and 
bodily movements in the Ethics is already political, then the difficulty is as to how 
his philosophy of individuation re-founds traditional paradigms of the origins of 
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civil society, as it would seem to go far beyond theories of social contract and 
self-interest. If this is indeed the case, then the main problem that arises here is 
whether this collective and affective process of individuation implies a return to 
teleological arguments, or a transcendent agency behind human association. 
Secondly, how does Spinoza’s account of affectivity as relational and powerful 
concretely produce and transform political individuals and communities? Thirdly, 
if passions and the imagination are causes of partial knowledge and of decreases 
in power, then what different form of political praxis and problems do they 
introduce within society? 
In order to address these questions I will continue to read Spinoza through 
Simondon. The latter’s ontological categories, in my view, may shed light on the 
originality of some of the themes within the Treatise that would otherwise remain 
obscure. I refer here to the question of whether society should be viewed as a 
process of becoming, rather than as a contract between rational and self-interested 
men. Viewing society as a becoming implies understanding actual and past human 
associations as a complex process traversed by problems, solutions and 
potentialities. Furthermore, if one reads the Treatise in the light of Simondon, the 
theme of the political role of affectivity in politics – particularly as regards the 
passions – leads one to understand that the affects are a fruitful topic for the 
theorisation of temporality, history, politics and society. 
The claim that I will make throughout this chapter is that in Spinoza’s 
analysis of affectivity becomes recognised as the generative source of the 
production of the political.  It is precisely in this context that the great modernity 
of Spinoza’s political gesture lies. Spinoza puts forward the idea that affectivity is 
not only the mediator of social relations, but also a powerful and endless process 
of producing the ‘common’; a process that covers the political scene in its 
entirety. As a full expression of affects and passions, the multitude, although not 
explicitly named in the theological section of the Treatise, is the actor and, at the 
same time, the theatre of the production of the ‘common’. In order to explore the 
affective production of the ‘common’ and how affectivity configures the body 
politic, I will present a reading in this chapter of the theological section of the 
Theological Political Treatise, which is structured around Deleuze’ and Guattari’s 
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account of conceptual personae (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-83). For Deleuze 
and Guattari, conceptual personae express the becoming of a particular philosophy 
and unveil the internal dynamics and problems that lie at the heart of the thinker’s 
theoretical project. Conceptual personae, in Deleuze’ and Guattari’s view, enable 
us to examine a philosophy by looking at the elements and forces of its 
development.  
Building upon Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of conceptual personae, 
I analyse the facts and personages of the first part of the Treatise as constitutive 
aspects of more complex conceptual personae. In this light, we will encounter the 
personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles, each 
of whom brings problems, transformations and relational beings into the realm of 
the political. The importance of analysing the themes of the Treatise through 
conceptual personae concerns, on the one side, the possibility of stressing the 
notion of affectivity as a process of political individuation. On the other, the usage 
of conceptual personae will disclose alternative trajectories towards the 
conceptualisation of the role of affectivity within the foundation of the theory of 
the multitude. Although this chapter is a study of the political significance of 
affectivity within Spinoza’s thought, the intrinsic relation between affects and the 
multitude requires an analysis of the affective characteristics that Spinoza gives to 
the multitude in the theological section of the Treatise, and of the ways in which 
these characteristics structure specific political behaviours. In the following 
section I will examine the structure of the theological section of the Treatise, 
drawing particular attention to the passive conditions of the mass. The analysis of 
these problematic aspects will frame our attempt to read the TTP in relation to 
conceptual personae.  
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1. The Plan of the Theological Political Treatise  
 
In the Theological Political Treatise, Spinoza presents a multisided 
account of the multitude. As the book’s narrative develops, the multitude is 
nuanced by a variety of affective denotations such as fear, hope, ambition and 
indignation, which makes a conceptualisation into a specific category of people, 
mob and citizens quite problematic. In order to examine this multifaceted 
character of the multitude and the role of affectivity within its constitution as mob, 
people and mass, we need first to look at the structure and the main arguments of 
the Theological Political Treatise. These offer a preliminary account of the 
function of affectivity within a political context and of the mechanisms in which 
this shapes the body of the multitude. As indicated above, attention will be given 
here to the theological section of the Treatise; the political thesis developed in the 
Treatise and in the TP will be discussed in chapter IV. 
The Theological Political Treatise consists of a pars destruens (chapters I-
X) and a pars contruens (chapters XVI-XX).
36
 As the title suggests, the Treatise is 
grouped into two main sections, the theological and political parts. In the 
theological section, which corresponds to the pars destruens, we are immediately 
projected into the affective status of the multitude, through which Spinoza 
introduces the causes of superstition, a critique of the ideological apparatus of 
faith, and thereby the ability of the clergy to exploit religion for the control and 
manipulation of the needs and acts of the people. In this part of the book Spinoza 
is concerned with undermining the entire metaphysical nucleus of theology, 
through which the Church has surreptitiously constructed its influence over the 
mass, political affairs and philosophical arguments. To this end, Spinoza adopts a 
new method of examining holy texts: he considers the historical, cultural and 
linguistic context within which the stories of the Scriptures occurred (Strauss, 
1997: 111-144; Balibar, 1998: 25-48; Montag, 1999: 1-25). 
Spinoza employs a very accurate exegesis of the New and Old Testaments, 
through which the extraordinary origins of certain unusual natural phenomena 
(miracles and signs), the alleged divinity of the prophets, and the metaphysical 
                                                 
36
 For an historical background of the TTP, see Nadler (1999), and Pollock (2005). 
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nucleus of faith are brought back to the realm of imagination. The knowledge of 
the prophets, their prophecies and speeches, are on the one hand viewed as being 
simply based upon an understanding of the laws of nature that relies on the first 
kind of knowledge, imagination, which is also the ground of the passions of fear, 
hope and devotion. On the other, the messages of the prophecies and the symbolic 
language adopted by the prophets are directed to the mass, who are easily inclined 
to believe in myths and extramundane forces. It is through the power of 
imagination, Spinoza explains, that people are persuaded of the esoteric meanings 
of the Scriptures and the belief in an ultimate end beyond the order of nature. This 
causes the emergence of superstition and ignorance within a community; as a 
result, human beings come to be moved by both fear of misfortune and hope for 
good fortune.  
The hegemony of the Church over society, Spinoza warns us, is erected on 
this superstitious apparatus, which plays deceitfully with the fear, hope and 
ignorance of the people.
37
 Spinoza’s attack on religion is thus intended to 
invalidate not religion itself, but rather the causes of human misconceptions about 
God, the authority of the clergy and nature; misconceptions that lead them, as he 
announces in the preface, to “fight for their servitude as if for salvation” (TTP: 
389-390).  As opposed to this, Spinoza, affirms that the true object of faith rests 
upon moral precepts, which aim at the development of obedience and piety 
between individuals (credo minimum). However, many problems arise from these 
first stages of the Treatise, pertaining to Spinoza’s ambivalent position regarding 
the role of the multitude and affectivity within a political context.  
On the one hand, Spinoza gives a somewhat negative account of the 
multitude, framing it via the categories of plebs, mob and mass. He refers to the 
multitude as ignorant, superstitious and unreliable, and claims that they can be 
easily mobilised against this or that authority. On the other hand, Spinoza includes 
within these categories the exponents of the Church too, who encourage and 
increase the passions of the mass through the expedients of miracles, prophecies, 
and also the notions of evil, sin, and grace. Furthermore, for Spinoza, as we will 
discuss further, the passions of fear and hope are experienced by both the clergy 
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 Concerning political authority of the Church and conflicts between the different faiths in 
seventeenth-century Holland, see Balibar (1998: 1-20), and Nadler (1999:116-244).      
165 
 
and the masses, although both are said to be afraid of each other.
38
 There is also 
an apparent contradiction here: Spinoza conceives the domain of imagination as 
the ground of the human misconceptions, through which superstition is founded 
and developed. Yet, it is also through imagination that the growth of ethical 
values and cohesive practises and mutual support take place.  
Prior to the political section there are a series of chapters (chapters XI-XV) 
that prepare the terrain for the themes of the political part. It is in the arguments 
articulated in these chapters that Spinoza’s notions of the multitude and affectivity 
become increasingly more ambivalent (Balibar, 1994: 3-38). This transitional part 
considers the ethical function of religion, precisely that of the New Testament; 
attention is also addressed to the separation between philosophy, religion and 
politics. In these chapters, Spinoza moves on to analyse the very object of faith, 
firmly drawing a line between philosophy and religion. For Spinoza, the focus of 
any faith should be solely addressed to the encouragement of positive affects such 
as love, joy, devotion, through which practises of mutual support are developed. 
As anticipated in the pars destruens, Spinoza consequently re-defines the domain 
of religion by narrowing its importance to ethical habits: pietas. This form of faith 
(credum minimum) does not negatively affect the development of political 
institutions; rather, it favours social relations, contributing to the growth of the 
sentiment of community (the common good). Spinoza refers here to the doctrine 
of the apostles.  
However, in the same part of the Treatise, Spinoza states further that the 
advantage of this conception of religion stems from the increased obedience of 
people. It is precisely in this context that Spinoza’s arguments of the multitude 
become ambivalent. The main difficulty concerns how Spinoza combines the two 
aspects of religion as reciprocal love and obedience. If the apostolic message of 
universal (Catholic) love leads to cooperative practices, why and to what extent 
does this have to be formulated in terms of obligation? Seen in this light, it might 
seem as if the affective constitution of the many is predominantly shaped by 
negative passions of fear, rivalry and egoism, which are not naturally disposed 
towards cooperation and, more generally, to a life in common. This would suggest 
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 The twofold status of fear within the Treatise has been acutely analysed by Balibar (1994). I will 
discuss his approach in chapter IV.  
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that the object of the faith of the apostles serves to teach the masses how to love 
one another. Nevertheless, Spinoza repeatedly points out that the knowledge of 
the apostles and the certainty of the prophets of the Old Testament are based on 
the same natural understanding that all human beings possess. This would indicate 
that there are no ontological and ethical differences between the apostles and the 
mass. The implication is thus that everyone should, spontaneously, follow the 
Catholic teachings of love without concurring to external devices of obedience 
(Deleuze, 1992: 255-288). 
 
The reception of the theological section of the TTP within contemporary Spinozist 
studies  
     
In general, contemporary Spinozist studies have viewed these themes 
within the theological section of the Treatise as an attempt on Spinoza’s part to 
establish a theoretical method able to grounds the political thought that he 
presents in the Treatise’s second part. Specifically, the theological chapters have 
been viewed as the foundation of a philosophical method that links the 
hermeneutics of the sacred Scriptures to the systematisation of Spinoza’s 
democratic thought. Yet the analytic and continental Spinozist scholars that 
follow this reading offer different interpretations of Spinoza’s political project. 
They also differ as regards the meaning and role of this first section of the 
Treatise. This has given rise to a wide range of views on Spinoza’s philosophical 
method.  
As we see below, for thinkers such as Curley (1996) and Smith (1998, 
2003) within the analytic tradition, Spinoza’s re-reading of the Old Testament 
aims at affirming a rational strategy for intending religious arguments and the role 
of faith within society. Seen in this light, Spinoza’s replacement of the 
extramundane origins of miracles and prophecies with natural phenomena, and his 
denials of the divine status of prophets and the philosophical authority of religion, 
delineate his scientific method of studying historical and religious events and 
personages. Spinoza’s scientific method aspires to enlighten people from 
ignorance through the rehabilitation of the authority of reason. This gesture has 
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direct political implications. In invalidating the philosophical power of faith, 
Spinoza undermines not only its authority over philosophy, but also – and more 
significantly – the influence of the Church over the state. This prevents political 
systems from degenerating into forms of despotic theocracies and it allows the 
development of rational and free individuals. It is for this reason that thinkers such 
as Curley (1996), Smith (1998), Israel (2002) and Feurer (1987) have viewed the 
theory of democracy explained in the political section of the Treatise as a model 
of liberalism, and have located this in close proximity to Hobbes, Tocqueville and 
Voltaire. Chapter IV will discuss the analytic interpretation of Spinoza’s paradigm 
of democracy in greater detail, whilst addressing the political section of the 
Treatise and the Political Treatise. 
In contrast to the analytic reading of the theological section of the Treatise, 
continental theorists such as Tosel (1984, 1997), Balibar (1998), Matheron (1988), 
Negri (1998) and Montag (1999) have more recently considered Spinoza’s 
exegesis of the Old Testament and New Testament in terms of his model of 
materialism and his philosophy of praxis, which continue and further develop the 
theses of the Ethics. This also prepares the terrain for the establishment of the 
politics of the multitude treated in the political section of the Treatise and the TP. 
In this light, and as we will see below, Tosel, Balibar and Montag have interpreted 
Spinoza’s attention to the linguistic, historical and cultural context of the stories 
narrated in the Sacred Scriptures in terms of the central importance that he gives 
to the material conditions and experiences in which miracles, prophesies and 
prophets originated (Tosel, 1997: 155-166; Balibar, 1998: 36-48, Montang, 1998: 
1-25). Spinoza’s attack on the metaphysical nucleus of theology, they have 
claimed, reveals a precise strategy of liberation of the mass, which proceeds from 
the rejection of the divine origins of prophets through  the apostolic formula of 
universal love to the advocacy of freedom presented in the political section of the 
TTP (Matheron, 1988; Negri, 1998). Therefore, Spinoza’s philosophical method, 
which is framed through the exegesis of the holy text, is founded on the theory of 
praxis. The formation of the multitude as a powerful political subject is predicated 
upon such praxis.   
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There have been important attempts, made from differing perspectives, to 
extrapolate a socio-psychology from the theological section of the Treatise. These 
attempts are central to the arguments of this chapter. Although they have reached 
diverse conclusions, Rice (1990), Gatens and Lloyd (1999) have offered fruitful 
insights into the social and psychological elements derived from Spinoza’s 
description of the role of passions and imagination within civil society. 
Significantly, the works of Gatens and Lloyd (1999) have stressed the social 
function of imagination and passions in the theological section of the Treatise. 
The power of imagination, they argue, does not only allow for the growth of 
superstition, ignorance and alienation. Rather, this refers to a more complex 
mechanism, which brings to light the centrality of the notions of the body, 
relations and identity. Spinoza’s thesis of the origins of prophecy, rituals and 
sacrifices, for example, discloses the ways in which imagination and passions give 
rise to collective identities, common rules and ethical practise, upon which a 
community is founded and developed (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 23-40, 87-107). 
Furthermore, given Spinoza’s definition of imagination as the domain of the 
fluctuation of actions and thoughts, this crucially introduces within the 
constitution of the social and political body a certain contingency, which enriches 
the political with dynamic elements (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 28-40, 51-57).
 39
     
Taking into consideration these readings – and with a view towards 
developing the continental and psycho-social approaches further – I think that the 
political meaning of passions in the theological section of the Treatise might be 
explored further through a different path. I refer to a more extensive definition of 
affectivity, which considers its role within the production of notions of time, 
relationality, and of powerful and collective political gestures and individuals. The 
different affective tones of the mass that emerge from Spinoza’s discourse, in my 
view, derive from a process of political and ontological individuation, which 
transforms the realm of the political as whole. It is precisely this process of 
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 The relation between imagination, affectivity and politics in Spinoza’s thought has nurtured an 
extensive literature that has done much to advance the importance of his notion of imagination 
within contemporary political theory; see Manning (2007) and Massumi (2002a). Significantly, 
Williams (2007) has further developed the significance of Spinoza’s notions of imagination and 
affectivity within democratic theory (Williams, 2007: 350-369).   
169 
 
individuation that signifies the anatomy and power of the multitude, explaining its 
centrality within the political part of the Treatise and the successive TP. 
In order to re-consider the political meaning of affectivity, specifically that 
of passions, and thereby their importance for understanding Spinoza’s notion of 
the multitude, an alternative strategy of reading the TTP has to be adopted. I 
propose to insist further on reading Spinoza’s thought through the philosophy of 
Simondon, as initiated in chapter II. An enquiry into the role of affectivity within 
Spinoza’s political discourse, I suggest, becomes of crucial importance when 
viewed via Simondon’s philosophy of individuation. Simondon’s ontological 
categories might shed light on the processes and relations that affectivity brings 
into question, and on how they impact effectively on the political. Simondonian 
notions of the collective being, emotions, transindividuality and disparateness 
give Spinoza’s treatment of passions great cogency, and infuse it with a new 
awareness of the reality and potentialities embodied in the community. The 
arguments that I will make throughout this chapter will thus concern 
understanding passions and, more generally, affectivity as natural and 
unavoidable conditions of the becoming of society as whole; conditions that 
enrich the domain of the political with unpredictable problems, meanings and  
relations.   
 
2. The conceptual personae of the Theological Political Treatise: Guidelines 
for re-reading affectivity within Spinoza’s politics  
 
Despite their differences, we have seen that the various ways of reading 
the TTP commonly begin with the analysis of the theological section (the pars 
destruens) before proceeding through the transitional chapters on the separation of 
religion and philosophy to the political part (par construens) on democracy and 
freedom. Without contrasting and denying the importance of these methods of 
reading the TTP, my enquiry into the theological section of the TTP is organised 
through a different, perhaps unorthodox, strategy. In order to re-investigate the 
meaning of affectivity within Spinoza’s political theses from a Simondonian 
standpoint I will extrapolate from the historical facts and personages narrated 
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within the theological section of the Treatise conceptual-affective personae. Each 
of whom embodies particular affective events and problematics present within 
Spinoza’s political quest. This strategy will also accompany our study of the 
political section of the TTP and the TP.   
This approach will allow us to emphasise the role of affectivity as a 
process of political and ontological individuation in Simondonian sense.  It is for 
this reason that I have adopted the strategy of conceptual-affective personae as a 
means of reading Spinoza’s political texts. In this chapter and the one that 
follows, the notion of conceptual personae is built upon the formulation given by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 61-83). Without venturing into a detailed discussion 
of the problematics and intricacies inhering in Deleuze’ and Guattari’s theory of 
conceptual personae, the usage made in this thesis of their concept requires only 
that we consider its key-elements and philosophical meaning. It is around these 
that I construct the conceptual and affective personae of the TTP and TP.  
    
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of conceptual personae 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, a conceptual persona embodies the becoming of 
a particular philosophy. It actualises the multiple potentialities of a philosopher’s 
concept (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 62-65). A conceptual persona is the subject 
of the life of a thinker, which presents him with a problem and glimpses of its 
solution. The role of such a persona, they claim, is to indicate to the philosopher 
the territory of thought through and within which he is to develop his theoretical 
project. Strictly speaking, conceptual personae express the actualisation of the 
principal problem of the philosopher, and open up towards its solution (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 68-70). It is for this manifold role, in Deleuze’ and Guattari’s 
view, that conceptual personae do not coincide with the ideal types employed in 
psychology and sociology, such as the migrant and the stranger. Whilst ideal types 
function as empirical instruments for constructing theories, conceptual personae 
are not prior, other than, or subsequent to the philosopher (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 66-68). Conceptual personae live within the philosopher and are his closest 
friends and severest enemies. 
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Deleuze and Guattari explain that in the history of philosophy conceptual 
personae have accompanied the genesis and development of the works of Plato, 
Descartes, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx and so on, engaging with them in 
an ideal dialogue throughout the entire journey of their philosophy. In some cases, 
they are sympathetic to the philosopher, as in Nietzsche’s Dionysus; in others, 
they are antipathetic, such as the Idiot that leads Descartes to discover the cogito 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-62). Furthermore, we might observe Marx 
playing with a varied range of conceptual personae from abstract labour, the 
bourgeois, the proletariat and the Jewish people, each of which does not express 
an ideal model, but rather a different actualisation of a principal problem and the 
possibility of its solution. 
My interest in Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of conceptual personae 
stems from its ability to reveal the multiple ways in which a philosophical 
problematic and system are activated within a philosopher. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of conceptual personae enables us to discover the path of the philosopher’s 
thought. Put differently, conceptual personae allow us to emphasise internal 
dynamics, and to understand what confluence of forces lie underneath and 
between the elements of a philosophical project. They thus offer the opportunity 
of analysing a philosophy not retrospectively, i.e. by tracing its conclusions back 
to their origins, but rather by looking at its development and at the experience of 
its becoming. My re-reading of Spinoza’s political thought is constructed around 
these characteristics of Deleuze’ and Guattari’s account of conceptual personae 
adapting the latter to the language and structure of the TTP. My use of Deleuze’s 
and Guattari’s view of conceptual personae as a means of reading Spinoza’s 
political thought is intended to grasp the latter’s development and problematics. 
The strategy of conceptual personae proposed here enables us to enter into the 
middle of Spinoza’s philosophical project, or, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s 
phrasing, into the interstices of its territory.   
 
 
 
 
172 
 
The anatomy of Spinoza’s conceptual-affective personae 
 
The presence of conceptual personae is less explicit in Spinoza’s political 
theses than in Nietzsche and Descartes, and we cannot clearly observe Spinoza 
playing with sympathetic and antipathetic personae as in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reading of Descartes and Marx. This might also explain the absence of references 
to Spinoza’s conceptual personae in Deleuze’ and Guattari’s discussion. Yet 
despite their silence, I have found cogent conceptual personae in the TTP and the 
TP, with which Spinoza can be seen to initiate an intense dialogue. These 
personae are not sympathetic or antipathetic; rather, they are multifaceted and 
problematic interlocutors, with whom Spinoza interacts throughout the entire 
development of his thought.  
Some preliminary clarifications are imperative before we analyse these 
conceptual personae. In both Treatises, Spinoza does not mention, even indirectly, 
conceptual personae. In his exposition, as discussed above, Spinoza examines 
historical and biblical figures and facts, and draws political reflections from them. 
The conceptual personae to which I refer map the path of Spinoza’s political 
philosophy. These are, in my reading, the complex interlocutors with which 
Spinoza confronts himself. Therefore, the conceptual-affective personae assumed 
in this chapter and the one that follows are not the historical personages narrated 
in the political Treatises, such as Moses, the apostles and Christ. Instead, 
Spinoza’s conceptual personae embody the affective and conceptual processes and 
events that bring him to analyse these personages and figures.  
The attention given here to the affective elements present in Spinoza’s 
political arguments – and also my identification of his conceptual personae as the 
power of the affects – follows from the claims advanced in chapter II, or more 
specifically from the reading of Spinoza via Simondon that was initiated in that 
chapter. It is also intended to reinforce the understanding of Spinoza’s theory of 
affectivity as a collective process of psychic individuation, and will draw out the 
latter’s political implications. Thus in order to delineate the affective mechanism 
surrounding the conceptual-affective personae of the Treatises we need to return 
briefly to the arguments made in chapter II. In chapter II, employing Simondon’s 
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categories, I argued that Spinoza’s ontology should be considered as a collective 
process of individuation. This led to the recognition of Spinoza’s original 
paradigm of the individual. In Spinoza, the anatomy of the individual is viewed as 
an open structure, traversed by continuous transformations. In this, the action of 
entering into relations with others is literally a movement of individuation. Related 
particularly to human beings, reading the Ethics through Simondon’s philosophy 
gave rise to many significant implications. Affects and passions could thus be 
seen to play the pivotal role in developing the process of psychic individuation, 
and led to re-shaping our awareness of the richness of affectivity and its central 
role in the individuation of psychic individuals. In the latter, affects and passions 
such as hatred, love and fear do not pass from one already individuated being to 
the other, and neither are they located in an obscure interiority of the individual. 
Rather, they are collective and – crucially importantly – irreplaceable phases of 
individuation.  
We have seen that in the Ethics Spinoza describes affects not, or not solely 
as auxiliary functions of human beings, which appear subsequent to the 
constitution of physical and psychical beings. Instead, affectivity activates the 
relational movements upon which the individual is formed. Thus, Spinoza’s 
conception of humankind brings about the need for re-positioning the constitutive 
role of affectivity at the centre of the human theatre. The reinstatement of the 
significance of affectivity has immediately political implications, which can still 
offer thoughtful theoretical insights for contemporary thought and society. Taking 
these preliminary arguments into account, the conceptual-affective personae that 
we encounter in this chapter are the Devotees of the prophet, the Subjects of 
Moses and the Apostles. As explained above, they do not coincide with the 
biblical figures and events discussed in Spinoza’s exegesis of the sacred 
Scriptures. Rather, they delineate the path through which affectivity produces 
psychic-political realities. Given that in the theological section of the Treatise 
passions are the protagonists of Spinoza’s analysis, the conceptual-affective 
personae examined in this chapter indicate how passions uncover a complex 
process of political individuation.  
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As the names I have given to them suggest, these conceptual-affective 
personae are essentially plural, i.e. relational, disparate and collective. The linkage 
between these conceptual-affective personae is not centred on a dialectical play of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and nor do they develop through teleological 
processes ‘towards the better’. By contrast, each conceptual-affective persona 
embodies a specific affective tone and actualises a different production of the 
political, which brings new orders of problems and solutions into the existing 
political scenario. Furthermore, differences between conceptual-affective 
personae are not qualitative; the Apostles, for example, are not superior or inferior 
in respect to the Subjects of Moses and the Devotees of the prophet. Following the 
notion of difference presented in the Ethics, the conceptual-affective personae of 
the TTP are distinguished one from another modally (E. I, prop. XV, Scholium). 
This means that each conceptual-affective persona expresses a distinct confluence 
of affects, which delineates specific political moments and individuals. delineates 
specific political moments and individuals. The first conceptual-affective persona 
that I will discuss is the Devotees of the prophet. This conceptual persona 
introduces a crucial phase within the thread of the TTP: namely, the constitution 
of the political and the necessity of the collective for the latter’s complete 
development.  
 
3. The Devotees of the prophet 
 
In chapter II, “Of the prophets”, Spinoza tells us that the prophets “were 
not endowed with a more perfect mind, but with a more vivid power of 
imagination” (TTP, chapter II: 404). The certainty of the prophets is based not on 
an extraordinary faculty or an intimate relation with God. The knowledge of the 
prophets, Spinoza asserts, is based simply on signs, lumen naturalis, memories of 
past events and stories and, more importantly, their own physical and psychic 
attitude.  
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As he summarises, 
 
Therefore the certainty of the prophets was based entirely on these three 
considerations: 
 
1.That things revealed were most vividly imagined, just as we are 
wont to be affected by objects in our waking hours.  
2.The occurrence of a sign. 
3.Lastly and most important, that the minds of the prophets were 
directed exclusively towards what was right and good.  
(TTP, Chapter II: 406) 
 
Spinoza, then, proceeds with analysing the historical figures of Isaiah, 
Moses, Abraham, Joshua, Amos, Nahum and Christ, and investigates how they 
experienced and divulged the idea of God. As Christ understood God without the 
use of images, signs and revelations, Spinoza sets his doctrine aside from the 
circle of the prophets that form the tradition of the Old Testament (TTP, Chapter 
IV: 431).
 
Excluding Christ from that tradition, Spinoza addresses the 
demystification of the divine status of the prophets, through which their actions 
and beliefs have been considered as indisputable. In order to clarify the mundane 
origins of prophets, Spinoza gives a detailed account of their respective historical, 
emotional, social and linguistic milieu, upon which the alleged divinity of their 
authority has been grounded. Spinoza contextualises their actions, beliefs and 
writings through a very accurate exegesis of the holy texts. This replaces the 
sacred reputation of the prophets with ordinary imaginative abilities, affectivity, 
bodily movements and, importantly, the environment (TTP, Chapters I-II).      
Each of these personages, examined in the TTP, reveals a particular use of 
imagination, which denotes an immature mode of intending the order and 
connection of natural phenomena (TTP, Chapter II: 409). According to Spinoza, 
the prophet explains the mechanism of nature through picturing images of fire or 
flood, and also through emotional states such as joy, hope, astonishment and 
prostration. Moreover, the prophet’s ignorance of nature produces the perception 
of events as gifts, miracles and punishments for his devotion or impiety (TTP, 
chapters I, II, III, VI). These are the causes of the growth of the anthropomorphic 
idea of God and nature.  
As discussed in the preceding part of the thesis, continental thinkers such 
as Matheron (1971; 1988), Tosel (1984; 1997) and Negri (1998) have considered 
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Spinoza’s arguments concerning the false divinity of prophets as a move against 
the ideological apparatus of the Church, through which people’s needs and desires 
were manipulated. Spinoza’s critique of the sacred status of the prophets has been 
commonly viewed as his political commitment to the emancipation of society 
from the enslavement of theology. Analytic readers however, such as Smith 
(1998) and Israel (2002, 2006), have interpreted Spinoza’s critique of prophecy, 
miracles and prophets as the establishment of his rational method, which aims at 
affirming the autonomy of philosophy and politics from theology. This autonomy 
forms part of the conditions through which freedom of people might be developed 
and liberal democracy founded. It is for this reason that analytic commentators 
tend to consider the arguments of the theological section of the TTP as 
anticipating the Enlightenment tradition of thought. 
The arguments formulated by Balibar (1998), Gatens and Lloyd (1999) 
have been crucial to the formulation of the position assumed in this chapter. From 
a continental perspective, Balibar has envisaged a theory of communication in 
Spinoza’s study of the origins of prophecy, miracles and the divine authority of 
prophets. Spinoza’s attention to the language of prophets, prophecies and miracles 
reveals, Balibar claims, the central role given by Spinoza to dissemination of 
ideas. The influence of prophecies over people derives from the expressions, 
symbolic elements and images employed in describing natural phenomena and 
past events. Similarly, the authority of prophets derives from the ways in which 
they present to others their perceptions of nature and ideas of God. This creates 
collective meanings and common identity, through which individuals recognise 
themselves as parts of a community (Balibar, 1998: 88-98 ). Beside its role as a 
critique of theology, Balibar concludes, Spinoza’s enquiry into prophecies and 
prophets brings about the centrality of a theory of communication within the 
constitution of a political subject, however passive or active (Balibar, 1998:105-
124 ).  
Developing further Balibar’s thesis, Gatens and Lloyd (1999) have 
recently placed an emphasis on the social function of passions and imagination 
that emerges from Spinoza’s study of prophets and prophecies. According to this 
view, passions and imagination establish psychic practises of recognition between 
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individuals, around which they create collective identity and meanings. These 
collective identity and meanings do not only have a psychic and social dimension, 
but more significantly a political significance. Passions and imaginations generate 
cooperative practises, which are already political and extremely powerful. These 
practises also actualise conceptions of time and history, which characterise the 
actions and thought of a specific political union (Gatens and Lloyds, 1999: 87-95, 
124-132).   
Building upon these arguments, I think, Spinoza’s portrayals of prophets 
and prophecies uncover a multisided process, which exceeds the production of 
social habits, ethical and political norms. Spinoza’s account of the imaginative 
status of the prophets and devotees brings to question the anatomy of a group 
within a forming political context and the production of the ‘common’ through 
affective movements. The claim that I will present in this section concerns the 
understanding of passions as fundamental elements of a process of individuation, 
through which political realities and individuals emerge. In other words, we must 
consider the multifaceted realm of the prophet and prophecies as a process of 
individuation, which embraces contemporaneously the political, the social and the 
psychic. 
In order to discover these aspects, a different path has to be followed. I 
propose to re-conceptualise Spinoza’s conceptions of prophecies, prophets, rituals 
and miracles (chapters I, II, V, VI) within a more complex conceptual persona, 
that is, the Devotees of the prophet. The analysis of these arguments through a 
conceptual persona might enable us to determine what lies at the very basis of the 
production of the political and how affectivity is generative of meanings, 
individuals and temporal flows. In order to delineate the anatomy and 
development of this conceptual-affective persona I will employ Simondon’s 
categories of the collective psychic individuation, as these might shed light on the 
manifold status of the prophets and their devotees.
 Simondon’s theory of the 
collective individuation might translate into contemporary language the political 
meaning of passions, through which the originality of the political stakes of 
Spinoza’s notion of affectivity might come to light.  
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Prophet and devotees: The threshold of the political    
 
In chapters I-II (“of prophecy” and “of the prophets” respectively), 
Spinoza describes the genesis and meaning of prophecy. As with the knowledge 
of the prophet, imagination grounds the prophetic messages too. This implies the 
interpretation of prophecy as a direct consequence of particular affective 
circumstances such as the prophet’s emotive disposition, linguistic expressions 
and the ignorance of certain natural laws. Spinoza defines prophecy or revelation 
as the understanding and communication of God’s power and existence through 
images and words (TTP, Chapter I: 396). The prophet is the interpreter (in 
Hebraic nabi) of God’s messages, and he also plays the fundamental role of 
divulging God’s will to the members of a group (TTP, Chapter I: 394). The 
message of prophecies, Spinoza explains, concerns an immature mode of 
understanding the laws of nature, albeit not a false one. For Spinoza, therefore, the 
foci of revelation are on the one hand addressed to the unveiling of the structure 
and becoming of nature throughout the employment of affective discourses and 
figures; on the other, the aim of revelation is directed to the establishment of 
moral behaviours within a group.
40
 This leads to the creation of common beliefs, 
opinions and actions, through which new forms of relations between individuals 
come to light. The prophet’s gestures of revealing God’s will to others sets in 
motion a mechanism that produces a series of commonalities, which re-organise 
and differentiate the equilibrium of the existing system. 
Prophecy therefore expresses here not – or not only – an ingenuous way of 
thinking God, but rather a more complex process that transforms and expands the 
domain of the individual on the realm of the ‘common’. In other words, behind 
the vague and mutilated opinions generated through the prophet’s speeches, there 
is the re-organisation and re-signification of the equilibrium of a collective body. 
Following Spinoza’s arguments, the prophetic message gives rise to a sense of 
closeness and participation between ignorant individuals, through which they 
recognise their role within the world. They become devotees, importantly, not of 
                                                 
40
 “[…], God’s testimony to Abraham implies only that he was obedient and commanded his 
household to the ways of justice and goodness” (TTP, Chapter II: 411).  
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God but of the prophet collectively.
41
 As the occurrence of the collective ground 
is moulded though the prophet’s speeches and images, it is through his body, 
stories, dreams and memories that common actions, ideas and tendencies are 
individualised.  
In order to prophesise and narrate stories, the prophet requires a group to 
whom he can address his messages. Without the group the prophet is directly 
confronted with the undifferentiated nature, which reveals his impasse in thinking 
God. The encounter of the prophet with nature is nuanced by the passive tones of 
fear, hope, sorrow and astonishment, which structure two movements. The 
prophet, on the one side, is frightened by the boundless force of nature, which is 
greater than the singular individual.
42
 On the other, a form of recognition occurs 
between the prophet and nature. In this respect the prophet considers himself as a 
constitutive element of the natural order.
43
 It follows that the prophet experiences 
the power of nature as Otherness and, at the same time, Sameness, which reveal 
his incapacity to signify himself through God.  
It is precisely at this moment that passions of fear, sorrow and hope 
activate a process, through which the individual enters into the realm of the 
collective ground. In order to solve the prophet’s impasse of orienting himself 
within the world, passions bring about the re-discovery of the group of the 
devotees.
 44
 However, this group is not a mere assemblage of listeners; rather, they 
are followers characterised by devotion (faith). On the one hand this moulds the 
message of the prophecy through collective meanings, which lead a group of 
                                                 
41
 “For Moses commanded them [Israelites] to love God and keep his Law, to regard to their past 
blessings […] as bestowed by God; and he further made terrifying threats if they should transgress 
these commandments, while promising many blessings if they observed them” (TTP, Chapter II: 
413).  
42“Adam, to whom God was first revealed, did not know that God is omnipresent and omniscient, 
for he hid from God and attempted to excuse his sin before God as if he had to do with a man. 
[…]. For Adam heard God walking in the Garden, calling him and seeking him out, and then 
seeing his guilty bearing, asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden tree” (TTP, Chapter II: 
410).  
43 “Therefore, if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man may do with his fellow (that is, 
through the medium of the two bodies), then Christ communed with God mind to mind” (TTP, 
Chapter I: 399; [my italics]). 
44
Concerning the figure of the prophet, Deleuze and Guattari strive towards the dramatic relation 
between the prophet and God. Referring to Spinoza’s description of the prophet, they view the 
condition of the prophet as a mere instrument of God’s will, whose role is signified and dependent 
on the power of God. The prophet, they conclude, is only a messenger of the Lord, insignificant in 
himself (Deleuze and Guattari , 2004b; 135-141), 
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listeners to become devotees of the prophet. On the other, the devotees attune 
their actions and thoughts to the stories narrated through the prophet’s voice.  
Given the central role of the action of communicating images for the 
creation of collective habits and opinions, one certainly might argue that 
Spinoza’s analysis of prophecy, and more generally imagination, delineates a 
theory of communication as Balibar (1998) has claimed, as have also  Gatens and 
Lloyd (1999), Visentin (2001) and Williams (2007), albeit in different ways. In 
this sense, prophetic messages indicate the ways in which these develop 
commonalities within a society. Spinoza, undeniably, gives full account of the 
language, speech and writings of prophets and of how they have been used to 
influence people’s actions and thoughts. However, the significance of the 
prophecy in the Treatise, I think, does not only rely on unveiling the mechanisms 
of language. It is not communication that lies at the basis of prophetic discourses, 
which would organise a community of devotees.  
The affective structure, which grounds the art of prophecy, develops a 
process of individuation in a Simondonian sense, which is collective and already 
political. For Simondon, as we saw in chapter II, to individuate means to 
exchange forces and undifferentiated masses and energies within a collective field 
(Simondon, 2007: 23-31, 73-84). The couple affects-emotions inheres within this 
process and generates psychic beings. Their emergence reinforces the collective 
and transforms the entire psychic process of individuation. Affects and emotions, 
Simondon explains, have a collective nature. Relating individuals one with 
another, they traverse and go beyond the individual. Affects and emotions activate 
a collective process of psychic individuation, which generate a powerful psychic-
social union (Simondon, 2007: 98-111, 114-123). Therefore, the role of affects 
and emotions, in Simondon’s account, is contemporaneously social and psychic 
(Simondon, 2007: 197-214). More significantly, this role corresponds to the 
power of individuation.
45
   
In the Devotees of the prophet, the art of prophesy might be re-explained 
through a Simondonian logic. As mentioned, prophecy means the act of 
                                                 
45
 For Simondon, the group is always a mixture of psychic and social realities. For him, groups are 
not exclusively psychic or social; instead, they are a confluence of these two poles of Being 
(Simondon, 2007: 175-214).      
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interpreting and communicating God’s gestures; and also it involves the art of 
predicting future events, which, however real or illusory, influence actions and 
thoughts of the Devotees in their actuality. Although the prediction concerns 
coming events, however, this guides and transforms the present actions and 
thoughts of the Devotees (TTP, Chapters II and V). Spinoza tells his readers that 
the prophet communicates through images and words, which implies a very 
extensive understanding of the status of revelation. Bodily movements here play 
the pivotal role of divulging God’s stories. It is through a combination of the 
prophet’s voice, eyes, memories and dreams that the common sense of devotion is 
developed (see particularly chapter V).  
It is precisely in this phase that passions become crucial, as they actualise 
and individualise relational forces, entirely re-configuring the realm of the 
collective. Fear, hope and devotion are mainly the conditions which re-form the 
domains of the prophet and the devotees. In the Ethics, part III, Spinoza defines 
fear as “inconstant pain arising from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose 
outcome we are in some doubt” (E. III, Def. Aff. XIII). Similarly hope is 
“inconstant pleasure arising from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose 
outcome we are in some doubt” (E. III, Def. Aff. XII). Lastly, by devotion 
Spinoza means “love toward one at whom we wonder” (E. III, Def. Aff. X). In our 
affective-conceptual persona of the Devotees of the prophet, it is the devotion 
toward the prophet that lies at the very heart of the ‘common’.  
In this state, devotion constitutes the fundaments and the purpose, through 
which desires and conatus are actualised into the political ground. The relational 
movements generated through the devotional force re-signify the realm of the 
common. Although devotion is a passion, it structures collective actions and 
thoughts, which notably do not pass from one individual to the other as from the 
prophet to his devotees; rather, devotion re-organises the equilibrium of the 
collective being into a political individual. Given Spinoza’s definition of 
affectivity as traces impressed upon individuals through movements of affecting 
and being affected, which delineate specific actions and thought, devotion might 
better function within a relational context (E. III, Def. III, postul. I-II). To act and 
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think within a relational realm – however moved by fear, hope or devotion – and 
within a collective structure means to behave politically.    
In his critique of theology, Spinoza gives full rights to the political 
meaning of passion without narrowing its role to ethical habits and alienating 
practises. The creation of rituals, laws and ceremonies within religious 
communities of the past exemplifies the political consistency of passions such as 
devotion and piety (TTP, Chapter V: 439). In this fashion, the novel political 
individual emerging from the devotional relations between devotees and the 
prophet brings to light multiple levels of heterogeneity such as time, ethics, 
humankind and history, each of which is embodied by the passionate tones of the 
Devotees of the prophet.  
As expressions of devotion, miracles, for example, do not only describe 
the misinterpretation of the causes behind the natural phenomena; in addition, 
they also explain how the collective individual of the Devotees moulds time, life 
and the becoming of nature. In the case of the miracles, the Devotees 
conceptualise (“understand”) the past (history) and organise their future through 
wonder, which includes political actions such as the exodus of the Israelites from 
Egypt. As “admiration toward” devotion gives rise to novel political practises, this 
transforms the community as a whole. In consequence the miracle is always 
described as a relational, collectively experienced event. Although with a negative 
meaning, Spinoza clearly states that the miracles are essentially created for the 
“common people” (TTP, Chapter VI: 444-447).  
If we now take into account the political and relational status of devotion, 
piety and wonder, we cannot ignore that Spinoza defines them as passions and 
that in the Treatise the devotees are described as vulgus (plebs). According to the 
Ethics, passions delineate a passive state, within which individuals are dependent 
on external forces (E. III, Def. II, III).  To put this in political terms: fear, hope 
and devotion are the causes of the manipulation of devotees’ needs and desires, 
through which ideological apparatuses are erected. If devotion, fear, piety and 
hope progressively reduce the actions and thoughts of individuals, in our case 
those of the Devotees, then no one can deny that they nevertheless constitute 
relational states that transform the parts of a group, and thereby the whole. 
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Furthermore, by definition, devotion is “love toward”, which advances the idea of 
certain active movements and desires (E. III, Def. Aff. X). The questions that thus 
immediately arise are firstly as to what Spinoza truly means by passivity, and 
secondly as to who or what is passive in the relation between devotees and the 
prophet. 
In the chapters of rituals and miracles, for example, Spinoza seems to 
attribute a quite passive role to the devotees. Therefore, the devotees, at first sight, 
appear as the locus wherein passions are grounded and developed. When we read 
further, however, we discover that the state of passivity pervades the entire 
conceptual-affective persona of the Devotees of the prophet, and not only parts of 
it. This is because both the prophets and the devotees are ignorant of the laws of 
nature and God. It means that devotion and wonder affect equally the actions of 
the prophets and their devotees.
46
 Both prophets and their followers institute 
sacrifices because they are moved by fear of misfortune and hope of fortune. 
These religious practices emerge from a collective process, which operates in the 
domain of passions. Fear, hope and devotion transform individuals into novel 
forms of collective life. Seen in this light, sacrifices and ceremonies exemplify the 
ways in which passions are productive of the ‘common’.       
In order to better situate the political meaning of passions within the TTP 
we need to return briefly to the analysis of affectivity developed in chapter II. I 
have argued through the adoption of Simondon’s categories that passions do not 
express a fracture within the process of individuation. They instead refer to 
different combinations of relational movements. In the case of passions, relational 
movements are less intense, and exchanges between beings rare. Passions delay 
the series of transformations within the collective individual. Similarly in the 
Devotees of the prophet, I would argue, the tendency towards passivity reveals the 
predominance of the pre-individual over the actions and thoughts of the devotees, 
as exemplified by their conception of God as otherness. This leads to a 
progressive stabilising of the entire equilibrium of the collective body, within 
which relational movements are not the ground of novel meanings and 
individuals, but instead simply a repetitive system of rules and regulations. As a 
                                                 
46
 See for example, the anger of Moses toward the pharaoh (TTP, Chapter II: 407), and how this 
generates political gestures.  
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consequence, the temporal life of the Devotees is constantly structured through 
moments of expectation and forgiveness. The time of the Devotees expresses an 
enduring state of expectation.
47
 Expectation means, in my reading, that the present 
does not actualise the infinite possibilities of the collective ground embodied by a 
group, but rather that potentialities, actions and thoughts remain enclosed within a 
time that lies between the past and the future.
48
  
Taking these arguments into account, we might now offer some 
reflections. The passivity of the Devotees of the prophet, I would argue, does not 
refer to a condition of lack. The Devotees of the prophet, we have seen, enfold a 
variety of emotive tones such as fear, hope and piety, each of which signifies 
different relational phenomena. The drama of the entire conceptual persona of the 
Devotees concerns the condition of stability of the entire process of individuation, 
which shapes relational conditions such as ceremonies, laws and sacrifices 
ordered through expectation. These situate political individuals (human beings, 
laws, institutions, ethical norms), however collective, within stable organisations, 
where relations are not productive of possible transformations and individuations. 
From Simondon, we know that a stable equilibrium (political, ontological and 
ethical) means the effacement of any possibility for transformations and 
movements, through which the advancement of the process of individuation is 
avoided entirely (Simondon, 2007: 49-65). 
The importance of the conceptual persona of the Devotees of the prophet, 
is on the one hand, that its emotive status brings about the discovery of a complex 
process, which forms psychological as well as social behaviours between 
individuated beings. This involves the re-actualisation of a political reality, which 
becomes differentiated and signified through intensive relational movements 
nuanced by devotion, wonder and piety. On the other hand, the Devotees bring to 
light a problem within the system, which refers to the possibility of being 
excluded from the general process of individuation. However, we cannot ignore 
the fact that this conceptual persona leaves many important questions unresolved 
                                                 
47
 Concerning the notion of time derived from passions and imagination, Gatens and Lloyd have 
pointed out in differing ways that imagination introduces a time of contingency within the social 
context, which gives special priority to the present (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 29-51).         
48
 Concerning a more general account of the theme of the time of prophecy: Agamben, by contrast, 
affirms that the time of the prophet takes the only form of the future (Agamben, 2005:59-60).   
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regarding the political meaning and the role of passions within the production of 
specific political behaviours such as struggle, resistance and pacts of fidelity. In 
order to determine what other forms of politics and society might be produced by 
passions we need to look at the story of Jewish people, which plays a pivotal role 
within the thread of the Treatise. The theme of the formation and development of 
the Hebrew state discloses how passions and affects give rise to important 
political events such as the collapse of the state of Israel. It is to the history of the 
Jewish people that I now turn.  
 
4. The Subjects of Moses 
 
The theme of the Jewish state is a central issue in Spinoza’s political 
thought, which raises many fecund arguments, running from specific questions 
about Judaism such as the messianic vision of the world and the role of Moses for 
the development of Jewish nation, to more general political analyses such as the 
limits of the confessional foundation of political states, the origin of the pact, the 
necessity of the separation of religion, politics and philosophy, and the nature of 
power. Spinoza gives a very accurate account of the Jewish question, which plays 
a strategic role both in the theological and political sections of the Treatise. 
Spinoza’s focus is on questioning the belief in the divine vocation of the Jewish 
people, upon which the latter’s alleged conviction that they are the nation chosen 
by God before all others has been based (TTP, Chapter III). For Spinoza, the 
distinctive status of the Jewish state resides on a well-organised system of laws 
and social cohesion, which overshadowed the other political governments of the 
time. This implies the recognition of the value of the Jewish nation independently 
of the faith professed and also the importance of the right of Jewish laws for the 
stability of society.  This is a decisive move within the thread of the TTP, which 
has political and religious implications. 
In contemporary Spinozist literature, thinkers such as Yovel and Smith 
have considered Spinoza’s analysis of Judaism as his attempt to develop a laic 
vision of Jewish Society. Accordingly, Spinoza opens the way towards the 
secularisation of Jewish culture and history. For this, Spinoza does not deny the 
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great achievements of the Jewish community obtained in history, which becomes 
an exemplary administration of society. Through his exegesis of the holy texts, 
Spinoza instead questions the sacred origins of the state and the idea of the divine 
election of the Jewish people. For Spinoza, there is a stipulation of a pact at the 
very basis of the Jewish nation, through which people have transferred part of 
their power to Moses. Spinoza’s critique of the divine vocation of the Hebrews 
thus opens up directly to the refusal of the paradigm of messianism, around which 
the entire apparatus of Judaism has been constructed (Yovel, 1992a: 15-126; 
Smith, 1998: 1-24, 166-205).  
Differently, post-Marxist scholars within the continental tradition of 
thought have emphasised the political implications that derive from Spinoza’s 
arguments on the Jewish nation. Thinkers such as Moreau (1996), Matheron 
(1988), Balibar (1998) and Negri (1998) have envisaged in Spinoza’s study of the 
Hebrew state a more general theory of mass movement, which situates the latter at 
the centre of political and historical processes. Spinoza’s analysis of the Jewish 
nation, they have claimed, reveals his awareness of the role played by the masses 
for the stability of the state. In this regard, the history of the Hebrew state 
provides Spinoza with fundamental elements, which enable him to understand 
how the masses form the real form of antagonism within any constituted political 
authority. This principle of antagonism is greatly exemplified by the history of the 
Hebrew nation, in which the Jewish people’s gestures have been the determining 
factor in the dissolution of the state. Therefore, Spinoza introduces through the 
analysis of the Jewish model of messianism and theocracy the fundamental 
political problematics of the nature of sovereignty and the linkage between this 
and the power of the mass (Negri, 1998: 128-149, 182-189; Moreau, 1996: 98-
104; Balibar, 1998: 36- 49).  
Within this general interpretation, Balibar in particular has raised 
important arguments that have been decisive for constructing the present 
approach. For Balibar, the biblical events of the evolution of the Jewish people 
reveal Spinoza’s innovative conception of history, which is organised through the 
constitution of the masses as a political subject. The masses, which in the case of 
Jewish history are exemplified by the Hebrews, are the real subject of historical 
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and political processes. The action of the masses, however passionate or active, 
impacts concretely upon the existing political organisation. As the example of the 
Jewish story indicates, the masses have been decisive for the maintenance and 
dissolution of the state of Israel (Balibar, 1998: 42-49; 1997: 178-204). Operating 
within a continental perspective, and whilst developing the general post-Marxist 
reading, Montag has recently shed light on other important themes contained in 
Spinoza’s exegesis of the history of Jewish people (Montag, 1999). Spinoza’s 
attention to the structure of Jewish government is connected to a crucial argument 
within political theory: namely, that of sovereignty. Spinoza explains, as we will 
see below, that the authority of the Jewish state was organised through a severe 
observance of rituals and ceremonies. These regulate both the private and public 
aspects of individual life. Montag concludes that Spinoza’s description of the 
organisation of the Jewish state through ceremonies and rituals discloses a lucid 
analysis of the genesis and anatomy of sovereignty. Through the example of the 
Jewish nation, Spinoza explains that the authority of the state is erected and 
reinforced not through the administration of the public sphere but rather by an 
invasive control of the private life of the people as the history the Jewish people 
narrated by Spinoza corroborate (Montang, 1999: 46-61). It is in these arguments, 
Montag claims, that the great actuality of Spinoza’s politics lies. 
Spinoza’s study of the history of the state of Israel, undeniably, involves a 
laic vision of Judaism, as noted especially by Yovel and Smith, and also novel 
political theories of mass movement, as post-Marxist scholars such as Balibar and 
Negri have underlined. It also addresses the fundamental theme of the origin and 
structure of sovereignty, as Montag has acutely observed. Developing the 
continental reading further, I think that there are still unexplored elements within 
Spinoza’s critique of the Jewish nation, and that we might uncover them via a 
different hermeneutic strategy. In order to investigate these aspects of his work I 
will bring our attention back to the affective tones of Moses and the Israelites, and 
to the pivotal role that their affectivity has played within Spinoza’s account of 
early Jewish society. An enquiry into the affective tones of Moses and the 
Israelites underlines the relational process which operates within the constitution 
of a community. My interest in affectivity here is not intended to deny or 
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invalidate the interpretations considered above. Rather, it aims to bring new 
arguments and trajectories into the present debate that may help us to re-assess the 
originality of Spinoza’s politics.              
In order to examine these themes, Spinoza’s analysis of the Jewish nation 
will be re-considered through the narrative of conceptual-affective personae.  In 
this light, the historical figures of Moses and the Israelite community will be 
incorporated within a more complex personage, that is, the Subjects of Moses. 
The importance of this conceptual-affective persona lies in its ability to unveil 
some of the ways in which affectivity structures relational movements within a 
process of collective individuation. The enquiry into the conceptual persona of the 
subjects of Moses brings about the discovery of the notions of obedience, law, and 
the messianic tendency as results of a process of individuation, which constantly 
signifies the realm of the political. It is precisely in this context that Spinoza’s 
conception of the anatomy and becoming of a community as a complex political 
individual comes to light.  
I will use the narrative thread afforded by this conceptual persona to argue 
that passions, desires and affects should be re-located at the centre of a process 
that generates the realm of the ‘common’. This is structured, as we will see, 
through collective forces, meanings and individuals. Whilst in the conceptual 
persona of the Devotee of the prophet, devotion, fear and hope shape the domain 
of the ‘common’ and disclose the necessity of the collective field; in the case of 
the Subjects of Moses, wonder, anger and desire generate a different political 
reality. It is through the dynamics of the Subjects of Moses that Spinoza’s 
conception of society as a mixture of incompatibilities and potentials emerges. 
Taking into account these arguments, let us map the affective dynamics of the 
conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses.  
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4.1 The time and the becoming of the Jewish people  
        
In chapter III, entitled “of the vocation of the Hebrew”, Spinoza makes the 
following, fundamental claim:  
 
Everyone’s true happiness and blessedness consists 
solely in the enjoyment of the good, not in priding 
himself that he alone is enjoying that good to the 
exclusion of others. He who counts himself more 
blessed because he alone enjoys wellbeing not shared 
by the others, or because he is more blessed and 
fortunate than others, knows not what is true happiness 
and blessedness, and the joy derives therefrom, if it be 
not mere childishness, has its only source in spite and 
malice. (TTP, chapter III: 415-416, my italics).                         
  
This general statement means, on the one hand, that happiness and 
wellbeing do not consist in an individualist and possessive fruition of these 
conditions. This might suggest that “true” happiness and blessedness, instead, 
require a state of sharing and participation or, at the very least, an enjoyment that 
is not ambitious or immodest. On the other hand, Spinoza’s affirmation might be 
considered as the recognition of the central limit of the Jewish people, which 
searches and enjoys happiness and fortunes for their own advantage, and also with 
the pretence of being more fortunate or blessed than other nations. Following the 
thread of Spinoza’s arguments, the supposed divine vocation of the Jewish people 
concerns a well-organised political and social government (TTP, Chapter III: 
418). This refers to the sharing of fortunes, rules and regulations collectively, 
rather than as independent beings.  
These factors come to constitute the sole exceptional character of the 
Hebrew state. From these initial explanations, however, many questions soon 
arise. Firstly, are there ruptures, messianic figures or inexplicable events that 
bring about the genesis of the Israelites? Secondly, what conditions or individuals 
prepare the terrain for the affirmation of this political body? A consideration of 
these aspects is crucial for determining the foundation of society within Spinoza’s 
politics more broadly.  In order to address these questions, I intend to follow that 
one must recognise the priority of process in order to understand the individual 
(Simondon, 2007: 12). This dictum becomes crucial, particularly for delineating 
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the genesis and peculiarity of the Jewish nation. Therefore, we need to take a step 
back, and should turn our attention towards the conditions and phases which have 
led to the emergence of the state of Israel. This emerges from the event of the 
exodus. In the conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses the exodus 
discloses a variety of powerful affective tones, which shape and transform 
politically those same subjects.  
 
Exodus: Slaves and claimants 
 
Spinoza tells us that the Jewish people after the exodus from the empire of 
Egypt find themselves in an unexpected situation that closely resembled a state of 
nature (TTP, Chapter XVII:  539). The exodus expresses a very crucial moment, 
within which they passed from a condition of servitude to one of freedom. This 
passage is structured by passions of fear, anger and hatred, which move the 
Jewish people’s condition of servitude towards freedom. This insinuates the idea 
that passions or “passive affections” are productive of important political actions. 
If this is the case, it would contradict the thesis of the Ethics. In the Ethics, as 
discussed in chapter II, Spinoza conceives passions as a dependence of one’s 
action upon an external cause. The exodus, however, represents an active and 
productive action. The Jewish people are moved by passions of fear and anger. 
Thus, how should we explain the exodus of the Hebrew people given the passivity 
of their relations? In order to re-investigate the problematic aspects of the biblical 
event of the exodus narrated by Spinoza, the conceptual-affective persona of the 
Subjects of Moses addresses these questions. This allows us to emphasise all the 
affective nuances characterising the political individual of the Jewish nation. 
Similarly to the conceptual personae defined by Deleuze and Guattari, and 
examined above, the conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses 
constructed here captures the political individual in its emergence and becoming.    
The Subjects of Moses who precede the exodus are nuanced by their 
wonder toward God and their hate for the empire of Egypt. Although the Jewish 
people are moved by passions of hatred and fear towards the pharaoh, they are, 
over all, a group. They recognise themselves as an individual claimant – however 
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multiple – of the Promised Land. As such a claimant, the Israelites express desire, 
which is represented by their demand for the Promised Land and by their rejection 
of the empire of the Egypt. Furthermore, the act of claiming brings to light the 
anomalous status of our conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses 
under their servitude. In the state of slavery, they are in the middle of individuated 
and potential political realities.   
This group claimant is located in the middle of a political context, the state 
of the pharaoh, which brings about a confluence between already individualised 
realities (the Egyptian rules, hierarchic equilibrium and customs) and forming 
political individuals (the hope of the promised land). The wonder of God 
structures and reinforces the equilibrium of this emerging individual towards the 
individualisation of more productive relations, which should overturn the 
passivity of the state of servitude. These elements, in my reading, play an equally 
pivotal role within the transition from the phase of servitude to the one of 
refugees. However, there is another crucial aspect of this transitional moment, 
which might shed light on the dynamics of the exodus. This entails the affective 
status of Moses. In the conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses, 
Moses expresses a specific affective tone and phase within the more general 
process of political individuation.  
Spinoza describes the wisdom of Moses as a vivid attitude towards mercy, 
devotion and the wonder of God (TTP, Chapter II: 412-413). Moses, Spinoza 
claims, communicates with God as one friend does with another (TTP, Chapter I:  
399). These emotive tones structure a positive force, which re-signifies the 
moments of fear and hatred. It is in truth the love of Moses towards both God and 
the Israelites that surpasses and expands the passive relations of the phase of 
servitude. This positive tension is located and operates only within a collective 
individual, which corresponds, in this case, to the Israelites. The encounter 
between the affective states of Moses and the Jewish people opens the way to the 
possibility of undermining slavery and constructing a different political reality. 
The two affective states expressed by the Israelites’ hope for the Promised Land 
and Moses’ friendship with God re-shape the passive relations of fear of the 
pharaoh towards the production of novel forms of political being. From the Ethics, 
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we know that hatred, however strong it might be, is always destroyed by love (E. 
III, prop. XLIII). This suggests a very different mode of intending passions and 
servitude, which discloses new trajectories towards its possible subversion 
without deferring to any external force or agency.  
It is not Moses that liberates the Israelites, neither God nor the Israelites 
themselves: instead, it is through the encounter between Moses’ affectivity and 
that of the Israelites that the exodus can be realised. This encounter, in my 
reading, structures a collective body, which carries confluences of affects and 
novel tensions. These, I would argue, create the conditions through which slavery 
might be destroyed. Strictly speaking, there is always a possibility of overturning 
hatred and servitude insofar as there are productive tensions, relations and 
exchanges of meanings, which, in our case are nuanced by the tones of Moses’ 
love toward his subjects and the Israelites’ desire for the Promised Land. As the 
conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses revealed, these affective 
tones, crucially, are not merely psychic states, which reside, secretly, within the 
intimacy of the group of claimants; according to the Ethics, affects and passions, 
however self-oriented or hetero-directed, are already actions (E. III, Def. III, 
postul. I, II).  
The significance of Spinoza’s philosophical gesture acquires great 
consistency, particularly in relation to the political event of the exodus. For the 
Israelites and Moses, what is at the stake is not only the turn from a polytheistic 
position to a monotheistic one. Rather it is life itself (the attainment of the 
Promised Land) that is at risk. The arguments of the exodus and servitude move 
our discussion towards the centre of our conceptual persona. This refers to the 
condition of the Jewish people within the unexpected state of nature. The analysis 
of the status of the Subjects of Moses within the state of nature is crucial. This 
might enable us to discover the genealogy of a community and the ways in which 
this signifies more complex political beings such as theocracy, anarchy and 
monarchy. 
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The community of God 
 
In the natural condition, Spinoza explains, the power of each person 
corresponds exactly to his right to act (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527). Furthermore, this 
implies recovering of the conception of the natural condition from its Hobbesian 
meaning as the domain of cruelty to a boundless territory shaped by desires, 
power and tensions. Related particularly to the Subjects of Moses, the regained 
condition is more complex and manifold. This expresses a situation that stands in 
the middle between existing political reality (the hierarchic system of the pharaoh) 
and the one to be formed (the state of Israel). As anticipated above, in this phase, 
the status of the Israelites is an anomalous one. They are not yet-subjects of the 
state of Israel and the followers of Moses’ laws; at the same time, they are no 
longer the slaves of the pharaoh.
49
 They are mixtures of individuated realities, 
potentialities, affects, passions and desires grounded upon the collective being. 
Spinoza describes the repossessed state of nature as a boundless territory, where 
the Hebrews were “at the liberty to sanction any new laws that they pleased or to 
establish new ordinances, to maintain a state wherever they wished and to occupy 
any lands they wished” (TTP, chapter V: 439, my italics).  
Given the complete absence of external constrictions, the Promised Land 
connotes an open structure, which is densely populated by desires, potentialities 
and affects. This confluence of elements expands the collective being of the 
Subjects of Moses towards further and more problematic stages of political 
individuation. These stages involve the re-signification of the Israelites within an 
unknown context, which becomes the ground of further relational movements. 
Desires play a pivotal role for the re-colonization of the state of nature, re-
organising ventures, actions and events. As we have analysed in chapter II, 
Spinoza defines desire as the very essence of humankind (E.III, Def. Aff. I). He 
considers desire as a transition, which exceeds the individuated being and 
continuously exposes him towards moments of individuation within the collective 
                                                 
49
 The theme of the anomalous condition of the Jewish people from the exodus to the present has 
been re-explored by Yovel. Referring to the situation of the Marranos as a split identity, Yovel has 
highlighted the fragmented condition of the Jewish identity. This psychological state derives from 
the state in the middle between two cultures and politics, in which he includes Spinoza himself 
(Yovel, 2009; 1992b).   
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field (E. III, Def. Aff. II). Following Simondon, we have called this tendency a 
transindividual force that is contemporaneously individual and yet at the same 
time more than the individual (Simondon, 2007: 104-111, 156-160).  
In our conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, desire lies at the very 
basis of the state of nature. It is through the gesture of desiring that Israelites pass 
from being claimants and refugees to people of a new political body. As a 
collective (or better: transindividual) force, desire resolves the anomalous 
condition, in which the Israelites found themselves following the exodus. As 
mentioned above, they were precisely in the middle between actuality (the status 
of claimant and slaves) and potentiality (the people of the state of Israel, the 
nation of God). In the persona of the Subjects of Moses, the state of nature 
moulded through desires does not only express a condition of potentiality, but also 
a ground of cogent political activity. As Spinoza says, in the state of nature, 
natural right corresponds to the power to act (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527). This 
means that desires already connote actions, movements and relations. What is at 
stake here is the actualisation of the state of Israel, within which the Subjects of 
Moses become both the theatre and the actors. The actualisation of the political 
body comes to light through a pact between the Jewish people and God. In this 
first pact, they decided to transfer their natural rights collectively to God, electing 
him as their only ruler. The emergence of the pact raises fundamental themes for 
the understanding of the anatomy and development of a community as such.  
First of all, the pact does not delineate a rupture between the state of 
nature and the political state. Given the collective alienation of natural right to 
God, the pact expresses a transitional phase. In the language of the Ethics, this is 
an expansive movement from a state of lesser perfection to a greater one. 
Secondly, as a transitional phase, the pact emerges from an act of desire. For this, 
Spinoza grounds at the very basis of any community –including the Jewish one- 
different degrees of desire. These are knowledge through primary causes, the 
acquisition of a habit of virtue, and the enjoyment of a secure and good life (TTP, 
chapter III: 417). Ultimately, the pact with God is structured through emotive 
tones. Spinoza stresses the states of fidelity and devotion for the actualisation of 
the pact. It is through fidelity toward and admiration of Moses, as well as devotion 
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toward God that a new political individual emerges.
50
 Unlike the exodus, the 
figure of Moses plays a relatively marginal role. In this phase, Moses simply 
denotes a degree of affectivity, which enriches the movements of the Israelites 
towards the political. 
These elements, I would argue, bring about Spinoza’s innovative paradigm 
of community, which marks the great difference between Spinoza and his 
contemporaries. The thread of the conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of 
Moses has disclosed to us that Spinoza considers the creation of the community of 
God to be grounded on a spontaneous and joyful becoming. The re-colonisation of 
the state of nature through the occurrence of the pact with God, Spinoza argues, 
proceeds from a collective gesture of desire (“Without much hesitation”), which 
crucially does not derive from fear and anger or from an egotistical attitude (TTP, 
Chapter XVII: 539). In this regard Spinoza describes the phases of the 
actualisation of the agreement with God as not conditioned by “forcible coercion 
or fear of threats” (TTP, Chapter XVII: 539). It is in this context that the great 
modernity of Spinoza’s political thought lies. Spinoza’s conception of the pact 
opens the way towards re-shaping our awareness of the meaning and origins of 
society itself. Given the formation of the pact as a transitional and expansive 
movement nuanced by desires and affectivity, society simply becomes: it is not 
created by obscure forces and rational choice; rather, societies are processes, 
carrying various levels of incompatibility, problems and solutions.
51
  
To consider society as a process does not imply the return to any form of 
agency, absolute spirit or God, which would guide and determine human history 
and practices. In this sense, no one would find in Spinoza’s analysis of the 
different types of society (the Jewish community, the state of nature, the English 
commonwealth under Cromwell and monarchy) a linear progression by which 
humanity becomes increasingly civilised, and within which human beings are 
                                                 
50
 “Finding themselves thus placed in this state of nature, they hearkened to Moses, in whom they 
all placed the greatest confidence, and resolved to transfer the right not to any mortal man, but to 
God alone”. (TTP, chapter XVII: 539).  
51
 Concerning Spinoza’s notion of the social contract, Negri suggests that Spinoza in the second 
foundation of his political thought replaces the idea of the pact with that of consensus (Negri, 
1998: 235-355). My interpretation of the foundation of society in the Treatise follows Simondon’s 
theory. For Simondon, the emergence of society corresponds to phases of individuation structured 
through emotive exchanges, potentials and preliminary tensions (Simondon, 2007:183).  
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merely instruments of a higher mind; neither is there a dialectical vision of history 
and society developed through moments of opposition and reconciliation. Society 
is instead a non-linear process, which proceeds through expansive movements. 
In this light, the structure of every society is fundamentally problematic, 
affective and collective, which unveils unsuspected phases of individuation, 
differentiation and transformations. However, the fact that the system follows a 
non-linear process does not mean that the solution to a precedent problem creates 
a qualitative change toward the better; rather, transformations, as we will see 
shortly, predominantly tend to expand the existing structure of the individual, 
increasing the level of incompatibility. It is for this reason that Spinoza claims in 
the Ethics that the more grades of reality a thing has, the more perfect it is (E.II, 
prop. XIV). As I have concluded in chapter II, the perfectibility of an individual 
resides solely in the progressive complication of its asymmetric structure: its 
being constantly incompatible with.  
By the expression “incompatible with”, I do not intend the ontological and 
political status of the collective individual as lacking, and nor do I refer to the 
Marxist notions of contradiction and class struggle, which Negri instead employs 
in his interpretation of Spinoza’s politics and, more generally, his theory of the 
power of the multitude (Negri, 1988: 235-253; 2005: 170-208). I also do not mean 
to refer to Balibar’s definition of the aporetic meaning of the mass in the Treatise 
(Balibar 1994: 3-37). Instead, and by developing Simondon’s presentation of the 
individual as something that is both problematic and disparate, my use of the term 
‘incompatible with’ pertains to an ontological and already political state of being 
which is both anomalous and in tension. Incompatibility, advanced here, involves 
the formation of new forces, desires and potentials, which transform and do not 
oppose the existing equilibrium. The conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects 
of Moses expresses the complex dynamics of this process and enables us to 
understand the political and ontological meaning of this form of incompatibility. 
The creation of the community of God expresses a great improvement over the 
condition of servitude and the state of nature. However, the political territory 
reveals considerable problematic moments, which disclose somewhat dramatic 
aspects of the disparate composition of the Jewish people.  
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The transfer of natural rights to God gives rise to the re-signification of the 
Subjects of Moses through the realm of the political, and equally to that of the 
political through the group of the Israelites. This involves, on the one side, the re-
positioning of the collective individual within the political context, within which 
the Israelites pass from the state of nature to constitute the community of God. On 
the other, the realm of the political becomes re-populated through relational 
movements, which bring into the system different modes of thinking time, ethics 
and language. It is precisely in this context that the status of the Subjects of Moses 
becomes complex and dramatic. As mentioned, they are in an intermediary 
location between pre-existing meanings (the condition of slavery under the 
Egyptian state) and a potential one (the Promised Land). This means that they are 
not only the ground of desires and potentialities, but also an already individuated 
reality. In the new political body of the community of God, the status of the 
Jewish people is twofold: as claimants of the Promised Land, they are a mixture 
of desires, and devotion towards God and Moses. They are expression of power, 
tension (devotion is always towards something or someone) and actions. This 
implies the re-characterisation of the collective individual as a productive force, 
which re-defines the equilibrium of the system as an enduring theatre of 
transformations. The Subjects of Moses, in this stage, constitute a form of 
invasive and intensive power, which can be partially predetermined and 
controlled.   
Moses hence invokes God’s help for the obstinacy of his people. The 
Israelites, Spinoza observes through Moses’ plea, are essentially an obstinate and 
passionate group, which can hardly be dominated and defeated.
52
 Furthermore, 
Spinoza himself (through Seneca’s discourses) points out the impossibility of 
fully restraining passions and desires of the mass (TTP, Chapter V: 438, and the 
same quotation recurs in chapter XVI: 530). From the Roman Empire onwards, 
Spinoza comments, any attempt to restrain the mass and impose resistance upon it 
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 “The fact is that when Moses realised the character and obstinate spirit of his nation, he saw 
clearly that they could not accomplish their undertaking without mighty miracles and the special 
external help of God, and must assuredly perish without such help; and he besought this special 
help of God so that it would be evident that God willed them to be saved. For he speaks […]”If 
now I have found favour in their sight, O Lord, let my Lord, I pray thee, go among us, for it is a 
stiff-necked people”” (TTP, Chapter III: 422).  
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has been vain, damaging the political system itself. Given the impossible 
effacement of passions and desires, thus, the political body can only accustom 
itself to the affective dynamics of the group. For this, Moses gives voice to the 
collective forces and desires of his community. In order to modulate and not to 
dominate, rules, ceremonies and sacrifices are instituted (TTP, Chapters III, 
XVII). Obedience and gift come to re-configure the realm of the political, within 
which the collective individual is the ground of transformations.  
As anticipated earlier, desire expresses a productive power, which calls for 
structural changes in time, relations and society itself. In this way, the 
establishment of rituals and sacrifices goes far beyond moral religious habits, re-
shaping modes of counting and perceiving time. In the realm of the Subjects of 
Moses, rituals invade every singular moment of the life of the community. The 
affects of devotion, wonder, piety and hope structure time through gestures of 
remembrance and expectation. Rituals and sacrifices arise from the expansive 
force of the Subjects of Moses, through which the entire political body re-situates 
itself within the realm of the collective individual. Religious festivals, for 
example, express some of the way in which the invasive and joyful force of affects 
exposes and further complicates the equilibrium of the political society of God. 
Certainly, Spinoza claims that these ceremonies are instrumental for reinforcing 
people’s obedience. However, religious rules become a common habit of both the 
ruler and the subjects to the point that the political body becomes a theocracy 
(TTP, Chapter V: 439-440; Chapter XVII: 540).  
As mentioned, in his plea Moses asks for a gift from God. In order to give 
voice to the unavoidable force of his subjects, in my analysis, Moses demands a 
recompense for the past servitudes of his people. In other words, as claimants, the 
Israelites are still waiting for the gift, the Promised Land. In turn, Moses 
communicates to them that they are, first amongst other nations, the elected nation 
of God. The gift brings about a further mode of conceptualising time. This 
becomes recounted through the affective tones expressed by the gratitude and 
expectation of God (TTP, Chapter III). These elements therefore bring to light 
how desires, passions and affects have a concrete impact upon the boundaries of 
the political. The desires of the Jewish claimants, I would argue, individuate and 
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transform the community of God from a form of democracy (the first pact with 
God), through theocracy and monarchy (from the second pact with Moses 
onwards) to its collapse. 
 
The collapse of the Jewish Nation 
  
 These arguments about the gift and the divine vocation of the Hebrews 
move our enquiry directly to the second aspect of the Subjects of Moses. As 
mentioned, they are in the middle between the status of claimant and that of slaves 
to the pharaoh. In our conceptual persona this opens up directly to the dramatic 
phase of the messianic vision of politics and the return to servitude. Although the 
Israelites have left Egypt and founded their own state, nevertheless, Spinoza 
observes, they have so long been habituated to the condition of slavery that the 
structure of the political body still echoes the hierarchic order embodied by the 
pharaoh (TTP, Chapter V: 439). For this, they collectively elect Moses as the 
representative of God’s will on earth, instituting theocracy and then monarchy 
(TTP, chapter V: 439-440; Chapter XVII: 540-552). This phase becomes crucial 
in the conceptual-affective persona of the Subjects of Moses. It is through the 
stipulation of the second pact with Moses that the messianic mode of structuring 
time and relations comes to light. Spinoza describes the occurrence of the pact 
with Moses as deriving from the astonishment of the Hebrews following the 
encounter with God. He observes, 
 
But on this first appearance before God they were so terrified and so 
thunderstruck at hearing God speak that they thought their last hour 
had come. So, overwhelmed with fear they went to Moses again, 
saying, “Behold, we have heard God speaking in the midst of the 
fire; now therefore why should we die? For this great fire will surely 
consume us; […]. Go thou near therefore, and hear all that our God 
shall say. And speak thou (not God) to us.” (TTP, chapter XVII: 
540, my italics). 
  
 
In the first part of the extract quoted above, Spinoza uses very suggestive 
expressions to explain the affective state of the Jewish people in relation to God. 
Expressions as “terrified” and “thunderstruck” connote the impasse of the Jewish 
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people in understanding the voice of God. They recognise God as Otherness. 
Similar to the state of the prophet in the persona of the Devotees of the prophet, 
the vision of God as Otherness involves the fear of death (“why should we die?”) 
and the search for eternity and forgiveness. Whilst the drama of the prophet 
derives from the absence of the collective ground, here the Subjects of Moses are 
already in a collective condition. They are the political community of God 
following the first pact. Therefore, the question arises as to why they are so 
“overwhelmed” by the fear of death. Simondon’s conception of anguish might 
shed light on this critical moment within the conceptual persona of the Subjects of 
Moses. If we take into account the different philosophical grounds upon which 
Simondon focuses his analysis of anguish (psychic individuation), his reading can 
be seen to offer alternative answers for understanding the problematic status of the 
Jewish people within the political scene.   
For Simondon, the psychic state of anguish arises from the relation 
between the pre-individual and the disparate being in the progressive 
disappearance of the collective field. The disparate being comes to experience the 
pre-individual force as greater than the individual. The individual begins by 
signifying himself as an ephemeral and meaningless entity in opposition to the all-
inclusive power of the pre-individual realm. This moves the disparate being 
towards a progressive withdrawal from the collective ground, experienced as 
redundant. In solitude the individual recognises his fragility, which causes his 
exclusion from the process of actualisation and differentiation. In other words, the 
‘anguished’ being ceases to actualise himself within and through the dynamics of 
the collective ground, giving rise to a process of displacement between meaning 
and time.  
Simondon explains that what appeared before as closer is now experienced 
as distant and disconnected from reality; by the same token, what was perceived 
as distant now becomes closer and disorienting (Simondon, 2007: 111-114). The 
present becomes spoiled of all its actualising forces and replaced by the thought of 
the past and future. As Simondon says, anguish corresponds to the dramatic 
moment, in which the individual being is enfolded in himself. Dissociated from 
the collective ground, the disparate individual ceases to constitute the theatre and 
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actor of the process of individuation, entailing the loss of crucial moments of 
transformation, actualisation and complication. Therefore, Simondon concludes, 
anguish brings about the gradual disappearance of the individual as such 
(Simondon, 2007: 113-114).  
Certainly this account of anguish greatly exceeds the astonishment of the 
Israelites in relation to God. However, Simondon’s arguments might unveil some 
dormant themes within the overwhelmed Jewish community. Given Spinoza’s 
attention to the emotive origins of the second pact, and also the collective context 
from which that pact emerges, an analysis of the emotive status of the Israelites in 
the light of Simondon acquires great consistency. Before venturing into the realm 
of God, the Jewish people were already a political individual. They collectively 
stipulated an initial pact with God, assuming the status of the nation of God. 
Considering themselves alone the people of God, they believed that his power and 
not their actions could save and protect from possible risks (TTP, Chapter XVII: 
540). It is precisely in this moment that the state of anguish emerges gradually 
within the Subjects of Moses.  
In order to understand the mechanisms of anguish and its political 
implications, we need to look back at some fundamental propositions within the 
Ethics. In the Ethics, Spinoza claims that thinking is on a par with acting, and also 
that the perfection of a body (its grade of reality) is sized upon its degree of 
complexity (E. II, prop.VII, XIV, prop. XXXIX). For Spinoza the complexity of a 
body depends upon the capacity of being affected, and the capacity to affect other 
individuals in turn (E. II, postul. I, III, IV). As we have analysed in chapter II, the 
capacity of being affected refers to a more problematic process of collective and 
psychic individuation through which affective exchanges transform the 
equilibrium of the individual within a collective ground.  
In the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, the first pact with God 
and the following encounter give rise to a mechanism through which the 
individual begins by regressing towards an unchangeable position. The fidelity of 
the Jewish people to the external aid of God involves the suspension of any 
productive forces and tensions, which instead have characterised the states of the 
claimant and refugee. Therefore, the Jewish people’s abstinence from acting and 
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thinking precludes the possibility of signifying and being signified within the 
process of individuation. As a consequence, I would argue, the community of God 
is brought towards a progressive stabilisation, which involves a break with the 
crucial phases of transformation, actualisation and differentiation. This involves 
the re-shaping of the realm of the political being, which becomes not a place of 
affective relations and productive forces, but a linear and motionless system.  
If desire and affects previously exposed the collective ground of the 
claimant to intensive changes and new meanings, thereby complicating it, these 
factors are now folded within a static body of rules, regulations and the moral 
norms of punishment and recompense. In particular, devotion and wonder pass 
from constituting relational movements and tensions to simply denoting a set of 
God’s laws and commands. Significantly, the affect of piety, Spinoza observes, as 
a source of relations, becomes redefined as justice; incompatibilities and 
differences are refigured as injustice and crime (TTP, Chapter XVII: 540). In 
other words, the collective body of the Subjects of Moses regresses to an 
inoperative position, implying the estrangement of the individual from time, 
becoming and affectivity. As in Simondonian anguish, this causes the disjuncture 
between time and meaning, for which the other nations become distant and 
viewed as enemies of God. In this light, notions of cruelty, exclusion, invasion, 
rivalry and jealousy come to re-signify the community of God, upon which the 
divine vocation of the Hebrew relies.
53
  
The productive flows of time moulded by festive rituals and sacrifices 
revert to a linear and repetitive remembering of the past adventures of the exodus, 
servitude and the regained state of nature. God becomes dramatically closer and 
recognised as the Other, who scrupulously oversees the actions and thoughts of 
the Subjects of Moses. The all-embracing presence of God brings about the 
emergence of the fear of death and the hope for salvation. It is in this moment, I 
would argue that the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses enter the 
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 “As to their continued existence for many years when scattered and stateless, this is no way 
surprising, since they have separated themselves from other nations to such a degree as to incur the 
hatred of all, and this is not only through external rites alien to the rites of other nations but also 
through the mark of circumcision, which they most religiously observe. That they are preserved 
largely through the hatred of other nations is demonstrated by historical fact” (TTP, Chapter III: 
425).   
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threshold of Simondonian anguish. Spinoza’s description of the astonishment of 
the Jewish people in hearing the voice of God, I think, goes far beyond the 
passions of fear and anger and the status of ignorance of the Hebrews. For the 
sudden feeling of fear and the certainty of death, this encounter between the 
Subjects of Moses and God is the result of a more complex mechanism of 
exclusion from the collective process of individuation, which gives rise to the 
emergence of a state of anguish. It is through this state of anguish that a messianic 
vision of politics and, more generally, of the world comes to light.  
 As we have seen, Simondon explains that the condition of anguish bounds 
the individual within two coordinates of time – the past and the future – which can 
never be actualised insofar as the collective ground is excluded. The Jewish form 
of messianism derives from the regressive movements of exclusion, stabilisation 
and remembrance. This folds the realm of the individual within a never-actualised 
present, casting the Subjects of Moses in a gap between past and future. In this 
gap, the past events of the exodus and the Promised Land become materialised 
through the repetitive movements of ceremony and sacrifice, and the potentialities 
of the future are narrowed to the time of the expectation of the Messiah to come. 
Given the refrain of the Israelites from actions and thoughts, the productive flows 
of time are re-defined as a linear sequence of events. This re-configuration of time 
has a strong impact on the political body.
54
 The messianic vision of the world and 
time brings about the return of the Subjects of Moses to a state of servitude 
towards the Messiah, Moses, and his heirs.
55
  
Taking these themes into account, we might now raise some conclusions. 
The conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses reveals the centrality of the 
collective ground for the complete development of the relational function of 
affects, passions and desire, without which the transformations of the political 
body are entirely lost. As we have seen with the phases of claimants and anguish, 
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 Agamben proposes an alternative reading of the messianic structure of time. Discussing the form 
of messianianism in the figure of Saint Paul, Agamben claims that the constitution of messianiac 
time is not that of a time of expectation. Instead, he claims that it is in fact the time of the present, 
in which he includes the kairotic moment, the ‘right moment’, (Agamben, 2005a: 59-87).      
55
 “The people [the Jews under Moses] could do nothing without being required at the same time 
to remember the law and to follow its commands, which were dependent solely on ruler’s will. 
[…]; they had to have certain signs on their doorposts, on their hands and between the eyes, to 
give them constant reminder of the duty of obedience” (TTP, Chapter V: 440).   
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the collective process of individuation calls into question crucial elements such as 
time, humankind and society, whilst affective and relational movements re-shape 
the realm of the political being. Therefore, the Subjects of Moses present a 
different understanding of affects and passions, disclosing their relational and 
productive power. This vision of affectivity introduces, in my view, a new 
awareness of the political meaning of the affects within contemporary Spinozist 
studies, opening up towards a different consideration of the relation between 
Spinoza’s ontology and politics, the Ethics and the TTP.     
The themes of the productive force of affects become crucial in the second 
part of the Treatise, the pars construens. In this section, Spinoza advances a 
conception of religion that presents it as the expression of love and joy. For 
Spinoza, these affects are instrumental in the realisation of democracy. The 
originality of Spinoza’s philosophy lies in his politicisation of joy and love, which 
have been traditionally restrained within the psychological, ethical and religious 
domains. In this light, the apostles and Christ express the productive political 
meaning of affectivity, through which the actualisation and transformation of the 
collective ground of the political are developed still further. I will now move to a 
consideration of these themes.  
 
5. The Apostles 
 
In the Theological-Political Treatise the exegesis of the New Testament 
occupies a very central role. This constitutes the passage from the pars destruens 
to the pars construens of the text, which prepares the terrain for the political 
section on the fundaments of the democratic society. Proceeding from the 
deconstruction of the ideological apparatus of theology, Spinoza examines the real 
object of religion throughout the stories of the early Church, which refer to the 
Acts of the Apostles. Given the non-divine and non-scientific account of the 
doctrine of the Old Testament, Spinoza examines the aims and implications of the 
precepts of the Catholic doctrine. Assuming that the dogma of faith is not 
concerned with the attainment of any extraordinary faculty and reality, and also 
that it does not imply the improvement of philosophical knowledge, Spinoza first 
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questions what notions remain to be used from the theoretical nucleus of religion, 
and secondly what categories (if any) might be qualified as being properly 
religious. In order to address these questions, Spinoza looks back at the lives and 
speeches of the apostles as fundamental expressions of an authentic doctrine of 
faith, to which both the organised church and state should pay closer attention. He 
finds in the doctrine of the apostles, structured through teachings, dialogue, and 
encounters with people of different cultures and nations, the expression of the key 
tenets of Catholicism. These tenets are based on an exercise of love, piety and 
devotion, which are the ground of the Catholic paradigm of universalism. 
Proceeding with the analysis of the historical figures of the apostles, 
Spinoza’s enquiry is focused, on the one hand, on a reinstatement of the 
independence of philosophy from religion; on the other, the re-affirmation of the 
genuine concepts of the early Church, such as joy, love, piety and devotion that 
have been corrupted by the ambition and ignorance of political and theological 
authorities. Spinoza does not reject the value of religion as such. He neither 
contrasts religious principles with ontological notions, nor replaces religion with 
philosophy. For him, there is a form of epistemic rupture between the object of 
faith and that of philosophy (TTP, Chapter XV: 523). Spinoza demonstrates the 
true object of faith through religion itself, showing its original message through 
the exegesis of the holy texts and the example of the apostles (Balibar, 1998: 5-9). 
As analysed earlier, Spinoza’s critique aims to invalidate the alleged 
philosophical authority of the church, and the mystification of the religious 
principles, upon which superstition, ignorance and servitude have been 
constructed. The speeches, writings and the mission of the apostles represent the 
true object and aim of the Catholic religion, which together disclose a practise of 
joy and love. For Spinoza, the authentic message of religion is based on ethical 
norms, consisting of affects such as joy, love, devotion and piety (Spinoza’s 
notion of the credo minimum). This involves re-positioning religion within society 
rather than suppressing it, so that it may become an important instrument of social 
cohesion. Whilst Spinoza considers religion to be an important element of social 
cohesion, this does not alter his position vis a vis the claims made by Machiavelli 
and Hobbes. For Spinoza, religion is a part of a more complex process, which 
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exceeds Machiavelli’s definition of faith as instrumentum regni;56 and Hobbes’s 
divide between the official credo professed by the state and the private beliefs of 
the subjects allowed under the “silence of the law”.57 For Spinoza, religion is 
important insofar as joy, love, piety and devotion found its messages (TTP, 
chapter XIV: 515). The social function of faith is not simply a device of the state; 
it is located, instead, in the body politic, passing from the political authority to the 
community and vice versa.  
Given the assumption of the authenticity of religion as an exercise of the 
affects of love, joy, piety and devotion, many questions arise. Firstly, assuming 
the impossibility of the suppression of faith from society, the problem of the place 
given to religion within the political domain emerges. Secondly, what paradigm of 
society arises from Spinoza’s idea of religion as joy and love? Thirdly, assuming 
the figures of the apostles to be the embodiment of true religion, how did their 
message impact effectively on the communities that they visited? In Continental 
Spinozist studies, these questions have generated a fruitful debate. Spinozist 
scholars, generally, are inclined to view Spinoza’s conception of the “credo 
minimum” as the reduction of the ideological apparatus of the Church to simple 
(minimum) ethical norms and practices, which further encourage people’s 
commitment towards the civil society. Thinkers such as Matheron (1988), Balibar 
(1998), Strauss (1997), Deleuze (1992), Negri (1998) and Giancotti (1995) share 
the conviction that the very of role of the figures of the apostles within the 
Treatise derives from a precise political strategy.  
This involves, on the one side, the political emancipation of the masses 
from the obscurantist policies of states and churches. Spinoza’s move, in this 
respect, is intended to foster the replacement of moral concepts and rules as evil, 
truth, punishment and gift with an ethical habit of joy and love. On the other hand, 
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 I am aware of the dispute among scholars concerning the relation between religion and the state 
in Machiavelli’s thought; and also, the differences between the Prince (1532) and the Discourses 
(initiated in 1513 and concluded between the 1517-18). My reference to Machiavelli, in this 
context, has the sole purpose of showing the difference in approach to the problem of religion that 
can be found between Machiavelli and Spinoza, see Del Lucchese (2009b). 
57
 Although Hobbes agrees with Spinoza on the non scientific and philosophical value of religion, 
in the body of laws of the Leviathan (1651) religion and certain forms of freedom are allowed 
insofar as these are not formally prohibited by the state. For the stability and unity of the 
government, it is better that subjects in the public sphere follow the official religion of the state, 
whereas in their private life they can profess a different faith, Hobbes (1998: 139-160).   
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these writers argue, Spinoza’s definition of the apostolic mission as the 
development of the affects of joy, love and piety within a community expresses 
his awareness of the social function of religion, when it is purified from its 
metaphysical framework. In this light, the implications of the teachings of the 
apostles concern the improvement of cooperative actions, through which 
individuals recognise themselves as constitutive parts of the body politic. As joy 
and love are active affects, the development of an ethical habit through these 
affects structures the social relations, mutual needs and, more generally, 
commonalities, upon which the progress of society relies. 
Taking these interpretations into consideration, I think Spinoza’s 
engagement with the figures of the apostles unveils a more complex process that 
founds and greatly exceeds ethical praxis. Certainly, the aim of Spinoza’s 
exegesis of the Acts of the Apostles is the description of how the pursuit of 
positive affects within a political context gives rise to practices of sharing, 
commitment and participation. Beside these ethical and political implications 
underlined by continental thinkers, a multifaceted notion of the role of the positive 
affects emerges from Spinoza’s arguments, which require further consideration. 
This refers to the status of joy and love not only as ethical habits but also as 
productive forces, which bring concepts such as time, relations and life into the 
political.  I argue here that the political meaning of the active affects does not, or 
does not only reside in the formation of an ethics of mutual love and support 
within a given society. Rather, they should be thought as generative sources of 
relational movements, which transform the entire political equilibrium, and not 
solely an already formed community. By this, I mean that affectivity discloses a 
process of individuation that signifies the domain of the political. Taking into 
account these prerequisites, I shall now move on to discuss these issues in further 
detail. 
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5.1 “The Good News”: Life 
 
Compared to his analysis of the stories of the Old Testament, Spinoza’s 
study of the Acts of the Apostles is not amply developed. Certainly, references to 
the discourses of the apostles, and particularly to the Pauline doctrine, can be 
found throughout the entire Treatise, yet they are not fully developed as with the 
history of the Jewish people. Although the apostles embody the true religion, 
strikingly, in the Treatise Spinoza dedicates no more than one chapter to the 
specific description of the apostolic doctrine. In this chapter Spinoza offers a 
concise but extremely meaningful account of the mission of the apostles towards 
society, within which a dynamic conception of religion is proposed. In chapter XI 
of the apostles, at the very beginning, Spinoza draws a line between the status of 
the apostles on the one hand, and Moses and the prophets on the other (TTP, 
Chapter XI: 499). If the protagonist of the Old Testament was Moses, the 
storyteller of the images of God, the protagonist of the New Testament is the 
apostle, who divulges the life of Christ. These aspects delineate two different 
modes of knowing and experiencing nature and God. The knowledge of the 
prophet, Spinoza explains, is structured through images, visions, signs and 
revelations, which are grounded in the domain of imagination (TTP Chapters I, II, 
and VI). These are nuanced by various and different affective tones, which run 
from fear, devotion, anger and hope to wonder.  
The knowledge of the apostles differs profoundly from that of Moses and, 
more generally, from that of the prophets of the tradition of the Old Testament. 
The apostles, Spinoza affirms, are the expression of the new religious formula, 
which establishes a different relation with God, nature and humankind. The 
Catholic faith is based on the life and precepts of Christ, who recovers the notions 
of love, piety, devotion and joy from the domain of Mosaic commandments to 
general suggestions and admonitions. These simply delineate a mode of living. As 
simple and general styles of life, the precepts of Christ pass from being an 
exclusive gift of the Jewish nation to universal (Catholic) recommendations for 
pursuing a better life, which can easily be followed by every human being 
regardless of nation, culture and language (TTP, Chapter XI: 501).
 
Thus, the idea 
209 
 
of God as legislator and judge of human actions is replaced by the role of Christ 
as teacher and friend.
58
 The encounter with Christ leads the apostles to re-situate 
themselves directly within the world, without passing through an initial relation of 
fear with the obscure power of God. This involves the conversion of the fear of 
death and hope for salvation into love and piety for humankind.   
The brevity of this portrait of the apostles renders an analysis of Spinoza’s 
view of these figures and of their effective role within a political context very 
difficult, and yet its significance also makes such an analysis crucial. If the 
objective of both the prophecy and the Mosaic laws is the development of 
obedience, the epistles of the apostles aim at obedience too. Two questions arise: 
what is the distinctive strategy of the apostolic message, and how does this 
effectively contrast with prophecy? What are the political stakes, not only of the 
doctrine of the apostles itself, but also of the form in which these arguments are 
realised? In order to investigate these issues it becomes imperative to employ, 
once again, the strategy of identifying conceptual personae. Through such an 
alternative approach these questions might, perhaps, find a response. Therefore, 
and as above in relation to the pars destruens of the Treatise,  I extrapolate in 
what follows from Spinoza’s analysis of the biblical figures of the apostles all the 
affective tones and events that characterise their statuses and gestures, and from 
these abstractions I construct the affective-conceptual personae of the Apostles.  
As with the persona of the Subjects of Moses encountered before, the 
Apostles emerge and are situated within an affective plane, which is a terrain of 
political and ontological individuation. In this sense, the affective anatomy of both 
the Subjects of Moses and the Apostles delineate a path of actualisation of the 
‘common’. Differently from the Devotees of the prophet, both personae are 
already a collective individual, through which complex political subjectivities 
come to light. What distinguishes the Apostles from the Subjects of Moses, we 
will see below, is their affective tones, which develop and are developed from 
different confluences of affects. It is important to note that this difference is not 
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 “For Christ was not sent to preserve the state and to institute laws, but only to teach the 
universal law. Hence, we can readily understand that Christ by no means abrogated the law of 
Moses, for it was not Christ’s purpose to introduce new laws into the commonwealth, His chief 
concern was to teach moral doctrines, keeping them distinct from the laws of the commonwealth” 
(TTP, Chapter V: 436).  
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intended to suggest, however implicitly, Spinoza’s support for Catholicism and 
his rejection of Jewish religion. A discussion around these arguments is beyond 
the scope of the present chapter. As indicated earlier, attention is given here to 
affectivity, and to the ways in which different confluences of affects embodied by 
the affective-conceptual personae generate crucial political actions.       
In the conceptual-affective persona of the Apostles, Spinoza’s divide 
between the knowledge of the prophets and the apostles, and also the Catholic 
formula of universal love are the fundamental conditions around which the 
political body of the Apostles is constructed. Love and piety, as we will see, 
structure a relational process, which re-configures the realm of the Apostles 
towards new modes of actualising the political. The persona of the Apostles 
brings about the discovery of multiple meanings that emerge through and within 
the political context. These involve understanding the political as generative of 
relations, time, tensions and forces that greatly exceed, and which do not oppose 
the notions of state, law, justice and equality. The claim that I will make through 
this conceptual persona is that Spinoza’s definition of the apostolic mission as 
love and piety opens the way towards re-shaping the meaning of the political, 
whilst including within the latter's domain unsuspected notions such as desire, 
love, becoming and time. These crucially express life.
59
 
 
Pilgrims, doctors and communities  
 
Spinoza describes the apostles as teachers, messengers and pilgrims of the 
“Good News”. These multiple functions bring to light the manifold status of the 
Apostles within the political body. Like the Subjects of Moses, the persona of the 
Apostles is already folded within an established political domain, i.e. the state of 
Israel. As we have seen with the Israelites before and after the exodus, the 
apostles are the group of the disciples of Christ and the Jewish tradition. They are 
not only apostles collectively, but also they experience the life of Christ as a 
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 Concerning the theme of the politicisation of the concept of life, or better the widening of the 
definition of the political to physics and, to some extent, biology, there has been a flourishing 
literature recently, inaugurated by the works of Foucault (1998, vol.1). For the purpose of this 
work, the theories of Deleuze and Guattari (2004a; 2004b), Simondon (2007), Hardt and Negri 
(2006; Negri,2005), and Agamben (2000; 1998) have been particularly influential.  
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group.
60
 This means that the realm of the Apostles is a political and collective 
individual formed of individuated reality (the Mosaic laws, system of rituals, 
sacrifices, Jewish history) and forming one specific reality (the presence of 
Christ). 
Importantly, and unlike the Subjects of Moses, they do not pass 
progressively from being disciples, teachers, messengers and pilgrims as the 
Israelites did from the phase of servitude, through the state of nature, to subjects. 
By contrast, the apostles are teachers, messengers, pilgrims and disciples 
contemporaneously. Spinoza remarks, on many occasions, that their peculiarity 
concerns the fulfilment of all these roles, for which the apostles differ from the 
prophets of the Old Testament (TTP, chapters XI, XIII, XIV, and XV). This 
indicates, on the one side, that the anatomy of the Apostles is consistently more 
complex and diversified than the previous conceptual personae examined, 
revealing a structure traversed by a higher degrees of relational movements and a 
variety of forces. On the other, this multi-sided constitution portrays the body of 
the Apostles as an open system, within and through which a never-ending process 
of actualisation and transformation takes a place.  
These elements, in my view, lead us to conceive the apostles as 
fundamentally a collective and problematic individual, which is the ground of 
powerful exchanges of meanings and actions. The roles of pilgrim, teacher, 
disciple and messenger create not only a relational status; they also function to 
maintain the equilibrium of our conceptual persona in an enduring condition of 
exposure toward the multiplicity of the world. These roles, firstly, presuppose a 
community or, at very least, other disciples. Secondly, they imply a movement 
toward something or someone, which is the owner of further meanings and 
demands in turn. It is in this context that the collective individual of the Apostles 
becomes an element within and the place of the production of the political, within 
which positive affects acquire a pivotal role. The multiform dimension of the 
Apostles throws light upon a range of affective states, which actualise the 
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 Concerning the collective formation and development of the apostles, there are many places in 
the New Testament, showing this collective condition. Overall, I think that the image of the “Last 
supper” offers a quite illuminating example; see for example Saint Paul, Epistle to the Corinthians 
11:23-26, to which certainly Spinoza pays attention.   
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collective individual. Differently from the persona of the Subjects of Moses, 
which is traversed by positive and passive affects alternatively, the persona of the 
Apostles is, instead, nuanced predominantly by the active affects of piety, love, 
joy and wonder. In the case of the Apostles, the affect of wonder is not addressed 
to an obscure God but rather to nature itself, embodied by the life of Christ. These 
affects shape the body of the Apostles as an open structure, which is traversed 
intensively by relational and affective movements.  
 
Love and piety: The actualisation of the present and the potency of action 
   
In chapter II, I argued through Simondonian logic that in the Ethics the 
realm of the individual is moulded through affects, desire, conatus (forces), 
common notions, movements of speed and slowness, and grades of intensity (hard 
and fluid bodies). These are constitutive elements for further developing the 
collective process of individuation, which is psychic and, we will analyse below, 
already political. In our conceptual persona of the Apostles, these elements set 
forth the actualisation and differentiation of a novel political being. It is in this 
context that love becomes a powerful source of political transformation, through 
which life enfolds the political and vice versa.  
As in the states of claimants of the Subjects of Moses, the affects of love 
and piety operate as expansive and productive forces, through which different 
forms of time, relations and meanings come to light. In the persona of the Apostle, 
the encounter with Christ in his actuality re-positions the apostles within the 
world, exposing their naturale iuditium (natural understanding) towards the 
production of new modes of structuring the present, actions, meanings and 
commonalities. Following Spinoza’s arguments, it is from the simple human 
(natural) understanding that the Epistles of the apostles derive, each of which 
expresses a different mode of thinking the life of Christ (TTP, Chapter XI: 500). 
Furthermore, the differences and disagreements between apostles, which have 
caused varied controversies within the Catholic Church, are the results of this 
productive force of the lumen naturalis shaped by love and piety (TTP, chapter 
XI: 503).  
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In the Ethics, Spinoza explains that the positive affects of joy and love 
give rise to a transition from a condition of lesser perfection to a greater one, 
through which the power of acting, existing and thinking (conatus) of individuals 
is increased and further developed (E. III, postulate I, prop. XI; schol., Def. II, 
VI). Related particularly to singular beings, the increase of the level of perfection 
indicates that individuals are formed of a great number of elements such as 
bodies, potentials and thoughts, which intensify the power of mind and body (E. 
II, postulates I, III, IV; prop. XIV, prop. XXXVII, corollary). Perfection 
determines the level of complexity of the individual beings. In this sense, positive 
affects are fundamental conditions, which transform  individuals (E. III, prop. 
XV). From studying the “geometry of the affects” through Simondon’s ontology 
of individuation  in chapter II, we have discovered that Spinoza’s conception of 
joy and love as transitional phases unveils a more complex process, which greatly 
exceeds ethical and psychological habits. These latter are located in the middle of 
the collective field or, to use Simondon's terms, active affects are transversal to 
both beings and the collective field.  
Given the assumption of these affects as important instruments for the 
increase of the level of perfection, this means that joy and love re-actualise and re-
signify the entire equilibrium of individuals. In this light, joy and love become 
recognised as powerful sources of intensive and relational movements, which 
individualise individuals within the collective context, advancing the process of 
individuation. This view of affects as productive forces impacts effectively on the 
existing system, setting forth concrete actions, ideas, and, more generally, 
collective beings. The role of joy and love acquires great consistency within the 
political context of the Treatise, specifically through the affective tones of the 
apostles. These re-organise the equilibrium of the political body throughout the 
emergence of more complex flows of time, incompatibilities and relational 
individuals. 
Returning to the affective-persona of the Apostles, if in the Subjects of 
Moses the becoming of time suddenly collapses in the gap between the past of 
exodus and the future of the arrival of the Messiah (the state of anguish), in the 
Apostles past and future take only the coordinate of the present. The present 
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becomes an enduring process of actualisation of the future and the past.
61
 The 
apostles that Spinoza refers to are disciples of Christ. This means that they do not 
wait for the advent of the Messiah: rather, they enter into relations with the 
materiality of Christ, and engage with his life (TTP, Chapter XI: 499). As life, 
Christ abandons all the divine properties of omnipresence, omnipotence and 
omniscience by taking the form of pure materiality. Christ becomes a body, 
expressing the abundance and potentialities of the material world. As we have 
seen, Spinoza gives full rights to the status of the body as an unavoidable element 
of transformations, relations and actions. This conception leads Spinoza to 
consider the body a fundamental condition for the constitution of time. In the 
Ethics, Spinoza states that it is solely through the existence of the body that 
various modes of organising time come to light. To be more precise, it is through 
the plenitude of the actuality of the body that our awareness of time emerges.
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Thus, the actuality of the world, I argue, is the only condition through which the 
past and future can be thought.   
As a body, consequently, the presence of Christ becomes crucial within 
the development of the conceptual persona of the Apostles. The corporeality of 
Christ re-configures the notion of time, through which the mode of the present 
becomes the only source and condition for the flow of the past and for the 
realisation of the future. Put differently: it is through the actuality of Christ that 
the present does not mirror the events of the past; neither is it a mere consequence 
of previous gestures. By the same token, the constitution of the present is not a 
place within which the future can be prepared or simply expected. The materiality 
of Christ reinstates the importance of the present, which acquires the pivotal role 
of producing the past and actualising the possibilities of the future.
63
 In this sense, 
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 The theme of the notion of the present as the form of actualisation and differentiation of the 
individuals is central in Simondon’s process of the collective and psychic individuation, to which I 
refer. For Simondon, the role of collective process of individuation concerns the re-signification of 
past and future within the domain of the present (Simondon 2007: 97-132, 175-214).        
62
 “The mind can exercise neither imagination nor memory save while the body endures” and in 
the proof: “It is only while the body endures that the mind expresses the actual existence of its 
body and conceives the affections of the body as actual […]. Consequently […], it does not 
conceive any body as actually existing save while its own body endures. Therefore […], it cannot 
exercise either imagination or memory save while the body endures […].” (E. V, prop. XXI and 
proof; [my Italics]).   
63
 Concerning the theme of the incarnation of Christ as the expression of the richness of the 
material world, see Hardt (2002: 77-84). 
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Christ’s gesture of indignation for the vain Hebrew rituals, followed by the 
commitment of the apostles to the re-foundation of the community of God, greatly 
exemplifies the path of the present.
64
 In the persona of the Apostles, this implies 
the replacement of both the messianic time and the motionless remembrance of 
the glorious gestures of the Old Testament with the richness of the expressions of 
the present. This actualisation of past and future within the becoming of the 
present leads directly to the production of actions developed through relational 
movements; exchanges of individuated meanings and potentials. It is precisely in 
this moment that the affective tones of the persona of the Apostles re-populate and 
complicate the political.  
As we have seen with the figure of Moses, what is at stake here is not 
solely the re-founding the temple of God, returning the Church to its origins. It is 
the affirmation and the realisation of the “Good News”. For as the meaning of the 
term “News” suggests, good news should indicate qualitative changes and 
certainly not a return. The power of the apostolic message, Spinoza tenaciously 
reminds us, resides in its open structure, upon which the Catholic paradigm of 
universalism is founded and developed. For this open structure, the revealing of 
the “Good News” goes far beyond the simple re-organisation of religious rules 
within a given political context. The potency of the “Good News”, as we will see, 
concerns, on the one hand, the destabilisation of the existing political orders as the 
state of Israel or the Roman Empire; on the other, this sets forth different actions, 
thoughts and tensions, which prepare the terrain for the constitution of the 
community of God (the universal Catholic Church).  
In this fashion, the tension encapsulated by the “Good News” opens the 
collective body of the Apostles towards complex modes of actualising and 
individuating the life of Christ. Importantly, these are not only different ways of 
narrating the precepts of Christ; instead, they re-signify the structure of every 
political being encountered by the apostles, re-configuring religious communities, 
laws, human relations and states. For this open structure of the “Good News”, 
Saint Paul, for example, considers work irrelevant for the attainment of the faith, 
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 For the indignation of Christ, I refer to his visit of the temple in Jerusalem and his whip in seeing 
the moneychangers, as reported in Mathew 21-26. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines indignation as 
“hatred toward one who has injured another” (E. III, Def. Aff. XX).     
216 
 
whereas for James only actions qualify a catholic observant (TTP, Chapter XI: 
503). These two modes of defining faith have direct effects on the societies visited 
by each apostle, which generate diverse ethical practises, relations, ecclesial 
groups and conflicts (TTP, Chapter XI: 503). Given this notion of the “Good 
News” as a mixture of force and intensity, many questions arise. Firstly, what 
truly are the contents of the “Good News”? Secondly, to what extent might this 
re-shape the boundaries of the political?  
Following Spinoza’s arguments, I would argue, the message of the “Good 
News” does not contain metaphysical notions and obscure truths, but instead, the 
life of Christ as it is, (TTP, chapters XI, XIV). As reported in the Epistles of the 
apostles, the story of the life and teachings of Christ simply concerns the praxis of 
universal love, that is, an unlimited loving kindness towards others. As 
anticipated, Spinoza attributes to the affect of love a very fundamental role. The 
theme of love occupies the entire thread of the Ethics from the third and fourth to 
the fifth part, where it becomes recognised as an ontological political function.  
Accordingly, love is viewed as an expansive force, which individualises 
and further develops human desires. This force augmented by love is formed 
through a degree of intensity that is always greater than any disruptive tendencies, 
such as hatred (E. III, Def. Aff. VI, prop. XLIII, XLIV). As productive sources of 
movements and transformations, this embraces the entire system of production of 
nature-God, re-populating that system with meanings, forces and movements. It is 
the potency of love that lies at the very basis of the whole system of production of 
the Ethics. It is the mechanism that governs, produces and individualises the 
domain of nature, which is defined in the final part of the Ethics as the intellectual 
love of God (the third kind of knowledge).
65
 The intellectual love of God is 
                                                 
65 Deleuze gives a very suggestive account of Spinoza’s conception of the intellectual love of God 
or Beatitude. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge concerns the complete actualisation 
of the plane of immanence initiated in part I of the Ethics, which becomes re-populated with novel 
forms of multiplicities such as desires, bodies, affects and, more generally, heterogeneity (Deleuze, 
1992: 289-320). In  successive works, Deleuze will further develop this idea of the intellectual 
love of God, describing this as the plane of consistency, that is, pure desire-machine (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b:170-184). Differently, Negri and Balibar, among others, read the third genre of 
knowledge directly connected with the two the political treatises, underlining the political 
implications of Spinoza’s notion of the intellectual love of God. Negri, for example, argued that 
parts IV and V of the Ethics together with the Political Treatise constitute the mature foundation 
of Spinoza’s form of materialism, upon which the political theory of the power of the multitude is 
grounded and developed (Negri, 1998: 193-285, 296-342).                
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twofold. On the one side, it refers to the mode in which the process of 
individuation of humankind proceeds through phases of actualisation and 
differentiation. On the other, it expresses the love of God towards the world, 
which simply is the life of nature (E. V, prop. XXXVI, corollary).
  
Without venturing into the vicissitudes of the third kind of knowledge, for 
the purpose of this work we need only to draw attention to the political 
implications of Spinoza’s notion of love as a productive force, which emerges 
from the Ethics and becomes a political category within the pars contruens of the 
Treatise. In the conceptual persona of the Apostles, this vision of love as force 
becomes crucial. It is through love enfolded within the “Good News” that the 
apostles act politically, advancing the process of individuation. As mentioned 
before, the message of the “Good News” refers to the notion of life, specifically 
the life of Christ. We have seen that the corporeality of Christ re-founds the 
conception of the present as the locus of the actualisation of the past and future. 
This exposure of Christ to the abundance of the world, Spinoza tells us, is shaped 
by love and piety toward humankind.  
The life of Christ is the actualisation of the affect of love, which gives rise 
to the political actions and thoughts of the apostles. It is in this moment that the 
notion of life as the actualisation of love enters the threshold of the political, re-
drawing its boundaries in turn. The great modernity of Spinoza’s political move 
can be found here. From the pars destruens to the pars contruens of the Treatise, 
Spinoza only refers to the life of Christ politically without mentioning his 
crucifixion and resurrection. For this, Spinoza discusses the political stakes of 
Christ through the latter's performance of actions and teachings that are formed by 
love and piety. In this light, the life of Christ discloses the political effects of the 
notion of love, which exposes and complicates the realm of our conceptual 
persona towards further transformation and individuation.
66
 
The political implications of the affect of love do not concern the 
development of practises of participation, sharing and giving. Spinoza’s 
politicisation of love, instead, brings about the discovery of love as the expression 
of the potency of action, which lies precisely in the middle of a collective 
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 On the figure of Christ in Spinoza’s politics, see particularly Matheron (1971), and Deleuze 
(1992: 290-310). 
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individual. As force, love traverses and transforms individuals without inhering 
within them.
67
 In the Treatise, Spinoza tells us, the mission of the apostles is 
directed to every people regardless of nation, language and culture. In each of 
their destinations, the encounter of the apostle with the community structures 
meanings, time, society and relations. In other words, it re-organises the entire 
equilibrium of both the collective body of the apostles and the community. As 
Spinoza affirms, the Epistles and the teachings of the apostles, on the one hand, 
are attuned to the different opinions, ideas and imaginations of the people to 
whom the apostles speak. On the other, the community itself is transformed by the 
“Good News”. This re-signifies and actualises the realm of the existing group into 
new ethical and political practises, which are nuanced by the evangelic formula of 
“love one’s neighbour” (TTP, chapter XIV: 515). This brings to light the 
production of new political and ethical notions of justice, labour, right and 
impiety, and of Christ and the anti-Christ (TTP chapter XIV). In other words, as 
force and tension, love re-shapes the boundaries of the “common”. 
Concerning this view of love as an enduring source of production, one 
might nonetheless question the kind of political practises that the teachings of the 
apostles have brought to light, and also how these teachings have created novel 
political individuals. The political stakes, I think, of the praxis of love essentially 
concern the destabilising role played within the political scene. As the encounter 
of Saint Paul with the Roman Empire exemplifies, the apostle questions the 
meaningless and motionless equilibrium of the Roman state as such, challenging 
not the ruler or the subjects, but rather the stability of the system itself. Saint Paul 
as well as the other apostles brings into the existing community both problems 
(the corruption of the Roman system, the hierarchic structure, the question of the 
pauperism) and possible solutions.
68
 In this light, the originality of Spinoza’s 
                                                 
67
 The theme of Spinoza’s political conception of love and joy as power has been particularly 
developed by Hardt and Negri. For Hardt and Negri, Spinoza’s vision of love is productive of 
political praxis and resistances, through which the multitude as a political subject emerges (Hardt 
and Negri, 2006; Negri, 2005). I will return to Hardt’ and Negri’s reading in chapter IV, which 
discuss Spinoza’s account of the multitude.     
68
 The political and ethical role of Saint Paul has nurtured an intense debate recently, which is 
centered on the essays of Badiou and Agamben. Whilst Badiou envisages in the figure of Paul the 
example of a revolutionary subject and universalism, a subject who challenges the Roman Empire 
and the Judaic law (Badiou, 2003), Agamben opposes Badious’s ethical reading with the 
ontological notion of the “remnant”. By this, Agamben refers to a concept of singularity based on 
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political gesture concerns not only the political meaning of the notion of love, 
(which has been used in Ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in Plato’s 
thought). Rather, Spinoza’s move brings about the discovery of the political 
significance of love as production, action and transformation; that is, love as a 
process. As a process of production, this consequently does not pass from one 
individuated being to another; rather, love resides in the collective field, without 
however inhering within it. 
In chapter II, in order to re-conceptualise this tendency, we employed 
Simondon’s definition of transindividuality. Simondon affirms that religion 
expresses one of the ways in which the transindividual force operates. The domain 
of religion is the place in which a sense of spirituality emerges; a sense that is 
productive insofar as it remains within the collective body. In a political context, 
the spirituality of a group is precisely a force, which gives rise to relations, 
transformation and metastability. It is this expansive force that shapes the progress 
of a society (Simondon, 2007:175-197). From the Ethics to the political Treatises, 
Spinoza, I would argue, gives voice to these instances and tensions, which lie 
underneath any community. Towards the end of the Ethics, Spinoza describes this 
spontaneous need for spirituality as “the feeling and experience of eternity” (E. V, 
prop. XXIII, schol.). This traverses and orients every given political, ethical and 
ontological society and, more importantly, future ones. In the political section of 
Treatise, this tendency is presented by the figure of the Apostles through the 
notion of the credum minimum, and, as we will see in chapter IV, through the role 
of democracy as mens una.   
The notion of the credum minum unveils Spinoza’s awareness of the 
importance of spirituality as one of the conditions through which the body politic 
is founded and developed. The becoming and the power of a society go far behind 
the fulfilments of material and intellectual needs, the question of the social 
contract and the boundaries of the state. This involves, rather, a structural tension, 
which re-situates and intensively alters a collective body, gathering individuals 
                                                                                                                                     
what is “left”. This is a condition, in which there are no differences left between the Jew and the 
Greek, or a principle of beginning and end, rather the absence of all possible divisions. The notion 
of “remnant” embodied by Saint Paul, in Agamben’s analysis, opens up towards new perspectives 
in politics that might dismiss traditional notions of people and democracy (Agamben, 2005a: 44-
58).    
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together in as many ways as the multiplicity of nature is infinite. This, however, 
does not mean that material and intellectual needs are irrelevant for the 
advancement of the social system; rather, they are fundamental parts of a more 
complex process, which structures and complicates the realm of a community in 
any given time and space. Our awareness of this, I think, should be incorporated 
within contemporary political discourses, which aspire to re-found a paradigm of 
philosophy of praxis.  
 
Conclusions: Towards a life in common  
 
This chapter has examined the relation between affectivity and politics 
within Spinoza’s political philosophy, and has considered the extent to which his 
conception of the political meaning of affectivity might open novel possibilities 
for thinking the anatomy and becoming of the community today. In order to 
examine the political status of affects and passions as fundamental elements of a 
more complex process, I have adopted a different strategy of reading the Treatise: 
the exposition of the facts and personages of the theological section of the 
Treatise through conceptual-affective personae. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of the conceptual personae, I have re-considered Spinoza’s themes of 
the Jewish nation, prophecy, prophets and the apostles as parts of more complex 
conceptual personae, each of which expresses the ways in which affects and 
passions intensively re-signify the domain of the political. Related particularly to 
the pars destruens of the Treatise, the use of conceptual personae has revealed a 
more extensive meaning of the political role of passions, which reconfigure the 
political body through different notions of temporality, meanings and relations.  
These arguments regarding the concrete dynamics within a community 
move our discussion directly to the question of the next chapter, which will 
investigate what form of political society emerges from Spinoza’s view of 
community as a mixture of affects, spirituality and passions. More precisely, it 
will address the problem that arises as to whether only religion is the ground of 
these transindividual dispositions, or whether there are in fact more complex 
political models, which incorporate Spinoza’s multifaceted theory of society. As 
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mentioned, Spinoza, in the political section of the Treatise, puts forward the idea 
of democracy as a place within which a community acts and thinks as mens una 
(one mind). Spinoza’s conception of democracy, I think, opens up a quite 
different understanding of the dynamics that operate within a political context, 
raising fundamental questions concerning the multiple connections between 
desires, life, love and sovereignty. It is to these arguments – specifically those 
pertaining to the relation between affectivity and democracy – that the remaining 
chapter will now turn.   
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Chapter IV 
 
Time for democracy: 
Towards a life in common 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter III I investigated the relation between politics and affectivity in 
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and argued that Spinoza’s political analysis 
presents affects as constitutive elements of political individuals. Attention was 
given to the ambiguous position of passions within the theological section of the 
Treatise, and to the ways in which passions are productive of both social relations 
and subjection. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of conceptual personae, I 
re-considered the arguments of the theological section of the Treatise concerning 
prophecy, Jewish history and the apostles as phases of complex conceptual 
personae that express various affective tones. These have shed light on the 
powerful role of affectivity within the process of producing the political.  
In the pars destruens of the TTP we encountered the conceptual-affective 
personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles, 
which revealed the multisided meaning of Spinoza’s definition of passions. The 
political status of the passions expresses not only the subjection of an individual 
and community towards the authority of the ruler or God, but also the emergence 
of a new order of problems within the political domain. This refers to the 
progressive stabilisation of the political body, within which passions of fear, 
hatred and hope are founded and developed. A consideration of this issue led to 
the discovery of affectivity as a generative source of political individuation, 
through which notions of life, death, time and relationality reclaim control over 
the domain of the political. It is precisely in this context, I have argued, that the 
great modernity of Spinoza’s philosophical work lies. Affects become recognised 
as productive and fundamentally collective.  
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Taking these themes into account, this chapter explores the relation 
between affectivity and democracy in Spinoza’s political writings. My focus here 
will rest on the centrality that Spinoza accords to the affects of joy, love and 
indignation within the actualisation of the democratic community. Thus, I will 
draw attention to the emotive circumstances described in both the Theological-
Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, which activate and, in some other 
cases, defer the production of democracy. As the full expression of affectivity, the 
multitude becomes crucial for understanding Spinoza’s theory of democracy. 
Thus, an enquiry into the relation between democracy and affects implies an 
analysis of the anatomy of the power of the multitude, and of the ways in which 
this political body acts and thinks democratically. Spinoza’s vision of democracy 
escapes the logic of the state apparatus, identifying democratic life directly with 
the process of producing the ‘common good’. Affectivity lies at the very heart of 
the fruition of the ‘common good’, through which the political life of the 
multitude under democracy emerges.  
Given the nature of these concerns, this chapter will also address several 
attendant questions. Firstly, the problem is the understanding of the very status of 
the multitude within Spinoza’s political analysis. From the Theological-Political 
Treatise to the Political Treatise, Spinoza gives an ambivalent account of the 
ontological causes that determine the political behaviour of the multitude. In some 
cases, he describes the multitude as a disruptive force that is set against the 
constituted order, and which is nuanced by the passive tones of fear, ambition and 
anger. On other occasions Spinoza emphases the role of the multitude as a 
powerful source of social cohesion and mutual assistance shaped by the affects of 
joy, love and devotion, which reveal a certain tendency towards democracy.  
Therefore, questions arise as to whether the multitude posits itself as a 
counterpart of the sovereign authority of the state, as greater than the state, or as 
something other than sovereignty as such; and if this is the case, the problem 
becomes that of whether the multitude is already an expression of a certain 
democratic existence. Secondly, Spinoza portrays the multitude as fundamentally 
affective and problematic. How this might play an active role within the 
construction of democracy? What forces, affects and actions are activated through 
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the multitude, and are they essential for the development and defence of 
democracy? Thirdly, and whilst bearing in mind Spinoza’s concern with the 
importance of increasing affects of joy and love within the democratic 
community, what new elements, order of problems, transformations and 
affectivity might introduce within democratic theory? How might these be 
considered politically relevant for contemporary thought and society? 
In order to address these questions, I will return to my previous strategy of 
reading Spinoza’s political theory via Simondon’s philosophy of individuation. 
Simondon’s ontological categories might provide us, once more, with alternative 
instruments through which the interface between affectivity and democracy might 
come to light. The use of Simondon’s ontology of individuation might allow us to 
discover the novelty of Spinoza’s paradigm of democracy. I will argue that 
Spinoza’s political work refers to the view of democracy as pure openness, which 
means a complex and collective body. The importance of understanding Spinoza’s 
model of democracy in this way is the possibility of affirming democracy’s 
independence from the concepts of the state, the public and individual freedom.  
In order to explore the dynamics of a democratic life within Spinoza’s 
writings, I think that the use of conceptual personae adopted in chapter III 
continue to be crucial. Having analysed the emotive gestures of the Devotees of 
the prophet, Apostles and the Subjects of Moses, the protagonist of this chapter is 
the conceptual-affective persona of the Citizens of democracy. The conceptual 
persona of the Citizens of democracy will show us an alternative mode of thinking 
the linkage between the multitude and democracy, affectivity and the ‘common 
good’, and also the relation between life and sovereignty. It indicates the way in 
which a ‘life in common’ might be constructed.   
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1. The political turn of the multitude: Re-theorising the ‘common’ today 
 
The theme of the political role of the multitude has become a central 
argument within continental political thought, and has nurtured an intense debate 
recently. The discovery of the multitude as a proper political category embraces 
ontological, political and ethical issues. These concern a more extensive 
genealogy of the notion of power within society, the re-definition of present forms 
of solidarity and an expansive view of the concept of production, which should 
incorporate heterogeneous factors involved within the triad product-producer-
producing, such as affects, relations, language, imagination and time.  
As the word “turn” suggests, the political turn of the multitude indicates a 
novel path toward the re-characterisation of the domain of the social, opening the 
way to ignored possibilities for politics and society. The political turn of the 
multitude means a heterogeneous and complex form of political subjectivity, 
which posits itself as other than the notion of people, nation and class. It 
embodies every contemporary phenomenon of association, resistance and 
struggle, expressing a productive process of meanings, affects, thoughts and 
actions. In other words, the multitude, as we will see in this chapter, has to be 
understood as a theatre and, at the same time, actor of the political scene.     
The increasing popularity of the concept of the multitude derives from a 
more general discussion within a certain strain of post-Marxist thought concerned 
with the re-conceptualisation of the meaning, genesis and anatomy of community, 
upon which a new paradigm of materialism and philosophy of praxis might be 
predicated. As I indicated in the thesis’ introduction and in chapter I, Althusser’s 
dictum of the “detour of Marx via Spinoza” offered fundamental theoretical 
insights for re-thinking the dynamics of social practises of cohesion, giving rise to 
a new approach to political theory, and in addition re-situating Spinoza’s politics 
within contemporary continental thought. The latter has brought about the need 
for re-structuring the domain of the political; a re-structuring that might disclose 
unexplored avenues of thinking and making community. Although this question 
has generated different theoretical positions, common to continental political 
theory is the conviction that the reality of society greatly exceeds the liberal 
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divide between private and public spheres, political state and civil society; and 
also the rationalistic formula of homo economicus: a figure whose acts are 
motivated by self-interest and rational choice.
69
 In contrast with the traditional 
model of society as a mere agglomerate of rational and autonomous 
individualities, the system of a community, continental thought has claimed, 
follows a non-linear path, which folds and unfolds a variety of heterogeneous 
elements such as desires, affects, bodies, thoughts and forces.
70
 This implies the 
complication of the domain of the political with non-conventional notions such as 
life, becoming, multiplicity, contingency, imagination and spirituality.
71
  
In this light, the focus of the continental enquiry into the political domain 
of a community, generally, has replaced the concept of individuality with 
singularity, self-interest with desire, authority (Potestas) with power (potentia), 
progress or evolution with becoming, homogeneity with multiplicity, and 
sequential and quantitative time (Kronos) with the time of contingency and 
productive moments (Kairos).
72
 These re-formulations, over all, bring to light the 
growing awareness of society as a complex body, for which alternative and more 
adequate categories have to be employed.  
Concerning these arguments, many questions arise. Given the multisided 
account of the community of the global era, the first such question concerns 
whether there is any existing or past political model (democracy, republic, 
anarchy, socialism and communism) that might fully incorporate the complexity 
                                                 
69
The works of Balibar (1994, 1998), Foucault (1998), Hardt and Negri (2006; 2000), Badiou 
(2005; 2002) and Nancy (1991) have recently been particularly influential as regards the 
continental debate around the meaning of the political, the anatomy of community and the re-
definition of the status of individuals within society.  
70
Concerning the role of affectivity, body and desires in the production of the political, feminist 
thought has provided an important contribution: see for example Irigaray (1994), Cavarero (2002) 
Ticineto Glough and Halley (2007), and Manning (2007).   
71
On the theme made of the politcization of the concept of life, Foucault (1998, vol. 1), first, 
introduces the question of the impact of the political authority of the state over everyday life, 
coining the term bio-power. Hardt and Negri (2000; 2006) conceptualised the term bio-politics as 
the opposite to bio-power, which is seen as the insurrectional response of the multitude through the 
use of the body and life to the bio-political control of the capitalist state. For further readings see 
also Agamben (1998: 71-104).  
72
Concerning the theme of time in contemporary continental political thought, Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004a,b) put forward the idea of the flowing of time through contingency and multiple 
movements of composition and decomposition of planes. Negri (2005: 131-169) reiterates the two 
Greek conceptions of time as Kronos (quantitative time) and Kairos (the time ‘in between’, 
qualitative), describing the latter as proper of the multitude. For further readings see particularly 
Massumi (1992, 1993) and Hutchings (2008).           
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of this social body. Secondly, assuming that political gestures greatly exceed 
models of rational choice and self-interest, a further problem is as to the nature of 
the emerging philosophy of praxis. Thirdly, supposing that social relations go 
beyond the differences of class, geographical and political territory, what lies at 
the very basis of the political community today? Ultimately, if the process of 
production of a collective body does not solely reside in the dual schema of the 
object-subject distinction, there is a difficulty in unveiling the possible 
mechanisms of the contemporary system of production, and in revealing the 
instruments employed and the outcomes of this process. In other words, what is at 
stake here is the understanding of the production of the ‘common’ (Negri, 2005; 
Hardt and Negri, 2006).  
In order to re-theorise the complexity of the social, the enquiry into the 
anatomy of contemporary society has taken a myriad of different positions. 
Without embarking on a detailed discussion of the variety of theoretical 
approaches that have been developed in political theory recently, we must, at the 
very least, consider the important contributions made by certain theories of radical 
democracy. These have raised fundamental questions about the redefinition of 
contemporary mass movements through more exhaustive concepts of hegemony, 
power, subject and bio-politics.
73
 Central within radical democratic theory has 
been the recovery of the notions of freedom, equality, rights, and of the public and 
private spheres from the liberal tradition of thought, which has reduced these 
values to abstract and incontrovertible truths. In contrast with the liberal 
democratic approach, these principles, it has been claimed, involve concrete 
political practises of transformation, and the constitution of new social and 
political identities (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Connolly, 2002).  
These themes of the autonomy of democracy from the liberal paradigm 
have nurtured fruitful debate concerning the meaning of community, repositioning 
its existence outside the boundaries of the state and civil society. This has brought 
about the necessity of re-considering the anatomy of community as an expression 
of heterogeneous, spontaneous movements; an expression that is not lacking or 
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 For a complete account of debate surrounding the theme of radical democracy, see Newman 
(2007), Thomassen and Tønder (2005), Laclau and Mouffe (2001); Butler, Laclau and Zizek 
(2000); and Badiou (2002).  
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contrary to the state, but which is rather other to and greater than sovereign 
authority. In order to re-conceptualise the richness of expressions of community, 
notions of ‘being-in-common’, violence, and the ‘whatever’ have been 
proposed.
74
 These have offered an alternative account of the forces and potentials 
that shape the present community, and unexplored possibilities for realising a pure 
democracy, escaping the surreptitious violence of the state apparatus. 
  
The return to Spinoza’s thought of the multitude  
 
Although these theories have brought to light thoughtful arguments and 
problems on the question of the autonomy of the community, a thought of and 
about the multitude becomes even more crucial today. I think that the “class-
concept” of the multitude (to use Negri’s term) appears to express the anatomy, 
becoming and dynamics of political subjectivities (Negri, 2004). Through the 
indeterminacy and multiplicity that the term “multitude” expresses, this concept 
brings to light fundamental questions such as the roles that affectivity, 
imagination and interrelation play in re-shaping the idea of society, thereby 
casting it as a process.
75
      
No one can deny that the conspicuous part of the actual debate concerning 
the theme of the multitude is largely indebted to the works of Deleuze and 
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Concerning the re-formation of the paradigm of community, parallel to the notion of the 
multitude, see for example, the stimulating dispute between Agamben and Nancy, articulated 
through Agamben’s reaction to Nancy’s thesis of the Inoperative Community (1991) with the 
theory of the Coming Community (1991); see also the debate between Nancy and Blanchot, who 
responded to Nancy’s thesis of the inoperative community by writing Unkowable Community 
(1988).           
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 The origins of the term “multitude” comes from the Latin idiom “multitudo-inis”, which is a 
composite of the adjective multus (many, plural, a large number of etc.) and the suffix –tude 
(corresponding to the English -ess). By multitudo, the ancient Romans refer to a condition, 
permanent or transitory, of indeterminacy. It means the state of being numerous, within which 
singulars events are not visibly discernible one from the other; these are also impossible to be 
counted qualitatively and quantitatively. In political theory, Roman writers as Polybius (Polybius 
is of Greek origins, although he spent almost of his life in Rome, where he also completed his 
Histories), Seneca, Cicero and Sallust, have amply used the term “multitudo” in most of the cases 
with the negative meaning of a large number of (multus) people without any political authority and 
social cohesion. It is during the XVI and XVII centuries that the expression “multitudo” acquires a 
more neutral significance and political consistency. Machiavelli, Hobbes and, above all Spinoza, 
amply adopted the category of the multitude for describing the role of the mass within the state. 
For further readings on the differences and similarities between Machiavelli’, Spinoza’ and 
Hobbes’s conceptions of the multitude, see particularly Del Lucchese (2009b), Virno (2004) and 
Montag (1999). 
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Guattari, and to those of Hardt and Negri. Deleuze and Guattari have pictured the 
community of the global era as a nomadic organisation that is structured through a 
“desiring-machine” and by movements of territorialization (maintenance) and 
deterritorialization (dissipation), and which opposes the homogeneity and stability 
of the state-apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, b).
76
 Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy has played a central role within the development of the ontological 
and political conception of the multitude today. This has significantly formed the 
ontological ground upon which the multitude as an alternative political individual 
has emerged. It is however through Negri’s political reflections that the thought of 
the multitude acquires great consistency and coherence, giving rise to what we 
have called above the “political turn of the multitude”.  
The importance of Negri’s philosophical gesture concerns the retreat of the 
multitude from its negative definitions of chaos, mass and mob to a positive 
meaning of productive force of desires, power, actions and conflicts and, more 
generally, commonalities. Negri does not examine the emergence of the multitude 
as a transitional social phenomenon derived from a specific historical or political 
moment of crisis within the political body, which could be re-incorporated into 
the categories of citizens, subjects and people as soon as the hierarchic order of 
the state is restored. Instead, the multitude, Negri claims, is the political antagonist 
of the contemporary state apparatus, which is as global (plural, decentralised and 
powerful) as the capitalist state itself, and as invasive as Empire.
77
 The multitude 
is opposed to the politics of Empire, as it is a praxis of spontaneous democracy 
that is structured through desires and by kairotic flows of time and life through 
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 Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the “Desiring-machine”, roughly, affirms the productive 
nature of desires, opposing both the Freudian and Marxist views of desire as emerging from lack 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). The notions of territorialization and deterritorialisation, and the 
theory of nomadic forms of organisation connote an expansive force (“nomadic war machine”) 
composed of heterogeneity and contingency strongly challenging the process of homogenization 
and stabilisation of the state-apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b).        
77
 By Empire, Hardt and Negri mean the contemporary model of capitalist expansion and 
dominance upon society, politics and culture, which is exemplified by the phenomenon of neo-
liberal globalisation. Empire, in Negri’ and Hardt’s view, expresses the present paradigm of 
capitalism, which is structured through the abolition of frontiers, the homogenisation of culture, 
politics and economic production. These elements are the emerging post-industrial forms that 
capitalist system adopts to exploit labour and to gain control over individual’s life (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000).  
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which the production of the ‘common’ is founded and developed ( Hardt and 
Negri, 2000; 2006).  
It is in this moment that the marginal status traditionally occupied by 
Spinoza within the history of political thought is undermined. Negri reiterates, in 
my view, Spinoza’s conception of the multitude, reinstating the central 
importance to the latter of Spinoza’s politics and ontology.78 For Negri, Spinoza’s 
political philosophy proposes a multisided vision of the multitude, which is not 
solely capable of challenging concretely the hegemony of the state and the 
Church, but which is also the only condition for the attainment of democracy. 
Within a continental perspective, Negri and other political theorists such as 
Balibar, Moreau, Matheron, Giancotti and Montag have consistently re-located 
Spinoza’s thought of the multitude and democracy within contemporary political 
theory. These thinkers have undeniably opened the way to a re-consideration of 
the great actuality of Spinoza’s notion of the multitude.  
With a view towards building on the re-formulation of Spinoza’s concept 
of the multitude that was inaugurated by continental scholars, I would argue that 
there are still unexplored aspects of the Treatises that require further attention. 
Firstly, I refer here to a more extensive understanding of the concrete political 
stakes of affects of joy, love and indignation within the constitution of the 
multitude, which are presented in the final part of the TTP and the TP. As we have 
examined in chapter III, passions do not only describe an inoperative 
psychological and ethical condition that is rooted in a specific historical, political 
and religious community. Affectivity, however passive or active, sets in motion 
intensive and relational movements which transform the political scene entirely. 
In the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, for example, we have seen 
that the Hebrews’ fear of God and hope for salvation generate a form of anguish, 
which signals the emergence of a dramatic moment involving not only the Jewish 
people and Moses, but the production of the political as whole.  
In this light, if passions are capable of producing and dissolving the 
political, the status of affects such as joy, love and indignation in Spinoza’s 
political enquiry into democracy and the multitude certainly goes far beyond 
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 The reinstatement of Spinoza’s philosophy today certainly is not only Negri’s achievement. In 
the course of the chapter, I will further discuss the other readings.    
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particular practises of sharing, sedition, subjection, individual freedom and mutual 
assistance. As we will analyse in the following section, the affects are the ground 
of fundamental political notions of social contract, natural and civil rights, 
sovereignty and consensus, upon which the very power of the multitude resides. 
Therefore, the study of the ontological and political foundation of affectivity is 
instrumental to investigating the many ways in which the multitude produces the 
‘common’ regardless of regimes of monarchy, aristocracy and tyranny. It is for 
this reason that in the thread of both Treatises, the multitude, obstinately, persists 
in any historical juncture, political crisis and restoration.                            
In the absence of an adequate political vocabulary for affectivity, 
Spinoza’s analysis of the multitude’s affective politics, I believe, becomes crucial. 
This might enable us to re-consider how the ‘common’ is produced, and 
specifically the forces, movements and tensions activated by the affects of joy, 
love and hatred for the constitution and fruition of the ‘common’. Furthermore, 
Spinoza’s concern with the affective tones of the multitude might provide us with 
alternative instruments for re-theorising the richness of expression of the social. 
The claim I will make throughout this chapter is that Spinoza’s attention to a 
praxis of joy and love reframes the controversial question of the relation between 
life (whether biological or already political) and sovereignty.  
Secondly, re-locating the role of affects for the production of the 
‘common’ directly questions the effective anatomy and potentials of democracy in 
Spinoza’s thought, which is described as the most natural system. As examined in 
chapter III, societies are processes that follow a non-linear path shaped by a 
mixture of relations, complexity and tensions. The emergence of a specific 
political individual does not create a community made by the establishment of 
laws, rules, private and public spheres. From the arguments of both the Ethics and 
the Theological Political Treatise, we have learnt that individuals are already 
collective and the order of nature is not qualitatively different from human, vital, 
and political systems. As the most natural model, democracy cannot be considered 
as a well-ordered form of government with a specific organisation of authority 
into laws and social division. Democracy instead refers to a process of continuous 
actualisation and transformation, which gives full rights of citizenship to the 
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actuality of the community as it is. This means that incompatibilities, relations 
and tensions shape a democratic realm, maintaining its body in a constant state of 
openness towards alternative transformations. As we have seen in chapters II and 
III, affectivity is the cornerstone of relation, which places individuals in the 
middle between generality and singularity, movements and transformations. It is 
in this context that the interface between affectivity and democracy comes to light, 
complicating the domain of the political through the production of the “the 
common good”.  
This focus on Spinoza’s conception of democracy introduces a new 
awareness of the relation between affectivity and politics, the meaning of 
‘common good’ and its production. In the search for a different conception of 
democracy today, Spinoza’s account of the linkage between affects and 
democratic praxis, I argue, might open unexplored avenues towards alternative 
modes of thinking pacts of solidarity and struggle. It is to this interface between 
democracy and affectivity that contemporary political thought should pay greater 
attention. Taking into account these arguments, in the following section I shall 
pass on to examine Spinoza’s multisided theory of the multitude, and the extent to 
which its life, political gestures and affective tones carry democratic meanings, 
actions and forces. As mentioned, the discussion of democracy, the multitude and 
affects will proceed through conceptual personae. In this chapter we encounter the 
Citizens of the democracy. As the name I have given suggests, the Citizens of 
democracy are the protagonists of the democratic community and embody the 
affective political phases of the multitude towards democracy. This conceptual-
affective persona embraces, in my analysis, Spinoza’s engagement with 
democracy, that is, how a life in common might be formed.  
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2. Spinoza’s political strategy: Democracy, sovereignty and the multitude 
  
The theme of democracy occupies the central part of Spinoza’s political 
theory, which is developed in both the political section of the TTP and the 
unfinished Political Treatise. Whilst in the pars contruens of the TTP Spinoza’s 
treatment of democracy is enfolded within a more general investigation of the 
typical themes of modern political thought such as the contractualist origin of 
society, natural and civil rights, freedom of speech and thought, in the Political 
Treatise the analysis of the democratic state follows a more complex discussion of 
the structure of sovereignty within monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. These 
questions involve the study of the notions of the differences and relation between 
natural and civil rights, the definition of political authority, the aims of the state, 
the meaning of the law, citizenship and the various forms of freedom. In both 
Treatises, Spinoza’s arguments delineate an accurate anatomy of power, through 
which its twofold status comes to light: power as fixed authority (Potestas) and as 
productive force (potentia).The description of the complex structure of power 
within society is the ground of Spinoza’s conception of democracy as the full 
expression of human association. 
The theme of inalienable right plays a fundamental role in the two 
Treatises. In the TTP, this argument is crucial for understanding Spinoza’s 
conceptions of the authority of the state, the social pact and freedom. More 
precisely, definition of the inalienable right explains where sovereignty is located 
within the body politic, and more importantly under what circumstances its 
authority might be legitimate. In the TP, the definition of inalienable rights is 
instrumental for determining the emergence of the multitude as a proper political 
counterpart of the state, and Spinoza’s thesis of the superiority of democracy over 
the other political models of aristocracy and monarchy.    
In the political section of the TTP, Spinoza claims that natural rights are 
coextensive with civil rights, and reiterates this more strongly in the TP through 
his adage of the “tantum juris quantum potentiae” (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527; TP, 
Chapter II.3). This means that the creation of the political body does not suppress 
the rights owned by every man in a pre-civil condition. For Spinoza, natural and 
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civil rights are not contradictory terms: rather, they are compatible with one 
another. Spinoza defines, more importantly, natural right as power, which means 
unpredicted and productive force. Following Spinoza’s analysis, in the state of 
nature the power of each individual does not lead necessarily to actions of 
reciprocal cruelty, as in the Hobbesian condition of perpetual war. Rather, 
Spinoza’s account of the pre-civil situation is multisided, where a variety of 
affective tones shape the actions and thoughts of individuals. This variegated 
structure of the state of nature produces a different kind of relational condition 
such as the fear towards others, humility or self-esteem (TTP, Chapter XVI: 528-
529; TP, Chapter III. 3-8).  
It is in this moment that the desire for society emerges. As mentioned, the 
civil body does not oppose the state of nature; rather it is a passage from the pre-
civil context to the civil rather than a rupture. As there is no contradiction between 
these two forms of power, this leads Spinoza to maintain natural rights entirely 
within society. Furthermore, individuals surrender collectively (collegialiter) their 
powers for the creation of the new political equilibrium (TTP, Chapter V: 438, 
Chapter XVI: 528). This implies the acknowledgment of civil authority as a result 
of this union, and as thus being dependent upon this collective power, which is 
always greater than the established authority (TP: Chapter III. 6-8). 
These arguments regarding the transfer of natural rights to the political 
body motivate Spinoza to pose the fundamental problem of sovereignty; and 
consequently to question which regime – monarchy, aristocracy or democracy – 
best maintains and guarantees the balance between powers (civil and natural) 
within society. In the TTP, Spinoza finds the composition of sovereignty within 
the systems of monarchy and aristocracy to be untenable. For Spinoza, these 
easily degenerate into regimes of violence and tyranny (TTP, Chapter XVI: 531). 
In order to justify their sovereignty, both monarchic and aristocratic governments, 
Spinoza explains, have to rely on religious expedients, such as the divine origin of 
authority or the suppression of the masses’ desires, needs and freedom. In the 
unfinished Political Treatise, Spinoza espouses the theme of sovereignty more 
rigorously, introducing the question of the maintenance of consensus within the 
body politic, and the extent to which this is defended and encouraged within 
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monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. If in the TTP the contractualist foundation 
of sovereignty might be interpreted as the premise for the formulation of the 
category of political obligation, which binds both the state and civil body, it is in 
the TP that the theory of consensus entirely dispels any possible recourse to a 
politics of obedience. As Spinoza connects directly the notion of the consensus 
with the multitude, this brings to light the centrality of the multitude as a powerful 
political individual (TP, Chapter IV). 
In order to consolidate the legitimacy of the state, Spinoza explains, both 
monarchy and aristocracy necessarily have to be dependent upon the consent of 
the multitude (TP, Chapters V, VII, X). Specifically, the preservation of 
monarchical government resides in the reinforcement of the ruler’s alliance with 
his subjects, and the progressive disappearance of the nobility’s privileges (TP, 
Chapter VII. 20). This involve counsellors to the king who are chosen from the 
citizen-body, the formation of a popular army, non hereditary election of the 
monarch, and the definition of the king as representative of the people’s will and 
not as the owner of the state (TP, Chapter VI. 10, 15; Chapter VII. 12, 25). For 
Spinoza, these are the conditions through which subjects’ consent can be best 
preserved, and thereby the authority of the monarchic regime maintained. 
Similarly, in an aristocratic regime, Spinoza’s attention is given to the increase of 
the relation between patricians and plebeians. In order to avoid the predominance 
of a specific cast of patrician, Spinoza opts for a solution of regular alternation 
between the patrician clans. This should prevent the emergence of inequalities 
between patricians and the formation of hereditary privileges, which would 
encourage sedition, ambition and rivalry among citizens (TP, Chapter X).  
A central consequence of this strategy of consensus is that in each of these 
regimes the stability of the state is based essentially on the progressive reduction 
of indirect forms of representation, which would better guarantee the balance 
between powers. In this light, each regime seems to move progressively towards 
democracy, through the constitution or, at the very least, through the permission 
of practices of sharing, participation and freedom. Given this intrinsic tendency 
towards democratic customs within each type of regime, the question immediately 
arises as what might be the anatomy of sovereignty in a proper democratic state? 
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Since the eleventh chapter on democracy is missing from Spinoza’s text, we do 
not know how the distribution of sovereign power in a democratic body is 
articulated in his later thought. In order to avoid the temptation to offer 
conjectures as to how Spinoza might have conceived the democratic state, I think 
that we might instead examine, deductively, Spinoza’s paradigm of democracy 
from the arguments developed in the Theological Political Treatise and his theory 
of the consensus conducted in the Political Treatise. These reveal, we will see 
below, Spinoza’s awareness of the pivotal role of the multitude within the 
formation of democracy, and its centrality to the production of the ‘common 
good’. 
In the TTP, Spinoza advocates democracy as the more natural form of 
political institution, within which the individual “transfers it [the natural right] to 
the majority of the entire community of which he is a part” (TTP Chapter XVI: 
531, my italics). For Spinoza, the democratic state ensures stability, peace and 
freedom of speech and thought, which are the only aims of the state. In the TTP, 
Spinoza claims that the aims of the state are freedom and the observance of the 
principles sanctioned in the social pact, whereas in the TP the reason of the state is 
the defence and preservation of peace and stability through the preservation of 
consensus. Given this collective structure, it is unlikely that the democratic 
government will degenerate into tyranny and efface human rights. It is through the 
maintenance and development of these conditions that the progress of society lies.  
 
2.1 Contemporary approaches to Spinoza’s politics 
 
In contemporary Spinozist studies, the themes of the role of the multitude 
in the TTP and the TP, civil and natural rights, consensus and democracy have 
been much discussed, and many interpretations have been proposed. As 
mentioned several times throughout the thesis, there have been two influential 
ways of reading Spinoza’s political philosophy: a liberal-individualistic approach, 
which stems predominantly from an analytic tradition of thought, and a 
continental reading that has been influenced by Marxist thought, and which has 
been particularly prevalent in France within certain post-Althusserian debates. 
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The liberal-individualistic approach has been particularly influential as regards the 
interpretation of the political section of the TTP.
 
As Spinoza posits a contract at 
the very basis of the political body, this has led to analogies between his work and 
that of Hobbes, Locke and Grotius. Furthermore, Spinoza’s reference to the notion 
of profit as the very basis of the state has allowed his philosophy to be aligned 
with the utilitarian tradition of thought exemplified by Bentham and Mill, and to 
the theory of rational choice (Israel, 2002; Smith, 1998; Feuer, 1987).  
Furthermore, the category of power within the political treatises has, as 
Rice points out, two dimensions. Rice claims that power as Potestas denotes the 
authority of the state, which is viewed as an “added capacity” that is always 
inferior to the individual and which opposes the order of nature. In this sense, 
Spinoza’s notion of the state is not a further development of his ontology. Power 
as Potentia means the ability of the individual, which is greater than the state 
(Rice, 1990: 274-285). Moving within the same perspective, Curley and James 
have emphasised psychological implications deriving from Spinoza’s theory of 
the contract. Curley in particular has considered Spinoza’s theory of the social 
contract as the deference of the individual to the state (Curley, 1996: 318-342; 
James, 1996: 210-228, 1997: 136-156). Seen in this light, Spinoza’s political work 
reveals his advocacy of the individual’s autonomy and power, and thereby a view 
in which the state performs an auxiliary function.   
The problems that I have encountered with the general liberal 
interpretation of Spinoza’s politics are that they do not pay adequate attention to 
crucial aspects of Spinoza’s themes of pact, power and profit. The foundation of 
the pact is, first of all, a form of spontaneous passage from the natural condition. 
This is collectively stipulated; thus, there is no singular individual at the basis of 
the contract, but rather a collective being. This implies that the conception of the 
community is to some extent prior to civil society. As it is formed collectively, the 
authority and the reason of the state reside in the power of the collective. 
Although Spinoza’s claim that interest or profit lie at the basis of the state may 
certainly lead one to utilitarian conclusions, it contrasts with the definition of the 
human being given in the Ethics as desire (E. III, Def. Aff. I). As we will see in 
the subsequent parts of this chapter, from the state of nature to the civil body, 
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Spinoza does not refer to the human being as a self-independent individual who 
experiences society as an attached and secondary body as Rice sustained (Rice, 
1990); instead, society is an expression not of self-interest, but rather of desire, 
which greatly exceeds both models of the rational choice and the Hobbesian fear 
of death.  
Furthermore, assuming Spinoza’s theory of the state and the human being 
as expressions of liberal and individualistic conceptions, this would mean that, for 
Spinoza, the individual can live under any form of government insofar as it does 
not limit the attainment of personal interest and self-realisation, just as Hobbesian 
man can exist perfectly well under the Leviathan. In this case, monarchy and 
aristocracy might adequately meet the needs of individuals similarly to democracy 
insofar as they do not degenerate into despotic and confessional regimes. 
However, as we have seen, Spinoza firmly advocates democracy as the best and 
more natural model of governance for the development of a society as a whole. 
The superiority of democracy, Spinoza claims, resides not in the possibility of 
expansion of the singular freedom. A democratic system is rather a community, 
within which the sharing of power is the only condition of collective freedom.  
In opposition to this view, post-Althusserian approaches to Spinoza’s 
politics have stressed the collective aspects of his thought. They have advanced 
the idea of the political foundation of Spinoza’s ontology and, at the same time, 
the ontological or naturalist ground of his politics. Post-Althusserian analysis has 
highlighted how his philosophy raises fecund arguments in relation to the strategy 
for maintaining power over people, the mechanisms of alienation used by 
religious and political authorities, the multisided forms of ideology, and non-
individualist conceptions of society and human nature (Tosel, 1984; Giancotti, 
1995; Montag, 1999). In this light, Spinoza’s affirmation of freedom of speech 
and thought has been explained as a project of “disalienation” of the mass, so as to 
create a community aware of itself as a unity, and not as a sum of individuals 
(Matheron, 1988: 612). It follows that the political body, instead of representing a 
mere sum of singular individualities, is the result of the collective power and 
desires of people. Thus, Spinoza’s advocacy of democracy is understood as the 
affirmation of the power of the mass against the authority of the state. Above all, 
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these series of studies have brought about the rediscovery of the originality of 
Spinoza’s theory of the multitude, which is conceptualised without reference to 
citizens, people and subjects.  
Taking into great consideration both readings of Spinoza’s politics and 
proceeding further with the post-Althusserian approach, I think that there are 
some further important arguments to be drawn from the Theological Political 
Treatise and the Political Treatise, which might still offer thoughtful theoretical 
insights for contemporary thought. Besides these disputes noted above as whether 
the foundation of democracy is either individualist or collective in nature, we 
should emphasise the hypothesis that lies at the basis of Spinoza’s democratic 
thought. The importance of Spinoza’s thesis of democracy, on my reading, resides 
primarily in the question which leads him to affirm the superiority of this 
institution over the other political models. Spinoza does not ask what the best 
form is for governing and gathering people together within the boundaries of a 
political equilibrium. Most importantly, Spinoza does not ask how people can rule 
themselves. This would imply a certain acceptance of the intrinsic incapacity of 
individuals to govern themselves collectively. We already know from the 
arguments advanced in chapter II that in the Ethics individuals are ontologically 
collective. Therefore, Spinoza’s principal political question is as to how this 
complex and collective being may act politically. By this, I mean that we should 
read the ontological and political status of individuals in strict continuity. This 
involves considering democracy as part of more complex process of 
individuation; a process that is both political and ontological.  
Given the Greek meaning of the term democracy as the government of the 
many (demos), democracy might appear, for Spinoza to be the most adequate 
political formula for expressing the manifold status of the individuals. The 
structure of democracy, in my view, appears to create the conditions, through 
which individuals, governing themselves, develop further the process of 
individuation. Yet if this is the case, many problems arise. Firstly, how does this 
complex individual act politically once democracy is formed? Secondly, given 
Spinoza’s conviction of the affective and passionate nature of individuals, how 
does the multitude act politically, favouring the progress of a society? In other 
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words, how do affects and passions impact concretely on the production of 
democracy? Concerning these questions, for the purpose of this chapter, Balibar 
(1994; 1998) and Negri’s (1998) theses offer fruitful arguments for our 
discussion. Building upon the continental reading of the TTP and TP, indicated 
above, Balibar (1994; 1998) and Negri (1998) have pointed to the linkage 
between democracy and the multitude within Spinoza’s politics. They have also 
highlighted the problematic status of the multitude within historical and political 
processes and its powerful role in the constitution of democracy.  
 
The anatomy of the multitude: The subject of history and the enemy of the state 
  
As anticipated previously, Spinoza gives a multi-sided account of the 
political role of the mass within a political context. In the TTP, Spinoza’s rare use 
of the term multitude and frequent reference instead to mob and plebs appears to 
stress only the passionate character of the mass, which can be mobilised now 
against this faction now against the other. In contrast, in the TP the multitude 
becomes the central name for defining the political status of the mass within the 
state. This is recognised as the concrete counterpart of the state, which can destroy 
any form of tyranny; consequently any ruler has to adapt his or her authority to 
incorporate the consent of the multitude. The mass is the social and political 
faction whose consent, however passive or active, inevitably alters the equilibrium 
of the political system.    
From this multifaceted vision of the mass, many questions arise. Firstly, 
how can a political body be founded as democracy without being ruled by any 
external authority? In other words, given the passionate tones of the masses, how 
does Spinoza think it possible for there to be a government of the many that could 
guarantee stability and peace? Secondly, given Spinoza’s refusal of any form of 
agency, how might the mass pass from being a passionate and violent mob to the 
citizens of democracy and the guardians of freedom? It is around these questions 
that Balibar and Negri have developed their approaches to Spinoza’s conceptions 
of the multitude and democracy. The former emphasises the ambivalent status of 
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the multitude in Spinoza’s analysis, whereas the latter focuses on the multitude’s 
praxis of emancipation.
79
 
Balibar addresses the twofold dimension of Spinoza’s notion of the 
multitude, within which imagination and communication play a pivotal role for 
the attainment of democracy. For Balibar, Spinoza’s analysis of the power of the 
multitude within a given political context reveals an irresolvable internal 
contradiction, which refers to a passive tendency towards servitude, and a 
constitutive power of new political order. On the one hand, Balibar observes, the 
body of the multitude is the rich expression of collective praxis, which limits the 
growth and expansion of any despotic and confessional state. In this light, 
affectivity is the generating source of the constitution of the power of the mass 
against the authority. On the other, Balibar rightly notices, the TTP describes a 
negative aspect of the movement of the mass, which is characterised by 
manipulation. The role of imagination generates superstition, mystification and 
alienation, for which a politics of obedience and a doctrine of mutual support 
become indispensable instruments for the stability of a community.
80
 Balibar’s 
reading concludes by envisaging an irreversible aporia within Spinoza’s theory of 
the multitude, which is characterised by the internal contradiction between 
citizens and mob (Balibar 1994: 3-37). For Balibar, it is precisely in this aporetic 
status of the multitude that the great originality and modernity of Spinoza’s 
political work lies (Williams, 2007; 2002). The coexistence of the mob and the 
citizens, Balibar argues, makes of the multitude the very problem and subject of 
the historical process, which traverses and forms human societies (Balibar, 1998: 
42-49, 64-71, 113-124; 1997: 192-204).
 
 
In contrast with Balibar’s reading and in a strong Marxist fashion, Negri 
opposes the definition of the masses as being marked by an inconceivable 
contradiction with the view of the multitude as internal to the domain of the state.
 
Negri points to the constitutive force of the multitude, which re-signifies the 
                                                 
79For an analysis of Negri and Balibar’s interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of the multitude, and a 
possible advancement of both readings through a more complex theory of imagination and 
affectivity, see Williams (2007; 2002), to which this discussion refers.  
80
Concerning the twofold status of imagination within the TTP, Balibar stresses the double 
meaning of the passion of fear as fear of the mass and the fear experienced by the ruler in relation 
to the mass (Balibar, 1994: 3-37).   
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political and social conception of power itself. Specifically, Negri identifies the 
twofold status of power. Accordingly, the notion of power refers on the one side 
to Potestas, indicating the authority of the state; on the other, power means 
Potentia, describing the productive force of the multitude. For Negri, Spinoza’s 
theory of the multitude reveals a radical anatomy of power, which brings to light 
its two meanings as dynamic force (Potentia) and immobile authority (Potestas). 
In Negri’s view, Spinoza’s notion of the multitude exemplifies the dimension of 
power as transformation of the established order, which contrasts the authority of 
the state. The role of the multitude becomes recognised as the counterpart of the 
state and the destabilising actor within the political scene (Negri, 1998: 242-253). 
Negri concludes that Spinoza’s thought of the multitude is an affirmation of 
“potentia contra auctoritas” (Negri, 1998: 242-253).   
Balibar and Negri both underline two relevant aspects of Spinoza’s theory 
of the multitude. The aspect of Balibar’s analysis that I have found to be 
particularly relevant for the arguments of this present chapter is his recognition of 
the multitude as a somewhat aporetic individual, which nevertheless is the real 
protagonist of historical processes. Similarly, the theme of power formulated by 
Negri, which is internal to and yet also the concrete counterpart of the state, has 
been essential for shaping the position assumed in the thesis. In my reading of 
Spinoza’s thought of the multitude, I re-consider Balibar and Negri’s insights 
through the strategy of the conceptual personae, adopted in chapter III. Thus, I 
propose to examine both passive and active affects or actions of the mass as 
constitutive elements of a distinctive conceptual-affective persona, which I call 
the Citizens of democracy. My aim is to re-direct attention towards the role of 
affectivity for structuring the dynamics of the multitude and developing 
democracy.  
The arguments that I will put forward via the argumentative thread 
afforded by this conceptual persona, concern the discovery of a complex process 
nuanced by varied confluences of emotive tones, which shape and further 
complicate not the singular being but rather the collective body of the multitude.
81
 
                                                 
81Concerning Spinoza’s theme of the political actions of the mass, Balibar and Negri too view 
these as phases of more problematic process. Whilst Balibar stresses the notion of process in the 
treatise as a form of historical becoming, and where Negri insists instead on an emancipating 
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It is through this affective process of enduring individuation that Spinoza’s vision 
of democracy as mens una comes to light.
82
 Furthermore, this analysis of 
Spinoza’s thesis of the multitude as a process draws attention to the ways in which 
affects are generative sources of the ‘common good’, and allows the opportunity 
to address the question of the interface between democracy and affectivity. Taking 
these arguments into account, let us now flesh out the dynamics and problematic 
characters of this conceptual persona.       
 
3. Citizens of democracy: Sovereign life and common good 
 
The conceptual-affective persona of the Citizens of democracy expresses 
the central problem that accompanies Spinoza’s enquiry from the Ethics, through 
the Theological Political Treatise, to the Political Treatise. This concerns the 
understanding of the form of life in common that is embodied by and through the 
multitude. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis, if the conceptual persona of 
Descartes is the Idiot and the one of Nietzsche is Dionysus, I would argue here, 
Spinoza’s major persona is the life in common that he ascribes to the body of the 
multitude (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-83; and also chapter III of this work.). 
By this, importantly, I do not intend that the multitude itself is Spinoza’s 
conceptual persona; rather, the paradigm of the life in common of the multitude 
becomes the privileged concept of Spinoza’s philosophical production. It activates 
multiple potentialities of Spinoza’s concept, raising a problem and glimpsing a 
solution. It is the multiform life in common of the multitude that forces Spinoza to 
question the power of affects and the anatomy of the individual.
83
  
As regards to the production of the political, Spinoza is confronted with 
the multiple and various levels of the relational behaviour and forces that the 
multitude introduces through cruelty and joy within the political process. The 
                                                                                                                                     
progress, my reading tends to maintain a stronger ontological foundation in the same vein as 
Simondon’s thought (Simondon, 2007: 175-214).       
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Spinoza in the Theological Political Treatise does not use the term mens una explicitly. This will 
appear in the Political Treatise (Chapter II. 16). In the Theological Political Treatise, he instead 
adopts the equivalent expression “coetus universus hominum” (“united body of men), (TTP, 
Chapter XVI: 530).        
83
For a detailed account of the themes of the autonomy of the affects and the paradigm of the 
individual developed in the Ethics, see chapter II of the present study.  
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multitude, Spinoza observes, obstinately persists through historical crises and 
social hierarchy. The multitude’s omnipresence in history, Spinoza recognises, is 
not inoperative at all; rather it carries unsuspected meanings, relations, powers 
and tensions, which transform and further individualises the political scene (see 
for example TTP, chapters XVII, XVIII). Every attempt to restrain the life of the 
multitude within a well-organised class of subjects, people and plebs causes the 
collapse of the political body (in the language of the TP, “the outrage of the 
masses”). By contrast, as we have seen, the search for a form of consensus leads 
towards more democratic regimes (see particularly, TP, Chapters V, VII, X). 
Therefore, Spinoza questions, in my view, what the founding elements are of the 
multitude’s life in common, and how we might conceptualise its collective 
political life. It is in a consideration of these problems that Spinoza’s enquire lies, 
drawing a line of continuity between the Treatises.  
The conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy precisely takes shape 
from this continuity between the Treatises, expressing the variety of affective 
tones given by Spinoza to life-in-common. I thus consider the arguments and 
problems of the pars construens of the TTP and TP as phases in the conceptual 
persona of the Citizens of democracy, each of which expresses a crucial emotive 
moment within the production of democracy. In the thread of the conceptual-
affective persona of the Citizens of democracy, these emotive phases of the 
production of democracy and the multitude’s affective life are embodied by three 
distinctive aspects, which I identify with the figures of demons, evils and virtuosi. 
These figures, we will see below, structure important political and ontological 
behaviours within the Citizens of democracy. The aspects of demons, evils and 
virtuosi characterising the Citizens of democracy enable us to understand the 
ways in which, passions and affects such as fear, hope, indignation and love 
activate the production of the ‘common’ and configure the boundaries of a 
community.    
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3.1 Anatomy of the Citizens of democracy: Demons, evils and the virtuosi of 
community 
  
Following the political arguments of the two Treatises, Spinoza addresses 
the reasons for the necessity (its natural status) of democracy. In order to expound 
this thesis, he considers first non-democratic systems and historical 
circumstances, in which the politics of consensus has been totally or partially 
corrupted. In the TTP, Spinoza looks at the negative examples of the Roman 
Empire, the Jewish state, and the recent events of the English Revolution of 
Cromwell. In the TP, he examines the ways in which the multitude’s agreement 
can be preserved within monarchy and aristocracy. In each of these cases, the 
multitude is the centre and the end of Spinoza’s enquiry. In his analysis of non 
democratic orders, the passive tones of fear, anger, hatred and ambition form the 
political practises of the mass. These cause instability, anarchy and the collapse of 
the entire political apparatus. In my re-reading of these arguments, the passive 
states of the mass are incorporated within the conceptual-affective persona of the 
Citizens of democracy. In this persona, I include the passive tones of fear, anger 
and ambition. The Citizens of democracy will show us how these passions 
determine crucial phases within the process of democratisation of the political and 
reveal a different way of producing the ‘common’   
Spinoza makes a fundamental claim at the beginning of the chapter XVII 
of the Theological Political Treatise, in which he affirms “Nobody can so 
completely transfer to another all his rights, and consequently his power, as to 
cease to be a human being, nor will there ever be a sovereign power that can do all 
it pleases” (TTP, chapter XVII: 536). As discussed above, Spinoza’s thesis of the 
inalienability of natural right becomes the dominant argument of the Political 
Treatise, upon which his theory of legitimacy of the state is based and developed 
(TP, II. 3-4). It is this inalienability of natural right that raises the problem of 
consensus and the existence of the multitude in politics. In the case of the 
conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, Spinoza’s statements are 
fundamental. In order to delineate the political implications of these statements, 
recourse to Simondon’s logic is once again essential. I will thus re-consider 
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Spinoza’s theme of the inalienability of natural rights through Simondon’s 
categories of thought concerning the collective process of psychic individuation, 
which in his view are transversal to the social processes of individuation 
(Simondon, 2007: 175-214).   
Within a Simondonian perspective, because nobody entirely transfers his 
or her natural right to an external authority, there remains a non expressed 
quantity of power within any given state. The anatomy of a political body is 
constituted by an individuated part (the civil right, laws and freedoms) and 
potentialities, which might suddenly be actualised. The Citizens of democracy 
fully express these aspects of natural right and enable us to understand its 
effective political stakes. The significance of Spinoza’s conception of the relation 
between natural and civil rights emerges more strongly in situations of fear and 
violence (such as the Roman Empire), which I will now move on to examine.  
 
States of fear: The servitude of the emperor, the freedom of the subjects 
 
In the states of fear and violence, the Citizens of democracy are in a 
condition of passivity, within which their power of acting and thinking is 
diminished. In this moment, however, the potentiality that has not been transferred 
to the political authority generates new political individuals such as revolts, 
anarchic phenomena and despotic regimes. These events derive from the partial 
transferral of natural rights to the constituted political body. This partial transfer 
of natural rights maintains the collective power of individuals who are naturally 
stronger than the established political order. The phases of fear and anger 
characterising non-democratic systems activate a distinct tendency within our 
conceptual persona. In the state of fear, the Citizens of democracy begin to act 
politically as demons.
84
 This demonic role is twofold. The Citizens of democracy 
incorporate the two meanings of the image of the demon: the Ancient Greek 
                                                 
84I borrow the figure of demons from Hardt and Negri’s appropriation of the novel of Dostoyevsky 
Demons (1873) (Hardt and Negri, 2006: 138-140). The authors refer to the notion of demons as an 
inner force, which is always present within any given political context. They indicate the Greek 
origin of the term demon, which means a great number, and also a creative spirit. My use of the 
notion of demons partly follows Hardt and Negri’s usage, partly the negative meaning of ‘demon’ 
as a disruptive force.    
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notion of the inspiring and multiple forces or spirit, and the Catholic figure of evil 
as negative presence. As an inner force within the political system, they constitute 
an expansive and invasive power, which bring into the existing order tensions, 
problems and various forms of resistance. This aspect becomes more intense, 
particularly under the states of violence, tyranny and, generally, slavery, which are 
structured through fear, hatred and indignation. They are, whether latent or 
manifest, the real enemy of the established political system (TP, Chapter III. 9).  
In a condition of oppression, Spinoza reminds us through the Annals of 
Tacitus, the power of the mass becomes increasingly stronger, causing the 
collapse of the entire political apparatus, the overthrow of the emperor or, at the 
very least, an enduring state of insecurity.
85
In the Roman Empire, in order to 
maintain the authority over the subjects, every emperor had to justify his role 
through the expedients of the glorious and divine origins of his power (for 
example August’s alleged origin from Aeneas) (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538). 
Spinoza argues that the state of passivity, the decrease of the power of action and 
thinking, does not pertain to the mass, but instead to the tyrant. It is the fear felt by 
the emperor for a possible insurrection of the subjects and their hatred that causes 
him to rely upon external aids such as myth and violence. Therefore, the authority 
of the ruler relies on the pure image of power, whereas the force of his subjects is 
a concrete and effective obstacle (TTP, Chapter XVII: 537). In the case of the 
persona of the Citizens of democracy, Spinoza’s analysis has many important 
political implications.  
The state of fear re-defines the political scene entirely, within which the 
Citizens of democracy, in their demonic aspect, play a pivotal role. They act as 
productive forces, which re-signify the domain of the ‘common’ through new 
flows of time, relation and society. The re-characterisation of the ‘common’ does 
not only signal a cultural or religious turn, but also a different political theatre. If 
one considers the historical examples given by Spinoza of the Jewish nation and 
the Roman Empire, this demonic force emerges more clearly. In the state of Israel 
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 “It is also beyond doubt that a commonwealth is always in greater danger from its citizens than 
from its enemies; […]. It follows that he on whom the whole right of the state has been conferred 
will always be more afraid of citizens than of external enemies and will therefore endeavor to look 
on his own safety, not consulting the interests of his subjects but plotting against them […]. ” (TP, 
Chapter VI. 6). 
248 
 
after the death of Moses and the failure of the democratic experiment, it is the fear 
and ignorance of the Israelites that gave rise to an anarchic phase and which 
prepared the terrain for the complete dissolution of the political apparatus and the 
dispersion of the Jewish people (TTP, Chapter XVII: 541-544). In the Roman 
Empire, fear, hatred and the indignation of subjects maintained the equilibrium of 
the political body in an enduring state of tension, through which the mythic 
foundation of the empire, restrictive laws and various forms of violence emerged 
as the only defence of the state.  
In the despotic regime, society is characterised by two main passions: fear 
and indignation. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines fear as “inconstant pain arising 
from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose outcome we are in some doubt” 
(E. III, Def. Aff. XIII); indignation is defined as “hatred toward one who has 
injured another” (E. III, Def. Aff. XX). In the conceptual-affective persona of the 
Citizens of democracy, the tyrant is nuanced by the passive tones of fear and the 
mass is mostly shaped by indignation toward the ruler. These two passions 
generate crucial political moments, which question concepts of life, death, relation 
and time. The emperor, Spinoza reminds us, is constantly dominated by the fear of 
the imminent upheaval of the subjects against his domain. For this, he calls for the 
support of friends and seeks alliance with Greek and Christian gods, through 
which he attempts to placate the anger of the mass (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538). 
These attempts are, on my reading, the results of a more complex process, the 
origin of which lies in fear and passivity. The sacred origin of the figure of the 
ruler goes far beyond the establishment of the ideological apparatus of the state, 
revealing instead the emperor’s fear for a secure death. It is this fear, I would 
argue, that paradoxically causes the death of the ruler and thereby the dissolution 
of the entire political body.  
Spinoza’s definition of the ontological state of fear as pain emerging from 
the uncertainty of a future or past has an effective impact on the realm of the 
political. This concerns a different constitution of time, the re-definition of the 
form of government, and the institution of slavery. Like the Subjects of Moses 
under the phase of anguish analysed in chapter III, in this context, the two 
coordinates of the past and the present are played out in the drama of the emperor. 
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In order to avoid the future possibility of death, the emperor’s fear brings back 
echoes, however real or illusory, of the past and the authority of his predecessors. 
In this light, the present abandons the forces and multiple possibilities of the 
future, and becomes a mere reflection of the past. Spoiled of the potentialities of 
the future, the realm of the emperor tends progressively toward a stable 
equilibrium, which implies the loss of opportunities for transformation. This fear 
of death goes beyond the constitution of time, re-structuring the political reality of 
the emperor’s authority.    
As mentioned before, this fear of the future shaped by the need for the past 
produces the divine status of authority, which implies the entire re-casting of the 
form of government. The emperor, under the state of fear, ceases to be the 
absolute ruler of the state, and becomes now the son of Jupiter, now the heir of 
Aeneas. The emperor’s need for Greek gods, I think, brings about the discovery of 
the progressive process of enslavement of his state. As Spinoza explains, 
emperors such as August and Alexander declare to simply follow someone’s 
desire, in order to persuade the mass of the legitimacy of their authority; 
Alexander, for example, will motivate his power as the realisation of an higher 
policy rather than an act of pride (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538-539).  
These examples, in my view, indicate the growing condition of servitude 
that emerges from the state of fear, which becomes two-sided. On the one hand, 
the emperor is a slave to the epic gestures of his fathers, which exclude his 
dominion from any possibility of change and becoming. On the other hand, as we 
already mentioned, the tyrant is subjected to the anger and indignation of the 
mass. As anticipated, the passion of fear activates this condition of servitude, 
upon which despotic regimes are based and developed. It is precisely the fear of 
death (“you will find more who died at the hands of their own people” recites 
Alexander’s plea) that lies at the very basis of the emperor’s enslavement. In the 
Ethics, Spinoza affirms that only one whose acts are motivated by fear of death 
and hope for salvation is a slave (E. IV, prop. LXIII), whereas a free man is 
concerned solely with the enjoyment of life and thinks least of death (E. IV, prop. 
LXVII). The political consequence of this fear of death concerns the realisation of 
the emperor’s anxiety, that is, death (TP, particularly Chapters VI, VII). In the 
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Roman Empire, Spinoza comments, subjects have made their rulers destitute six 
times, and in the state of England, for the first time in history, a popular assembly 
has condemned the king to death (TTP, Chapter XVIII: 556-557).  
Many questions arise from this analysis. First of all, the main problem 
concerns who or what is the real enemy of the emperor; an enemy possessed of 
such power that it can reduce the emperor to servitude? Secondly, given Spinoza’s 
claim that it is the subjects of the tyrant who are most feared, the question arises 
as to how their forces are structured, and what elements might give rise to the 
death of the ruler.  These questions bring us to the core of Spinoza’s political 
philosophy, that is, to the origin of sovereignty. Without addressing this theme our 
enquiry could go no further.  
 
Sovereignty: Bare and Sacred life   
 
In order to examine the problem of sovereignty it is necessary to 
investigate Spinoza’s definition of the reason of the state. In the opening of the 
Political Treatise, the question of the relation between life and sovereignty is 
posed as soon as Spinoza comes to define the aim of the state.  For Spinoza, the 
purpose of the state is “peace and security of life” (TP, Chapter V.2), which is 
centred on a well-organised balance between duty and freedom. From the position 
of individuals, the creation of the state apparatus guarantees the improvement of 
their lives. This is because the state is the higher expression of human association 
and is always desirable to the state of nature, and the preservation of its form is 
necessary (TP, Chapters III. 4-8, VI. 1-8). Following these general elements of 
Spinoza’s conception of sovereignty, one might argue that his notion of the 
political authority tends towards a certain vision of an all-invasive state, which 
decides upon human life and death through laws and punishments. If we include 
in this notion of the state Spinoza’s claims regarding the inalienability of natural 
right, the power of affects, and his definition of the political body as the union of 
individual powers, then his paradigm of sovereignty becomes more complex. 
In Spinoza’s analysis, as we saw above, the conception of sovereignty, 
once affirmed, is not only linked to the notion of the state, but more importantly 
251 
 
has an intimate relation with the concept of life. In order to explore this relation 
between sovereignty and life I propose to employ Agamben’s reflections on 
sovereignty, as this provides fruitful insights for developing the arguments of the 
present chapter. Agamben, in my view, underlines in an innovative way the 
linkage between life and sovereignty. I want to emphasise that for the purpose of 
this work, a discussion of Agamben’s philosophy per se is not in question. Rather, 
I intend to utilise his notions of bare and sacred life as theoretical tools to analyse 
the theme of sovereignty and life in Spinoza’s political writings. These notions 
add a new conceptual level to the conceptual-affective of the Citizens of 
democracy, disclosing its political stakes more strongly. Therefore, my recourse 
to Agamben’s political concepts and reflections in relation to Spinoza’s politics is 
not intended to present a dialogue between him and Spinoza or to examine 
Agamben’s enquiry regarding the structure of contemporary sovereignty. 
In order to describe the very status of the human being in relation to 
contemporary sovereignty, Agamben looks back at the ambiguous figure of the 
sacred man defined in Roman law. The sacred man (homo sacer) is a person 
whose life lies between an inclusion and exclusion from the state. The sacred man 
is excluded from civil rights; he may thus be killed, but will not be elevated to the 
status of religious sacrifice. In Agamben’s own re-formulation, the paradigm of 
the sacred man defines the existing condition of the individual in relation to the 
state, in whom life “is sacred but yet may be killed” (Agamben, 1998: 15-28, 72-
85). For him, the political position of human life resides in the paradox of the 
inalienability of human rights (the sacredness of human being sanctioned by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen), which, given certain 
“exceptional” circumstances, may be abrogated (such as during wartime, and in 
the case of refugees).  
Deprived of sacred status, individual life returns to its original meaning of 
bare life (biological existence), which in turn may be killed. It is precisely in the 
schism between bare life and political life, Agamben claims, that the power of 
sovereignty lies (Agamben, 1998: 71-110).
86
 Agamben envisages the origins of 
this paradox in the history of Western thought from Aristotle onwards, which has 
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 Agamben’s definition of bare life has been strongly influenced by Arendt’s description of the 
refugee as “naked life”, as presented in her Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).   
252 
 
classified qualitatively the unity and complexity of human existence into two 
capacities, vital and political, negating the relevance of the biological one 
(Agamben 1998: 15-30). Certainly this reading goes far beyond Spinoza’s 
definitions of the relation between the state and citizens, natural and civil rights. 
Nevertheless, I think, Agamben’s concepts of bare life and sacred man might offer 
very thoughtful points of discussion for developing further the theme of life, 
affects and sovereignty in Spinoza’s thought.  
In the conceptual-affective persona of the Citizens of democracy, the state 
of fear examined above resembles the “exceptional” circumstances described by 
Agamben, where citizens are deprived of all their rights and reduced to bare life. 
In the Citizens of democracy under the state of fear, the relation between the 
sacred authority of the emperor and the passionate life of his subjects re-defines 
the domain of tyranny, provoking the enslavement of the despot and the uprising 
of his subjects. In the state of fear, it is the life of the emperor that is considered 
sacred, whereas the life of the subjects is deprived of any political significance. 
The emperor’s life is sacred in Agamben’s terms because the emperor cannot be 
killed or elevated through sacrifice. The emperor is, we have seen above, the son 
of Jupiter or the heir of Aenas. As with the exceptional circumstances of the 
refugee in Agamben’s reflections, in a regime of fear, Spinoza reminds us, the 
only form of life permitted by the emperor is that of a pure biological life, a bare 
life in Agamben’s terminology (TP, Chapters V. 4, VI. 4). Yet whilst they are 
reduced to bare life, the emperor’s subjects do not only resist slavery; they are 
also capable of political action. It is in this context that the interface between 
affects, sovereignty and life comes to light, re-configuring the state of fear.  
In Spinoza’s political analysis, the notions of conatus, desire and passions 
that are explained in the Ethics occupy a strategic role. A bare life, in the language 
of the Ethics, is conatus, which is power (literally: striving) of preserving and 
persevering into life. Thus, life, even at the biological level, is intrinsically linked 
to the idea of individuation (E. III, prop. VI, VII, VIII). Strictly speaking, conatus 
is a power of acting and thinking that pervades beings without coinciding with 
them. As I have argued in chapter II, it is a process, which is organised through 
relational phases located within a collective ground. With particular reference to 
253 
 
human beings, conatus is a power of desiring that is structured through relational 
movements of affecting and being affected, through which individuals re-signify 
themselves within the collective and vice versa (E. III, Def. Aff. I).  
This vital force of affecting and being affected incorporates political action 
too. In other words, stripped of all its predicates (vital, affective, rational, political 
and ethical), life is fundamentally abundant (desire) and politically cogent. 
Following Agamben’s critique of the categorisation of life into genres, and 
following also the negative political implications derived from this, I argue that a 
bare life in Spinoza’s philosophy is not only powerful; crucially, it is in addition 
political relevant. Therefore, unlike the general tendency in Western thought 
highlighted by Agamben, Spinoza presents a paradigm of life, which even in its 
vital stage is always powerful, relational and thus implicitly politically cogent. It 
is precisely in this context that the great originality of Spinoza’s philosophical 
gesture lies, to which contemporary political theory should pay closer attention.  
The political implication of Spinoza’s notion of bare life emerges more 
strongly through our persona of the Citizens of democracy in the phase of fear. In 
the case of our conceptual persona, under the state of fear, the bare life of the 
emperor’s subjects gives rise to effective political actions, meanings and time. 
These are, on the one side, the ground of the enslavement of the tyrant, which is 
characterised by the imaginary constitution of its power through the recourse to 
the myths of the past; on the other, the rise of the mass to freedom. In chapter XX 
of the TTP, Spinoza re-formulates in more political terms the affective anatomy of 
the power of subjects under a despotic regime. This power, he claims, is always 
stronger than any restrictive laws. Spinoza holds that in the state, where freedom 
is avoided, 
 
Those who are conscious of their own probity do not fear death as 
criminals do, nor do they beg for mercy, for they are not tormented 
with remorse for shameful deeds. On the contrary, they think it an 
honour, not a punishment, to die in a good cause, and a glorious thing 
die for freedom (TTP, Chapter XX: 570, my italics).   
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In this argument for freedom, we might discover the political constitution 
of the power – whether dormant or manifest – of every community under a 
repressive state. It is this indifference to death, I argue, that transforms the 
emperor’s subjects into his cruel enemy. The subjects oppose to the despot’s fear 
of death their own attachment to life (conatus), which is a pure abundance of 
forces, desires and tensions. As anticipated above, in the Ethics, the lack of 
concern for death makes individuals free, which implies in turn a pleasure for 
life.
87
 The indifference to death, which in the Ethics is freedom and plenitude of 
life, forms a concrete structure from the political resistance of not only 
enlightened men, but also of a heterogeneous group of individuals deprived of 
political status. Strictly speaking, everyone who lives under a regime of despotism 
rebels against the ruler regardless of the forms of life and rights allowed by the 
state.  
Thus, in the TTP Spinoza warns his readers that human beings under 
coercive laws naturally react against the state, causing rebellions and disorders.
88
 
Whilst laws against freedom originate from fear of death (the sacredness of the 
tyrant’s life), a group’s revolts derives from its desire for life (conatus). The 
former condition, as we have seen, generates the progressive enslavement of the 
emperor – or, in Simondon's state of anguish, the enfolding of the individual 
within himself (Simondon, 2007: 111-114) – whereas the concern of life opens 
the way to freedom. I would conclude that no matter how many times a sacred 
power attempts the de-politicisation of life, the latter always turns to the political 
again. 
Spinoza’s definition of bare life as already and always political has more 
radical implications. It is not only an expression of defence and care of life; in 
addition, it is also capable of transformations. Deprived of all of its predicates, the 
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 “A free man, […], is not guided by fear of death […], but directly desires the good […]; that is 
[…], to act, to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own 
advantage. So he thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation upon life” (E. 
IV, prop. LXVII, proof, my italics). 
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 “Men in general are so constituted that their resentment is most aroused when beliefs that they 
think to be true are treated as criminal, and when that which motivates their pious conduct towards 
God and man is accounted as wickedness. In consequence, they are emboldened to denounce the 
laws and go to all lengths to oppose the magistrate, considering it not a disgrace but honorable to 
stir up sedition and resort to any outrageous action in this cause” (TTP, Chapter XX: 569, my 
italics); and (TP IV. 4).   
255 
 
life of the Citizens of democracy is conatus (perseverance in life). It is this 
perseverance in life that connotes the aspect of the Greek demon, which acts as an 
inner and invasive force of the body. In the political individual (when some of its 
parts are damaged), this force passes from a condition of potentiality to actuality. 
In order to signal the total or partial corruption of the system, the demons internal 
to the structure of the state operate through the actualisation of concrete actions 
and thoughts (TP, Chapter X. 1). This is the case of despotic regimes structured 
through repressive laws. The administration of authority of these political orders, 
Spinoza explains, inevitably produces the indignation of its subjects, giving rise to 
rebellions, disorders and the dissolution of the entire state (TTP, Chapter XX: 
569-570).  
However, these themes pertaining to the demonic force of the subjects of 
the emperor leave two fundamental questions unanswered. Firstly, how might 
bare life, however powerful and demonic, produce the ‘common’? Secondly, how 
and why is the people’s power always greater than any established authority, even 
under the guidance of the passions? In order to avoid the temptation of populist 
answers and alliances with certain Marxist explanations, we might find a response 
to the origin of the power of the mass in Spinoza’s definitions of the social 
contract and natural rights. Spinoza’s arguments regarding the pact and the power 
of individuals in nature, I think, are the basis of the multitude's natural 
(ontological and political) condition of superiority over every established 
authority in any given time and space. Further, these explain the reasons for 
Spinoza’s thesis of the primacy of democracy over other forms of government 
such as monarchy and aristocracy.   
The power of our conceptual persona thus derives from two crucial 
elements. Firstly, it is the form of the pact stipulated between individuals, from 
which civil society emerges. As analysed at the beginning of this chapter, the 
contract signals a passage and not a rupture from the state of nature to a political 
one. This leads to a view in which society is seen as a process, and not as an 
artificial institution that is merely added to the lives of human beings as proposed 
by Rice (Rice, 1990: 274-285). In accordance with the claims made in chapter II, 
society is a process from a lesser phase of perfection to a greater one, which 
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signals the increasing level of complexity within the collective field. More 
importantly, this contract occurs between individuals who are already in a 
collective state, through whom the stipulation of an agreement acquires political 
cogency. In this way, the community is prior to and founds the state, which is 
always dependent upon the power of individuals as a collective body. 
Furthermore, Spinoza insistently reminds us that the status of individuals within 
the state must not be considered as a “state within the state”, but rather as a mens 
una (TP, Chapters II.2; III.2-6). Spinoza’s statement has crucial implications for 
determining the very role and persistence of the Citizens of democracy.  
Since the state is not divided into different organs that perform specific 
functions separated from the others, but rather it is conceived as a mens una, 
individuals occupy a powerful position.  Spinoza’s idea of the body politic as a 
mens una does not allow a dialectical mechanism or a strict divide between the 
public affairs of the state and the private interests of the citizens. Citizens, instead, 
are the constitutive and indestructible force of the more complex processes of 
signification of sovereignty itself. In other words, and whilst paraphrasing 
Agamben’s expression, the Citizens of democracy are not sacred and yet may be 
sovereign; they thus cannot be killed. It is for this reason, I would argue, that they 
are the demons of the state: plural, powerful and, importantly, inherent within the 
body politic. In the case of the despotic regime examined before, they become 
operative when dismissing the ruler and advancing the process of transformation.    
Secondly, as Spinoza claims, individuals do not entirely surrender their 
natural rights to the point of “ceasing to be a human being”. As we have seen, this 
means that the collective being preserves in any individualised social system a 
potential mass of power (natural rights), which constitutes, to use a Simondonian 
expression, the reserve of being of the individual (Simondon, 2007: 125-132). In a 
political context, I think, this reserve of being is (potentially) the ground of the 
production and fruition of the ‘common’, upon which the boundaries of the 
political are constantly signified and re-signified. It is precisely within the power 
of producing the domain of the ‘common’ that the natural (ontological) 
supremacy of the collective body, whether mob or citizens, lies. This power of 
producing the ‘common’ secures, generally, the equilibrium of the system from 
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possible tendencies toward stabilization, which would prevent movements of 
exchange of meanings and powers. In a particular situation, this generative power 
of production orients and constrains the actions of any form of government, 
however democratic or despotic, as the events that occurred in the Roman Empire 
have shown (TP, Chapter VI.2).  
In chapter III the affective and relational gestures of the Subjects of Moses 
brought us to the need to re-shape our understanding of society through a 
conception of its complexity. This vision of society as part of a more problematic 
process does not suggest the idea of a form of agency behind and beyond the 
constitution of the political order, which would direct the system toward the 
better, or towards the truth. Rather, historical events amply testify to the 
impossibility of conceptualising the development of societies within fixed 
categories of Truth, Spirit and obscure forms of agency. A theory of complexity, 
instead, implies the understanding of the human modes of association as 
intensively problematic, and as moving through confluences of forces, problems 
and solutions.  
As there is no pre-established project beyond human societies, this means 
that the development of society follows unsuspected movements, which can 
hardly be predicted. For this, spontaneous movements might lead in some cases to 
dramatic phases, such as the state of anguish of the Subjects of Moses, or the 
joyful moments in the emergence of the “Good News” within the conceptual 
persona of Apostles. In the conceptual-affective persona of the Citizens of 
democracy, the complexity of the system becomes more problematic and multi-
sided. This is, on the one hand, the aspect of the Greek demon, which we have 
analysed above. On the other, our conceptual-affective persona brings to light a 
destructive tendency, which gives birth to cruel political gestures. It is in this 
moment that the Citizens of democracy behave with as evil actions within the 
body of society.  
 
 
 
 
258 
 
The evils of the state: A defence of life 
 
As we have analysed above, Spinoza does not only refer to the productive 
aspect of the mass (as in the figure of the Greek demon); in many circumstances 
he describes it in quite negative tones.
89
 On several occasions, Spinoza develops 
severe attacks upon the masses, accusing them of ignorance, servility and 
ambition. Spinoza’s hostile vision of the many opens up to the other aspect 
embodied by the Citizens of democracy, that of the meaning of demon in a 
Catholic sense.
90
 This refers to an inclination to act as an evil force within the 
state, which brings about the emergence of a blind cruelty.  
As we have seen above, in repressive states, passions of fear, ambition and 
indignation shape the political actions and thoughts of the entire society, passing 
from the ruler to the ruled. Although passions of indignation and anger might lead 
to concrete and constructive actions, such as the collapse of despotic regimes, 
nevertheless, Spinoza explains, they still remain passions. From the arguments of 
the Ethics, we know that passions decrease the power of acting and thinking of 
individuals, which implies the reduction or stabilisation of the level of 
complexity. To put this in more Simondonian terms: passions are negative for the 
individuals insofar as they detach the singular being from the collective field. 
Strictly speaking, in a passive state an individual loses the possibility of being a 
constitutive part of the process of individuation.  
Seen through the argumentative thread provided by the conceptual persona 
of the Citizens of democracy, Spinoza’s account of passions has important 
political implications. These concern the role of evil played by the mass within a 
civil context, in which the objects of the social pact are partially or totally 
corrupted. As mentioned above, this aspect is significantly highlighted in the 
                                                 
89See for example Spinoza’s claim that the multitude is easily manipulated by theological 
superstition; as he says, “Following this example of the Pharisees, the vilest hypocrites, urged on 
by the same fury which they call zeal for God’s law, have everywhere persecuted men whose 
blameless character and distinguished qualities have exited the hostility of the masses, publicly 
denouncing their beliefs and inflaming the savage crowd’s anger against them”  (TTP, Chapter 
XVIII, p. 555, my italics).  
90
For Spinoza the notions of evil and good do not exist in terms of universal categories of thought. 
Rather, Spinoza claims that the conceptual couple of evil and good refers to what can increases or 
decreases the individual conatus, see (E. IV, Def. I-II; TTP, Chapters XVI-XIX). My use of the 
image of the evil is addressed to simply conceptualise a disruptive force, which operates within the 
body of the Citizens of democracy.          
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Theological Political Treatise. Commenting on the events of the English Civil 
War, Spinoza observes that people were only able to change the monarch without 
extinguishing the causes of tyranny effectively (TTP, Chapter XVIII: 556). This 
has led, Spinoza claims, to the re-creation of the monarchic system under a 
different ruler, who behaves politically as the former king in all but in name.
91
 It 
is through the example offered by the English events that the passive tones of our 
conceptual persona entirely re-define the political scene.  
As discussed before, in a despotic regime fear shapes the political action of 
the emperor, whereas indignation structures the reaction of its subjects. The 
consequences of the emperor’s fear were the progressive enslavement and the 
death of his empire. The limit of the subjects’ indignation concerns the incapacity 
of structuring actions, which go far beyond the defence of actual life. Although 
the subjects of a tyrant are a powerful and free community, Spinoza observes, 
their political gestures are unable to defeat tyranny. This inadequacy is caused 
mainly by indignation and anger, which, as Spinoza explains in the Ethics, are 
generated from hatred, and not from joy. This causes, as I have argued in chapter 
II, the effacement of movements of exchange and alterations of meaning and 
powers, and thus of the possibility of transforming and being transformed (affect 
and being affected by the others in the language of the Ethics).  
This absence of expansive movements in the political body immediately 
implies a different constitution of time, which becomes restricted to the form of 
the present. The present is no longer the actualisation of the infinite possibilities 
of the future or the meanings of the past; rather, it is a static place characterised by 
retreats and restorations. Deprived of the multiple potentialities of the future, the 
care of life nuanced by indignation and hatred cannot produce political gestures 
other than destructions and the sudden re-establishment of extant forms. 
Consequently, the Citizens of democracy can kill and overthrow monarchs as 
many times as they please without abolishing monarchy. As the English revolt has 
shown, after having executed the king and caused cruel massacres, people 
searched for the return to monarchy. 
                                                 
91Spinoza specifically refers to the execution of Charles I (1649), the establishment of Cromwell’s 
protectorate (1653-58), and the Restoration of monarchy (1660).   
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It follows that the care and defence of life, however free from the fear of 
death, do not directly mean joy and love of life, which instead are the ground of 
productive movements. By contrast, in its more evil aspect, our conceptual 
persona lacks a future, as it loses its power to actualise the possibilities of the 
future within the present. Concerned more with the defence of actual life rather 
than an enjoyment of it, the Citizens of democracy understand all the new and 
unpredictable events as possible risks (such as a new king) to their life, which 
consequently have to be destroyed as soon as these enter the threshold of the 
community (TP, Chapter V.6). As a result of this lack of future and of joy of life, 
they will kill Christ. The masses, under the guidance of hatred, Spinoza warns us, 
do not hesitate to prosecute Christ, philosophers and intellectuals (TTP, Chapter 
XVIII: 555).   
A consequence of this evil tendency is that the body of our conceptual 
persona tends toward a stabilisation of the political order, which implies the 
progressive decrease of the power to re-signify the ‘common’. In this light, every 
emerging political reality will be necessarily re-defined and bound within the pre-
existing order. In this same respect, Cromwell’s protectorate and Augustus’ 
empire are a repetition of the former ruling order. This, notably, does not mean 
that the collective body under the control of hatred ceases to be the ground and the 
generative source of the ‘common’. As we have analysed, it is the very 
ontological (natural) constitution of the collective beings that produces the 
‘common’ and which makes them impossible to kill. The evil character, rather, 
involves a mere reproduction of the present order and the occlusion of the future.  
From the arguments made so far, I would conclude that Spinoza’s enquiry 
into the cruelty of the mass reveals his concern for the loss of political life under 
the domain of hatred, and thereby the necessity of giving a sacred status to people 
through civil rights and laws. As discussed before, whilst the lives of individuals 
might be reduced by a politics of hate, life is always political. Spinoza’s analysis 
brings to light a more complex process, and one that is at risk under the states of 
fear and hatred. This process pertains to the development and fruition of the 
‘common’, through which – and solely through which – relations, meanings and 
further transformations are founded. A fundamental question arises in relation to 
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these arguments. Assuming Spinoza’s refusal of any form of agency, higher mind 
and a society of philosophers, how might this complex collective being constitute 
a democratic state? To answer this question, we must examine the constructive 
elements in Spinoza’s discourse, which encourages the development of a 
community and the prevention of its possible dissolution.  
Spinoza observes that the political life of every community, nuanced by 
the affects of joy, love, piety and hope, has been directed towards the stability, 
peace and unity of the entire society. In the TTP, Spinoza reflects upon the “amor 
patriae” (love of one’s nation) of the Israelites under Moses’ governance, and the 
apostolic doctrine of love and piety. Although the Hebrews’ love for their nation 
ultimately caused the exclusion and successive failure of the Jewish nation, 
Spinoza notes how this amor patriae in itself favoured a politics of fidelity and 
solidarity, which certainly reinforced the entire political order (TTP, Chapter 
XVII: 547). This was based, Spinoza explains, on the use of a popular army, a 
certain respect for the principle of unanimity in issuing laws, decision making, 
and common ethical habits. Concerning the religion of the New Testament, 
Spinoza finds many fruitful insights in the precepts of the apostles and teachings 
of Christ, which might consolidate an ethics of mutual assistance and cohesion. 
Specifically, Spinoza’s interest is directed to the apostolic principle of “love of 
one’s neighbour”, which reinstates the importance of relations, sharing and 
tolerance, favouring the development of democratic values. The Jewish form of 
patriotism and the apostolic ethics shaped by love and devotion provide Spinoza 
with important instruments for conceptualising in more political terms his theory 
of consensus and thereby democracy. Spinoza’s enquiry into the dynamics of the 
democratic community is intended to unveil some of the mechanisms in which joy 
and love structure powerful political behaviours and transformations.  
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States of love and joy: Democracy 
 
Beside the question of the apostolic doctrine and the patriotism of the 
Jewish people, the importance of Spinoza’s references to amor patriae and 
universal love concern his recognition of love, devotion and wonder as important 
counter-arguments to the state of fear (despotism). Affectivity, once again, 
features in Spinoza’s political discourse as a basis and not as an instrument for the 
establishment and progress a community. In his search for more adequate 
conditions for the development of society, the role of affectivity becomes 
increasingly central and multi-sided. It is through the affects of love, devotion and 
piety that democratic values are founded and developed.  
These affects, I will argue, are recognised as proper political categories, 
which open the way to a new path of making and thinking the polis. Spinoza 
develops the idea of a possible linkage between democracy and affectivity, 
specifically between love (piety) and democracy, through which notions of life, 
flows of time and relations re-colonize the domain of the political. The novelty of 
Spinoza’s political move, I think, concerns the way his arguments are not limited 
to unveiling the mechanisms in which sovereignty invades every moment of the 
lives of a community, but rather show how life as an expression of joy and love 
determines the production of the political.
92
 In other words, Spinoza’s democratic 
formula offers important insights into how life can reclaim control over the 
sovereign power. 
Although a detailed description of the democratic institution is missing 
from the TP, its absence does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. This 
work is mainly focused on how the affective life in common of the multitude 
tends naturally towards democracy, and both the Treatises amply address these 
themes. Drawing upon the final chapters of the Theological Political Treatise with 
the theoretical support of the Political Treatise and the Ethics, we might 
determine the modes in which the multitude behaves democratically, and more 
                                                 
92
 The political relevance of Spinoza’s notions affects and life has been particularly emphasised by 
Hardt and Negri, influencing also the development of Hardt and Negri’s own theory of bio-politics 
(Hardt and Negri’s, 2006: 93-95; Negri, 2005: 170-229).    
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specifically how affects are powerful sources of democratic actions, thoughts and 
tensions. 
Having explained the collective foundation of the social pact and the 
negative consequences of a politics of fear, Spinoza makes a fundamental claim at 
the very beginning of the Political Treatise, which enriches the thesis espoused in 
the TTP. Spinoza affirms that a “common desire” gives birth to civil society,93 
and this reveals Spinoza’s awareness of the emergence of society as the abundant 
and collective production of desires, and certainly not that of poverty or need. The 
significance of Spinoza’s position is that he identifies desires and tensions at the 
very basis of the origins of society, thereby opening up a reading of human forms 
of association as complex confluences of problems, potentials and forces (TP, 
Chapter III. 6-9). It is at this moment that Spinoza’s quest for democracy 
commences.  
Spinoza describes democracy as “a united body of men (“coetus universus 
hominum”) which corporately (“collegialiter”) possess sovereign power over 
everything within its power” (TTP, Chapter XVI: 530). For Spinoza, the 
superiority of this political model is that the authority of the state (Potestas) relies 
directly on the power of its members, who, through their original pact, have 
founded the civil body. It is for this reason, Spinoza argues, that democracy is the 
closer form of political organisation and coherent transformation to the state of 
nature, in which the right of everyone is coextensive with on individual’s own 
power (TTP, Chapter XVI: 531). These primary definitions form the basis of 
Spinoza’s advocacy of democracy, that is, the defence and expansion of 
consensus and freedom within the commonwealth. In the TTP, Spinoza clarifies 
his treatment of democracy before the other forms of state by claiming that the 
notion of freedom is immediately implied in the democratic system (TTP, Chapter 
XVI: 531). A democratic life inaugurates a practise of freedom, which is never 
simply individual liberty circumscribed within the private sphere of the citizen. 
From the arguments of the TP, we know that freedom is concerned with a 
                                                 
93“Since men, […], are led more by passions than by reason, it naturally follows that a people will 
unite and consent to be guided as if one mind not at reason’s prompting but through some common 
emotion, such as […] a common hope, or a common fear, or desire to avenge some common 
injury” (TP, Chapter VI. 1)  
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collective (“collegialiter”) production of consensus and unanimity (a mens una), 
which is fundamentally political and inherent within the domain of sovereignty.
  
Related particularly to the TTP, the vision of democracy as a collective 
production of consensus moves Spinoza to advocate freedom as the very object 
and end of the state, without which the entire body of a society loses its power and 
potential (TTP, Chapter XX: 567). Spinoza claims that the organisation of the 
political body should be based on the inalienable freedom of speech and thought, 
upon which the progress of the whole society resides (TTP, Chapter XX: 568). 
The importance of Spinoza’s arguments as to the inalienability of the freedom of 
judgement stems from the direct impact that he claims it exerts upon the political 
life of a community, and from the way in which it thereby collectively re-
characterises and further transforms practises and ideas. Moreover, Spinoza’s 
advocacy of freedom is immediately nuanced by affectivity, and specifically by 
love and piety, which consequently become the sources and, at the same time, the 
outcome of a politics of freedom.  
 
Agorà: A “common desire”  
   
Spinoza’s claim as to the linkage between democracy, freedom and affects 
becomes a crucial element within the thread of our conceptual persona of the 
Citizens of democracy, which we have examined under the state of fear. The 
affects of love and piety that derive from the democratic state give rise to more 
problematic relational movements, which connote the political actions of the 
collective body of the Citizens. In the state of democracy, they behave politically 
as virtuosi and demons of the state. In democracy, demons are the virtuosi of the 
state and virtuosi are the demons of the polis. It is in this moment that the 
affective production of the common good emerges.
94
  
In the states of fear and violence, we have seen that our persona 
incorporates the two meanings (Ancient Greek and Catholic) of the image of 
demon, which alternately characterise its political actions as a productive (the 
enslavement of the emperor) and as a disruptive force (the execution of Christ). In 
                                                 
94
 I follow Hardt and Negri’s analysis (2006) of the ways in which the multitude, in its aspects of 
demons and virtuosi, act within democracy,  
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the state of democracy, the citizens still express the Ancient Greek conception of 
demon as inspiring force, which plays a pivotal role within the dynamics of the 
community. Unlike the state of fear, in this democratic stage, the Catholic figure 
of evil is replaced by the constructive function of the virtuosi of the polis. 
As mentioned before, freedom is the ground of the development of the 
democratic body. In the Ethics, we have seen, the notion of freedom has a direct 
relation with the concept of life, which is in turn connected with the theme of 
desire as the very essence of humankind (E. IV, prop. LXVII, prop. LXIII and 
schol.). For Spinoza, a free life is nuanced by the affects of joy and love, which 
individualise beings through desires and tensions (E. III, prop. XI, schol.; E. IV, 
prop. LX, prop. XLI). In chapter II, we saw that these affects do not express a 
private virtue or ethical attitude. Rather, love and joy are expansive and invasive 
phases of a more general process of individuation. Importantly, these phases do 
not coincide with already individuated individuals; instead, they create 
individuals coinciding one with the other. Thus, joy and love increase the 
relational composition of individuals (the level of complexity). Given these 
conceptions of love and joy as relational and powerful forces of individuation, and 
also as conditions of freedom, Spinoza’s theory of a free democratic community 
necessarily exceeds practises of sharing, mutual assistance and political principle 
of unanimity. In the conceptual persona of the Apostles, discussed in chapter III, 
we saw that the actualisation of love through the body of Christ has produced not 
only a different religious and cultural move, but also complex political 
transformations. In Spinoza’s political enquiry, affects acquire a more radical and 
powerful position.  
To assume the necessity of founding a democratic body on love, joy and 
thus freedom suggests an idea of democracy as an open structure that allows for 
transformations and the exchange of forces. In this way, the time of democracy is 
structured through unexpected phenomena that activate the multiple potentialities 
of the future. In aristocracy, for example, democratic time proceeds through the 
interstices of the patrician assemblies and the rumours of the plebs, and suddenly 
accelerates each time a state of fear collapses (TP, IX. 14- VII. 27). I would 
however argue here that democracy is not solely a political project or possibility 
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that can never be fully realised. Such a view would inevitably imply a return to a 
form of messianism, and thus to a time of expectation. In contrast, the openness of 
democracy means an actual political individual, the equilibrium of which is in a 
condition of actuality and potentiality. In this respect, a democratic system is a 
concrete political organisation, which is actualised in many different forms; and it 
also contains unexpressed meanings, individuals and actions, which will be 
transformed into more complex political subjectivities. Paraphrasing Negri, I 
would claim that for Spinoza democracy is that which is already achieved and yet 
that which is also yet to come.   
However, the open structure of the democratic state does not imply that it 
is qualitatively more perfect, or the embodiment of truth. Rather, it denotes the 
level of complexity of a society. This complexity results from emerging problems, 
individuals, conflicts and pacts, which densely populate the democratic 
community. It is in this moment that the Citizens behave as demons within the 
domain of the political. In a free democratic system, Spinoza warns us, there are 
many possible problems, such as internal enemies and conflicts. Spinoza refers 
here to the possible phenomena of subversion (TTP, Chapter XX: 567-568) and, 
more generally, to disagreements amongst citizens. As in the state of fear, the 
demons imbued within the body politic pass from a condition of latency to an 
actual one. The actions of the demons, we have seen, do not tend to remove or 
exclude the emerging political being, but instead transform it into a more complex 
reality. Importantly, the emerging reality will not be integrated and attuned within 
the existing community. This would direct the process toward movements of 
retreat and restoration, such as those that occurred in the crucifixion of Christ 
analysed above. Yet, as argued above, in the state of joy and love (democracy), 
the collective body is affected by and affects the emerging reality, thereby 
enriching the present with the possibility of the future.  
In this respect the Citizens of democracy certainly place the existing 
political order under constant threat, and it is in this constant risk that the 
superiority (its openness) of democracy lies.
95
 For this, Spinoza concludes, “what 
                                                 
95“I do indeed admit that there may sometimes be some disadvantages in allowing such freedom, 
but what institution was ever so wisely planned that no disadvantages could arise therefrom?” 
(TTP, Chapter XX: 569).  
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cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed, even if harm often ensues” 
(TTP, Chapter XX: 569, my italics). In other words, Spinoza tells us that a life in 
common is always placed on the edge of incompatibilities, and that it is always 
better to release the latter than to restrain them. Thus, as with the state of fear, the 
life in common of the citizens of democracy expresses a pure excess of desire, 
through which they move towards tyranny. This form of the life in common of 
individuals – a form that originated through their “common desire” – cannot, I 
would argue, be destroyed. Collective individuals, in every community (historical, 
political, ethical) in which they live, express a constant condition of 
incompatibility. As I have argued in chapter III, it is in the very anatomy and 
power of individuals to encounter this incompatibility. Therefore, a political 
institution founded on this ontological structure necessarily has to give rise to the 
complete actualisation of these problems and incompatibilities, and also to be the 
place itself of these tensions. 
Spinoza’s complex description of a democratic life, populated by relations, 
tensions and various forces, evokes the Ancient Greek notion of agorà (literally: 
“place of assembly”). The Ancient Greek agorà was a place of assembly that was 
not recognised by the sovereign state as politically relevant, but in which political 
ideas, discussion, struggles and sedition were nonetheless organised. The agorà 
delineated an alternative political life outside the boundaries of the state that 
impacted upon the stability of the body politic. In Spinoza’s own re-formulation, 
the agorà acquires a more radical political meaning. It becomes the fundamental 
place of the actualisation of the “common desire” and the production of the 
“common good”. In the TTP, the structure of the agorà is not conceived as a 
“state within the state”, but instead becomes the condition for the production of 
the political itself. It is precisely in this context that our conceptual persona 
embodies the role of the virtuosi of the state. In the Spinozan agorà everyone who 
intervenes within the administration of democracy is a virtuosi rather than an 
enemy of the state. A good citizen is, for example, a man that views, 
 
[…] a certain law is against sound reason, and he therefore advocates 
its repeal. If he at the same time submits his opinion to the judgement 
of the sovereign power […], and meanwhile does nothing contrary to 
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what is commanded by that law, he deserves well of the state, acting 
as a good citizen should do.  (TTP, Chapter XX: 568).  
    
 
 This active role given to the virtuosi of the state, shaped by love and piety, 
reinforces the image of the demons, which expose the political domain to novel 
realities. As we have analysed in the state of fear, the power of the demons is 
fundamentally founded on the capacity to produce ‘the common’, through which 
Greek gods, divine fathers and epic gestures have been developed. It is in this 
context that the originality of Spinoza’s notion of democracy lies. Spinoza’s 
definition of the political status of virtuosi as fundamentally productive and 
invasive leads us to directly relate the meaning of democracy to the fruition of the 
“common good”. To situate the production of the “common good” at the very 
heart of democratic praxis is to set aside the construction of the democratic body 
from the logic of the state apparatus. The identification of democracy with the 
production of the “common good” suggests a vision of democracy as an actual 
and complex process that is structured through the intensive and expansive forces 
of the affects of joy, love and piety. From the Ethics, I have argued that these 
affects are transversal to the collective body, and that they expose and complicate 
the realm of the individuals. This implies an understanding of democracy as a 
political individual located between generality and singularity, and between 
individuation and potentiality. This view of democracy, as essentially a hybrid 
individual, brings about the discovery of a different paradigm of the democratic 
body, which is constituted by and through a theory of complexity. As anticipated, 
a thought of complexity in political theory is based on a process of collective and 
affective individuation. Understanding democracy through a theory of complexity 
might provide us with an approach to political philosophy able to exceed 
dialectical process, logics of poverty or lack, or notions of transcendent agency. 
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 Conclusions: Towards a new grammar of democracy  
 
This chapter has investigated the relation between democracy and 
affectivity within Spinoza’s political writings, and has considered the extent to 
which his democratic theory might offer relevant insights for contemporary 
thought and practice. Attention has been given to the affects and passions of joy, 
love, fear, hatred and indignation within the political section of the TTP and the 
unfinished TP, and to some of the mechanisms by which they produce important 
political individuals, meanings and transformations. In both treatises, Spinoza 
gives full attention to the political status of affectivity within the constitution and 
development of the democratic community, locating affects directly within the 
realm of the multitude. This has led us to investigate the anatomy of the power of 
the multitude, and to ask whether or not the multitude can be an expression of 
democratic practises. 
The protagonist of this chapter was the conceptual persona of the Citizens 
of democracy. This latter has shown us an alternative mode of thinking life under 
democracy, within which affectivity and the multitude occupy central positions. 
The Citizens of democracy have brought to light the fundamental problem and 
thesis of Spinoza’s philosophical production, that is, how a life in common might 
be constructed. The manifold status of the Citizens of democracy exemplified by 
the aspects of demons, evils and virtuosi has indicated how affects of joy, love, 
hatred and indignation have a concrete impact upon the political body, and how 
they reconfigure notions of temporality, sovereignty and relations. It is precisely 
in this context, I would argue, that the originality of Spinoza’s philosophical 
gesture lies. Spinoza presents the idea that the ‘bare’ life of individuals is 
structured through a confluence of desires, affects and passions, which are 
powerful sources of political meanings and actions. These sources always make 
individuals stronger than any formed sovereign state. 
As a full expression of collective and joyful life, democracy is an open 
plane moulded through continuous transformations. This means that Spinoza’s 
vision of democracy is not merely a project or a possibility; instead, it is a 
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concrete political individual. This definition of democracy as pure openness has a 
further political implication, which refers to the relation between the democratic 
body and the state apparatus. The novelty of Spinoza’s thesis stems from its 
identification of the realisation of the democratic order with the fruition of the 
“common good”, without passing through the constitution of any form of 
sovereign authority; democracy is thereby located in the collective body of the 
multitude. I would thus argue that in relation to the search for an adequate 
paradigm of contemporary democracy, Spinoza’s account, which presents 
democracy as an open structure that is both individual and engaged in a process of 
transformation, may disclose alternative trajectories able to lead towards a 
different political vocabulary. Such a vocabulary should include a more expansive 
view of the relation between affectivity and democracy, as it is through that 
relation that the power of the multitude might be conceptualised.  
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Conclusion: 
 
The individual as a powerful problem 
 
This thesis has investigated the convergence between ontology and politics 
in the work of Baruch Spinoza, and has considered the extent to which his 
philosophy might disclose unexplored possibilities for re-theorising the social in a 
materialist way. Its enquiry into Spinoza’s thought is situated within the general 
tendency inaugurated by Continental thought, which has seen the rehabilitation of 
the materialist ontology within political theory. My contribution in the existing 
debate has been an argument for the re-positioning of the importance of a 
materialist ontology of individuation in order to re-define the realm of the 
individual within the present. The return to a thought of individuation, claimed in 
the thesis, has been motivated by the continental portrayal of the social body as a 
complex system; a view that requires a fresh notion of the individual. A 
materialist ontology of individuation does not offer a formula, principle and 
archetype of the individual being, but rather explains the mechanism through 
which individuals come to light. For a materialist theory of individuation this 
mechanism is common to all beings and inherent within nature.  
The study of Spinoza’s philosophy has been decisive for the re-assessment 
of the importance of a thought of individuation today, and my investigation of his 
philosophy of individuation has been constructed around a specific object. 
Following Balibar’s suggestion as to a certain affinity between Spinoza and 
Simondon’s philosophical views, I have re-interpreted the arguments of the Ethics 
and the political Treatises through Simondon’s ontology of individuation. My aim 
has been directed neither to the establishment of similarities between Simondon 
and Spinoza, nor to influences of the latter upon the former. Rather, the recourse 
to Simondon’s reflections has re-situated Spinoza’s thought upon an alternative 
theoretical ground. This involves a materialist model of individuation, which 
analyses the genesis and development of ontological, ethical and political beings.  
272 
 
I have argued that Spinoza’s theory of individuation is based on an 
intricate paradigm of materialism. This interpretation of Spinoza’s materialist 
discourse has been conducted in chapters I and II. In chapter I, the central theme 
has been the analysis of the fundaments of Spinoza’s materialist ontology, 
focusing on the categories of the absolute, power, immanence, nature, the attribute 
and, specifically, matter and thought. These notions delineate the distinct model of 
materialism presented by Spinoza, from which his theory of individuation follows. 
In order to develop this chapter’s arguments, I have examined the receptions of 
the Ethics within continental and analytic schools, and considered the ways in 
which they have treated the themes of matter and thought within the Ethics. A 
consideration of these interpretations has been decisive for understanding the 
richness of Spinoza’s system of reality and, specifically materiality. More 
significantly, these readings, in different ways, have contributed to the 
construction of my approach to the theme of materialism within the Ethics.  
Whilst the analytic reading assumes ideas and rationality as the central 
elements that drive the entire system of the Ethics, the continental approach 
affirms that matter, bodily movements, immanence and power are the constitutive 
principles of Spinoza’s ontology. The former concludes that rationality organises 
reality entirely, and holds that reason ultimately shapes human actions. The latter 
draws a model of materialism from Spinoza’s theories of nature, matter and the 
metaphysics of Substance. The risk, to which the analytic approach might lead, I 
have claimed, is that of falling into a form of mentalisation of matter. By this I 
mean that the structure of the mental comes to shape extended reality entirely: 
matter either simply becomes thought by another name, or materiality becomes an 
empty category. Such an approach fails to fully evaluate the richness of Spinoza’s 
account of matter, which in the Ethics is assumed as one of the modalities of 
Substance-nature. 
In order to re-assess the status of matter, the thesis then moved to a 
discussion of the continental study of the Ethics, which defines Spinoza’s 
ontology as radical form of materialism. The interpretation of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics developed within the continental perspective insists on the centrality 
of the themes of immanence, absolute and power, and also on the infinity of 
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matter and its correspondence with thought. These elements re-assess the cogency 
of the sensible world and delineate the productive statuses of materiality and 
nature within Spinoza’s account of reality. As a result, Spinoza’s ontological 
system is recognised as pure activity, within which thought and matter are equally 
productive. The main problem that I have encountered within this approach, 
however, is that it does not fully explain how various individuals and events might 
follow from a system of pure activity. Strictly speaking, how does such a pure 
system, which produces itself, also produces the world and all existing beings?  
Building upon the continental approach to the Ethics, the arguments made 
in chapter I re-consider Spinoza’s ontology as a complex system of production. 
Specifically, I have claimed that Spinoza’s ontology presents an anomalous 
process of production. This is a process because the modalities of Being, by 
which Substance-nature is surrounded, - expresses phases, which actualise and 
constantly differentiate the entire ontological system. It is anomalous because in 
Spinoza’s metaphysics of Substance - determinism and contingency coexist 
without contradicting one another. Lastly, I also define Spinoza’s ontology as a 
process of production because the essence of Substance is defined as pure power; 
and also because the emergence of ideas, bodies and the relation between cause 
and effect correspond to series of changes. It is this anomalous process of 
production that, in my reading, grounds Spinoza’s paradigm of materialism. This 
materialist model of production necessarily opens up an alternative mode of 
thinking the emergence of singular individuals and their interrelation within the 
world.  
Having delineated the fundaments of Spinoza’s materialist ontology, 
chapter II explores the paradigm of the individual emerging from this anomalous 
process of production. Spinoza’s conception of the human individual is centred on 
an accurate study of the dynamics of affects and passions and rationality. It is 
preceded by an enquiry into the structure of the body and the development of 
ideas, self-awareness and knowledge of the world. These arguments suggest 
Spinoza’s primary interest to lie in knowledge of the generative process through 
which individuals are formed. As mentioned above, given Spinoza’s attention on 
the genesis and development of beings, I have suggested a detour of Spinoza via 
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Simondon’s paradigm of individuation, focusing to the Simondonian categories of 
pre-individuality, collective field, disparation, metastability and transindividuality. 
These notions delineate the value of the collective as an irreducible condition of 
individuation, the definition of the individual as an excess of heterogeneity, and 
the crucial role of emotions within the formation of psychic beings.  
By reading Spinoza’s theses of the individual and affectivity via 
Simondon, the arguments that I have put forward concern the way in which 
Spinoza’s ontology unveils a manifold process of vital and psychic individuation. 
This is constructed around the notions of relationality and affectivity. More 
rigorously, for Spinoza, vital and psychic individuals are created through 
relational confluences and exchanges of power. Related particularly to the psychic 
process of individuation, this resides in the realm of the affects, which individuate 
and further differentiate beings into more complex forms of collective life. The 
status of the individual emerging from this process of individuation is very 
complex. This is not the principle of individuation and yet it is extremely 
powerful.  
For Spinoza, the individual expresses an unstable mixture of various 
grades of reality, the perfection of which consists in its capacity to affect and be 
affected by other individuals. Considered in itself, the singular being is possessed 
of abundant individuated and non individuated parts, which are actualised and 
further differentiated within the collective context. The role of the individual 
within the process of individuation resides in constituting a problem and a 
solution within the system. As a problem, the individual is introduced into the 
collective power. As a solution, the individual singular exchanges and transforms 
a mass of power with the collective, moving further the process of individuation. 
In this light, the power of the individual, I have suggested, concerns its being one 
and more than one, in the middle between collective and particular realities. In 
other words, it is the unavoidable and powerful problem in every context 
(political, psychic and natural) in which the individual lives. The understanding of 
this is imperative for determining the political stakes of Spinoza’s thought.  
In chapters III and IV, I have discussed the political implications of 
Spinoza’s ontology of individuation for the constitution of the multitude as a 
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political category. In these chapters, I have adopted an alternative strategy of 
reading the political Treatises. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
conceptual personae, I have constructed conceptual-affective personae around 
facts and historical figures discussed in Spinoza’s political writings. These pose or 
resolve a question within Spinoza’s political reflections. In chapter III, the 
passionate-conceptual personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses 
and the Apostles have been crucial in addressing the problem of the ambiguous 
position of passions within the Theological Political Treatise. These are, on the 
one hand, the origin of human servitude and, on the other, productive of social 
relations, common values and practises of sharing and participation. In both cases, 
passions impact effectively upon the dynamics of a community, generating new 
meanings, relational events, collective life and flows of time. These factors 
consistently re-shape the existing political theatre. 
The exposition of these themes via conceptual personae has revealed a 
more extensive role attributed by Spinoza to passions within the political context. 
In each conceptual persona examined, passions of fear, hope, devotion and 
wonder indicate the emergence of a problem that affect not the individual 
community, but rather the entire political body. Thus, the domain of the political 
is not the place of exchanges and transformations of thoughts, actions and 
potentials, which inevitably modify the development of the process of 
individuation. The conceptual personae of the Treatise do not signal a rupture 
within the production of the political, but rather the presence of incompatibilities 
in the existing system. For example, we have seen in this light that the Apostles 
and the Subjects of Moses are not the political and ethical revolutionary subject; 
neither are they the oppressed class. Rather, they are fundamentally incompatible 
with the homogeneity of the state of God, the pharaoh and the Roman Empire, for 
which they constitute a powerful problem. The great modernity of Spinoza’s 
political thesis resides in his idea of community, structured and individuated 
through levels of heterogeneity, incompatibilities and problems. These do not 
proceed through logics of social contract, rational choice and transcendent agency. 
Affectivity, even its passive aspect, is the ground of this process, which introduces 
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and further problematises the political domain with more complex flows of time, 
collective life and tensions. 
Having examined the affective tones of the political within the Theological 
Political Treatise, in chapter IV, I have discussed the interface between affectivity 
and democracy, which Spinoza describes as the greatest expression of political 
society. I have drawn attention to the affective politics of the multitude, and 
considered its role within the development of democracy. The protagonist of 
chapter IV is the Citizens of democracy. This affective-conceptual persona 
articulates the central thesis and great preoccupation that accompanies Spinoza’s 
project from the Ethics, through the Theological Political Treatise, to the Political 
Treatise. This is the conceptualisation of the paradigm of the life in common 
embodied by the multitude. Spinoza envisages in the life in common of the 
multitude an alternative form of democratic praxis, which lies, obstinately, in the 
interstices between the authority of the tyrant and the power of its subjects, the 
revolutionary and reactionary movements of the mass. 
The analysis of the affective status of the multitude through the conceptual 
persona of the Citizens of democracy has shown that the power of the multitude 
emerges from its life. Spoiled of its predicates (ethical habits and political rights), 
the life of the multitude is a mixture of affects and passions such as joy, love and 
hatred, which, as we have seen in chapters III and IV, are continually productive 
of complex political meanings, individuals and actions. These form the domain of 
the ‘common’, which is produced and further developed by the affective politics 
of the multitude. It is for this reason, I have argued, that in Spinoza’s political 
writings the multitude tenaciously persists in every historical juncture and is 
greater than any form of sovereignty such as monarchy, oligarchy and tyranny. It 
means that the multitude is not only a political subject such as the people, class 
and subjects, but more significantly it is the theatre of the realisation of the 
‘common’. In this manner, the multitude cannot be thought as a social category in 
opposition to others, but rather as a problematic and incompatible individual.  
In a Spinozist way, democracy is an open individual, which embodies and 
further develops the collective and affective life of the multitude. This marks the 
difference between Spinoza and his contemporaries, indicating his modernity. 
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Spinoza does not associate democracy with the concept of sovereignty, but 
instead, with the fruition of the ‘common good’, which in turn resides in the realm 
of the multitude. More significantly, democracy is not a final goal, to which 
human society should tend, but rather a concrete political reality. This lies inside 
and between the state apparatus, which is actualised in infinite ways, as are the 
many lives of the multitude. The discovery of these democratic practises is the 
challenge that Spinoza’s thought launches to post-modernity.     
It is for this reason that the position taken in the thesis has not meant to re-
draw a manifesto for the multitude of the present or to establish new principles for 
democracy. Rather, it aims at the understanding of these ignored concrete forms 
of political life, and to learn from their analyses a novel democratic grammar. 
Spinoza’s ontological politics of individuation provides contemporary thought 
with alternative theoretical instruments for re-conceptualising the connections 
between affectivity and politics, life and sovereignty and the a-temporality of the 
multitude.    
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